

SANSKRIT POETICS
A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY

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KRISHNA CHAITANYA



ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE

BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • NEW DELHI • MADRAS
LUCKNOW • BANGALORE • LONDON • NEW YORK

© 1965 K K Nair
Krishnapillai Krishnan Nair (1918)

PRINTED IN INDIA
BY K C PAL AT NABAJIBAN PRESS, 66 GRAY
STREET, CALCUTTA-6 AND PUBLISHED BY P S
JAYASINGHI ASIA PUBLISHING HOUSE, BOMBAY

TO
VICTOR MASSUH

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All references are given at the end of the book on
pp 417 ff

Preface

IN THE concluding lines of *A New History of Sanskrit Literature*¹ I had expressed the hope of following up some day with a volume on Sanskrit poetics.

The preface of the first work had a distinctly apologetic air about it. For there were illustrious predecessors who had contributed histories of Sanskrit literature and there was an understandable diffidence about gate-crashing into such an august company. I feel less diffident on the present occasion.

This, I must hasten to add, is not at all because I underrate the work already done. For we do have two works on the subject. One is S. K. De's *History of Sanskrit Poetics*,² first published as early as 1923. The other is the work by P. V. Kane, which first appeared in 1910 as the introduction to a critical edition of three chapters of Visvanatha's *Sahitya Darpana*, but emerged in the second edition of 1923 as a *History of Sanskrit Poetics*.³

The greatest contribution of these two pioneers was the clear charting of the contours of the material, the vast corpus of writing on poetics in the Sanskrit tradition, with patiently dug-up data on texts, authorship and dates. But the tradition, I am afraid, remained hermetic because the exposition was not made intelligible to readers who knew only English and not Sanskrit as well, though the works were in English and therefore implied an obligation in this respect on the part of the authors.

Kane, perhaps, is consistent though uncompromising. For he seems to be addressing only those who know Sanskrit in addition to English. He gives many quotations, in Devanagari, from the original texts and does not bother to give translations. Unfortunate as this is, there is much less self-deception here than in the case of De. For he uses so many original Sanskrit terms in his narration that the ultimate result is the same: the exposition is unintelligible except to the Sanskrit scholar. Here is a specimen: "The realisation of *Rasa*, therefore, is a process of logical inference, and the *nishpatti* of Bharata's *sūtra* is explained as *anumiti*, the *vibhavas* standing to *Rasa* in the relation of *anumapaka* or *gamaka* to *anumapya* or *gamyā*."⁴

Take a passage from another writer: "Abhinava remarks that in *Santa* one can see and enjoy the *Anubhavas*, viz., the slow disappearance of *Kama*, *Krodha* and other evils and that though the whole world of *Bhavas* become *Vyabhicharins* for the *Santa*, such *Bhavas* like *Nirveda* and *Jugupsa* for worldly objects, *Dhṛti*, *Matī*, *Utsaha* of the type of *Dayavira*, *Rati* for God in the form of *Bhakti* and *Sraddha* will stand out prominently as more

intimate accessories, Abhyantara Angas”⁵ I regard the person who wrote this as the greatest scholar in this field today and I must acknowledge here that it is his writings that initially stimulated me to explore the fascinating, but practically lost, world of Sanskrit poetics. But I doubt very much if any one who does not know Sanskrit fairly well can get the meaning of writing of such density and unfamiliar texture.

It does seem worth while, in the circumstances, to make a fresh attempt to communicate the ideas of the great Indian thinkers to the English-speaking world which is perhaps half the world today. I know the enormous unconscious pressure for the retention of the original technical terms, but as far as possible I have isolated them in brackets, so that the exposition will be self-sufficient in the medium used, which is English, not Sanskrit in English script. In view of the extended comparative and interpretative approach of this work it did not seem desirable to eliminate the original terms completely, for those who know Sanskrit would like to satisfy themselves that I am not twisting meanings. In the case of proper names I have taken some liberties. The orthodox scholar may want to disembowel me for writing “Ananda Vardhana” instead of “Anandavardhana” or even “Anandavardhanacharya”. But the layman will find my approach convenient and it is the layman, especially the foreigner, whom I want to help. The pundit is beyond all help.

Smooth communication was the first task. But other problems opened up immediately. Was the narration to be chronological? Here I preferred Kane’s approach which groups material thematically rather than chronologically. But the bulk of his work is taken up with texts, authors and dates, leaving only seventy pages for a sketchy summation of this type under a few titles like definition, purpose and divisions of poetry and equipment of the poet. I felt, therefore, that it would be better to plan the structure of the entire work according to the natural thematic divisions of the subject of poetics, somewhat on the model of Maritain’s *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*⁶. This also enabled me to avoid monotony in narration by moving from general theory to the viewpoint of Sanskrit poetics, or from the latter to the former.

Maritain’s work is a reinterpretation of Thomist philosophy in its bearings on poetics and aesthetics. The method therefore is elaborately critical and comparative. The need for a similar approach became immediately apparent in the present task too. Poetic experience has a universal identity. But the Indian intellectual who is well acquainted with his tradition seems to be a schizophrenic case today. For he applies the critical criteria of the Sanskrit tradition in evaluating Sanskrit poetry, but switches over to another set of criteria in appraising English poetry or even poetry in any modern Indian language. This cannot possibly be right, for the nature of poetic experience has to be fundamentally identical whatever the medium used. But the only way of clarifying this truth was to undertake a sustained critical and comparative treatment. The critical analysis, further, could not

be confined to the purely literary level, but had to penetrate deep into psychology, for clarifying the profound psychological foundations of Indian views regarding all aspects of poetic creativity and experience. The comparative method also helped in bringing out the affinities of Indian thought in this field with European tradition. One of the numerous exciting discoveries here was the astonishing parallelism between the Indian theory of poetic resonance (*Dhvani*) and the doctrine, elaborated mostly by Mallarmé, of the symbolist movement in French poetry. Another was the profound affinity between Indian thought and that of Valéry.

Far wider horizons now opened up. Here I got a valuable cue from a paper entitled *Aesthetic Values in the East and West*⁷ presented by Van Meter Ames, head of the department of philosophy of the University of Cincinnati, at the Third East-West Philosophers' conference held at the University of Hawai in June-July 1959. His intention was to explore and identify Western philosophical attitudes towards art, and to lay these besides the Eastern approach to aesthetics. He noted that philosophical interest in art in the West went back to Plato, but that many Western philosophers had not taken art seriously. When Western thinkers have found art important, they have often been formalists, seeing the value of art as divorced from other and (to them) lesser values of life. Or art has been considered to have spiritual values, not in its own form, but only as it serves a religion or an ideology. It is only since the rise of modern aesthetics in the eighteenth century, notably with Kant, that Western philosophy has begun to take art more seriously and to note that the spiritual value of art may inhere in clarifying and intensifying values which are already there in human life.

This cue encouraged me to attempt to look at the entire Indian tradition from a new and significant perspective. Later Sanskrit poetics gets bogged down in verbal analysis and purely rhetorical preoccupations. But deep below this cacophony on the brass, there was a continuous melody on the flute. The Vedic vision of life was basically a poetic vision. The Vedic reference to the soul as finally reposing in aesthetic relish (*Rasena triptah*) was a very condensed but profoundly intuitive summation of the aesthetic attitude, which did not drift away from life but embraced it and integrated it. That vision was obscured by the rise of thought-currents which distrusted the world and saw becoming as an illusion and only withdrawn static being as real. It was Vyasa who reestablished the validity of the aesthetic attitude. This was a many-splendoured achievement. Against the world-denying transcendentalists, he robustly affirmed the authenticity of being-in-the-world, to use a pregnant expression of Heidegger's. Yoga for him was "skill in action" (*Kārmasu-kausala*). It was also the skill in discriminating what was of significance to the spirit from what was not (*Atmanātma-viveka-kausala*). And, in the last analysis, this significance was an aesthetic significance, culminating in relish.

Much has been written on the magnificent way in which Vyasa managed

a synthesis of many philosophical systems and attitudes. But no one today seems to have noticed that he was engaged in establishing not only the validity, but also the integrative adequacy, of a poetic vision of life and man and man's action in the world. I noted that the great Abhinava Gupta had seized the significance of Vyasa's synthesis with a swift intuition. Indian thought had managed a magnificent programmatic ordering of human life by the definition of the four goals of man: economic security (*Artha*), the satisfaction of libidinal and aesthetic urges (*Kama*), moral living (*Dharma*) whose prescription controlled the pursuit of the first two goals; and ultimately the liberation of the human spirit (*Moksha*). Abhinava claimed that the consummation of all these ends was a poetic relish and, conversely, poetic experience could achieve the ultimate of all these goals through its own modality. The paramount humanistic significance of such an integration struck me even more forcefully when I found T. S. Eliot, in the *Four Quartets*, struggling with the problem of reconciling the demands of action in this world and of poetic experience. He misunderstands the latter as demanding withdrawal from life and he goes to the extent of claiming that his views are identical with "what Krishna meant"—in the *Gita* which is a part of Vyasa's great epic, *Maha Bharata*.

The enormous task of clarifying what Krishna, or more correctly his creator, Vyasa, really meant now became inescapable. Incidentally, in view of the facts that the *Asvalayana Gṛhya Sūtra* refers both to the *Bharata* and the *Maha Bharata* and that some people have questioned the historicity of Vyasa, I may state my views on the matter very briefly. These are my beliefs: there was an earlier shorter version of the epic; it was expanded and creatively rehandled some time between A.D. 150 and 300 by an extraordinarily brilliant person whose brilliance would continue to be undeniable even if he were to be called by some name other than Vyasa (which in any case is a functional appellation), this person added the *Gita*, no model for which existed in the earlier version, he was also the creator of the *Bhagavata*, both texts have been interfered with in the subsequent centuries, but the basic poetic intentions of Vyasa stand out with massive clarity. I may also add that if any one chooses to believe that the two works wrote themselves or that they were produced by a committee of one hundred people it would be perfectly all right with me. I am concerned with the world-view presented in the works and I do not mind if some people want to claim that, whenever I use the name Vyasa, nothing more is meant than a reference to the two works. But I would insist that I should be taken to mean nothing less either. Let us now return to the task, which confronted me, of clarifying what Krishna or Vyasa (or these two works) meant. From a volume on rhetoric the work was threatening to expand into a book on an integrative philosophy. I must confess that, because of the magnitude of the task as it now opened up, I was sorely tempted to handle Abhinava's identification of poetic experience and liberation (*Moksha*) as implying nothing more than a rhetorical way of saying that some poetry is "simply

divine" But this is what the teenager would say about the latest dance-tune and I could not risk that horrible analogy without reaping a bitter harvest of self-contempt. So the task had to be attempted, however inadequate my mental equipment for it.

Poetry cannot be authentic if the world and being-in-the-world are not authentic. Though Sankara expressed himself with extreme subtlety, the trend of his thought is unmistakable. Being-in-the-world has no authenticity for him. And the immense prestige of Sankara in the Indian tradition implied that, if this work was to develop further, an encounter with the formidable giant could not be avoided. But I happen to believe that Vyasa's genius is immeasurably greater than that of Sankara. Therefore, what was required was not a direct encounter with Sankara, which would have been a quixotic assault on a gigantic windmill, but the recovery of the true image of Vyasa. But even this was a tremendous task, for it meant clearing the heavy overburden of transcendentalist interpretation which Sankara had piled up on the works of Vyasa.

If orthodox tradition lost the true visage of Vyasa, radical temperaments today sometimes try to caricature it. An egregious instance is the argument by one writer that since the *Gita* has "attracted minds of bent entirely different from each other" no question remains of its basic validity if "the meaning be so flexible".⁸ According to him, the *Gita* is an interpolation by a "Brahmin bent upon getting his *niti* (moral philosophy) revisions into a popular lay of war".⁹ Then he wakes up to the fact that Brahminism and the Brahmin were most unlikely, to put it mildly, to derive any profit if people began to follow the teaching of the *Gita* and now argues that the *Anu-gita* of the fourteenth canto was the text that was added to extol Brahminism and the Brahmin.¹⁰ The writer may probably believe that this type of contradiction should be pervasive as a cult-feature in his own work, for he claims to be a Marxist. But the precise Karl would be appalled at this confusion of the Hegelian synthesis of contradictions with confused self-contradiction and would hastily pass on the disciple to Groucho who in his turn may have difficulties in accepting him since the Marxism of the Marx brothers demands witty and inspired, not just pointless, clowning. The distinction would be clear from a few more verdicts of the writer's. By a laboured argument based on estimates of the resources of agricultural production (here is some materialistic interpretation of history for you!) he comes to the conclusion that five million people could not have participated in the *Maha Bharata* war.¹¹ He just cannot forgive the poet for this exaggerated figure, which incidentally has no particular significance to the profound message of the epic. One can imagine the writer similarly dismissing Dante's *Divine Comedy* as balderdash with the simple and simple-minded argument that Hell and Purgatory and Paradise have no geographical location and cannot be looked up in an atlas. Archaeology is like Marxism, another field which he has refused to let alone and he undertakes wild forays into the myths of ancient Sumeria and Greece to seek deriva-

tions of the various features of the Krishna figure. The incredibly naive mistake committed here lies in the failure to distinguish between primitive racial myth and the myth as creatively rehandled by a poet. An analogous piece of obtuseness would be to equate T. S. Eliot's mentality with that of Celtic yokels centuries ago since the Fisher King appears both in the *Waste Land* and in Celtic folk lore. This is not the only piece of obtuseness. The writer sees a contradiction between Krishna's dismissal of *Yajna*, ritual as unimportant and his claim that *Yajna* is the generator of rain, the basis of life. He has completely failed to realise that in the latter instance the word stands for the dedicated act and opens up a vision of the world as dynamic process, a magnificent teleological orchestration. Priceless is the peroration that immediately follows. "This slippery opportunism characterizes the whole book. Naturally, it is not surprising to find so many *Gita* lovers imbued therewith. Once it is admitted that material reality is gross illusion, the rest follows quite simply, the world of 'double-think' is the only one that matters"¹². Here traditional misunderstanding finds its complement in modern obtuseness, for Sankarite Advaitins and modern critics of this type are equally muddled. Vyasa never denied the world's reality. No great poet does. But if poetry is completely opaque to a temperament, it can never penetrate to the philosophy of a poet.

On each of the many systems of Indian philosophy—Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Dvaita, Advaita—enough books have been published to fill a shelf. The way it has grown, this is probably the first work on Indian poetics which recognises it as something far more profound than a system of rhetoric, in fact as an integrative philosophy, to which status Vyasa and Abhinava raised it. And in the clarification of that philosophy the critical and comparative methods have been applied to the fullest. Many inadequacies may emerge in the narration as the reader turns the leaves of this work. But I hope he will treat them with some measure of indulgence in view of the magnitude of the pioneering task, the exhausting compulsion to fight back on both sides, against traditionalists as well as modernists, and the earnestness of the writer in this attempt to rescue the great tradition of Sanskrit poetics from the dusty immortality of the book-shelves of the antiquarian scholar and to integrate it with world currents in this stream of thought.

KRISHNA CHAITANYA

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SANSKRIT POETICS

CHAPTER ONE

The Poetic Situation

I THEORY OF THE POETIC CONTEXT

IN India, poetics evolved out of dramaturgy. This is due to a remarkable and historically very important accident—the early advent of an aesthete who felt that the dramatic form was the most perfect fruition of aesthetic creativity, the most generalised definition of the function of which is that it is the embodiment of feeling in sensuous tissue. Like Wagner, centuries later, Bharata conceived of the drama as a *gesamtkunstwerk*, or synthesis of all the arts, and in his great work, *Natya Sastra*,¹ he gave to India a monumental treatise full of detailed suggestions for integrating libretto, stage effects, music, dance and histrionics into an organism, the soul of which is the aesthetically experienced emotion (*Rasa*).

We are not in a position to give a precise date for Bharata. But his treatise cannot be later than the second century and it may go back to the second century B.C. If we come down to the level where poetics is distinguished from dramaturgy as a specialised discipline, the sixteenth chapter of the *Natya Sastra*, which deals with the libretto or the text, can be regarded as laying its foundation. It is also interesting to note that the treatise is earlier than the earliest existing *Kavya* or epic poem. However, it must also be remembered that Bharata does not have separate terms for poet and dramatist but uses the expression, *Kavi* (poet), for both. Bharata continuously stresses that the aesthetic creation is a presentation or representation (*Abhinaya*), the form of which is shaped by the aesthetic emotion which is intended to be communicated. Therefore, stage-craft, music, dance and the poetic text are all representations. The libretto, thus, is *Vachika-abhinaya*, representation through the medium of the word, language. Alike in drama and poem, the soul of the creation remains the aesthetic emotion, *Rasa*.

The word *Rasa* is a fine crystal, secreted by Indian thought over slow centuries, and, like the crystal which can shed a many-coloured radiance according to the angle of incident light, it also reveals many meanings according to the angle of approach. In the *Atharva Veda*,² the word is first used for the juice of plants. It also begins to be used in the sense of savour or taste. "May the strong satisfying *Rasa* (savour) of the honey-

mixed libation come to me !³ In the transcendental meditation of the Upanishads,⁴ there is a combination of both the senses and the word now stands for essence as well as the highest relish or experience which brings in its wake ineffable joy. *Rasa* here stands for the supreme reality of the universe, the self-luminous consciousness, which the Upanishadic seers strove to attain, and which, when realised, results in transcendent bliss. The Vedic reference to the soul as enjoying the flavour or essence (*Rasa*) of experience,⁵ seems to be the basis of the elaborations of the concept in Upanishadic meditation as well as aesthetic speculation. The Vedic mind was richly sensitive to the beauty of the external world, to the loveliness of dawn and dusk, of forest and flowing river. If the lyric was spontaneous the beauty of this new creation from within is also immediately noticed and savoured. Upanishadic thought extends this savouring of the world to the savouring of its transcendental origin. Aesthetic theory utilises both the meanings. The aesthetic creation is savoured like a beautiful object in nature is savoured. At the same time, although the stimulus belongs to the mundane world, the experience is felt to be almost transcendental, like the sage's intuitive experience of the self-luminous consciousness which is the ground of the universe. Art thus mediates between the experience of the world and the experience of the transcendent. We shall take up later the development of the ideas about this specific, transcendental, significance of aesthetic activity.

How does the creative poet organise the aesthetic presentation which enables the aesthetic emotion to be experienced and relished? It is in seeking the answer to this question from Bharata that we realise the astonishing originality of his mind. For what we find is nothing less than a complete theory—be it ever so condensed—of aesthetic perception and emotive reaction which matches, in the profundity of its psychological insight, the definition and appraisal of these processes by the understanding of our own day based on extended research. But we have to proceed very cautiously if we are to make clear beyond the shadow of doubt that we are not reading too much into Bharata in our enthusiasm.

Let us first glance at the famous formula in the *Natya Sashtra*—the pillar on which the whole of subsequent aesthetic theory has been erected—which deals with the modality of the arousal of poetic emotion by the organisation of the poetic context. At the risk of being initially unintelligible, but for the sake of utmost caution in analysis, we shall retain the Sanskrit terms in a first translation, though it may read woefully like a transliteration. "When the *Vibhavas*, *Anubhavas* and the *Vyabhichari Bhavas* unite, *Rasa* emerges"⁶ But since this formula is given after referring to the very important concept of the *Sthavi Bhava*, a fuller rendering would be this: "When the *Vibhavas*, *Anubhavas* and the *Vyabhichari Bhavas* combine to awaken the *Sthavi Bhava*, the awakened *Sthavi Bhava* finally develops into *Rasa*." As this is scarcely helpful, we can attempt a free translation, purely as a provisional formulation, a foothold for

further analysis, not to be accepted if the further argument does not substantiate it "When the prime stimuli, their congruent behavioural features and the transient but ancillary emotional reactions they evoke, combine to activate the sentiment, the sentiment develops into aesthetic emotion" Again, postponing the very necessary detailed discussion to a little later, for a preliminary understanding we can take the help of Bharata's own clarification of the terms The *Sthayi Bhava* is sentiment as Shand⁷ uses the expression It is a potential, complex reactivity It is potential because it exists prior to the aesthetic situation, as an abiding reality of our psychological organisation This is the etymological meaning of *Sthayi* (continuing, abiding) *Bhava* (existent, from *Bhu*, to exist) It is complex because, even if its basis is the instinct or drive, it is the result of further evolutionary development over centuries of humanised, socialised living If we take the erotic sentiment as the *Sthayi Bhava* in an example, the *Vibhavas* are the prime stimuli which activate it woman and the spring season The *Anubhavas* are woman's suggestive or responsive glances and gestures. The *Vyabhichari Bhavas* are the transient feelings, joy in proximity, melancholy in separation, hopes or misgivings about winning, all of which are genetically related to the basic emotive orientation Activated and developed in this manner in an aesthetic presentation, the latent sentiment emerges as emotion which can be consciously savoured

It is clear that the aesthetic situation is a recreation of the pattern of emotive experience in life and a theory about the psychology of emotional experience, valid both in life and art, is implicit Our analysis now should proceed in two stages We should first have a clearer conception of the psychological theory as Indian aesthetics outlines it We should then critically evaluate it in the light of our own understanding of the psychology of emotive reactions and experience

First of all, when we seek the precise meaning of the term *Sthayi Bhava*, we find a certain nebulous quality which is reflected in the great variety of terms used by writers of our own day in translating the Sanskrit expression Thus, De⁸ translates it variously as the principal or permanent mood, more or less permanent mental state, permanent mood or sentiment, dominant emotion, dominant feeling, etc Sastri⁹ uses the expressions, potential condition of mind, a permanent mental condition, etc Naidu says "The *Sthayi Bhavas* are the propensities of Western psychology"¹⁰ Watave¹¹ has earned the gratitude of everyone interested in Sanskrit poetics by patiently compiling all the relevant passages scattered throughout the various texts Vadekar¹² summarises the broad upshot of the passages thus "The *Sthayi Bhavas* are the innate, predominant, prevailing, uneclipsable, assimilative, enduring and permeating, enjoyable, conative-dispositional factors in human nature In brief, the *Sthayi Bhavas* are the prevailing, innate, conative-dispositional factors in human nature" Watave's own summing up is this "The *Sthayi Bhava* is the 'sentiment'

Our Sanskrit *Sthayi Bhava* is neither an instinct nor an emotion, nor a mood, although it has got an instinctive base and is a primary emotion in character."¹³

If absolute precision is not fully gained even now, we feel nevertheless justified in making two remarks : that the verbalisations, in spite of their inadequacies, are sufficient to point to certain realities of psychological processes, and that today's attack on the problem cannot be said to have fared very much better in gaining absolute precision. Let us clarify the latter remark first, though it makes unavoidable a plunge into rather technical analysis.

Struggling to define and classify the stable affective states of the human personality which genetically explain the emotional reactivities in specific situations, Descartes¹⁴ distinguished six basic states which he called the passions. These are admiration, love, hate, desire, joy and sorrow. All other reactivities were derivatives of these. Bain,¹⁵ likewise, outlined eleven categories, which, however, were called emotions. Mercier¹⁶ outlined six groups of sentiments. Ribot¹⁷ undertook a more penetrating analysis, which sought to establish a genetic relation between primitive instincts and simple, primary emotions and to trace the conscious and unconscious process by which composite and derived emotions emerged. Thus, according to him, the instinct of self-preservation leads to fear in its defensive aspect and anger in its offensive orientation. The surplus of affective energy seeks outlet in adventure, play and aesthetic creativity.

In recent years, theory has coalesced around broadly three concepts, the drive, the Freudian instinct and instinct as understood by McDougall. Ladd and Woodworth¹⁸ formulated the concept of the drive as early as 1911. The drive is the tendency to action which is aroused by a need, being its complementary and its expression.¹⁹ Basic drives are generated by the primary needs of the organism like hunger, self-preservation, the urge to reproduce and perpetuate the species. This suggests a convenient distinction between deficit needs like hunger, which lead to explorative behaviour, and protective needs, which generally make the organism withdraw from unfavourable situations. Holt²⁰ has given the name "adient" and "abient" respectively to these two classes of drives. The concept of the drive need not be a rigid one, precluding evolutionary growth. Skard,²¹ Elliott²² and Wada²³ have shown through their experimental studies that modifiability and adaptability, on which learning ability depends, are also considerably increased, under the influence of strong drives. The operative action of a drive does not become complete till it links up with an external stimulus, which, in fact, releases the drive.²⁴ Lashley²⁵ and Konrad Lorenz²⁶ undertook a closer study of the internal processes in the operation of the drive. The essential elements of Lorenz's formulation include a flexible appetitive behaviour, an innate releasing mechanism and a consummatory act. The appetitive behaviour is the variable introductory phase of a behaviour pattern or sequence. The concept of the innate

releasing mechanism assumes there to be within the central nervous system a series of mechanisms which effectively inhibit all discharge of activity unless the organism encounters the right environmental situation or stimulus. The stable appetitive tendency is the *Sthayi Bhava* and the stimulus which triggers the innate releasing mechanism is the *Vibhava*. But we have to keep in mind one caution. The schematisation that the unsatisfied drive leads to restlessness and explorative behaviour and the consummation leads to relaxation and pleasure may be broadly acceptable, but if we interpret the drive as basically a biodynamic disequilibrium, all action would, in terms of origin, be the result of literal dis-ease²⁷. But only the activity of animals and of man at the lowest cultural level can thus be exhaustively described as motivated by the desire to gain and maintain equilibrium at all costs. An experience of profound upheaval or disequilibrium is often most essential and beneficial in order to bring about reorganisation and integration at a higher level²⁸. Man may thus seek states of tension. As Woodworth²⁹ pointed out, habits may become drives and the quality of the habit will depend upon the culture of the individual and the society in which he lives. Therefore, when we equate the *Sthayi Bhava* with the stable appetitive tendency, we should not confuse the latter with the crude primitive equipment, but its profound transformation by the socio-cultural process.

If broad affinities can be established between the concept of the *Sthayi Bhava* in Sanskrit poetics and the theory of drives, no similar rapprochement is possible with the theory of instincts as developed by Freud. Like Hobbes, Freud builds up a heavy super-structure of theory on a tenuous abstraction: the "natural" or "instinct-motivated" man, in complete isolation from society³⁰. In the context of social living, according to his view, the instincts do not grow in varied directions but remain as a basic layer, always distinct from the strata of behaviour brought into being by social and cultural life. To Freud, socialised behaviour is a thin veneer which can peel off any moment to reveal the savage within. If he made a great contribution by revealing the extensive operation of the rationalising tendency, he annulled it by reducing all rationality as rationalising, since behaviour, according to him, is determined far below the level of the deliberating consciousness by the instinctual urges. This determinism is absolute. "Any one," he wrote, "thus breaking away from the determinism of natural phenomena, at any single point, has thrown over the whole scientific outlook on the world"³¹. You have an illusion of psychic freedom within you which you do not want to give up. I regret to say that on this point I find myself in sharpest opposition to your views.³² His associate Jekels³³ puts it thus: "This being, prostrate by the burden of heredity and constitution, driven either by his urges or by tormenting anxiety, nailed to his ego by his narcissism, seems unlikely to promise much changeability, and there is little chance for him to become the demiurge of an entirely new world." Character traits, claims Fenichel,³⁴

are not at all adaptations made by the ego, but things that happen to the ego, against its will, by instinctual forces which return from the repressed

Since our primary purpose here is to clarify the basic concept in Sanskrit poetics by comparison with current theories, a detailed critique of Freudian assumptions cannot be offered here. We can only indicate here that if there is a wide gulf between the psychological assumptions of Sanskrit poetics and psychoanalysis, the gulf is equally wide between responsible concepts of living, post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory and the outlook of great literature respectively and the Freudian assumptions. Juridical thought has indicated the utter anarchy that would result if Freud's doctrines are accepted. The Report of the Special Committee of the American Bar Association on the Rights of the Mentally Ill³⁵ neatly sums up the social situation. "So far as your Committee can discover, the doctrines of psychoanalysis tend towards determinism, free will does not exist, but human conduct is or may be determined in any given case by long past events in the life of the individual, the very memory of which has long passed from his mind and the significance of which he may not have recognised even at the time of their occurrence. Unless there is a reversal in the trend of the development and exploitation of psychoanalysis as a means of diagnosis and treatment, the courts will be called on sooner or later to determine whether it is an established science or not." As for post-Freudian developments in psychoanalysis itself, they have kept in mind the caution of Ernest Jones³⁶ who once said that we would be forsaking science for theology if we accepted the first conclusions of psychoanalysis as sacrosanct and eternal. Revisionism³⁷ has been gaining increasing momentum and has been radical, as can be seen from the works of Erich Fromm,³⁸ Karen Horney³⁹ and Sullivan⁴⁰. As for the outlook of literature, no work of humanistic significance in the entire world heritage has surrendered faith in man's responsibility. We do see a paradox in existentialist literature. Sartre identifies himself with astonishing completeness with Freud's negation of psychic freedom. "Conscious deliberation," he writes, "is always faked. When I deliberate, the die is already cast."

The decision has been taken by the time the will intervenes, and the latter's function is simply to announce it"⁴¹. I have no comment to make on this statement except to point out that it has come from a thinker and creative writer who has built up a sombre, ultra-romantic, Promethean theory of freedom depicting man with his immense burden of responsibility, outlined against the flare of the twilight of the gods. As for Sanskrit poetics, its steady movement towards the detachment and liberation which come from aesthetic experience, to be studied in detail later, precludes any visualisation of instincts as fetters and sees them as the seeds which can grow into the fullest psychological and spiritual autonomy.

More sober than the Freudian formulation, although still needing cautious handling is McDougall's definition of instinct as an "inherited or

innate psychological disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and pay attention, to objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such an action" ⁴² Under the sharp attack of writers like Dunlop,⁴³ Faris,⁴⁴ Allport,⁴⁵ Kuo⁴⁶ and Bernard,⁴⁷ the instinct theory could not survive in its old formulation and McDougall later adopted the term, "propensity" ⁴⁸ But serious difficulties were created when McDougall wrote: "We may say, then, directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity. By the conative or impulse force of some instinct (or of some habit derived from some instinct) every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained. And all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means" ⁴⁹

We seem to have regressed to the fallacy of reductionism which vitiates not only Freudian thought but the attempts by Hull⁵⁰ to derive entire learning from the conditioned response, of Holt⁵¹ and Warden⁵² to rely solely on the concept of drives, of Murray⁵³ to lean heavily on viscerogenic needs, of Carr⁵⁴ to theorise extensively on a vaguely defined concept of motivating conditions, of Hobbes⁵⁵ and Bentham⁵⁶ to make hedonism the fundamental and total principle of motivation. Lloyd Morgan⁵⁷ was essentially right when he warned us that "in no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale." But this is a principle of caution in analysis not a dogma of reductionism. We have to balance it with Baudouin's reference to the misunderstanding by which psychoanalysis seeks an explanation of the superior by the inferior and ends up as a reduction of man to the animalistic element in his nature ⁵⁸ This reductionist fallacy is evident in all the approaches mentioned above. They peg man down to the level of the animal and deny the tremendous growth of the instinctual heritage throughout the long socio-cultural evolution. Because of their serious inadequacy, psychologists have sought to attempt more broad-based theories which can take in wider horizons of growth. Woodworth⁵⁹ and Klineberg⁶⁰ referred to dependable motives, Thomas⁶¹ postulated wishes, and Dewey⁶² introduced the concept of dynamic habit.

Among these concepts which give due recognition to evolutionary reality, the most significant seems to be that of sentiment. French psychologists like Ribot and Binet used it as a general term for the entire field of affective life. The evolution of the concept in the writings of Shand, from

his articles in the *Mind* of 1896⁶³ and 1907⁶⁴ to his mature work⁶⁵ of 1914, has made a great contribution by bringing out the distinction between sentiments and emotions. Shand pointed out that the sentiment, as a product of social experience, is an organization of emotions around the idea of an object. McDougall adopted the concept, adding his own contribution. Here he is able to exorcise the reductionism that clings to his earlier thought, for he recognises the reality of growth and the significance of that growth. These are his views, in a very brief summary. The organisation of the sentiment in the developing mind is determined by the course of experience. That is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution. The growth of the sentiment is of the utmost importance for the character and conduct of individuals and of societies. It is the organisation of the affective and conative life. It is only through the systematic organisation of the emotional dispositions in sentiments that the volitional control of the immediate promptings of the emotions is rendered possible. Again, our judgments of value and of merit are rooted in our sentiments. And our moral principles have the same source, for they are formed by our judgments of moral value. The sentiments may be classified according to the nature of their objects. They then fall into three main classes: the concrete particular, the concrete general, and the abstract sentiments—for example, the sentiment of love for a child, of love for children in general, of love for justice or virtue.⁶⁶

Here we have a formulation which perfectly harmonises with that of Sanskrit poetics. The *Sthayī Bhava* is not activated emotion, but the abiding sentiment which can develop into emotion when confronted by appropriate stimuli. Gopinatha⁶⁷ (seventeenth century) points out that, although the erotic emotion (*Rati*) may be transient as a palpable state of the sensibility, it ever endures as a latent reactivity and manifests itself in the contexts which spark the relishable emotion. The *Sthayī* (*Sthayī Bhava*) is not pure instinctual legacy, but the result of its further development by the cultural process. For the Sanskrit theoreticians speak both of inborn tendency or disposition (*Naisargika Vasana*) and also of acquisitions through experience and study (*Samskara*). The crude emotion associated with primary instincts is discounted in art, for it is stressed that the delectability of an emotion depends on the fineness and complexity that it attains in the course of evolution. For instance, in the analysis of the comic spirit, Bharata distinguishes between “laughing with” and “laughing at”. He also outlines a broad three-fold classification of laughter according as men are refined, moderately refined or unrefined.⁶⁸

The *Sthayī* is not *Rasa*, sentiment is not emotion, but the possibility and promise of it. Both Abhinava Gupta,⁶⁹ the great philosopher and aesthetician of the tenth century and Bhoja, the king-turned-aesthetician of the eleventh century, make it very clear that the *Rasa* is different from the *Sthayī*. The *Sthayī* is unmanifested *Rasa*. The

aesthetic attitude is that in which the emotion, instead of being a nascent dynamism generated for immediate motor expression in a practical encounter, is contemplated, relished, savoured. The expressions used (*Rasana*, *Charvana*, *Asvadana*) are boldly borrowed from the physiology of taste, especially the tasting of a liqueur of fine vintage. Now, Sanskrit aesthetics posits right from the beginning that a descriptive verbalisation cannot communicate the flavour of feeling. "Between the sweetness of the sugarcane juice, that of milk and that of palm sugar, etc. there is great difference, and yet that difference it is quite impossible even for Sarasvatī (the goddess of learning) to explain," wrote Dandin⁷⁰ of the eighth century. The solution of the aesthetic task is brilliant in its psychological insight. Only sympathetic induction can communicate emotion. Hema Chandra,⁷¹ the twelfth century polymath, uses the significant comparison of the salivation produced automatically in one man who witnesses another relishing a fruit with gusto. The stimulus situation of ordinary life, therefore, has to be transposed to art. Bharata explains that just as a beverage is compounded by various spices and herbs, so the sentiment is activated by the significant organisation of the stimulus situation, whose focal stimuli, supporting environmental pattern and depiction of ancillary emotions and moods, compound the emotional flavour. The metaphor of the beverage is particularly apposite because of its plural significations. If it is compounded by various ingredients, its final flavour is unitary. Likewise, says Abhinava,⁷² the *Sthayī* is harmoniously mixed with the features of the situation and the final *Rasa* is unique in its flavour, just as the beverage is distinct in taste from each of its ingredients in isolation. Govinda⁷³ of the fifteenth century says the same thing when he asserts that the *Sthayī Bhava* is not *Rasa* but has to be brought to the relishable condition (*charvanopayogi*) by organising a specific concretisation (*vyakti visishṭa*) with the help of the stimulus and other elements (*Vibhavadī melaka*).

Emotion cannot be communicated by information. The witness of the aesthetic presentation should experience a Longinian transport. This can only be done if the spectator confronts a situation identical to those in real life which excite his emotion, but of course more idealised, far more sensitively organised. Here begins the careful work of transposing to art the stimulus-situation which is valid in real life.

The *Vibhava* is the prime stimulus which activates the sentiment. More accurately, it is the equivalent, in the creatively devised aesthetic situation, of the stimulus in real life. For Indian poetics never forgets to lay stress on the continuous transitive action of the poet, the shaping of the material by him for the ultimate end which is enabling the witness to experience the inducted emotion. *Bhava* is sentiment and the etymological variation *Vibhava*, is deliberate, because the stimulus arouses emotion in a manner which in its ultimate import is quite different from that in which emotion is aroused in real life. Abhinava Gupta,⁷⁴ who makes this point, clarifies it by pointing out that the causal relation which holds valid in real life is

significantly altered in the transposition to art. The erotic sentiment may be triggered into nascent erotic feeling by the sight of a pretty girl in real life. But, in the dramatic situation which is created by the poet, everything becomes a medium rather than cause. The spectator experiences the erotic emotion by sympathetic induction from the actor, who is therefore a medium for the spectator. The *Vibhava*, the heroine, likewise, is the medium, not the cause, through which the emotion arises in the actor himself. The *Vibhava* has been further defined as the focus of the cognition which is preliminary to emotional reaction and which can make the three kinds of representation, through words, significant bodily behaviour and emotional display, capable of being sensed. Thus, if love is the aesthetic emotion which is intended to be ultimately communicated, the introduction of a woman presents a stimulus, easily cognised as a stimulus by the spectator, who settles down to react to the further shaping by which the stimulus leads to the gradual transformation of the sentiment into nascent emotion. The dramatist uses the *Vibhava* as a centre of condensation for the sentiment whereby it loses its opacity and hidden nature and becomes visible and relishable.

Emotion has an objective reference. It arises in the presence of an external stimulus. As everything exists in some place at a certain time, spatial and temporal factors form, with the primary stimulus, an integral pattern. Thus Sanskrit poetics distinguishes two types of *Vibhavas*. The basic stimulus (*Alambana Vibhava*) is the object which is primarily responsible for the arousal of emotion, on which emotion depends for its very being and which is its mainstay. This is the stimulus of Konard Lorenz's schematisation. The enhancing stimulus (*Uddipana Vibhava*) is the environment, the entire surrounding, which enhances the emotive effect of the focal point or the object which primarily stimulates emotion. This is the right environmental situation of Lorenz which triggers the innate releasing mechanism till then blocked. The instances which the Sanskrit texts give are, in the case of the erotic sentiment, woman as the basic stimulus and a garden or the spring season as the enhancing stimulus.

If *Vibhava* is the basic stimulus, the centre of condensation, *Anubhava* is its behaviour which progressively achieves this condensation. In the erotic sentiment, the glance is the example most frequently cited by the texts. Quantitatively also, poetic descriptions of lovers' glances occur so frequently in Sanskrit that they often become routine tricks of rhetoric. But the original insight into the physiology and psychology of emotional experience should not be forgotten. Here, what Simmel⁷⁵ has written about the sociology of the senses, especially of visual interaction, is relevant enough to be briefly cited. It is through the medium of the senses that we perceive our fellowmen. Sense impressions may induce in us affective responses of pleasure or pain, of excitement or calm, of tension or relaxation, produced by the features of a person, or by the tone of his voice. Of the special sense-organs, the eye has a uniquely sociological function. The

union and interaction of individuals are based upon mutual glances. This is perhaps the most direct and purest reciprocity which exists anywhere. The mutual glance between persons, as distinguished from the simple sight or observation of the other, signifies a wholly new and unique union between them. The significant fact here is that the glance by which one seeks to perceive the other is itself expressive. By the glance by which one seeks to perceive the other, one discloses oneself. By the same act in which the observer seeks to know the observed, he surrenders himself to be understood by the observer. The eye cannot take unless at the same time it gives. The eye of a person discloses his own soul when he seeks to uncover that of another. These very interesting observations of Simmel were cited to indicate that the concept of the *Anubhava*, especially of visual interaction, was informed by insight on the part of the founders of the theory. In Katha Kali, the dance drama of Kerala, which, like any other traditional dramatic or dance form in India, goes back to Bharata for its original inspiration, the training of the eye and its movements is one of the most difficult and thorough elements of the discipline and its luminosity and colour are enhanced by artificial means to make it the most conspicuous feature of the visage.

The *Anubhavas* are the results of the excitation produced in the *Vibhava*, say the heroine, as the dramatic situation develops. The perception of the excitation transfers it to the spectator by sympathetic induction, in a parallel movement. Here Bharata also mentions a new category, the *Satvika Bhavas*. These are involuntary expressions and the brilliant analysis of the expression of emotions by Charles Darwin⁷⁶ will enable us to understand the significance of the concept. He points out that actions of all kinds, if regularly accompanying any state of the mind, are at once recognised as expressive. Though every true or inherited movement of expression seems to have had some natural or independent origin, when once acquired, some of these movements may be voluntarily and consciously employed as a means of communication. Thus the glance may be an unconscious revelation of longing or a deliberate invitation. (I remember reading this smart performance by a publicity man. "In Elizabeth Taylor's gaze there lurks an intimate caress".) The *Anubhavas* are, properly, this class of voluntary expressions. In terms of the physiology of the processes, these are directed mostly by the rolandic motor region of the nervous system. But, in excitement, there are unconscious changes, brought about by hormonal or endocrinal action, glandular discharges, created by the action of the autonomic nervous system. As Darwin has pointed out, we can cause laughing by tickling the skin, but we cannot cause a blush by any physical means, that is, by any external action on the body. It is the mind which must be affected, when it emerges as a smooth, involuntary expression. Such expressions constitute the *Satvika Bhavas* and Bharata includes in them blushing, change of colour, horripilation, the breaking out of perspiration.

Like Darwin, Bharata⁷⁷ also emphasises that these tokens of inward feeling cannot be induced by the action of another mind on oneself (*na sakyate'nya manasa kartum*) They emerge only when one's own mind is stirred How can sorrow, he asks, which must be manifested by weeping, or joy which must be expressed by laughter, be delineated except by these spontaneous, involuntary tokens? And how can these spontaneous expressions arise, unless the mind is moved? They arise directly from the movement of the mind or sensibility (*manah-prabhavam*). Bhoja⁷³ stresses that all forms of emotional expression (*Bhava*) are, in a generalised sense, *Satvika* if you take *Satva* to mean mind, but he also distinguishes the involuntary expressions we are discussing as *Bahya Vyabhichari* *Bahya* means external and the *Vyabhichari* is the derived emotion that is the reflection of the enduring *Sthayin* as modified in specific contexts Bhoja is thus emphasising the unity of the psychophysical organism and reading the involuntary expression of the body as the direct, spontaneous expression of inward feeling Bhanu Datta⁷⁹ (fifteenth century) proceeds further along the same lines He defines emotional states and expressions (*Bhavas*) in the poetic or dramatic presentation as modifications of feeling-reactivity appropriate to the emotion which is sought to be raised to the relishable state (*Rasanukula Vikara*) He then classifies the *Bhavas* as internal (*Abhyantara*) and external (*Bahya*) The latent reactivity (*Sthayin*) as well as the derived emotions (*Vyabhicharins*) belong to the first group while the involuntary expressions under discussion belong to the latter group He agrees that they are physical manifestations (*Sairastu satvikabhavadi*) But he wants to distinguish voluntary emotive expression (*Cheshta*) from inward feeling spontaneously emerging in expressive changes of the body (*Vikara*) He makes his meaning very clear by arguing that a *Cheshta* like an erotically provocative glance (*akshi maidana*) is a willed gesture, while a *Vikara* like a tear cannot be made to appear at will

In Patanjali we read that by his time—second century B C—drama had emerged and there were men who specialised in feminine roles But Bharata insisted that feminine roles should be played by women and not by men and the reason he gives is very interesting No training can enable a man to acquire that psychic frame which is natural to woman in certain situations⁸⁰ Here he has glimpsed the specificity of the endocrinal organisation which sex differentiation implies, for the involuntary *Satvika Bhavas* of woman cannot be expressed by man According to Abhinava in his commentary on Bharata, a person is qualified to become an actor in proportion to his capacity, not so much for reproducing the physical conditions of an emotion in an emotive situation, as for orienting his sensitiveness in such a manner as to have the necessary mental states, from which the physical expressions would automatically follow⁸¹

The last of these important concepts is that of the *Vyabhichari* (or *Sanchari*) *Bhavas* They stand for transient, but ancillary emotions Thus,

in love, joy in union and anxiety in separation are ancillary emotions. They are determined in their feeling-tone by the basic emotion and in turn reinforce it. The action of the drama is not over in one situation or episode. It is extended into a plot with its changes, reversals, crises. It is necessary that the basic emotion should persist throughout all the stages and it is equally necessary that it should modulate responsively to each change in the situation. This modulation takes colour from the features of the changed situation but what primarily determines it is the persisting basic emotion. The modulations are the refractions of the basic emotion when the perspective and the light and shade change. The transient shades arise with their specific feeling-tones just because the basic emotion is there, and it is what it is. It is worth while recalling here Grierson's characterisation of Donne's poetry as the "imaginative apprehension of emotional identity in diverse experiences, which is the poet's counterpart to the scientific discovery of a common law controlling the most divergent phenomena"⁸² The dramatist, likewise, preserves the emotional identity in the diverse experiences of the character and the law here is the genetic relation between the basic emotion and the transient feelings. McDougall has stated that the sentiment, when once formed, is the 'enduring basis of a considerable range of emotions and desires which he calls derived emotions'⁸³ These are the *Vyabhichari Bhavas*. McDougall clarifies the distinction between the primary and derived emotions and classifies the latter into two groups: the prospective emotions of desire such as hope, anxiety, despondency, and the retrospective emotions of desire such as sorrow, regret, remorse.

II COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

It would be worthwhile now to attempt a comparative evaluation of the fundamental theory of Sanskrit poetics which has been outlined above. For it will show that there is astonishing congruence between Indian thought and world thought, although it may not be possible to find a parallel elsewhere for the complete, integrated statement of the whole theory as a precise and detailed formulation that we find in the Sanskrit tradition.

John Dewey is probably the thinker who has stressed most the continuity of the aesthetic with other experiences. "In order to understand the meaning of artistic products, we have to forget them for a time, to turn aside from them and have recourse to the ordinary forces and conditions of experience that we do not usually regard as aesthetic"⁸⁴ For Dewey, the relevant phenomena are basically biological. "In life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges. To grasp the sources of aesthetic experience it is, therefore, necessary to have recourse to animal life below the human scale"⁸⁵ The mention of animal life below the human scale is unfortunate, because it suggests reductionism. But in view of the great

stress laid on evolution by Dewey in all his writings, we have no difficulty in interpreting the expression to mean that the modality of experience is basically the same in animals and man, the essential processes being biological. The work of art is treated, finally, in terms of experience. "The real work of art is the building up of an integral experience out of the integration of organic and environmental conditions and energies"⁸⁶ The work of art is not to be identified, except potentially, with a physical object. "It has been repeatedly intimated that there is a difference between the art product (statue, painting, or whatever) and the work of art. The first is physical and potential, the latter is active and experienced."⁸⁷ Dewey's views are identical with those of Sanskrit poetics. Both see an identity in the modality of experience, in life as well as art, both see aesthetic experience as an integration of organic energies and the environmental stimuli that activate them. As we shall see later, Sanskrit poetics also stresses that art is activity (*Vyapara*) and not the physical art object.

Dinkwater is referring to the *Sthayin* of Sanskrit poetics when he writes "We are brought back to the trite assertion that poetry is primarily and immutably concerned with the emotions that do not change in a changing world. But truth, however trite, needs ever new witnesses."⁸⁸ He also relates aesthetic experience to experience in life. "And all the time this marvel of experience is related, more or less patently as the case may be, to the common experience of life. The poet is the most uncompromising of realists, but his poem is reality transfigured."⁸⁹ Because poetry deals with emotions that do not change in a changing world, Sanskrit poets and dramatists have had no diffidence in handling the same story or theme, mostly drawn from the great epics, *Ramayana* and *Maha Bharata*, over and over again. The attention of the creative spirit is transferred from the search for new stories and plots to new and subtly varying treatments for arousing emotion. This has had the advantage of anchoring the bulk of poetry to what Dobrée⁹⁰ calls "public themes". It is worth while mentioning here that Dobrée has put forward the view that the poetry that is most widely loved and remembered is so, precisely because it concerns itself with these great shared emotions and that the decline in the power of universal communication of today's poetry is due to the fault of poets who have abandoned public themes.

Now that we have seen the congruence in the approaches of both Sanskrit poetics and Western thought in the identification of aesthetic and life experience, we can proceed to the detailed morphology of the experience. Throughout his many works, I. A. Richards⁹¹ has endeavoured to establish the identity of the neural and psychological processes in both ordinary experience and aesthetic experience. Take these varied instances: Pavlov's dog hearing a bell from a distant part of the mansion and thereupon rushing incontinently to the drawing room, a man expecting a flame when he hears the scratch of a match, a scientist in a laboratory observing through an instrument and writing down a formula, a scholar expounding

a passage in Plato. The only principles we need to interpret any of these examples of the universal "sign situation" are, first, the fact that any response of an organism to a stimulus from its environment involves at once, though in varying proportions on different occasions, an appropriation of the stimulus and a reaction to it and, secondly, the fact that the immediate experience interacts with remembered experiences of like character in the past to yield the final flavour of the experience⁹². This analysis is identical with that of Sanskrit poetics which sees the individual, alike in life and art, reacting to the *Vibhava* or stimulus, the total reaction being compounded by the basic reactivity (*Naisargika Vasana*) and the accrual to the immediate experience of the funded similar experience of the past, the acquisitions through experience and study mentioned by the Sanskrit writers.

The "sign-situation" mentioned by Richards can lead us now to the issue of fundamental importance—how the creative artist moulds his work as a sign-situation which can transfer the experience to another. Here Mannheim's analysis⁹³ of sign and form and the various strata of meaning proves very helpful. Every cultural product in its entirety will display three distinct strata of meaning—its objective meaning, its expressive meaning, its documentary or evidential meaning. The objective meaning of a Greek statue is that it is a physical object sculptured out of marble to represent a hero or a god. Its documentary meaning refers to the cultural and mythological background. In both these levels, the artistic object functions strictly as a sign. But, when we come to the expressive meaning, we begin to feel the need for distinguishing between meaning realised by sign and by form respectively. In one sense form is also a sign, but of such a higher order of functioning that it is less dangerous to use a different word altogether. Expressive meaning is indeed embodied in the stratum of objective meaning, but as a form within a form. In theoretical discourse the word is merely a sign of the expressive content, it only names it, the verbal designation merely referring to it without being able to express it adequately. Sanskrit poetics has always resisted the attempts by grammarians to annex poetic evocation as a form of the denotative power (*abhidha*) of words. Expressive meaning has to do with a cross-section of the individual's experiential stream, with the embodying of a psychic process which took place at a certain time. True expression is characterised by the fact that some psychic content is captured within a sensuously formed medium, endowing it with a second dimension of meaning. And this capturing of the psychic content is possible, concludes Mannheim, only if the sensuous medium is not treated as something secondary and exchangeable, but is given its individual form valuable on its own right. As Whitehead⁹⁴ has pointed out, each occasion of experience has its own individual pattern. And therefore, its expression, in an aesthetic representation, has to acquire its specific form. Medium and expressive meaning cannot be separated here because the medium is moulded as the form of expression.

Thus form, as Gurrey⁹⁵ has put it so well, is the shape which the poet's experience takes under the stress of words as well as the shape which the words take when subjected by the poet to a significant design. As Ker⁹⁶ has luminously analysed the situation, poetry in one sense is all form, not properly the artistic treatment of the subject, but the subject so translated into form that the mind does not need anything else. Contemplation of the form then becomes also contemplation of what is expressed, and is in fact the process of bringing about a combination of idea and expression, is, in fact, the process of becoming aware of the experience which is evoked by the words and at the same time of becoming aware that the words express that experience. Therefore, in reading poetry one is not only receiving new impressions, but one is also receiving at the same time words to express those experiences. And the two complex acts of impassioned, imaginative cognition and of full, precise expression of that activity are one—the words both evoke experiences in us and express them for us. The true moment of appreciation, concludes Ker, is that in which we recognise the "form" of the imaginative creation.

What is made clear in all this is that the language of discourse is a sign while the language of poetry is the spirit incarnated as sound and image, the *Rasa* taking form as the body of sound and meaning (*Sabdārtha Sāra*). The aim of the poet, says Herbert Read,⁹⁷ "should be to get away from the tyranny of medieval logic—to return to the original processes of language formation. The way back lies through the concrete image, the thing . . ." The object in poetry and the objective situation in drama become expressive because, in reality, what we confront is not the object in stolid neutrality but the effect it has created. "Describe not the object itself," wrote Mallarmé, "but the effect it produces. Therefore, a verse must not be composed of words, but of intentions. All words must yield to sensation."⁹⁸ Kandinsky lays down a similar, relevant dictum: "The choice of object must be decided only by the corresponding vibration of the human soul."⁹⁹ Malevich meant the same thing when he wrote: "The appearances of natural objects are in themselves meaningless, the essential thing is feeling."¹⁰⁰ Robert Henri gives a generalised formula valid for all art forms: "The object, which is back of every true work of art, is the attainment of a state of being, a state of high functioning, a more than ordinary moment of existence. In such moments, activity is inevitable, and whether this activity is with brush, pen, chisel, or tongue, its result is but a by-product of the state, a trace, the footprint of the state."¹⁰¹ Chirico emphasises that art is the concretisation of the immaterial reality: "A work of art must narrate something that does not appear within its outline. The objects and figures presented in it must likewise poetically tell you of something that is far away from them and also of what their shapes materially hide from us."¹⁰² The Chinese artist Li Jih-hua put the same thing more profoundly when he said: "The brush comes to a stop, but the idea is without limit."¹⁰³

In poetry we are dealing with the universe of intuitivity, the creative intuition or *Pratibha* and the receptive intuition or *Samvedana* of Sanskrit poetics. Poetic intuition intuit its expressive form and the transfer of the experience to another depends on the intuition of the latter. As Ransom puts it, though rather wordily, a poem is really "an ontological and metaphysical manoeuvre"¹⁰⁴. The poet enshrines his own being in his work. It is dangerous to forget even for a moment the inwardness of the whole reality we are dealing with here. Writing on Ibsen, Rilke says "Farther in than any one has yet been, a door had sprung open before you, and now you were among the alembics in the firelight". Ibsen had passed through the world of action and appearance "as one crosses a vestibule" until he came to the place "where our becoming seethes and precipitates and changes colour inside"¹⁰⁵. Erich Heller, likewise, wrote "The Discovery and Colonization of Inwardness—this might be a fitting title for the story of poetry from the Renaissance to our day". But the inward experience has to precipitate its own form with such justness that intuition can recover from it the original experience. Form and spirit thus become a unity. "The music of poetry," wrote Eliot, "is not something which exists apart from its meaning". Poetry does not refer to a material object closed in itself, but to the universality of being and beauty, perceived each time in a singular existence. "It is not in order to 'communicate ideas', it is in order to keep contact with the universe of intuitivity"¹⁰⁶. Susanne Langer¹⁰⁷ also has repeatedly insisted that art is not discursive but shows, it does not communicate but reveals. Sanskrit poetics would query even the expressions "shows" and "reveals" and insist that emotion is not revealed so much as transferred by induction.

This leads us to the profound nature of the concretisation of inwardness, of the *Rasa* into the complex of *Vibhavas*, etc. The artist has to mobilise the logic of the visible at the service of the invisible, as Odilon Redon¹⁰⁸ once said. An utterance by a European poet which immediately forges a link with the outlook of Sanskrit poetics is that of Pierre Reverdy. "*Je suis obscur comme le sentiment*" (I am obscure as feeling is). Reverdy here should not be interpreted to mean that feeling remains eternally private, obscure and incommunicable. He is stressing, like the Sanskrit aestheticians, that feeling is the primary reality in art, that it is incommunicable by discourse, that it has to precipitate a transparent form through poetic intuition. Eric Gill¹⁰⁹ helps us here to proceed further. "What is a work of art? A word made flesh, a word, that which emanates from the mind. Made flesh, a thing, a thing seen, a thing known, the immeasurable translated into terms of the measurable. From the highest to the lowest that is the substance of works of art". This is the probing towards Clive Bell's "significant form" which can be defined as form expressing and embodying an emotional experience. The creative intuition is successful, if the emotion has its life in the poem and not in the history of the artist, as T. S. Eliot¹¹⁰ has stressed. The meaning of this has to be

carefully understood as misunderstandings are possible. As the donated emotion was first experienced by the poet, it is an integral part of the history of his spirit. But the objectification should be complete without requiring cues beyond the bounds of the presentation for effective transfer of emotion to others, the only demand on whom is the possession of the capacity for intuitive response.

Bharata's pregnant, condensed formula for the transfer of the emotional experience, with its exacting requirement of building up an integral pattern of stimuli, corresponds to the requirements of concretisation indicated by Western thought on the subject which we briefly reviewed just now. In fact it can be claimed to be a fuller and more precisely scientific statement. Bharata's dictum indicates that in Sanskrit poetics the poet has to be a craftsman who has to feel first and then plastically shape and concretise that feeling. Emotion has to be recollected in tranquillity, as Wordsworth said, in order to yield the poem. Diderot had stressed this before him: "Do you compose a poem about death the moment after you have lost your friend or mistress? No. When the great pain has passed, when one is remote from the catastrophe, when the soul is calm, when the memory unites with the imagination, then one can speak well. One says that one weeps, but one no longer weeps when one chases a striking epithet, when one is occupied in making the verse harmonious. When the tears flow, the pen drops from one's hands, one surrenders to feeling and one stops composing"¹¹¹ Schiller, who insisted on strict reciprocity of form and content, on "an actual union and interpenetration of matter and form", for which he used the term "living shape", also stressed the objectivity in creative craftsmanship which alone could concretise the subjectivity. The poet must beware of "singing his pain in the midst of pain". He must write "from the milder and more distancing memory", never from present emotion. "He must become a stranger to himself, must extricate the object of his fervour from his individuality"¹¹²

Since art is beauty wrought out from within upon the flesh, we here inevitably move in the direction of the sensually palpable context insisted upon by Sanskrit poetics, of what Diderot called a rhetoric of sensation, where sensation and emotion fuse and ideas become emotions rather than concepts. Alexander Baumgarten defined aesthetics as the science of perception, the word being used in a special sense. To Baumgarten, art and poetry are "cognition", but not thought. They are non-intellectual knowledge, "perception". The poem is defined as a "perfect sensuous discourse". Discourse, language, is the material of poetic art, and perfection means, as Baumgarten explains in detail, two things: clarity (which must not be confused with logical distinctness) or vividness in representation (the perfect *Abhinaya* of Sanskrit poetics), and what we would call organization, totality, wholeness.¹¹³ The change in meaning of the expression "sensuous" from "pertaining to the senses" to "pertaining to

beauty and art", effected by Baumgarten, is of far deeper significance than an academic innovation¹¹⁴ Kant also related the aesthetic function to sensuousness understood in this sense The nature of sensuousness is "receptivity", cognition through being affected by given objects¹¹⁵ "Poetry, painting, music," wrote Herbert Read, "all these arts are skills for raising the senses to that condition of insight, in which the world is not transfigured but in which for the first time some aspect of it is revealed, or made real and thereby, for human eyes newly created, newly communicated"¹¹⁶ In poetry, thought also is transmuted and rendered, as George Eliot has said in *Middlemarch*, "with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling—an idea wrought back to the directness of sense, like the solidity of objects" Abstract words endowed with sensory qualities—of sound, of texture, of feeling—make a "thought" which is not logic but Poetic "Within these thought-images," George Whalley points out, "the interplay of sensory and abstract can establish exquisite interfaces which, like the lips, transmit tingling shocks of acute sensation"¹¹⁷ What Whalley says about the linguistic tissue—*Vachika-abhinaya*—is valid for the *Abhinaya* as a whole, the aesthetic presentation in its integrated complexity, as conceived by Bharata For the sentiment (*Sthayin*), as latent reactivity, is really an abstract, remote reality, which has to be raised to the relishable condition through a sensuously palpable concretisation Here, a voluntary expressive gesture (*Anubhava*) like a meaningful glance and an involuntary expression (*Satvika Bhava*) like a tear or a blush are exquisite interfaces of the abstract and the sensory, for it is the activated sentiment that leads to these sensory expressions and, in turn, is brought to the relishable state by them. It is because these expressions transmit tingling shocks of acute sensation that the *Rasa* experience is transferred to the spectator by sympathetic induction

Though slightly archaic in flavour, Sidney Lanier's schematisation of the process of aesthetic creativity is not unhelpful in clarifying the responsibility of the artist in achieving a sensuous incarnation Seeking a very generalised formula for all arts and using the terms in a very special sense, Lanier says that every poem, from a sonnet to *Macbeth*, has substantially these elements Hero, Plot, Crisis The Hero is the Ruling Idea, Plot is the Idea's involution in complexities related to or clustering about it and Crisis is the unity of impression sealed or confirmed or climaxed by the last connected sentence, or sentiment, or verse of the poem The perfection of the work of art will consist in the simplicity and the completeness with which the first is involved in the second and illustrated in the third¹¹⁸ This schematisation is in harmony with the outlook of Sanskrit poetics, which insists on a dominant *Rasa* for a poetic composition and its involution in the objective presentations that form the stuff of the work Bharata's insistence on the significant pattern of concrete stimuli has similar affinities with T S Eliot's insistence on "objective correlatives" The poem is the objective correlative of a state of feeling " a set of

objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be a formula of that *particular* emotion, such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked”¹¹⁹ The emotion here is the *Rasa* of Sanskrit poetics, the set of objects the *Vibhavas*, the situation their patterned, organised presentation and the chain of events include not only the episodic stream but also the stream of the emotive reactions of the characters to them, the *Anubhavas* and the *Sanchari Bhavas*

A dim intuition of the complex psychological doctrine of Bharata is latent in the preference of Keats¹²⁰ for “a Life of Sensations rather than of Thoughts” For art has to be sensuously palpable concretisation of the inward state—in the complex of *Vibhava*, *Anubhava*, etc which becomes the objective constellation of stimuli that will arouse the same state in the relisher also Aesthetic theory in Europe shows a steady intuition of this truth, though the thoroughness, precision and clarity of Bharata’s analysis are lacking Abercrombie¹²¹ wrote “The whole purpose of a poet’s technique is to make a moment of his experience come to life in other minds than his” C P E Bach¹²² emphasises the need for the musician to have experience himself before he can stimulate others “Since a musician cannot otherwise move people, but he be moved himself, so he must necessarily be able to induce in himself all those effects which he would arouse in his auditors, he conveys his feelings to them, and thus most readily moves them to sympathetic emotions” I A Richards¹²³ moves closer to the mediate process in this transfer “Communication takes place when one mind so acts upon its environment that another mind is influenced, and in that other mind an experience occurs which is like the experience in the first mind, and is caused in part by that experience” Goethe¹²⁴ clarifies the mediate processes further “It was not, on the whole, my way, as a poet, to strive after the embodiment of something abstract I received within myself impressions—impressions of a hundred sorts, sensuous, lively, lovely, many-hued—as an alert imaginative energy presented them And I had as poet nothing else to do but to mould and fashion within me such observations and impressions, and through a vivid representation to bring it about that others should receive the same impression, when what I had written was read or heard”

The immense prestige of Poe in France is intriguing, since his poetic achievement is not very distinguished But it is also true that his analytical writings have some valuable intuitions which were further developed by Baudelaire and Valéry Poe¹²⁵ follows the creative mind in the process of externalising experience “I prefer commencing with the consideration of an *effect* I say to myself, in the first place, ‘Of the innumerable effects or impressions of which the heart, the intellect, or (more generally) the soul is susceptible, what one shall I, on the present occasion, select?’” This is the selection of the *Sthavin* whose *Rasa* shall dominate the com-

position. The next task is the conception of the complex of *Vibhava*, etc. which will concretise the feeling. "Having chosen a novel first, and secondly, a vivid effect, I consider whether it can best be wrought by incident or tone—whether by ordinary incidents and peculiar tone, or the converse, or by peculiarity both of incident and tone—afterwards looking about me (or rather within) for such combinations of events or tone as shall best aid me in the construction of the effect." Baudelaire¹²⁶ endorses this approach. "The artist, after having conceived the effect to be produced in leisurely deliberation, must invent the incidents, and combine the episodes most suitable for leading to the intended effect." Valéry paid a very high tribute to Poe by claiming him to be the first to have examined and reduced the problem of literary creation as a problem of psychology and deliberately employed the logic and mechanics of effects. "For the first time, the relations between the work and the reader were elucidated and given as the positive bases of art."¹²⁷ Valéry defined the poem "as a sort of machine for engendering the poetic state through the medium of words."¹²⁸ He declared that experiencing the poetic state is not the primary function of the poet, that is his own private affair. His function is to create that state in others, he has to inspire the reader.¹²⁹ Eluard¹³⁰ also affirms that the poet is he who inspires far more than he who is inspired. "The poetic word induces us to *become*, rather than exciting us to *understand*," wrote Valéry.¹³¹ "Poetry is not concerned with transmitting to another what happens in one that is comprehensible by the intellect. It is concerned with creating in him a state, the expression of which (in him) will be precisely the same as that (expression) which communicates the state to him."¹³²

Pirandello¹³³ elucidates this with reference to the role of the actor, the analysis thus coming much closer to Bharata. "The image already expressed (in the dramatic text) must return to organize itself in him (the actor) and tends to become the movement that brings it about and makes it real on the stage. For him, too, in sum, the execution must spring alive from the conception, and only by virtue of it, by movements thus set in motion by the image itself, alive and active, existing not only inside of him but having become soul and body with him and in him." In Claudel's analysis of these realities, the physiology of the sensation of taste is used as analogy and more than analogy, exactly as in the Indian tradition, especially Hema Chandra. The word can be used towards two ends, says Claudel, for producing in the reader a state of awareness or knowledge, or a state of joy. In the latter case, the poet is really trying to create, through the medium of words, some sort of equivalent of an emotion, which is "soluble" in the sensibility, exactly as the painter and musician seek to create such equivalents with colours and sounds. Here expression becomes more important than the object. The poet here makes the reader participate in the creative, poetic action. He places "in the hidden mouth of his sensibility" an enunciation of the object or feeling

which is congenial to his intellect as well as his organs of physical expression. A series of complexes (constellated poetic stimuli) is released, deployed in such a way that the reader is enabled to experience their structure and "savour" simultaneously¹³¹

While Bharata is thus clearly endorsed by Western thinking in this field, he still remains unique for the precision and penetration of his analysis and the completeness of his statement. Even in Eliot, many ambiguities linger and precisely because the matter has not been thought out to its depths. For instance, the meaning of the distinction he makes between emotions and feelings is not clear in terms of his own analysis. "The business of the poet," he says, "is not to find new emotions, but to use the ordinary ones and, in working them up into poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual emotions at all." Emotions and feelings, he says elsewhere, are the experience, the elements which enter the transforming catalyst, the mind of the poet. This statement would seem to suggest that both emotions and feelings are the initially given realities which are further processed by poetic action. But the earlier statement suggests that emotions are some sort of raw material which are refined into feelings by the aesthetic process. But this final feeling is also called a "new art emotion" and aesthetic experience is completely separated from life experience in a statement like this: "The effect of a work of art upon the person who enjoys it is an experience different in kind from any experience not of art." Ambiguities pile up in the further elaboration. "It (the effect of a work of art) may be formed out of one emotion, or may be a combination of several, and various feelings, inhering for the writer in particular words or phrases or images, may be added to compose the final result. Or great poetry may be made without the direct use of any emotion whatever, composed out of feelings solely. Canto XV of the *Inferno* (Brunetto Latini) is a working up of the emotion evident in the situation, but the effect, though single as that of any work of art, is obtained by considerable complexity of detail"¹³⁵ Trying to clarify the meaning of all this, Williamson¹³⁶ writes: "If the business of the poet is to use the ordinary emotions 'and in working them up into poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual emotions at all', it is to be done by associating with the basic or structural emotion a number of floating feelings which will transmute or transform it into a new art emotion." Here the ordinary, basic or structural emotion seems to correspond loosely to the *Sthayin* or sentiment (though strictly it is not an emotion but a latent emotive reactivity, as Bharata and Shand have clarified), the floating feelings to the ancillary and derived feelings (*Anubhava* and *Vyabhicharin*) and the new art emotion to the unitary *Rasa*, which is the *Sthayin* raised to the relishable state within and through the matrix of all these various kinds of stimuli patterned as an organic whole. But Eliot's exposition is not clear or definitive and is full of ambiguities.

This comparative evaluation, even if it might have seemed a trifle wear-

some to some readers, was necessary to rescue Sanskrit poetics from the dusty immortality of the book-shelves and reveal its affinity with world currents in aesthetic thought. A cross-fertilisation, which would have been immensely beneficent, has till now been blocked because Sanskrit poetics has continued to remain a rather hermetic tradition.

We may conclude this section by citing the views of two writers with which Sanskrit poetics would be in complete agreement. Tolstoy¹³⁷ wrote "To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colours, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit that feeling that others may experience the same feeling—this is the activity of art. It is a means of union among men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the life and progress towards well-being of individuals and of humanity." This reads like a summary of the general position of Sanskrit poetics. Ducasse¹³⁸ writes in detail about the objectification and transfer of the emotion and the affinity with Sanskrit poetics is so great that this writer found it difficult to exorcise the feeling that he was reading a translated passage from one of the Sanskrit texts. "An *aesthetic symbol* of anger, i.e. an aesthetic object embodying anger, would be, among the sorts of things which are evidences of anger, any situation allowing, or still better, inviting aesthetic contemplation, and such as to yield through it to us the 'taste' of anger—not the mere intellectual information that some one is angry. Such a situation might consist merely in the *representation* of behaviour emphatically evidencing anger (rather than in the actual *presentation* of such behaviour, which might make impossible the contemplative attitude). For instance, it might consist in the representation of a scowling face, or of the speeches of an angry man, such as those of Achilles in his quarrel with Agamemnon. Feeling is aesthetic feeling whenever its status is neither that of a mere incitement to or accompaniment or result of practical activity, nor that of an accessory or by-product of cognition, but is, on the contrary, the status of something sought or entertained for itself, and simply 'tasted'. The aesthetic feelings are not qualitatively different from the non-aesthetic, and this involves that there is no sort of feeling which may not on occasion acquire the aesthetic status, or which art may not attempt to objectify." The features of this formulation correspond absolutely with those of the formulation of Sanskrit poetics. The expression, "tasting" the emotion, could have come directly from any Sanskrit text. Sanskrit poetics forbids the bald report or news (*Varta*) that some one is, for example, angry, above all it expressly forbids the direct mention of the emotion which is sought to be communicated. And the means of this communication is *Abhinaya*, representation, a term which Bharata uses to cover not only histrionics, but libretto, music, dance and even the stage setting. Ducasse later mentions the social, as distinguished from the private, objectification of emotion, the test of the former being the object's capacity to impart in contemplation

the artist's feeling not merely back to himself, but to others also. The entire poetic situation, plastically moulded by the psychological theory of Sanskrit poetics, is such a perfected social objectification.

III. POETIC TRANSFER

We can now take up the very important question how the poetic emotion is transferred to another.

The initial requirement of course is that the poetic situation has been plastically moulded by the creative artist as a complex of the objective correlatives of his own emotion. Western thought has frequently stressed that art is symbol. "True art," Yeats observed, "is expressive and symbolic and makes every form, every sound, colour, every gesture, a signature of some unanalysable essence"¹³⁹. Yeats stresses here that the essence, the *Rasa* of Sanskrit poetics, cannot be communicated by discourse which is analytical, but has to be integrally embodied in form. Ezra Pound also stressed the need for poetry to be concrete. "I believe that the proper and perfect symbol is the natural object." We have to interpret the expression "natural object" as standing, not for dead, neutral, material entities, but the object as invested with the power of emotional reasonance, the concrete stimulus shaped as a *Vibhava* in a poetic situation. Pound clarifies that the particular in art is the symbol of generalised meaning. "Art does not avoid universals, it strikes at them all the harder in that it strikes through particulars"¹⁴⁰. In recent times it is Susanne Langer¹⁴¹ who has laid the greatest emphasis on the symbolic nature of art. She starts with the distinction made by Wittgenstein¹⁴² between the discursive symbol and the presentational symbol. Language is a tissue in which different signs denoting particular objects are combined according to the rules of syntax into complex symbols such as sentences. These express propositions which have the same *logical form* as the facts they represent. Presentational symbols do not act through the logical relationship, but are direct concretisations. "Music sounds as feelings feel.

And likewise in good painting, sculpture or building, balanced shapes and colours, lines and masses look as emotions, vital tensions and resolutions feel.

Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feelings." A creative work, she holds, is a "single, symbolic form, which is the embodiment of a feeling pattern." It is a virtual object, not a physical object. An art symbol, for her, stands apart from the personality of the artist and at the same expresses his feeling. That is, it has a concrete reality which does not need any further reference outside the contours of its form to the prior experience of the artist, because that experience has been embodied in it. The art symbol does not mean a sign pointing to some other thing. It is a creation in which the thought, passion and craft of the creator take on a transformed life. This is what Day Lewis¹⁴³ also meant when he wrote. "The poem must stand up after the poet has got

out from underneath it, it must apply beyond the individual experience out of which it arose and carry meaning beyond the poet's own time and social environment" Two modern poets¹⁴⁴ accept this concept, which is also the basic concept of Indian poetics, in their analysis of the technique and effect of *Sunset*, a poem by E.E. Cummings, which presents "a complicated recipe for a sunset experience", and if used, "turns the reader into a poet"

While all this emphasises that the art form embodies feelings, its transfer to another is yet to be explained Here, the approach of Sanskrit poetics is neatly summarised by Lacombe The aim of the creatively moulded concrete symbol is "to suggest to the soul of the spectator or listener, through a constellation of *signes inducteurs*, psychic states impregnated with aesthetic emotion"¹⁴⁵ Let us clarify and vindicate this claim

Dhananjaya,¹⁴⁶ the tenth century dramaturgist who belonged to the court of King Munja of Dhar, begins with a simple illustration We often see a child riding a stick and enjoying a horse-ride as it were He shows all the physical signs and emotions of a horse-rider He tightens the bridle, uses the whip and makes his mount gallop The question which now arises is this "Is a horse the cause of this experience of the horse-ride?" How can it be so in its absence? The experience therefore is due to a medium, through which the child works himself up so as to experience a horse-ride Just the same is the case with the situation presented on the stage It is only a medium through which the actor works himself up to a certain emotional pitch and consequently shows the signs which are natural to that emotion The spectator, likewise, experiences the emotion by identification with the actor, or more accurately, the hero whose role is played by the actor The action of sympathetic induction thus spreads in widening circles We have already referred to Hema Chandra's use of the significant analogy of the salivation produced in a man who sees another savouring a fruit

With the clarification of the concept of empathy by Theodore Lipps, the key role of sympathetic induction in aesthetic experience is beginning to be increasingly understood in our own time But one tribute which we cannot hold back from the schoolmen, alike in East and West, is that they attack and analyse their problems with monumental thoroughness The theory of sympathetic induction is one about which great intellectual battles have been fought in India The controversies have been immensely helpful in aiding us to steer away from any simplistic reduction of the realities involved

The approach of each controversialist to this specific problem is consistent with his general philosophical outlook Thus, the Mīmāṃsaka philosophers of India adopted an uncompromising literalism in their study of the Vedas and other scriptural texts They were thus committed to the recognition of only the denotation (*Abhidha*) of words and situations Lollata, who lived in the late eighth or early ninth century, was a

Mimamsaka His writings, unfortunately, have been lost and we know his views only from their brief review by Abhinava Gupta in his commentary on Bharata¹¹⁷ But it is clear that Lollata was one of the earliest commentators on Bharata In Bharata's famous formula there were two words of strategic importance, which were susceptible of radically different interpretations. These were *Samyoga* or combination and *Nishpatti* or emergence. He had said that when the *Vibhavas*, *Anubhavas*, etc combined, *Rasa* emerged Lollata, who admitted only denotation, interpreted *Nishpatti* as causal origination The *Vibhava* or the stimulus is the direct cause (*Karana*) of the aesthetic emotion, *Rasa*, which is therefore an effect (*Utpadya*) To Lollata, Bharata's *Nishpatti*, emergence, is *Utpatti*, causal origination

Abhinava Gupta's brilliant mind noticed at once that the literalism of the Mimamsakas would annex aesthetics to grammar and bring about as complete an impoverishment in aesthetics as it had brought in philosophy He saw that Lollata was confusing aesthetic communication with intellectual discourse, the emotive symbol with the denotative sign The basic reality in aesthetic experience is the sentiment and its activation Abhinava argues that the sentiment, the *Sthayi Bhava*, is not an object of perception, which category alone can be embraced by an approach like that of Lollata The *Sthayin* is not an object of perception because it cannot be staticised as an object existing at only one specific conjunction of space and time It is an abiding reality of human nature The fact that it abides as a potential reality, which rises to a relishable state only when the constellation of stimuli, etc is present, further proves that it is not a material object or reality Later writers brought forward other arguments as well against Lollata Mammata¹⁴⁸ of the eleventh century argued thus. An effect, when it has been brought into existence, may continue to exist when its efficient cause is destroyed But the life and reality of the aesthetic emotion are circumscribed by the duration of the continuing contact with the aesthetic stimulus-situation It disappears when the latter disappears, a fact which goes to prove that the *Rasa* must not be taken as an ordinary, mundane (*laukika*) effect Mammata, like Susanne Langer, is stressing here that the object in art is a virtual and not a physical object and it becomes a virtual object because the whole phenomenon is processual, the process involving the activity of intuition and emotion Visvanatha¹⁴⁹ in the fourteenth century raised yet another criticism Cause and effect can not be contemporaneous If the *Rasa* is an effect, having for its cause the perception of the *Vibhavas*, then at the time of the relish of the *Rasa*, the *Vibhavas* would not be perceived, for we do not find the simultaneous experience of a cause and its effect The perception of the touch of the sandal-wood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously, however rapidly the one may succeed the other Here again, analysis is endeavouring to emphasise the cardinal distinction between mere perception, or mere cognition in the case of

denotation, and the emotive reaction to it which is a subsequent event and whose tone is not determined by the stimulus alone but also by the nature of the sensibility on which it impinges

In the history of Indian philosophy, Mimamsa stagnated in literalism and was displaced by Nyaya or Logic which was a far more fruitful approach, although it forgot its limitations when it tried to annex aesthetics. This, indeed, was the attempt made by Sankuka who was a younger contemporary of Lollata. His work too has been lost, Abhinava Gupta being our only source for his views. Being a Naiyāika or logician, Sankuka tried to apply syllogistic reasoning to the experience of aesthetic emotion. He claimed that the *Rasa* was not produced as an effect, as Lollata claimed, but was reached by the logical process of inference (*Anumana*) from the denotational sense. Govinda¹⁵⁰ criticised this view on the ground that it disregarded the well-recognised fact that the inferred perception or cognition of a thing could never produce the same charm, the same aesthetic pleasure, as direct emotive experience. It has also been pointed out that aesthetic emotion is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of Rama, the hero represented on the stage, being past, cannot be cognised by the organs of sense belonging to the present time and the present place. It was the exponents of the doctrine of suggestion (*Dhvanī*) who led the most powerful attack on the inference-theory and we have therefore to postpone a fuller discussion to a later section when we shall take up the theory of suggestion. But, briefly, this is the summary of the criticism. The aesthetic presentation (*Vibhavas*, etc.) cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the sentiment (*Sthayin*), because the *Vibhavas* do not stand in the same relation to the *Sthayin* as the middle term (*Sadhana*) does to the major term (*Sadhya*) in a syllogistic statement, but are its suggestor (*Vyanjaka*).

The views of Lollata and Sankuka which held the aesthetic presentation to be the efficient cause (*Karaka-hetu*) or the logical cause (*Jnapaka-hetu*) respectively of the aesthetic emotion, thus, could not survive critical attack. The defect of both theories was that they sought to invest the stimulus with a physical, automatic, compulsive power to evoke emotion. With Bharata, on the other hand, the accent was on the inwardness of the situation, the initiative always being with the sensitive heart, both in aesthetic creation and response. We now come to a brilliant formulation, which recognised the inwardness of the whole situation and gave very suggestive insights, even if we have reservations in accepting it in its entirety. The thinker who gave us this formulation is Bhatta Nayaka of the ninth century. More keenly than in the case of Lollata and Sankuka, we feel the loss of his work, the *Hṛdaya Daṇḍana*. Again our source is Abhinava, but the greatness of Abhinava is that in the summary statement of the position of the other writers whom he intends to criticise he is astonishingly objective and fair.

In general philosophy Bhatta Nayaka followed the Sāṃkhya system

Samkhya was an evolutionary theory, with nature evolving under the catalytic action of the spirit. Like Lamarck, Bergson and Lecomte du Nouy, Samkhya believed that the need of organisms generated functions which produced organs including the brain and mind. The purpose of the evolution of nature is enabling the soul the enjoyment (*Bhoga*) of experience. In this relishing of experience, even the painful is transformed into positive experience as in the case of the experience of a great tragic drama, because the attitude is detached, aesthetic. Such a philosophy of evolution and experience was full of cues that cried for extension to the field of aesthetic experience and Bhatta Nayaka undertook this extension.

Bhatta Nayaka argues that the aesthetic emotion cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes, namely the constellation of stimuli in the aesthetic presentation, being non-realities, cannot bring about real effects. That is, our sorrow when we see the sufferings of Rama in a drama is as genuine as our sorrow when we see a person in the same circumstances in real life. But Rama cannot be the cause of our sorrow, in the sense that a person in real life can be the cause, for the gross reality of the situation is that we do not see Rama at all. We only see an actor. The aesthetic emotion cannot be inferred, because the real character, Rama, not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist as an actuality and what does not exist cannot be inferred. Besides, how is it possible for the ordinary reader or spectator to identify himself with the extraordinary virtues of a hero like Rama? To solve these difficulties, Bhatta Nayaka maintains that the aesthetic emotion is enjoyed in connection with the *Vibhavas* through the relation of the enjoyer (*Bhojaka*) and the enjoyed (*Bhojya*). He admits the denotational power (*Abhidha*) of the poetic statement, but regards it as insufficient as a total explanation. He posits another power also for poetic expression, the power of generalisation (*Bhavakatva*). It is this which enables the *Vibhavas* to be sensed in their generalised character which rises above their specific contextual reference. Thus, Rama's love for Sita is a particular which becomes the universal for love in general without the limitation of the reference to the agent or the object. The third function is that of enjoyment (*Bhojakatva*). By virtue of this, the reader or the spectator relishes the experience aesthetically, not practically. This enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened, self-sufficient and blissful awareness, arising, in the language of Samkhya philosophy, from the prominence of the attribute of goodness (*Satva*) in a man and different from the ordinary pleasurable experiences of the world. To make this last point clear, we have to recall that according to Samkhya, nature is compounded of three qualities, powers or potentialities. The terms are difficult to translate because they telescope both physical conditions and psychological and even moral dispositions. *Tamas* is physical inertia, mental apathy, the dark turbulence of the primitive impulses. *Rajas* is dynamic energy, psychological extroversion, impassioned activism. *Satva* is static, potential or

controlled energy, psychological poise, moral perfection This scheme is surprisingly similar to the psychology of Plato's *Republic* with its reasonable, passionate and lustful energies of the soul

Bhatta Nayaka's most important contribution is the clarification that aesthetic experience is, to use the term of Ducasse,¹⁵¹ an endotelic activity. Activity is ectotelic when the end is external to and other than the activity, as when we work in an office to be able to make both ends meet. It can be autotelic, it can have an end, but the activity is performed for its own sake and the end is there only to increase the pleasure from the activity. This is the case with play. Scoring a goal is not the absolute end or aim. A drawn match is not a total loss. Or activity may be endotelic, as in art. The end is internal and real, real in the sense that it is not secondary or trumped up as in autotelic activity, internal in the sense that it is not determined by practical considerations but is really a state of being. Bhatta Nayaka stresses the role of the spirit as the aesthetic relisher (*Bhojaka*) of experience. His emphasis on the *Satvic* nature of the sensibility makes aesthetic experience contemplative and inward rather than governed by practical considerations.

His second contribution is the emphasis on the universalisation of experience in aesthetics. In European thought the significance of this has been emphasised ever since Aristotle gave the first clarification. If Plato implied that art was untrue, and based itself on episodes that were real only in fancy, though they simulated the course of events in real life, Aristotle pointed out that art was not a slavish imitation of reality, twice removed from the truth. Presenting, as it must do, individual men and women in the circumstances of life, it does not stop there, but penetrates to what is significant in action and character, expressing through their words and actions what is true for all human nature, the poet's truth, the universal. If the poet must necessarily give us something less than physical reality—in his verse he cannot give us the physical warmth of flesh and blood—he makes rich compensation by giving something more, the universal reality, evoking so much of spirit and heightened feeling as life itself can yield only to the choicest minds and in their finest moments.¹⁵²

If we now find that Abhinava Gupta has reservations in accepting Bhatta Nayaka's formulation, it must be clearly understood that he does not deny the realities that Bhatta Nayaka indicates but only their further analysis by the latter. Aligning himself with the position in logical analysis—exemplified in Europe by the principle known as Occam's Razor—that concepts should not be multiplied unnecessarily, Abhinava feels that it is not necessary to staticise either the generalising function of poetry as a separate power of *Bhavakatva* or the appreciative activity of the reader or spectator as a distinct, isolated power, *Bhojakatva*. He refers back to the sentiment or *Sthayin* as an abiding inner reality compounded by basic, inborn reactivities (*Vasana*) and latent impressions of experience. He also assumes the capacity for universal sympathy which, in the specific

context of aesthetic experience, manifests itself as sympathetic induction. He feels that the configuration of the aesthetic situation is enough to account for the universalisation of experience and its aesthetic relishing. For the stimulus-situation in art, unlike that in daily life, does not trigger motor action, practical involvement in the stream of represented action. The actor obviously is not Rama, and tomorrow he may be playing the role of Udayana. Therefore the *Vibhava* can only be a medium for the activation of the sentiment. When the sentiment is thus activated by a non-practical context, the experience has to be a generalised one. Aristotle implied this when he said in the very first chapter of the *Poetics* that poems are all modes of imitation. That is to say, a play is not a slice of life but a picture or diagram of life. On this Samuel Johnson gave the vigorous clarification in his *Preface to Shakespeare* (1765): "It will be asked how the drama moves (its audience), if it is not to be credited. It is credited with all the credit due to a drama. It is credited, whenever it moves, as a just picture of a real original." It is because drama is not life in the raw, but a diagram of life, that we do not rush up on the stage to rescue the innocent Desdemona as she is suffocated. Likewise, the relisher of aesthetic experience is not an isolated power or element of the personality which we need staticise as a *Bhojaka*. It is the entire personality in a specific attitude which Ducasse, for example, calls the attitude of "endotelic listening-in". That is, the entire personality places itself in an attitude of aesthetic receptivity, heightening its sensitiveness as far as possible to the emotional suggestions of the aesthetic presentation and relishing those emotional nuances.

In one sense, the generalising power of a poetic tissue can be claimed to be as much a real property of it as its stratum of denotational meaning. But while the denotation can be grasped by logical analysis, through grammar and syntax, the generalised emotive intimation is perceived only by sensibility, just as it is there in the poetic tissue, in the first place, because it has been concretised by the poet's sensibility. This again emphasises that we cannot afford to forget for one moment the inwardness of the aesthetic process. Jagannatha¹⁵³ of the seventeenth century was stressing this when he said that, in the depiction of love or erotic sentiment, the vicissitudes of union and separation relate to the interior reality, the heart's mood, rather than to the material context of external circumstances, for a couple can share the same couch and still there will be a gulf between them if the hearts are not united. Allport¹⁵⁴ unconsciously echoes this "What impersonalistic psychology is able, for example, to give an intelligible setting to the fact that my seat-mate in the street-car is distant from me, while the friend towards whom I am riding is already near me?" Voltaire¹⁵⁵ has a passage emphasising the inwardness and delicate sensitiveness to nuances needed in aesthetic appreciation which Regnaud¹⁵⁶ quotes in his work on Sanskrit rhetoric because of its remarkable affinity with the Indian outlook. "It does not suffice for (aesthetic) relish to per-

ceive or cognise the beauty of a work, it is necessary to sense it, to be touched by it. It does not also suffice to merely sense it, or be touched by it, it is necessary to react to the different nuances. This is yet another identity between aesthetic relish and sensuous taste, for the gourmet can immediately sense the blending of two liqueurs" (The metaphor of savouring liqueur of fine blend, favourite with writers on Sanskrit poetics, seems inevitable in any depth analysis.)

Let us now move forward to a closer look at the exact inward processes involved in the transfer of aesthetic emotion. After discoursing on the prime stimuli, congruent behavioural features and ancillary emotional reactions (*Vibhavas*, *Anubhavas* and *Vyabhichari Bhavas*) of love, Bharata remarks: "When all these are represented, aided by poetry, music and histrionics, the deep-seated sentiment (*Sthayi Bhava*) of love is kindled in the mind of the audience and developed to that climax, when, through complete imaginative sympathy with the situation, the audience forgets all differences of person, time and place, and the climax of emotion reveals itself in a sort of blissful consciousness"¹⁵⁷ The representation of the stimuli as a concrete constellation emphasises that denotation is not sufficient. Thus, in the poetic text of the drama, which Bharata significantly calls linguistic representation (*Vachika-abhinaya*) in harmony with his general position that every element of the total pattern is an aesthetic representation, the hero's anger cannot be communicated by the denotational statement that he is angry. Udbhata,¹⁵⁸ the eighth century aesthetician, went wrong here when he inclined to the view that *Rasa* has as its seat (*aspadā*) its own name (*svasabda*), that is, a denotational reference to the emotion may help in arousing it. For this he was strongly criticised by Ananda Vardhana,¹⁵⁹ the great ninth century exponent of the doctrine of suggestion who belonged to the court of King Avantī Varman of Kashmir, by Abhinava¹⁶⁰ and later by Mammata¹⁶¹ in the eleventh century. Mammata went to the extent of regarding the denotational mention of the aesthetic emotion (*Svasabda vachyatva*) as the worst flaw (*Rasa dosha*) in aesthetic representation. It is again and again stressed in Sanskrit poetics that emotion is essentially private, that the poet cannot communicate it as he can a thought or image, that the aim should be to see that the emotion arises in the spectator and that this can only be done by managing an ideal revival (*Udbodhana*) in the spectator or reader of the identical emotion. Therefore he has to be confronted with a pattern of stimuli into which the poet has plastically moulded his emotion, which then is transferred by sympathetic induction.

Here we can legitimately use the present-day knowledge of the process for a fuller understanding. Emotion can be evoked not only by the stimulus which has the innate capacity of arousing it, due to the psychophysical structure of the stimulated organism, but also by the perception of the expression of the emotion in the behaviour of another. The wild horse is afraid not only when he sees or smells his carnivorous enemy, but also

when he hears the neigh of fear uttered by another wild horse, even though the object of fear perceived by the latter remains invisible to the former.¹⁶² It is worthwhile recalling here once again that voluntary and involuntary expressions of emotion (the *Anubhavas*) form the most important element in the histrionic discipline of Bharata. The emotion first experienced by the poet is private, a state of his being. If it is to be transferred, the only way is to make the spectator or reader live through the same experience and feel the same emotion. This ideal revival is possible because human nature and experience are generally identical. The emotional experience of the reader or spectator, being an ideal revival, goes back to his past experience as well as his basic reactivity. But, as Mammata¹⁶³ takes great care to emphasise, it is at the same time very much more than a reminiscence. The past experience serves merely as a centre round which a new reconstruction takes place. New nuances of emotion, not previously experienced, are possible through art and are in fact its most precious gifts. (This could be the "new art emotion, different in kind from any experience not of art", which T. S. Eliot refers to, but he does not express himself very clearly.) Thus, aesthetic experience is as valid as experience gained in practical living, an autonomous and independent reality which is not a mere repetition of experience in the workaday world. This will be made clearer later when we analyse the exact sense in which Bharata and Abhinava understand art's imitation of life.

The need for sympathetic induction in the spectator is once again clarified by Abhinava in his emphasis on the sentiment and the emotion as the hidden realities with which contact has to be established through the medium of the aesthetic presentation. We never rest content with the knowledge of adjectives but seek the substantives which the adjectives qualify. Likewise, the *Vibhavas*, etc. are not the terminal of aesthetic experience but the media which put us in rapport with the emotion back of them. Bhoja¹⁶⁴ stressed the same truth when he said that the *Vibhavas*, etc. were like the meaning of separate words (*Padantha*) in their relation to the meaning of the sentence (*Vakyantha*) as a whole. They do not exist separately by themselves. Their ultimate aim and sole justification are the manifestation of the *Rasa*. They are only the means (*Upayamata*) for the latter. Bhoja makes a subtle point when he proceeds to say that just as the meaning of separate words, though they are real, are not separately realised when we realise the meaning of the sentence, so quick is our emotive perception of the *Rasa* from the *Vibhavas*, etc. that there seem to be no *Vibhavas* at all nor even a process of transition (*Krama*) from them to the *Rasa*.¹⁶⁵

Abhinava stresses another subtle aspect of the situation. Bharata had used the word "union" or "combination" (*Samyoga*) in his famous formula for the evocation of *Rasa*. It is when the *Vibhavas*, etc. combine that the aesthetic emotion manifests itself. Now Abhinava makes it very clear that this combination is an organismic integration effected by the creative aes-

thetic pattern In mechanical integration, the elements retain their specificity of function. In organismic integration, the function and import of the elements take colour from the overall import and function Abhinava points out that each *Vibhava*, *Anubhava* or *Vyabhichari Bhava* cannot be taken as specifically and invariably related to a particular sentiment Tears can arise out of both joy and sorrow Perplexity (*Bhrama*) and anxiety (*Chinta*) can be the accessories of both extrovert activism (*Utsaha*) and the withdrawal of fear or insecurity¹⁶⁶ What eliminates all ambiguity is the total aesthetic pattern in which each of such features is organically embedded

Ananda Vardhana also emphasises that the reader or spectator should ideally reproduce in himself, with the aid of the suggestive, presented elements and his own reactivity and feeling equipment, a mode of experience similar to the one, under the spell of which a poet has expressed himself in the poem or aesthetic presentation in question¹⁶⁷ These elements are the *Vibhavas*, etc which the poet has presented But being only the objective correlatives of the emotion, they have to be imaginatively synthesised by the reader before they can recover for him the emotional experience Poetic experience is a "felt reality for all relishers"—*Samastabhavaka-svasamvedya* Here *samvedya* is itself enough, as it means felt reality But *svasamvedya* is used, it means "personally experienced"—an emphasis which is psychologically important, though perhaps etymologically unnecessary, since "experience" has to mean the personal experience of someone And this experience, Ananda Vardhana emphasises, is an indivisible, integral, unitary aesthetic experience (*Akhanda Charvana*) and *Rasa* means this experience.¹⁶⁸

CHAPTER TWO

The Poetic Circuit

I THE WORLD AND THE POET

ONE of the most significant contributions of Sanskrit poetics is its clear delineation of a circuit of poetic experience. In conformity with its general outlook, which identifies the modality of poetic experience with that of experience in life, in terms of stimulus and response, the circuit starts with the world itself, the womb of all experience. The next element is the creative spirit, the poet, who reacts intensely to the world and can embody his reaction in a form which is a socially valid objectification. This form indeed is the third link in the circuit. The fourth is the *Sahridaya*, the receiver of aesthetic experience, the spectator of the drama or the reader of poetry. Etymologically the term means that he is "of like heart" with the creative spirit. The circuit is complete when aesthetic experience makes the *Sahridaya* a more sensitively functioning entity in the world, with enriched and more refined reactivities.

"Without the stimulus and variety offered by contact with nature and the world about him, his (the artist's) work would tend to become monotonous and devitalised and would grow too subjective in character," wrote Margaret Bulley¹. Somerset Maugham² clarifies this interaction between world and art. "The author does not only write when he is at his desk. He writes all day long, when he is thinking, when he is reading, when he is experiencing. Everything he sees and feels is significant to his purpose and, consciously or unconsciously, he is for ever storing and making over his impressions." Sickert emphasised the need for "cumulative and silent observation—a manner of breathless listening, as it were, with the eyes, a listening extending over a long series of years"³. Marin wrote "Seems to me the true artist must perforce go from time to time to the elemental big forms—Sky, Sea, Mountain, Plains—and those things pertaining thereto, to sort of re-true himself up, to recharge the battery. For these big forms have everything. But to express these, you have to love these, to be a part of these in sympathy"⁴. Here we see that what is essential is not mere objective cognition of the variety of the world, but sympathetic interpenetration with its various elements and its life. Rodin made this clear when he said that the artist's eye,

grafted on his heart, reads deeply into the bosom of nature.⁵ The experience is not a hot-house product of closed subjectivity, for the world with its power floods into the heart. This is what Hopkins called the "inscape", that stirring of something in the world whose passage into himself he called "instress". On the other hand, the experience is not a complete donation of the outside world to the human spirit. As Abrams⁶ has emphasised in his study of romantic poetry, the artist is not content merely to hold the mirror up to nature, but seeks to cast over the world "the light that never was on sea or land, the consecration and the Poet's dream". Wordsworth revealed the true nature of the bipolar field of interaction which is aesthetic experience when he said that the imagination was "creator and receiver both" and when he described himself as a lover "of all the mighty world of eye and ear—both what they half-create and what perceive". The world and the self, thus, have to interpenetrate. "When he (the artist) has succeeded in dissolving the world in his pure subjectivity," wrote Gentile,⁷ "that is to say, in feeling it, then only can he express it, drawing from himself what has flowed into him, and analysing in the light of consciousness the dim and formless matter within him, the mere feeling."

The reality of the interpenetration of the world and the self has been brought out by Rilke⁸ in a superb passage which it is worthwhile reproducing here, though it is slightly long. "Verses are not, as people imagine, simply feelings, they are experiences. In order to write a single verse, one must see many cities, and men and things. One must get to know animals and the flight of birds, and the gestures that the little flowers make when they open out to the morning. One must be able to return in thought to roads in unknown regions, to unexpected encounters, and to partings that had been long foreseen, to days of childhood that are still indistinct, and to parents whom one had to hurt when they sought to give one some pleasure which one did not understand (it would have been a pleasure to someone else), to childhood's illnesses that so strangely begin with such a number of profound and grave transformations, to days spent in rooms withdrawn and quiet, and to mornings by the sea, to the sea itself, to oceans, to nights of travel that rushed along swiftly and flew with all the stars—and still it is not enough to think of all this. There must be memories of many nights of love, each unlike the others, of the screams of women in labour, and of women in childbed, light and blanched and sleeping, shutting themselves in. But one must also have been besides the dying, must have sat beside the dead in a room with open windows and with fitful noises. And still it is not enough to have memories. One must be able to forget them when they are many, and one must have the immense patience to wait until they come again. For it is the memories themselves that matter. Only when they have turned to blood within us, to glance and gesture, nameless and no longer to be distinguished from ourselves—only then can it happen that in a most rare hour the first word of a poem arises in their midst and goes forth from them."

While apologising for the length of this quotation which, if casually and unsympathetically read, might read like an inventory of the stuff out of which poetry can be made, I must hasten to add that it was necessary for bringing out the affinities between Sanskrit poetics and world currents. Analysing the form of the *Kavya* or the extended narrative poem, Dandin⁹ of the eighth century also mentions a string of features which read like an inventory. The subject should be taken from old narratives or traditions, not therefore invented, as regards its main episodic stream. That is, its historicity should be essentially valid, it should have, or at least could have, formed part of the world's events, of the experience of men in the world. The hero should be sensitive and noble, because he has to react deeply and ideally to the world first, before he can become a medium which can enable the reader to react similarly. There should be descriptions of towns, oceans, mountains, seasons, the rising and setting of the sun and moon, sport in parks or the sea, drinking, love-dalliance, separations, marriages, the birth of progeny, meeting of councils, embassies, campaigns, battles, and the triumph of the hero, though his rival's merits may be exalted. The enumeration has an archaic flavour. But it is obvious that Dandin was keeping in mind as a model Valmiki's *Ramayana*. It is also true that many of the later epic poems reveal a dismal misunderstanding and use the features mechanically as an inventory very convenient for padding. But the meaning should be clear, especially when we remember Valmiki. The epic poem should paint a great fresco of man in the world, of life, of human action straddling a vast landscape and continued over seasons, years and generations, of character and personality being moulded by the world and in turn reacting on it.

In epochs when poetry became a cult, a substitute for living instead of the grace of a perfected living, the theme of escape became a very familiar one. Many nineteenth century French poets turned to the theme of flight. back to childhood, into the distant past, to other lands real or fanciful, into artificial paradises created with a variety of stimulants. Baudelaire's fancy is always setting sail for exotic lands; sometimes it wants to sail away from this world altogether.¹⁰ Leconte de Lisle¹¹ felt that the poet had no place in an industrial, technocratic culture and vigorously defended his preoccupation with the past, the preference of the dead over the living. Mallarmé was deliberate in his commitment to create a world divorced from empirical reality, "an abstract realm, superior, situated nowhere"¹². The restricted evolution of the Sanskrit language itself as a medium of the élite and the development of urban culture which won immense prestige for the *Nagarika*, the cultured urbanite, as the ideal social type, have in fact tended to make a substantial proportion of the literary output in Sanskrit also a courtly tradition with closed horizons where preciousness often supplanted depth and range of feeling. But the profounder ideal of the poet as well as the *Sahodaya*, who could feel with men and women and indeed all created things in the variety and depth of

their experience, was also continuously active. In a drama like Bhavabhūti's *Uttara Rama Charita*, memories, not only of "nights of love, each unlike the others", but also of the heart-breaking demands made by the world for moral decisions which can compel a king to inflict terrible wounds upon himself as individual, turn to blood within the poet, his characters and lastly within us.

If the world, the prime source of all experience, is the initial point in the circuit of poetic experience, the second element is the poet. Ananda Vardhana¹³ describes his role in exalted language. The poet is a creator in the boundless world of poetry. The universe appears to assume that from which he is pleased to give to it. Whatever be the emotion (either love or pathos or heroism) with which he charges his poem, the world becomes immersed therein. Mahima Bhatta¹⁴ in the eleventh century uses equally lyrical language. Poetic genius (*Pratibha*) is like the third eye of God Siva, with which the poet perceives the shape of things, past, present and future. Poetic consciousness touches for a moment the Real Essence of the world.¹⁵

What are the requisites of a poet,¹⁶ the gifts that go into the making of a poet?¹⁷ Creative genius (*Pratibha*) is of course the basic requisite. About culture (*Vyutpatti*) and the skill that comes from constant practice (*Abhyasa*) there is difference of opinion. While stressing the supreme importance of the creative imagination, Rudrata¹⁸ of the ninth century and Hema Chandra¹⁹ of the twelfth incline to the view that culture and practice can polish, brighten, and sharpen the imagination. Sanskrit poetics, thus, would not agree with Ben Jonson²⁰ that "a good poet is made as well as born", but would be inclined to assent to this opinion of Horace²¹. "The question is whether a noble song is produced by nature or art. I neither believe in mere labour being of avail without a rich vein of talent, nor in natural ability which is not educated." Though Coleridge²² distinguished genius and imagination from the corresponding lower faculties, talent and fancy, regarding the former as unifying and reconciling and the latter as only combinatory and thus mechanistic and associationist, he did not regard the two groups as mutually exclusive. Rather, genius needed talent and imagination needed fancy. He left empirical and associationist thought undisturbed in a subordinate position below an idealistic system. Ananda Vardhana,²³ while not directly contradicting such views, wants to make it clear beyond any ambiguity that the supreme position is reserved for creative imagination. He says that if the poet has the creative power (*Sakti* or *Pratibha*) the defects that may arise from the lack of culture or learning will be cancelled, whereas, if the poet is deficient in it, and has only learning, the defects in his composition will stand out as conspicuous features unassimilated into the poetic organism. This seems to be very similar to the view of Keats. "The Genius of poetry must work out its own salvation in a man. It cannot be matured by law and precept, but by sensation and watchfulness in itself. That which is creative must create itself."

The consensus of opinion is that the creative imagination is a native

endowment Bharata²¹ designates it as the "internal disposition" (*Antargata Bhava*) of the poet Both Bhamaha²⁵ of the seventh century and Dandin²⁶ of the eighth acknowledge the supremacy of the creative imagination which is said to be endowed by nature (*Naisargiki*) or inborn (*Sahaja*) Vamana²⁷ of the eighth century, who seems to have been the minister of King Jayapida of Kashmir, puts this more emphatically. He asserts that in creative imagination lies the seed of poetry (*Kavya Biya*) and defines it as an ante-natal capacity of the mind without which no poetry is possible and if attempted the poetic performance would only become ridiculous Abhinava²⁸ quotes Bharata's opinion that creativity is an internal disposition and proceeds to his own elaborate definition of it as consciousness or sentience (*Prajna*) capable of original invention (*apuvva-vastu-numana-kshama*), its distinguishing characteristic being the capacity of creating poetry, possessed of relishable feeling, clarity and beauty (*rasavesa-vasadya-saundarya-kavya-numana-kshamatvam*) Mammata²⁹ aligns himself with the view expressed by Vamana though he uses the more general term, power (*Sakti*) for poetic creativity (*Pratibha*) Another definition is cited as anonymous by Hema Chandra,³⁰ though Kshemendra³¹ (eleventh century) thinks it was formulated by Abhinava's teacher, Bhatta Tauta, in his lost work *Kavya Kautuka* Here poetic imagination is defined as the consciousness that can body forth ever fresh presentations (*Prajna-nava-navollekha-salini*) This corresponds to Dr Johnson's statement that the "essence" of poetry is "invention"³²

There is another quotation in Hema Chandra from Tauta in which Tauta speaks of the greatness of the poet, whom he calls Sage and Seer Hema Chandra uses this quotation while speaking of the etymology of the word *Kavi*, poet The *Kavi* has *Darsana* or vision and *Vanana*, the power of description or objective presentation Without the latter the Seer does not become a poet Poetry is not mere vision, but vision objectified in poetic cast, *Vanana*³³ Lowell³⁴ has a passage which expresses the same outlook "However far we go back, we shall find that the poet and the priest were united originally in the same person, which means that the poet was he who was conscious of the world of spirit as well as that of sense, and was the ambassador of the gods to men This was his highest function, and the reason for his name of 'seer' . . . Gradually, however, the poet as the 'seer' became secondary to the 'maker'. His office became that of entertainer than teacher But always something of the old tradition was kept alive And if he has now come to be looked upon as merely the best expresser, the gift of seeing is implied as necessarily antecedent to that, and of seeing very deep too" Focussing attention on the danger of poetry degenerating into shallow verbalism, Lowell here places the accent on prior vision Bhatta Tauta takes vision for granted as the initial reality without which poetry cannot come into being and therefore he proceeds to lay emphasis on the power of creative objectification Raja Sekhara,³⁵ the tenth century writer, brings out the same idea by

stating that poetic imagination has two aspects, appreciative (*Bhāvayitṛi*) and creative (*Karāyitṛi*). The appreciative aspect is generally discussed with reference to the role of the reader or spectator. But it also refers to the poet's own role, his own appreciation of the world and sensitive reaction to it which yield the vision (*Darsana*) that is later enshrined through the power of objectification (*Varnana*). When Maritain³⁶ asserts that creativity of the spirit is the first ontological root of artistic activity in the vital dynamism of fine arts, prior experience should be taken as elliptically understood. Only when sensitive experience is the great prior reality can a good book, as Milton puts it, become "the precious life-blood of a master spirit embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life". And if Sanskrit poetics stresses the power of poetic imagination for ever original invention (*Nava navollekha*) it would essentially agree with Ruskin's claim that "the virtue of originality that men so strive after is not newness—it is only genuineness". But it is the genuineness of a rare vision gained through a rare capacity for the most sensitive experience and therefore, for less sensitive reactivities, it cannot but appear as original.

Alike in the prior vision and the subsequent objectification, the primary reality is the dynamism of the aesthetic process. Sanskrit poetics repeatedly emphasises the continuous transitive action of the poet, on the world so that it will yield to him the mystery of its deeper essence in his vision and feeling-response, on his medium so that it would mould to shape under his plastic, creative handling and thus become a transparent symbol for feeling which was originally private and opaque. Thus, we find writer after writer emphasising the importance of the poet's action (*Kavī Vyāpāra* or *Kavī Karma*), the continued, unremitting activity of the poetic consciousness. Whenever controversy tended to get bogged down on the details of formal elements, this concept has proved immensely helpful in pulling it up again to a higher perspective, for what gives any formal element or technical detail its power is the reality of the poetic action behind it. Bhatta Nayaka, as Jayaratha³⁷ of the thirteenth century points out, made the poet's action (*Vyāpāra*) which makes both sound and sense, expression and idea, subservient to itself, the basic reality in poetry. Kuntaka³⁸ of the eleventh century, who formulated a significant theory of poetic expression which we shall discuss later, also agreed in deriving the unique quality of poetic expression from the activity of the poetic consciousness (*Kavī Karma*). Reviewing the many theories which emphasised the importance of either idea or expression, Samudra Bandha,³⁹ who wrote about 1300, summed up the situation by saying that only an inclusive theory which recognised the importance of both the expression and the expressed and derived both from the activity of the poet's genius which shaped everything could be finally acceptable. Raja Sekhara⁴⁰ also states that neither the idea nor the word but the manner of expressing that idea in words (*Ukti Viśeṣa*) is what makes poetry. Nilakantha Dikshita⁴¹ of the seventeenth century echoes the same thought in almost the same terms.

Susanne Langer⁴² makes an important distinction between the physical object and the object created by aesthetic activity. The latter has a physical existence, but it is not a physical object, it is a virtual object. This is because the real potency of the artistic creation is not exhausted by its finite reality. As Coleridge says, the infinite spirit presents itself through the finite object. Subject in one aspect, object in another, the work of art is both infinite and finite. "In the existence, in the reconciling, and the recurrence of this contradiction consist the process and mystery of production and life. The intelligence tends to objectize itself and to know itself in the object"⁴³ Because artistic productions are not evolutes of nature, given elements of physical creation, their reality does not depend on physical reality, but on the fact that they are real creations of poetic power. Mammata⁴⁴ illustrates this with reference to the painting of a horse and explains further that art objects have no place in the everyday world of space and time. Because of this freedom from the limitation of spatio-temporal locus or physical status, the question of physical reality ceases to be applicable to them. This does not mean that they are unreal. It only means that the distinction of physical existence and non-existence does not arise at all in their case. This seems to have been the position of Yayavariya also, as recorded by Raja Sekhara⁴⁵. In poetry, things are not what they are physically, but what they are to the mind of the poet. Raja Sekhara also quotes the opinion of his talented wife, Avanti Sundari, who says "There is no constant nature of things, so far as poetry is concerned. For the poet's mind and poetic expression conceive of things in all sorts of ways". The objective reality which science investigates is not what counts here, but the reality of the poetic reaction, the reality created as a new order of virtual existence by poetic action. Purely imaginative creations thereby become as palpable, to quote a favourite idiom of Sanskrit poetics, "as a globular berry in the palm of one's hand".

It is because the power, the halo, donated by the poet's spirit is of far greater significance than the contours of the object as given that Sanskrit poetics has insisted that there can be no such distinction as poetic and unpoetic subjects. Bhamaha⁴⁶ of the seventh century, one of the oldest writers on poetics, states that there is nothing in the realm of being or in that of thought which does not serve the poet's purpose. Bradley⁴⁷ states the same thing when he asserts that "we cannot determine beforehand what subjects are fit for art, or name any object on which a good poem might not possibly be written". Bhamaha had indicated that any thought could also be transmuted into poetry. It is interesting to note that a reviewer⁴⁸ found a poetic transmutation of the second law of thermodynamics in these lines of Robert Frost.

*And even substance lapsing unsubstantial,
The universal cataract of death
That spends to nothingness*

Dhananjaya¹⁹ endorses Bhamaha "Nothing is there, in the world, whether it be delightful or detestable, high or low, gross or elegant, occult or deformed, entity or non-entity, which, when touched by the imagination of the poet and men of taste, does not become *Rasa*" This is because poetry, even when overtly dealing with a subject, is a new creation "In the boundless world of poetry," said Ananda Vardhana,⁵⁰ "the poet is the sole creator" The object is recreated and acquires a personal reference to the creator "In looking at objects of nature," wrote Coleridge,⁵¹ "I seem to be rather seeking a symbolical language for something within me than observing anything new" Beauty is "the subjection of matter to spirit so as to be transformed into a symbol, in and through which the spirit reveals itself" The infinite objects of the world can be annexed and assimilated to the realm of spirit if the poet "can see them feel or link them to some feeling" As Coleridge said in the *Nightingale*, "in nature there is nothing melancholy", nor is there anything glad And he emphasises the supreme importance of *Kavi Vyapara*, the poet's action, in *Dejection* when he says that in us lives "the spirit and the power which, wedding nature to us, gives in dower a new Earth and new Heaven" This truth is valid not only in poetry, but for all the arts In Van Gogh, for instance, as Schapiro⁵² has pointed out, in every painting we experience his exaltation before things In him the opposites of reality and emotion are united and reconciled Van Gogh⁵³ himself has recorded that he yearned "to express hope by some star, the eagerness of a soul by a sunset radiance" And Malraux has rightly called his famous painting of the chair an ideogram of himself

II THE POEM AND THE WORLD

In the discussion of the creative transformation by which the natural object becomes the ideogram of the poet's personality, we have moved on to the interface between the second and third components of the poetic circuit, the poet and his socially objectified self-expression, the poem For the ideogramatic quality refers back to the poetic action which created it and forward to the poem in which it is concretised Form, structure, style, ornament, all are organic features of the poetic creation and since their extended analysis is taken up in several chapters that follow, here we shall concentrate only on a basic issue the relation of the poem, the third term in the poetic circuit, to the world, which is the first term, the mediating agent between the two being, of course, the poet

Bharata⁵⁴ states emphatically that the basis of authority or authenticity (*Pramana*) for the dramatic representation is the world A theorist can only give initial guidance, the rest can be learnt only from the world He emphasises that one has to know the infinite variety of human nature—basic human nature (*Prakṛti*) and the habits and manners generated by the socio-cultural process (*Sila*)—since it is on this that drama is based

And finally, in judging drama, the ground of reference for the success of the art is the world⁵⁵ But is art an exact imitation of the world? If the basis is the world, Abhinava⁵⁶ significantly compares it to the wall (*Bhūti Samya*) which is further beautified by murals The ways of the world (*Loka Dharm*) only furnish a canvas What fills it with significance is the creative act of the poet The expression "imitation"—of life—does occur in Sanskrit poetics (*Anukaranam*) But Abhinava⁵⁷ takes great pains to point out that Bharata had used a different word, *Anukirtanam* It is difficult to translate this very significant expression in one word The distinction which Abhinava establishes between *Anukaranam* and *Anukirtanam* broadly suggests the distinction between a song on life and a psalm of life Abhinava explains the word as meaning *Anuvyavasaya* *Vyavasaya* means work or activity and the expression implies working with nature or working in the manner in which nature works This means that art does not imitate the forms which are the end products of nature's activity but imitates that creative activity itself Since *Kirtanam* means a psalm, an upward-soaring expression of idealism, there is implicit here the belief that there is an upward trend in the evolutionary processes of nature which aesthetic insight should imitate to further that creative evolution

There is a philosophical background to this, a brief exposition of which will help in clarifying the meaning Among the many philosophical systems of India, the Samkhya doctrine was definitely a doctrine of evolution In its explanation of the mechanism of evolution, Samkhya is opposed to the outlook which reduces it as a casual sequence resting on accidents Random mutations in the genes, and the action of the struggle for existence on the resulting variations in the capacities of organisms for survival imply essentially a series of accidents Like Bergson and Lecomte du Nouy, Samkhya affirms a broad inner orientation or self-direction in nature The need of the organism for a rich, diversified contact with the world generates the function (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch) and the function produces the organ (eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin) The brain and mind are also physical realities produced by the evolution of nature But there was one difficulty in the Samkhya formulation It posited an absolute dichotomy between spirit (*Purusha*) and matter (*Prakṛti*) The presence of spirit catalytically activates matter to evolve, but it is itself completely aloof from the evolutionary process The insistence on this absolute dichotomy reflects certain trends in the prior philosophical tradition which had contrasted the world's flux with the unchanging Absolute existence and seen in the former a graded-down reality, if not a complete alienation from real existence

Vyasa who gave us the *Gita*, resolved this difficulty If he was a great philosopher, he was an even greater poet As a poet he could not agree to the rejection of the crowded splendour of the world, its tensions, pains and ecstasies The teleological trend in the processes of nature did not seem to him to be congruent with the Samkhya assumption that nature

was dead, inert, insentient, prodded into evolutionary process by the action of a remote, merely catalytic, agent. He asserted that spirit was not aloof from the world, but its inner guiding power. He also derived historical existence as a divine programme and man could become the ally of God when he recognised it as such. The *Pratyabhijña* (which essentially means this recognition) doctrine to which Abhinava and his teacher Utpala adhered, also moved away from the Sankhya dichotomy to the *Gita's* integration. Creation is God's manifestation of Himself to Himself, a reflection of God in a mirror which also is God Himself.

When the dichotomy of pure being and the world, absolute existence and historical existence, was thus resolved, there were two immense gains. First of all, art could concern itself with nature and historical existence, with phenomenological experience, without the tormenting doubt that it was immersing itself in mere illusion. Secondly, evolution in nature was a reality and since, in man, nature had become endowed with self-consciousness and freedom of will, which, according to the *Pratyabhijña* doctrine, are attributes of the divine existence donated to man, he had to undertake the endeavour to further the evolution. *Anuvyavasaya* means working like nature, with nature. Commenting on the Aristotelian formula that drama is the imitation of action in life, Maritain points out that this does not refer to a merely successive picture or image of the actions performed in human life—merely successive, that is, made up, as Bergson put it, of immobile sections sewn to one another in time, like the picture of a race or a football game by the movies. "The 'imitation of action' is itself an action, which is analogous to the actions performed in human life, and which recasts them in a man-born pattern. And this action—analogue to the action of human life—is the action of the work itself, the action of the play"⁵⁸ This brings out exactly the meaning of the expression *Anuvyavasaya*. The expression, *Anukirtanam*, reveals further the idealising quality of that action. The real is what has been achieved so far by evolution. The ideal is what can be, what is to be, achieved further. "The artist's work," said Goethe, "is real in so far it is always true, ideal in that it is never actual"⁵⁹ Baudelaire⁶⁰ wrote "The imagination is the queen of the realm of the true and the *possible* is one of the provinces of the true. It is positively related to the infinite." Newman⁶¹ claimed that "it is the essence of poetry that it delineates that perfection which the imagination suggests, and to which as a limit the present system of Divine Providence actually tends."

If the innermost inspiration of poetic action edits the real into the ideal, the outer form, correspondingly, edits raw reality into style. One of the most brilliant contributions of Susanne Langer⁶² is her clarification of this truth. As a virtual, rather than an actual, object, the art symbol establishes its habitat at a distance from nature. Each art is removed from nature, even while reflecting it, by its own "primary illusion." Langer's choice of the word "illusion" is unfortunate, and unnecessary since she

has already clarified that the art symbol is a virtual and not an actual object. What she means is that each art form creates a new order of equivalents for the features of reality. In painting, this is "virtual space". The space in painting is a semblance of actual space, but it is a new, virtual reality and has no relation to the space of common sense or of science. The virtual space of painting is matched by the virtual volume of sculpture, the virtual "place" of architecture (distinct from the usable room in a building), the virtual time of music, the virtual powers of dance, the virtual history of fiction, etc. The fact that works of art float in a space-time-cause world of their own creation does not at all imply that they have no connection with life and reality. For aesthetic creativity is a part of life and reality, and this new order is its creation, just as natural forms are the creation of the evolutionary energy of nature.

Bharata⁶³ also insists that the very idea of drama involves the non-acceptance of reality in its raw features (*Svabhava*). He asserts⁶⁴ further that the imaginative recreation of the external world involves the acceptance of a complex of dramaturgical conventions, (*Natya Dhami*) which together create a style and transform the ways of the world, of reality (*Loka Dhami*) into an aesthetic presentation⁶⁵. The casual drift of the world's events has to be tightened and concentrated into poignancy. Monologues become perfectly justifiable. Abhinava⁶⁶ asserts that the presence of only one actor (*Ekapatihariyatvam*) which is the feature of the Sanskrit monologue play, the Bhana, is a legitimate *Natya Dhami*. Invisible presences like the Furies in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus, symbolical of retribution, have to take form on the stage. Abhinava points out that in the drama, *Maya Pushpaka*, the divine curse storms into the stage as a terrible form. Lowes⁶⁷ wrote: "We are dealing with the communication of ideas, perceptions, feelings, impressions. That involves a medium. The medium and the thing communicated do not correspond: stage time is not real time, a surface has no depth, words are not things. There are differences between the relations in each case, of course, but in all one fundamental fact appears; we accept as one thing something which is another and a different thing. Convention, therefore, so far as art is concerned, represents concurrence in certain accepted methods of communication. And the fundamental conventions of every art grow out of the nature of its medium." The fact that Sanskrit drama, as conceived by Bharata, was above all a presentation with a unique style, created out of conventions growing out of the nature of the media used, comes out clearly when we read Bharata on the role of dance and music, the idiom of dramatic speech, the symbolic gesture. In his typology, Bharata did in fact include the realistic play. But it figures lower down in the hierarchy. He calls such productions *Bahya*, a term which implies that creativity limits itself to the imitation of the external surface of reality. The fully stylised presentation is called *Abhyantara* which suggests a fuller penetra-

tion by the creative genius into inwardness, into the autonomy of its own formal organisation as well as the deepest essence of reality⁶⁸

III. THE RELISHER

The fourth link in the poetic circuit is the reader or the spectator Sanskrit poetics calls him *Sahūdaya*, "of like heart" with the poet. This is not just a flowery tribute, but a whole theory about the transfer of aesthetic experience is behind it. The theory is based on the recognition of a kinship of spirit between the poet and the sensitive reader. Ananda Vardhana⁶⁹ clearly states that appreciation of poetry is essentially the same as the creation of it. Pratiharendu Raja,⁷⁰ of the tenth century, commenting on the "endotelic listening" (*Bhavana Vyapar*) which is a significant element in Bhatta Nayaka's formulation, proceeds to a generalised concept of imagination, which, according to him, is the basis not only of poetic creation but also of the reader's and critic's aesthetic recreation of poetry in the enjoyment of it. The aesthetic emotion is transferred only when there is an ideal reawakening of it in the reader. Ananda Vardhana⁷¹ briefly describes the process by which this awakening takes place. The sensibility of the responsive reader first becomes attuned to the emotional situation portrayed (*Hṛdaya Samvada*). It then identifies itself with the portrayal (*Tanmayibhavana*). It is only when this identification is there that experience of the aesthetic emotion (*Rasanubhava*) becomes a reality. Dhananjaya⁷² of the tenth century elaborates this. The creatively moulded aesthetic presentation which is an integration of stimuli (*Vibhavas*, etc.) makes the sentiment relishable as an emotion. The enjoyer of the aesthetic emotion (*Rasika*) is the member of the audience (*Samajika*) who has the requisite sensitivity. Dhananjaya makes clear two things. First, the locus of the aesthetic emotion is the sensibility, not the stage representation or the libretto. The emotion is not a static entity but a processual reality which is perceived only when it is experienced. The locus of the *Rasa*, he points out, is not in the represented hero who belongs to the past, nor is it in the poem itself which is at best an integrated configuration of aesthetic excitants. Even more important is the second fact that the *Rasa* does not consist of the reader's mere apprehension (*Pratiti*) of the emotion latent in the poem or enacted by the actor. For, in the case of mere apprehension, the emotion is an external reality to which the spectators react differentially according to their different temperaments, just as the spectacle of the intimacies of a pair of lovers may cause shame, envy, desire or aversion. Identification is necessary for aesthetic experience. The reader or the spectator has to receive the represented feeling into his own soul to enjoy it. And this enjoyment is an active process of delectation (*asvada*, *chaitanya*, *rasana* or *bhoga*).

The concept of the *Sahūdaya* is nearest to *Empfindung* or Empathy (oneness of feeling with) as basis of poetic pleasure. For, without the

tuning to the poet and to the premises of a poem, no appreciation is possible or correct. Empathy involves inner mimicry. Watching an athlete doing the long jump, our body unconsciously simulates the posture of the former as it hurtles through space. But as Lee⁷³ has warned, it may be dangerous to seek always in incipient motor or visceral mimicry the total explanation of empathy. It is true that glandular changes organise the body for action in emotional situations. The rush of blood in anger and the faster pulse give the body greater energy to attack or repulse the object that aroused the anger. But it would be naive to regard the bodily changes as the initial phenomenon and to derive anger as merely the passive awareness of these changes. As Darwin revealed in his analysis of involuntary expressions like blushing, often it is the mind that is affected first and initiates the bodily changes. As Lee has said, when empathic imagination—itsself varying from individual to individual—happens to be united to a high degree of (also individually very varying) physiological excitability, the visceral and motor mimicry may be conspicuously evident. But the prior reality is the swinging into action of the empathic imagination.

Plato⁷⁴ has a passage which reveals complete agreement with the view of Sanskrit poetics that the transfer of aesthetic experience takes place through sympathetic induction. "The stone Euripides calls magnet does not only attract iron rings, but it also gives them the power of attracting other rings as the stone itself does. In the same way, the Muse herself inspires the artists, and through their inspiration others are enraptured, and the line of inspired is produced. . . One poet is suspended from one Muse, another from another, he is said to be 'possessed'. From these primary rings, the poets, others are in turn suspended. . ." If, as Bhatta Tauta said, vision precedes description in the case of the poet, the description transfers the vision to the reader. The glory of art, says Nahm,⁷⁵ is that it "creates the creator", that is, the percipient is enabled to share the thoughts and feelings of the artist, to share in other words the mysterious but exhilaratory experience of creation. Dewey⁷⁶ also concurs with the view that the sensitive reader is "of like heart" with the poet. The artist and audience should not be separated since "to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience. We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes, the processes the artist went through in producing the work." Spingarn,⁷⁷ similarly, wrote "The identity of genius and taste is the final achievement of modern thought on the subject of art, and it means that, fundamentally, in their most significant moments, the creative and the critical instincts are one and the same. . . Criticism at last can free itself of its age-long self-contempt, now that it may realize that aesthetic judgment and artistic creation are instinct with the same vital life." There are innumerable echoes of the same view in European thought. Empson,⁷⁸ for instance, wrote. "The process of getting to understand a poet is precisely that of constructing his

poems in one's own mind'. The reader has then created the poem anew for himself—by means of the poet's words. The conviction that the true apprehension of poetry is a creative process is seen also in this delightfully lucid declaration of Sir Percy Nunn: "To lead pupils to 'appreciate' is not merely to lead them to admire or to take pleasure in a beautiful thing, but to make them become in a sense its re-creators."⁷⁹ Robert Graves⁸⁰ laid down that "the reader of the poem must fall into a complementary trance if he is to appreciate its full meaning". The reference to the trance would have been particularly liked by Sanskrit writers, for, as we shall see later, aesthetic experience to them is definitely a trance-like condition when the awareness of all other things is eliminated (*Vigalita vedyantara Vedyantara sparsa sunya*). Maritain⁸¹ also identifies appreciation and creation: "Just as the original intuition arose from a self-identification of the artist with the appointed theme, so aesthetic experience, reproduction, arises from a self-identification of the spectator with the presented matter, criticism repeats the process of creation". Finally, Dhananjaya's insistence that the poem is not the external object but the inward experience is matched by Martin's reference to "the series of events in our own mind that for convenience but sometimes all too complacently we call 'Milton's Poetry' "⁸²

The reader has to be steadily drawing near to the writer and finally identify himself with him to recover his experience. "Everything is tedious when one does not read with the feelings of the author," wrote Wordsworth⁸³. Virginia Woolf⁸⁴ advises: "Do not dictate to your author, try to become him. Be his fellow worker and accomplice". Proust regarded the processes of appreciation as variations of the process of creation, the difference being operational rather than functional. "In reality, every reader, as he reads, is the reader of himself. The work of the writer is only a sort of optic instrument which he offers to the reader so that he may discern in the book what he would probably not have seen in himself."⁸⁵ Proust said that the reader recognises himself in the book and Shorthouse said the same thing with a fuller penetration into the inwardness of the situation. "It seems to me that a favourite book knew me."⁸⁶ Walpole⁸⁷ wrote: "One is inclined to feel that no book is written by its author, or rather that an author merely collects notes for a certain suggested work and that every reader then writes the book for himself". Baudelaire⁸⁸ asserted that in all the arts, there is "a lacuna which is completed by the imagination of the relisher". This lacuna is not any deficiency on the part of the creator of the artistic presentation. It exists so, long as the relisher stops short at a mere apprehension (*Pratiti*), as Dhananjaya clarified. It is eliminated when the objectified feeling is received into his own soul by the reader and relished. And when this happens the identity of creator and relisher is reached. Pascal wrote "Not in Montaigne, but in myself I find all that I see in him."

If the reader or critic is "of like heart" with the poet, the expression

should not be interpreted to mean that the transfer of aesthetic experience is automatic or that the recipient is passive in this process. Apart from the fact that "endotelic listening" is an active reaching outward of the consciousness in search of the cues and stimuli embodied in the aesthetic presentation, Sanskrit poetics expects this mobilisation of sensibility to be stabilised as a habit before the reader can mature into a critic. Abhinava⁸⁹ says that the more a man is attuned to aesthetic impressions from literature by constant literary habit, the more mirror-like his heart is as a consequence of the constant study of poetry, the more easily is the transfer of aesthetic emotion effected. The constant relishing (*Charvāna*) of poetry refines the sensibility in such a way that cues can trigger the aesthetic experience while the casual reader would need the full presentation and perhaps also interpretation. Even stray verses are enough for the *Sahūdaya* to understand the full context⁹⁰

The view regarding the equipment which the critic should have, implicit here, is endorsed by Western critics. As Cook⁹¹ said, "art relies for its full effect on what the spectator brings with him". "It is through the emotions," says Constable,⁹² "that the art historian has to judge whether he is in the presence of a work of art." This is not so banal a remark as would seem at first sight. In the evaluation of period art, an especially fine emotional sensitiveness is required as the strangeness of the idiom would normally block the perception of aesthetic values. As in the case of aesthetic creativity, in receptivity also innate sensitiveness (*Vasana*) and imagination (*Pratibha*) are irreducible requirements, for which erudition (*Vyutpatti*) cannot be a substitute. Dewey⁹³ wrote. "Since the matter of aesthetic criticism is the perception of aesthetic objects, natural and artistic criticism is always determined by the quality of first-hand perception, obtuseness in perception can never be made good by any amount of learning, however extensive, nor any command of abstract theory, however correct." D. H. Lawrence⁹⁴ put it more forcibly. "A critic must be able to feel the impact of a work of art in all its complexity and its force. To do so, he must be a man of force and complexity himself, which few critics are. A man with a paltry, impudent nature will never write anything but paltry, impudent criticism. And a man who is emotionally educated is as rare as a phoenix. The more scholastically educated a man is generally, the more he is an emotional boor." Lawrence's sharp contrast between scholastic equipment and emotional sensitivity is in harmony with the emphasis of Sanskrit poetics on oneness of heart, that is, sensibility, rather than intellectual parity, between reader and poet. And Lawrence's emphasis on the education of emotions recalls Abhinava's stress on constant touch with literature which alone can make the heart's mirror capable of reflecting the subtlest lights and shades of the aesthetic presentation and the emotional nuances behind them. Leavis⁹⁵ endorses this. "Intentions are nothing in art except as realised, and the tests of realization will remain what they are. They are

applied in the operation of the critic's sensibility, they are a matter of his sense, derived from his literary experience of what the living thing feels like " As Lewis Gates⁹⁶ said, the critic tries to recreate the consciousness of the artist at the moment he evoked his images, "charged them with spiritual power, and called into rhythmical order sound-symbols to represent them henceforth for ever".

IV THE CONCEPT OF BEAUTY

In the Sanskrit tradition, poetics has occasionally been referred to as the science of beauty (*Saundarya Sastri*) The words for beauty are *Saundarya*, *Charutva*, *Chamatkara*, etc But the general tendency is to play down the concept as not having any autonomous validity and to assimilate it to the quality of the poet's action and the significance of the experience he donates to the reader Only one writer, Visvesvara⁹⁷ of the fourteenth century, has written a work on poetics with a title specifically mentioning beauty And even this work opens with the statement that beauty (*Chamatkara*) is the sensitive reader's delight on reading a poem And since he traces this delight to the feeling content and its expression through structure, diction, figures of speech, etc it is clear that the concept of beauty has been generalised and assimilated into the quality of the poetic action itself A significant synonym for the beautiful is *Hridya*, that which is capable of moving the heart with a fine delight The earlier writers use the term *Chamatkara* as a synonym for positive literary relish From Abhinava⁹⁸ we understand that Bhatta Nayaka had used the word in that sense Ananda Vardhana⁹⁹ also uses the word in the same sense Abhinava¹⁰⁰ uses the word many times, but always consistently with the same generalised meaning Kuntaka¹⁰¹ of the eleventh century assimilates the concept of beauty to the general theory of creative poetic action (*Kavi Karma*) Narayana, an ancestor of Visvanatha of the fourteenth century, equated beauty (*Chamatkara*) with the expansion of the heart (*Chitta Vistara*) that results from aesthetic experience and held all kinds of *Rasa* realisation to be of the nature of this type of Longinian transport Jagannatha¹⁰² in the seventeenth century equated beauty with the disinterested, supermundane pleasure we obtain in aesthetic experience The *Agni Purana*¹⁰³ equates the experience of aesthetic emotion, beauty and the luminous sentience of the soul (*Atma Chaitanya*)

The attitude of Sanskrit poetics, therefore, is definitely against equating beauty with sensate surface, especially as given in nature, and in favour of assimilating the concept to the basic and more generalised reality of the poet's action which creates a transformed order of existence even out of the natural datum The artist seeks to create, not a pretty form, but significant form European thought generally endorses this André Breton¹⁰⁴ referred to the "absurd distinction between the beautiful and the ugly" Constable claimed . "There is nothing ugly I never saw an

ugly thing in my life. For, let the form of the object be what it may, light, shade, and perspective will always make it beautiful." Addison wrote : "Anything that is disagreeable when looked upon, pleases us in an apt description. Here, therefore, we must inquire a new principle of pleasure, which is nothing else but the Action of the Mind, which compares the ideas that arise from words, with the ideas that arise from the objects themselves. For this reason, therefore, the description of a dung hill is pleasing to the imagination, if the image be represented to our minds by suitable expressions' ¹⁰⁵ What Addison calls the Action of the Mind is the exact equivalent of the *Kavi Vyapara* of Sanskrit poet-cs. In Addison's formulation, the inwardness of the description, of the power of words, is not sufficiently stressed but can be assumed. As Bhatta Tauta and Hema Chandra would put it, the description (*Vannana*) has power because behind it is the experience of vision (*Darsana*)

Lessing's formulation is far more subtle. "Art's imitations extend over the whole of visible nature, of which the beautiful is but a small part. Truth and expression are its first law, and as nature itself is ever ready to sacrifice beauty to higher aims, so likewise the artist must render it subordinate to his general design and not pursue it farther than truth and expression permit. Enough that, through these two, what is most ugly and beautiful in nature has been changed into a beauty of art" ¹⁰⁶ When he speaks of the ugly and beautiful in nature, he is referring to repulsive or attractive sensate surfaces as given and he stresses the impossibility for art to align itself with such a categorisation. Nature itself prefers significance to beauty understood in this restricted sense. Art also has to make the same choice and then the ugly is changed into beauty, of a new order, which is also a synonym for the significant truth of emotion and expression. And this significance is donated by the creative spirit. Avantī Sundarī said that the poet, with perfect justification, can glorify the moon as nectar-rayed or present it as a maleficent influence. This is unconsciously echoed by Mitchell ¹⁰⁷ "Whether we see the same sunlit sea to be smiling frankly or in treachery is a matter of our mood" Croce ¹⁰⁸ says : "Without the aid of imagination, nothing in nature is beautiful, and with its aid, according to our disposition, the same thing is now expressive, now unmeaning, now expressive in one way, now in another, sad or joyful, sublime or ridiculous. Man, faced with natural beauty, is exactly the mythical Narcissus at the pool"

Rodin stressed the transforming action of imaginative creativity. "We call ugly that which is formless, unhealthy which suggests illness, suffering, destruction, which is contrary to regularity—the sign of health. We also call ugly the immoral, the vicious, the criminal and all abnormality which brings evil—the soul of the parricide, the traitor, the self-seeker. But let an artist get hold of this ugliness; immediately he transfigures it—with a touch of his magic wand he makes it into beauty." ¹⁰⁹ There is no contradiction between this type of statement which emphasises the transmuting

power of imagination and a claim like that made by Sir Thomas Browne that even among objects as given there can be no ugliness "There was never anything ugly or misshapen but the Chaos, wherein, notwithstanding, to speak strictly, there was no deformity, because no form . . . In brief, all things are artificial (i.e. artistic), for nature is the Art of God"¹¹⁰ Even here, the discovery that nature is the art of God is possible only through vision and the truth discovered here is a truth created for itself by the spirit and donated to others

If what is ordinarily considered ugly in nature is transformed into beauty in art, what is the ugly in art? It is the tissue where the poetic action, the *Kavi Vyapana*, has not been effective Ella Sharpe,¹¹¹ who considers beauty as essentially rhythm, defines the ugly as the arrhythmic, where the sought rhythm has not been able to make the tissue align itself with the significant pattern of undulation and movement For Rickman,¹¹² the ugly is the destroyed or the incomplete object—or the artistic object incompletely transmuted because of the failure or inadequacy of poetic action When that action is adequate, even the ugly is transmuted into the beautiful "The view of beauty which I shall defend," writes Reid,¹¹³ "will be that beauty is perfect expressiveness"

A vexed question which repeatedly crops up in aesthetic theory is whether or not beauty has an objective status Since the concept of beauty has to be equated with the quality of the emotional transport derived from a work of art, the issue is whether or not the capacity for emotional stimulation in this manner is an objective property of the work of art The old distinction between science which is supposed to explore the "real", objective, features of the world and art which is supposed to be concerned only with purely subjective experiences lingers here It should not, after the startling revolution in physics of our own day The old view was that scientific observation was an autonomous, completely independent activity, which left the entity or process observed unaffected in the least But Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy, which revealed that microphysical reality is totally unlike what classical physics had conceived it to be, has demonstrated that to observe is to act on the entity observed The resulting knowledge, therefore, is of the entity after it has thus been acted upon Its nature, prior to the observation which is also a transitive action, can never be known This should invalidate the old distinction between "objective" science and "subjective" art In both we are dealing with phenomena that could be called subjective or objective alike They can be regarded as subjective since the scientific datum gives information about an entity as affected by the action of the observing subjectivity and the artistic image presents a natural object after it has been impregnated by the action of the emotive subjectivity Or they can be regarded as objective, for the scientific datum is true as a measure of the interaction of observation and observed entity and the poetic image is valid as a record of the interaction between natural object and sensibility Elizabeth Sewell¹¹⁴

rejects the usual dichotomies between science and poetry, because they are "structurally similar activities" and both necessary; between analysis and synthesis because "each is a precondition of the other's working"; between intellect and imagination, between mind and body; between mathematics and words "because each is an instrument for myth in the mind". Discovery, both in science and poetry, she tells us, is always "a mythical situation in which mind unites with a figure of its own devising as a means towards understanding the world" and this figure "is always in some kind of language". If the assertions regarding myth in science and poetry seem of doubtful validity, it is because she does not make it very clear that the concept of myth is being used in a special sense. We shall have occasion to clarify this later.¹¹⁵

The poetic image is an objectively existing record of an experience because it can yield back the experience—which here is an emotional experience—to another sensibility, just as the scientific datum will remain constant for another observer. But it is here that difficulties arise. Wellek and Warren¹¹⁶ confront these difficulties in their attempt to clarify the concept of "adequate interpretation". The poem, they argue, is not so much a specific, unvarying experience as a potential cause of experiences. Thus the real poem must be conceived as a structure of norms realised only partially in the actual experiences of its many readers. And these experiences will vary, since sensibilities vary. The *Iliad*, as understood by the Greeks, is not identical with the *Iliad* we are capable of understanding. From this impasse, they make a brave effort to work towards some standards of objectivity. "Though reactions vary, there must be a substantial identity of 'structure' which has remained the same throughout the ages." But again, not all the viewpoints in terms of which the "structure" is seen will be equally capable of grasping it most meaningfully. Therefore, some "hierarchy of viewpoints", a criticism of the grasp of norms, is implied in the concept of the "adequacy of interpretation". This dependence on a "system of norms" more or less completely realised by various generations of readers (as well as by individuals) would avoid the extremes of absolutism and relativism. It would seem to follow also that one might, after all, by knowing a good deal about the potentialities of literary form or structure, be able to say that particular generations of poets or novelists or dramatists held viewpoints that enabled them to make excellent or relatively poor use of their medium.

Wellek and Warren define the problem clearly but there is a veiled ambiguity in their solution. The empirical test of survival for great literature is one which has acquired great prestige. "In general," wrote Longinus,¹¹⁷ "we may regard those words as truly noble and sublime, which please all and please always. For where the same book produces the same impression on all who read it, whatever be the difference in their pursuits, their manner of life, their aspirations, their ages, or their language, such a harmony of opposites gives authority to their favourable

opinion" The difficulty here is the assumption that the impression produced is the same Hume¹¹⁸ made the same assumption "The same Homer who pleased at Athens and Rome two thousand years ago is still admired at Paris and at London All the changes of climate, government, religion, and language have not been able to obscure his glory" However, as Wellek and Warren point out, the reactions of epochs and of individuals to Homer widely vary But what is their solution? It is a majority opinion of history An alternative answer may be difficult to suggest, but the choice of this as the way to escape the extremes of absolutism and relativism still fails to penetrate to the depths of the problem of the objectivity of poetic value And yet, in their reference to the knowledge of the potentialities of form and structure as the instrument for judging the level of poetic achievement, Wellek and Warren reveal their unconscious faith that the problem can be tackled on a scientific, objective basis

A confident approach is possible where this type of diffidence can be completely shed. According to Sanskrit poetics, beauty is objective like truth The philosophical basis of this faith is the perception which is unambiguously clear in the *Vedas*, but gets obscured in some philosophical systems which found difficulties in accepting the world as real, that the world is an evolutionary development from God and embodies the qualities of Absolute Being truth, goodness and beauty The Vedic poet sang "We with our hymns elect today the all-God, Lord of the good, Savita, whose decrees are true"¹¹⁹ The essentially poetic mind of the Vedic Aryans could not but be attracted towards beauty, which, to them, is no illusion, but an attribute of the eternal order "Firm-seated are the foundations of Eternal Law In its lovely form are many splendid beauties"¹²⁰ God, may we obtain all things that are beautiful!"¹²¹ By Eternal Law have the worlds entered the universal order, the hymn continues, and beauty is as much an attribute of the world as its truth In the *Gita*, the Supreme Being gives this august reassurance "Whatever is sublime, good, auspicious, mighty, in the universe, understand that it exists as a spark of my splendour"¹²² While ontological conceptions thus provide the philosophical background to the belief that beauty is objective, it is also supported by psychological analysis, the basic assumption of which is the reality of the evolutionary process which has endowed man with emotions, sentiments, reactivities Disinterested—that is, non-practical—relishing of emotions, is a true event in the psychological history of the individual because his emotivity is a real feature depending upon the solid reality of his psychophysical organisation And since there is the basic identity of human nature between individuals, it should always be theoretically possible for the reader to experience as objectively true the emotion of the poet which he has embodied in a poem Admittedly, sensitivity varies widely between individuals But to use this fact to question the objective validity of the emotion embodied in a poem is as illogical as using defective instruments for a scientific measurement and claiming that

the consequent discrepancies prove that the magnitude measured has no precise, objective value. This, in effect, is the answer of Sanskrit poetics. Beauty as a value is objective and needs to be striven for and achieved (*sadhya*) irrespective of whether one approaches it as an artist or as a spectator¹²³. The proof of the objective truth of *Rasa* is its relish by the reader. But the reader should be a *Sahridaya*, of like heart with the poet, otherwise he is not the right instrument for the test. The objective truth of beauty is witnessed by the identity of the reaction and experience of all sensitive minds (*Sakala sahrdaya samvadabhaya pramatra gochantatah*)

Sanskrit poetics is not necessarily isolated in this bold attitude towards the problem. "I think," wrote Keats to John Taylor at a time when he was struggling profoundly with the whole question of what poetry is and should be, "Poetry should strike the reader as a wording of his own highest thoughts, and appear almost a Remembrance." Surely, this is not possible unless the poem enshrines an objective capacity and the reader has the right sensibility? Surely, again, the insensitive reader cannot be cited as proof that poetry cannot have this objective capacity? Tolstoy's formulation¹²¹ of the same view would have struck the Sanskrit writers on poetics as a rewording of their own thoughts. "The receiver of a true artistic impression is so united to the artist that he feels as if the work were his own and not some one else's—as if what it expresses were just what he had long been wishing to express. A real work of art destroys, in the consciousness of the receiver, the separation between himself and all whose minds receive the work of art. (This reads almost like a direct translation of the Sanskrit expression quoted above—*Sakala hrdaya samvedana sakshika*) In this freeing of our personality from its separation and isolation, in this uniting of it with others, lie the chief characteristic and the great attractive force of art."

Clive Bell¹²⁵ clears the way towards an objective theory of aesthetic value thus: "The starting-point of all systems of aesthetics must be the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The objects which provoke this emotion we call works of art. This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion, and if we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all the objects that provoke it, we shall have solved what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics." Jagannatha¹²⁶ tries to move closer to a solution. Beauty (*Chamatkara*) is generated by the poetic action (*Kavi Karma*) or poetic imagination (*Kavi Pratibha*) and comes to dwell in the poetic tissue. Beauty means *Rasa* experience and Jagannatha defines it as a felt or experienced reality of our consciousness (*anubhava sakshika*), consisting of a trans-mundane pleasure (*Alaukika-ahlada*), which latter idea may, for the present, be taken to mean that it is a pleasure which emerges from a non-practical or non-utilitarian context. Santayana and others would concur with Jagannatha that the generic quality—which Clive Bell was seeking—is the ability of works of art to give delight.

Santayana¹²⁷ defines beauty as "pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing" Signor Perenna's statement that the beautiful is "that which pleases the mind as objective value" indicates an identical outlook Ducasse¹²⁸ also feels that beauty or aesthetic value is assessed in terms of the immediate pleasantness or unpleasantness of the feelings obtained in aesthetic contemplation.

But there is a serious danger if the special quality of this pleasure is not stressed, as Jagannatha does stress Ozenfant¹²⁹ points out "Masterpieces are practically never pleasing Their effect on us is too striking for the definition of 'pleasing' to have any true application The editor of the Dictionary must have been thinking of comic opera" Howes,¹³⁰ similarly, writes "The Mass in D rarely gives pleasure and the choral finale of the Ninth Symphony causes many people pain" Ogden and Richards¹³¹ indicate the need for deepening the concept "The disadvantage of a pleasure view is that it offers us too restricted a vocabulary We need fuller terms with which to describe the value of works of art" Marshall indicates the direction in which the concept should be deepened when he defines "beauty as relatively stable, or real, pleasure" The epithet "real" does not seem to amount to much here, but the final chapters of this work will clarify the Indian concept of the "real" pleasure derived from the highest poetic experience That will also reveal the profounder meaning of Jagannatha's qualification

Let us return to the issue whether aesthetic value is an objective value Alexander¹³² wrote "Some there are who believe beauty to be a character which belongs intrinsically to the beautiful object and is merely observed or discovered by us" As against this we have the statement by Lipps "Aesthetic pleasure is an enjoyment of our own activity in an object" The two views seem mutually exclusive But they can be harmonised To the extent that the power to yield delight is the generic quality of objects of art, it seems to be an objective feature But delight is an inward reality in the relisher If it is true, as Jagannatha said, that beauty is *anubhava sakshika*, attested by the experienced reality of consciousness, it is also true that a consciousness endowed with the requisite sensibility is—and has to be—assumed here "If the pleasure fails the very substance and protoplasm of beauty is wanting," wrote Santayana¹³³ "Not until I confound the impressions and suffuse the symbols themselves with the emotions they arouse, and find joy and sweetness in the very words I hear, will the expressiveness constitute beauty" We return to the equation between science and art A scientific fact has objective truth when it can be verified again and again But the instrument used should have the adequate capacity to register the fact Beauty is objective when the beautiful object can evoke delight again and again But the individuals who confront it should have the right sensibility "The meaning of any beautiful created thing," wrote Oscar Wilde,¹³⁴ "is at least as much in the soul of him who looks at it, as it was in his who wrought it"

The poetic circuit begins with the world and is completed when the aesthetic experience makes the *Sahridaya* a more sensitively functioning entity in the world, with expanded horizons of the heart. The discussion of this last linking arc of the circle can be more conveniently taken up later.

CHAPTER THREE

The Poetic Tissue

I NUPTIALS OF SOUND AND SENSE

"It is not with ideas that one makes sonnets," Mallarmé¹ wrote in a letter to Degas, "but with words" A very imperceptive way of interpreting this would be to regard poetry as nothing but a web of words What Mallarmé means is that opaque, private feeling can mature as art only when it is incarnated in a poetic tissue, which consists of words, but words invested with an unusual charge of evocative power This is what Cocteau² also meant when he wrote "It is not pathetic messages that make us shed our best tears, but the miracle of a word in the right place"

It is noted very early in the Sanskrit tradition that the poetic tissue (*Kavya Savira*) is qualitatively different from the web of language that expounds a scientific proposition or narrates an event Abhinava³ quotes Bhatta Nayaka who points out that the story or content (*Artha*) is what matters in the plain narration or chronicle (*Purana*) of a past event, and the denotational meaning is the most important element in science (*Sastra*), but in the poetic tissue both word and meaning are subordinate to expression which is a higher reality, though it is an integration of these two components This is the distinction which I A Richards⁴ makes between "referential" and "emotional" speech, between "pure, scientific, impersonal or neutral statement" in which words are used to point to things and "emotive utterance which expresses and evokes states of feeling" Pollock⁵ uses the terms "referential" and "evocative" In evocative symbolism, "human beings attempt to communicate, not the abstraction from the experience, but the actual experience itself" Mallarmé⁶ contrasted the function of the word in poetry with its function in narration, instruction and discourse as the common currency of "reportage" Bhamaha, twelve centuries earlier, used an identical expression, *Varta*, news, information, reportage De Quincey emphasises the same distinction, though he uses different expressions literature of knowledge and literature of power Yvor Winters⁷ opposes poetry to "other kinds of writing", finding that poetry takes "special pains with the expression of feeling" And Ransom⁸ stresses the antithesis of logical "structure" and poetic "texture"

Writer after writer, in Sanskrit poetics, lays stress on the distinctive

quality of poetic expression. One of the earliest terms coined for this purpose is *Vakrokti*, literally "deviant utterance". If some writers show a tendency to see this special quality as a feature of the verbal tissue, others repeatedly correct it by pointing out that it covers both word and idea, and has ultimately to be traced to the poetic action. Thus Bhamaha⁹ uses the term to refer to the choice of ideas as well as words which makes poetic attitude and expression different from the matter-of-fact outlook and speech. Poetry, Sanskrit poetics repeatedly affirms, is distinguished by the supremacy of the utterance (*Ukti Pradhana*). Utterance, here, does not refer to the verbal tissue alone. It emphasises both the content, image, episode and thought coloured by emotion, and the form, the special, poetic verbalisation. Kuntaka,¹⁰ who wrote a whole treatise on *Vakrokti*, explains the special deviant quality (*Vakrata*) of poetic expression as the peculiar charm (*Vicchitti*) or strikingness (*Vaichitya*) which can be creatively donated to ordinary expression by the imagination of the poet (*Kavi Pratibha*). It is the mode of expression (*Vinyasa Krama*) in which this imagination incarnates itself that makes poetry stand apart from matter-of-fact speech or scientific discourse. Nilakantha Dikshita¹¹ also lays stress on this special mode of expression (*Vinyasa Visesha*) which enables it to incarnate beauty. Ruyyaka¹² of the twelfth century holds the same view although he uses a different term, *Praudhokti*, elevated or distinguished utterance. All such expressions, *Vakrokti*, *Praudhokti*, etc remind us of Arnold's definition of poetry as "the most delightful and perfect form of utterance that human words can reach",¹³ or as "nothing less than the most perfect speech of man".¹⁴

Ransom¹⁵ defined poetry as a "compromise between meaning and metre". This is rather unfortunate, because it suggests that the poetic intention is forced down to a lower level in achievement in the process of verbal and rhythmic incarnation. When Abhinava interprets poetic utterance as an "ideal structure"¹⁶ (*Utkrishita samghatana*) and derives it directly from poetic action,¹⁷ he is confident that the poetic intention can integrate meaning and word, idea and expression, without any sense of compromise or scaling down in final achievement. It is very important to realise that, in Sanskrit poetics, the antithesis is not between meaning and metre, between idea and verbalisation. The idea or meaning is not the soul nor the verbal tissue the body. Both meaning (*Artha*) and word (*Sabda*) together constitute the body of poetry (*Kavya Samira*). The soul is the poetically experienced feeling. As the antithesis usually drawn is between idea and verbalisation, meaning and metre, it is very interesting to note that the distinctive approach of Sanskrit poetics finds a parallel in Valéry¹⁸ who wrote: "Poetic necessity is inseparable from sensory form, and the thoughts set forth or suggested by a poetic text are in no way the unique and primary concern of discourse, but are rather the *means* which move together *equally* with the sounds, the cadences, the metre, and the embellishments, to provoke, to sustain a particular tension or exaltation, to

produce in us a *world*—or a *mode of existence* altogether harmonious” This leads us to the very significant definition given by Bhamaha¹⁹. “Poetry (poetic tissue) is that in which word and meaning coexist” (*Sabdarthau sahita kavyam*) The word *sahita* means to unite or exist together, in organismic fusion. The Sanskrit word for literature is *Sahitya* and Kuntaka derives this word from Bhamaha’s definition. The earliest use of this term, *Sahitya*, in poetics occurs in Mukula²⁰ of the late ninth or tenth century and in his pupil, Pratiharendu Raja²¹. By using the expression *Sahitya Vidya*, for poetics, Raja Sekhara confirmed this etymology of the term which makes literary tissue the organismic union of word and idea. This organismic union is emphasised by various European writers, though not with the perfect clarity of the analysis in Sanskrit poetics. Thus, Flaubert²² wrote, attacking Augier’s conception of form as merely an outer garment. “No! Form is the flesh itself of the idea, as the idea is the soul of life” This corresponds to the concept of the *Sabdārtha Sanna*, but in Sanskrit poetics, as in Valéry, the body of poetry is composed of both idea and verbalisation, the soul being the *Rasa*. Baudelaire²³ wrote that “idea and form are two realities in one” and warned that if the meaning was overrated and the form neglected, the result would be the annihilation of poetry. The concept of “two realities in one” is an exact equivalent of the Sanskrit doctrine of *Sauhitya*. Banville²⁴ wrote that immediately the poet’s imagination had a clear vision of what to present to the reader, the words would spontaneously present themselves to the spirit along with the vision.

Sanskrit poetics rejected the usual polarisation of meaning and word, idea and verbalisation, content and form, because these dualities are apparent only to analytical dissection, while in the actual poetic expression they are indissolubly united. Secondly, against the background of the entire theory that opaque, private emotional experience could be communicated only by sympathetic induction through a mediating presentation whose efficacy would depend upon its truth as a concretisation of the experience, the polarisation could not but be between experience of vision (*Darsana*) and expression or description (*Varnana*), the latter standing for both word and meaning in their complete fusion. An identical preception is seen in Valéry²⁵. “The essential principle of the poetic mechanism—by which I mean the production of poetic sensibility by the use of words—lies, or so it seems to me, in the harmonious interchange between expression and impression. Our poetic pendulum begins in sensations, moves towards an idea or sentiment, and returns again to a memory of the initial sensation, or to an act which is capable of reproducing that sensation” This sensation, or more properly, feeling, is not the idea or meaning which is usually contrasted with expression in the analysis of the poetic tissue. It is experience. Rosenberg²⁶ stresses this when he states: “Poetry as verbal alchemy is a way of experiencing”

Mallarmé wrote “The verse which, from several vocables, recreates

one integral word, new, a stranger to language, almost incantational, achieves the unique perfection of speech”²⁷ The vocables, here, have both phonetic shape, sound, as well as denotation, meaning But they do not function separately, atomically. They unite to yield a new, integral reality To emphasise the paramount importance of this union, writer after writer, in the Sanskrit tradition, seeks the support of effective comparisons Bhoja,²⁸ in explaining his concept of the just proportion of sound (*Sabda sammitatva*) clarifies it as the quality of sound (*Sabda*) and meaning (*Artha*) being held as if in a balance That is, they have parity. Meaning, in poetic expression, cannot claim greater attention than sound or form Raja Sekhara²⁹ also explains the concept of fusion (*Sauhitya*) as the proper equipoise (*Yathavatsahabhava*) between word and meaning Kuntaka³⁰ says that idea insufficiently expressed is “dead” (*Mrtakalpa*) and expression without idea or expressing something other than the intended idea is “diseased” (*Vyadhibhuta*) Thus, *Sauhitya* means perfect commensurateness between form and content Taking special efforts to introduce effects of verbal music implies an overemphasis on beauty of sound (*Sabda saundarya*), and Kuntaka warns that this can only result in the loss of that parity in integration implied by the concept of *Sauhitya*³¹ Sound and meaning are compared by Kuntaka to two friends united in some great endeavour Parasara Bhatta calls them brothers between whom exists the most ideal fraternal feeling (*Saubhratia*) Kalidasa³² (fourth century) compares the relation between sound and meaning to the ideal relation envisaged in the *Smritis* (religio-ethical texts) between husband and wife and symbolised in myth in the union of the divine couple, Parvati and Paramesvara. To indicate the indissoluble union of the two, Hindu myth has a concept which has also received concrete expression in iconographic representations This is the *Ardha-Narisvara*, a figure one half of which is sculptured in masculine form while the other half is feminine Kalidasa and Vidyadhara (fourteenth century) use this concept also to refer to the “celebration of the divine nuptials of sound and sense in poetry”, a fine idiom used by Wilfred Meynell in his comment on Francis Thompson’s *Sister Song*

Western thought supports this approach of Sanskrit poetics Dewey³³ warns that if one makes a conscious distinction of sense and thought, of matter and form, one does not “read or hear esthetically, for the esthetic value of the stanzas lies in the integration of the two” Henry James³⁴ wrote . “Since, in proportion as the work is successful, the idea permeates and penetrates it, informs and animates it, so that every word and every punctuation point contribute directly to the expression, in that proportion do we lose our sense of the story being a blade which may be drawn more or less out of its sheath The story and the novel, the idea and the form, are the needle and thread, and I never heard of a guild of tailors who recommend the use of the thread without the needle, or the needle without the thread” I A Richards³⁵ has emphasised that metre, diction, metaphor

and methods of organising the poem are not ornaments but parts of the total, integral expression. Maritain³⁶ points out that in poetry the logical sense, the denotational meaning structured by the words, is digested, so to speak, by the poetic sense. "This poetic sense, which is but one with poetry itself, is the inner ontologic entelechy of the poem, and gives it its very being and substantial significance." And in a manner which would pleasantly remind Indian readers of Raja Sekhara quoting his gifted wife, Avantī Sudarī, Maritain quotes Raissa Maritain³⁷ "It (the poetic sense) is inseparable from the formal structure of the poetic work. The poetic sense is substantially bound to the form, immanent in the organism of words, immanent in the poetic structure as a whole." Word and meaning can be separated out only in analysis. In the poetic tissue they are indissolubly united. Poetic action is, in the quaint idiom of Puttenham,³⁸ "both auricular and sensible, by which all the words and clauses are made as well tunable to the ear as stirring to the mind." T. S. Eliot³⁹ gives the restatement in contemporary idiom. "The music of poetry is not something which exists apart from its meaning." Bradley⁴⁰ puts it a little more elaborately. "In poetry the meaning and the sounds are one, there is, if I may put it so, a resonant meaning or a meaning resonance. If the substance means ideas, images and the like taken alone, and the form means the measured language by itself, there is a possible distinction, but it is a distinction of things not in the poem, and the value lies in neither of them." But the pleasant difference of opinion between Bradley and Saintsbury over a specific instance should have a moral for us. In the lines

*Our noisy years seem moments in the being
Of the eternal silence*

Bradley holds that the beauty lies almost wholly in the meaning, while Saintsbury⁴¹ claims that the sound has its own beauty and it is quite independent of the meaning. To prove his point, the latter proceeds to show that the meaning of the passage can be exactly expressed thus: "Our noisy (or loud-sounding or clamorous) twelve months appear minutes (or seconds) in the existence of the unending soundlessness." One is puzzled as to the exact point which is sought to be proved by either of the distinguished critics. The paraphrase of the denotational meaning is nothing more than that. It is not the equivalent of the poetic expression. The separation of meaning and verbal form is an analytical dissection. In the living tissue the two are indissolubly united as is clear from the fact that the paraphrase of the meaning fails to be an aesthetic equivalent of the poetic statement and likewise the sound sequence by itself, listened to merely "auricularly and not sensibly" as Puttenham would put it, can only tickle the ear without stirring the heart. To seek refuge from such an analysis with a poetic answer to that analysis, we may quote Yeats⁴²

*O body swayed to music, O brightening glance
How can we know the dancer from the dance?*

II. THE POETIC ORGANISM

Raissa Maritain used the expression "organism of words". This is a very apt idiom for indicating the standpoint of Sanskrit poetics. In analysing the categories of reality, Nyaya, or the Indian philosophy of logic, very carefully and emphatically distinguished between accidental or separable connection (*Samyoga*) and inherence or inseparable connection (*Samavaya*). The latter is the relation between a thing and its properties, the whole and its parts, motion and the object in motion, etc. What is indicated here is essentially a concept of organismic integration. Sanskrit poetics envisages the union of sound and meaning in poetry in terms of this organismic concept which definitely implies a complementarity of the functions of different components. Kuntaka said that sound and sense should be such as to beautify each other (a point of view which might have pleasantly resolved the differences between Bradley and Saintsbury, for that is obviously what sound and sense do to each other in that verse). Kalidasa¹³ said that they should be equally so beautiful, that, between the two, it should be difficult to decide which is the beautifier and which the beautified. Kuntaka expands the concept to cover the continuum which is represented by an extended poem. Not only should there be this functional integration between sound and meaning in the poetic moment, but in the extended poetic tissue, such an integration should subsist between one word and another in the expression and one idea and another in the expressed. The organismic integration, therefore, has to be a reality in two planes. In the vertical plane, it achieves the epiphany of poetic feeling in verbal form. In the horizontal plane it integrates the meanings among themselves and the verbal forms among themselves, while the organismic reality integrates both strata as functionally interdependent components serving the evocation of *Rasa*. Mallarmé¹¹ wrote to Cazalis, about his poem *L'Azur* : "I swear to you that there is not a single word which has not cost me several hours of research and that, the first word, which clothes the first idea, besides making its own contribution to the general effect of the poem, serves further to prepare the last."

As it is the integration and not the separate functions that is the fundamental reality, and as the equilibrium is dynamic rather than static, poetry is tension generated and ably contained. It is very interesting to note that Kuntaka¹⁵ defines literature in one place as the mutual tension, jealousy or rivalry (*Paraspara spardha*) of word and meaning. As he uses the word *Sahitya* for literature, he is explaining here the concept of the coexistence or union of sound and sense which is the basic trait of literary expression. This means that the tension is compatible with the basic harmony, that is, the tension is a competitive rivalry to achieve the same common end, which is the incarnation of the initial poetic experience. Here also Kuntaka extends his concept from the poetic moment to the poetic continuum. One word should vie with another, and one idea with another.

An affinity with Kuntaka's views seems latent in Allen Tate's¹⁶ doctrine

of "tension" But Crane⁴⁷ comes nearer to Kuntaka in his study on Cleanth Brooks The poetical structure "unites the like with the unlike It does not unite them, however, by the simple process of allowing one connotation to cancel out another, nor does it reduce the contradictory attitudes to harmony by a process of subtraction . It is a positive unity, not a negative". Crane is of course referring to that type of poetry—Marvell, Donne, etc—where ambiguity, paradox and irony are the most conspicuous features But the tension which is obvious here can exist in other types of poetry, irrespective of whether Cleanth Brooks will concede it or not Kuntaka, at least, it is certain, was formulating poetic tension as a principle of general validity And what is relevant to our purpose in Crane's analysis is that the tension of the components can be in harmony with the orientation of their integrated reality The reality of the dynamic nature of the poetic equilibration, though not specifically the competitive tension of the components, is stressed by Brownell⁴⁸ also The writer "vitalizes the parts by permeating them with a sense of the whole, and thus gives everywhere the feeling of completeness, of forces in the repose of equipoise in contrast to stagnation or even stasis" Herbert Read⁴⁹ says "An image is always jealous of words, that is to say, it is most effective when conveyed in a minimum of words" Though the word "jealous" recalls Kuntaka's *spadha*, Read is not referring so much to the competitive rivalry between word and meaning or image as to the concept of the just proportion of sound which alone can achieve the union of meaning and sound on a basis of parity, a point which was stressed by Bhoja in his concept of *Sabda sammitatva* But, in another passage, Read moves nearer to Kuntaka "Two images, or an idea and an image, stand equal and opposite, clash together and respond significantly, surprising the reader with a sudden light"⁵⁰ The parity of sound and image or meaning, the notion of a tension between them, and the functional subordination of both parity and tension to the higher, integral objective of the total poetic expression, which are the most important features of Kuntaka's concept, are emphasised here As Whalley⁵¹ says in his comments on Read, there is here a process of cross-fertilisation and mutual enrichment . in such a manner, we may add, recalling Kalidasa, that it is difficult to say either of idea or sound whether it is the beautifier or the beautified But the writer who comes nearest to Kuntaka is Dylan Thomas "Out of the inevitable conflict of images—inevitable because of the creative, recreative, destructive and contradictory nature of the motivating centre, the womb of war—I try to recreate the momentary peace which is a poem"⁵² Tension is generated because the equilibrium of the poem is dynamic and can be achieved only on the basis of balancing of forces The conflicts make up, in fact, what Day Lewis⁵³ has called that "dialectic of purification" by which the poet handles the emerging pattern, flaking off its accretion of waste matter so that the result is a poem, "which is neither the experience, nor the memory, nor an abstract dance of words, but a new life composite of all three"

The poem, which is the peace created out of forces or tensions in functional integration, is the perfect expression of the experience, or more strictly, its concretisation as a verbal tissue. The form now is fully functional and organic and therefore unalterable. Emerson⁵⁴ wrote : "It is a metre-making argument that makes a poem—a thought so passionate and alive that, like the spirit of a plant or an animal, it has an architecture of its own, and adorns nature with a new thing" The form is like the form of a crystal shaped from within by the action of the solute in a chemical solution. Its architecture is internally determined and therefore it cannot be altered. Vamana⁵⁵ wrote . "The insertion and deletion of words occur only so long as there is uncertainty in the mind. When the fixity of words is established, the composition is perfect" He proceeds to say that perfection of verbalisation (*Sabda Paka*) is realised when the words are so functionally, poetically, adequate that they cannot be replaced by synonyms. Later thought expanded the concept to cover both the perfection of the stream or web of words (*Sabda Paka*) and the perfection of the structure of meaning (*Artha Paka*). According to Bhoja,⁵⁶ there is perfection of poetic expression (*Kavya Paka*) when both the replacement of words by their synonyms as well as the substitution or modification of ideas have to be ruled out if the poetic sense is not to be destroyed or radically altered.

Yeats wrote . "The correction of prose, because it has no fixed laws, is endless, a poem comes right with a click like a closing box"⁵⁷ Elsewhere he wrote : "Our words must seem to be inevitable"⁵⁸ Raleigh⁵⁹ says the same thing a little more elaborately . "All who have consciously practised the art of writing know what endless and painful vigilance is needed for the avoidance of the unfit and untuneful phrase, how the meaning must be tossed from expression to expression, mutilated and deceived, ere it can find rest in words" Raleigh's expression—"finding rest in words"—is very interesting, for it calls to mind the concept of *Sayya* with which the conception of *Paka* (perfection) of both word (*Sabda*) and meaning (*Artha*) was related by the Indian tradition. *Sayya* means bed, in poetic theory it means, initially, the repose of words in their mutual favourableness like the repose of the body in a bed, the similitude explaining the etymology of the term. The earliest use of the word in this sense is found in the seventh century writer, Bana⁶⁰. The discussion of these concepts by the tenth century writer, Raja Sekhara,⁶¹ is very interesting. He defines perfection (*Paka*) as maturity (*Pannama*) and maturity, again, as felicity of verbal tissue, since *Paka* is realised in the verbal tissue, it is a value which concretises as the power of the word; but, it is simultaneously emphasised, that power can be perceived only by the man with poetic sensibility (*Sahrdava*). Like the word *Rasa*, *Paka* (ripe, well cooked) is also linked, in its etymological derivation, to the sensation of taste. Further, since Raja Sekhara uses it as a generic concept, it has reference to the perfection of both meaning and expression. Therefore, in the final analysis, when the *Paka* is ideal, the literary value of *Sayya* is realised, where meaning reposes in the tissue of words, while each word

itself finds a perfect embedding in the integral tissue. The fourteenth century writers, Vidyadhara⁶² and Vidyānātha,⁶³ relate the concepts of *Paka* and *Sayya* in this profounder sense and Mallinātha⁶⁴ affirms that, with the realisation of the ideal here, the verbal tissue will show strong aversion of words to replacement by synonyms.

A passage in Robert Nichols⁶⁵ reads like a footnote, giving data from personal experience, to Vamana and Mallinātha. Nichols is analysing the birth of a poem. He begins with that phase of uncertainty, to which Vamana refers, when words are inserted or deleted. Then he describes how a slight, but definitive, alteration made a line take perfect shape. "No sooner had this change been effected than I recognised that the line had set in an order that no subsequent occurrence must be suffered to disturb. When a line is once really right, its rightness is of so sacrosanct a nature that, rather than change it, the poet will abandon the entire piece. The laws of psychological necessity within the art are inflexible and the poet's personal integrity is involved in his recognition of and reverence for the fact that a line is right and that nothing in heaven or earth can make it otherwise. If it is changed, it may be right for some poem or other, but that poem will not be the poem originally intended." Raissa Maritain,⁶⁶ likewise, endorses Vamana's dictum that when once the poetic expression has become perfect, substitution by synonyms is ruled out. "In the modality of prose, words are almost exclusively signs. They are there, above all, to refer the mind to their significations. By themselves, they have only a secondary importance. On the other hand, in poetry, words are at the same time signs as well as objects—objects which are the vehicles of images—which organise themselves into an independent and living tissue. They cannot suffer substitution by a synonym without the poetic sense being destroyed and mutilated."

Ben Jonson said that "in all speech, words and sense are as the body and soul" and De Quincey spoke of language as an "incarnation of the soul". Here they are referring to language as such, not necessarily poetic language. But even in this generalised level there is a latent profundity, for it is a miracle that immaterial meaning can incarnate in material sound. The philosophy of Indian grammar recognised this profundity. According to Pāṇini⁶⁷ of the second century B.C. the grammarian is a Yogi whose inward vision enables him to look within and see the eternal flow of pure consciousness. It is this consciousness that incarnates in the two-fold category of sound and meaning and what we call speech, the vehicle of communication, is nothing but the expression of the spirit active within. The knower of the secret of speech visualises *Brahman*, ultimate Reality, in the wreath of letters. To Pāṇini, the alphabets are not mere phonetic shapes, but glowing sparks of *Brahman* illuminating the entire sphere of existence. They are eternal (*Akshara*), an epithet most characteristically and frequently applied to *Brahman*. It is this profound inwardness of the mystery of language that led Bhartṛhari,⁶⁸ later, in the seventh century, to

define grammar as the door leading to the final beatitude. Nevertheless, even while recognising that grammar and the generalised science of language explore semantic realities which are really profound, it is possible to claim that we are dealing with a different order of meaning in poetry. Semantic enquiry can safely accept a polarisation between meaning and word, for the former can have alternative verbalisation in discourse, referential speech. But in poetry, the poetic meaning cannot be separated out. It lies in or more correctly it is, the specific verbalisation with its distinctive texture and music. Thus so far as poetics is concerned, Longinus is more precise than Ben Jonson and De Quincey, for he states that "thought and language in literature are interfolded each in the other". This significant distinction between discourse and poetry is noted by Indian thought also very early. One Rig Vedic verse⁶⁹ denounces the person who sees only the externals in poetry and praises the person of sensibility to whom alone the beauty of the inner, poetic sense is revealed. This places the right emphasis on the inner meaning. But the importance of the tissue, the web of words, is also equally stressed. "When men of intuition create verse after winnowing words, as barley grains are sifted by means of a winnowing pan, then men of equal sensibility recognise the meaning. In such verses, blessed glory is enshrined."⁷⁰

A. W. Schlegel⁷¹ emphasises the "unity and indivisibility" of a work of art, "the inner mutual determination of the whole and the parts". This is the organismic relation (*Samavaya*) of the component elements of poetry on which Sanskrit poetics insists. Schlegel points out that a beautiful whole can never be pieced together from beautiful parts, the whole must first be posited absolutely and then the particular evolved from it. He speaks of a work of art as ideal if, "in it, matter and form, letter and spirit, have interpenetrated so completely that we are unable to distinguish them". Schiller, who also insists on the "living shape" which can only result from an "actual union and interpenetration of matter and form", has recorded a very revealing experience that shows that in the interaction between word and meaning in poetry, both are equal partners and the flow of transforming, plastically shaping power is not invariably from meaning to word as is commonly supposed, but can run the other way too. He was experimenting with the versification of some material which he had first handled in prose. He wrote to Goethe: "I have never been so palpably convinced as in my present occupation how closely in poetry Substance and Form are connected. Since I have begun to transform my prosaic language into a poetic, rhythmical one, I find myself under a totally different jurisdiction. Even many motives which in the prosaic execution seemed to me to be perfectly in place, I can no longer use. They are merely good for the common domestic understanding, whose organ prose seems to be. But verse absolutely demands reference to the imagination. And thus I was obliged to become poetical in many of my motives."⁷² This experience throws light on the inwardness of the struggle made by many Indian writers to find the

apt simile and metaphor for the parity in co-operative, integrated function of both word and meaning. Kalidasa, it will be recalled, used the metaphor of the ideal union of Siva and Parvati. The later handling of the concept by Indian Tantrism further reveals the inwardness of the comparison. Tantrism accepted monism. In the pure monist statement, *Prakṛti* or *Sakti*, the energy of material nature which evolves the world, is accepted as the attribute of *Purusha* or *Brahman*, the Supreme Being or pure consciousness. In the ritual of Tantra, the two concepts are separately personalised as Siva and his consort Sakti, though the basic monism is secured by conceiving the two as in indissoluble union. Here again, the flow of power is not only from Siva to his consort. If, apart from Siva, Sakti is blind, undirected force, in a pregnant metaphor, Siva, apart from Sakti, is described as a corpse. Usually we think of poetic feeling as fashioning metrical form for its expression. What the imagery of Kalidasa and others, as well as the experience of Schiller, reveal is the reality of the power of poetic form in stimulating the poetic spirit.

Valéry wrote: "In the lyric universe, each moment must complete an undefinable alliance of the sensuous and the meaningful. The consequence is that the composition is, in some way, continuous, and can hardly fix itself in any time other than that of execution. There is not one time for the 'substance' and another for the 'form', and composition in this genre contrasts not only with order or disproportion, but with *decomposition*. If the meaning and the sound (or the substance and form) can easily dissociate themselves, the poem decomposes."⁷³ This is the profounder meaning of Bhamaha's concept of *Sauhṛitya*, organismic union of sound and sense. Siva, apart from Sakti, is a corpse, a decomposing body. The living poetic organism, similarly, decomposes into dead tissue when meaning and sound are not in organismic union. Kuntaka said that the idea which is imperfectly incarnated is dead (*Mitakalpa*). But Valéry also steps up the metaphor to the higher plane, like Indian poetics, seeing the *Rasa* as the soul and sound and meaning as together constituting the body (*Sabdantṛa Sarva*). Here sound and meaning are equal in status and lead to the evocation of *Rasa* through establishing reciprocal relations between themselves. Valéry defines the "problem of pure poetry" as the creation of "a complete system of *reciprocal* relations between our images and ideas on the one hand and our means of expression on the other, a system which would correspond especially to the creation of an emotive state of mind."⁷⁴ Equality of status and reciprocity mean that the flow of inspiring power can take place in either direction. Valéry clarifies this: "Note well this dual possibility in first appearance in the interplay: sometimes, some thing has an urge to express itself, sometimes a medium of expression seeks some idea it can serve."⁷⁵ Spender⁷⁶ records his personal experience which brings out this profounder meaning of reciprocity: "Sometimes when I lie in a state of half-waking, half-sleeping, I am conscious of a stream of words which seem to pass through my mind, without them having a meaning, but they have a

sound, a sound of passion, or a sound recalling poetry that I know. Again sometimes when I am writing, the music of the words I am trying to shape takes me far beyond the words, I am aware of a rhythm, a dance, a fury, which is as yet empty of word."

A helpful analysis by Daiches⁷⁷ reveals with what plastic sensitiveness poetic form manages, in fact, becomes the controlled revelation of meaning. The place of any part of the statement in the total pattern of the whole is of great significance in the literary expression, while this is not the case with the non-literary statement. Thus, poetic expression depends to a great degree on the order of the individual word. This is demanded by the poetic function. The poet arranges the words in such an order that until the total complex of meaning is achieved, no premature leakage of meaning can occur and the poetic sense remain, integrally unrevealed, until, on the completion of the verbal stream, the meaning "explodes", to use the term of Gerard Manley Hopkins. Rhyme and metre are important devices of this type—though they have other functions too—for they unconsciously tip off the reader to delay his integral reaction till the completion of their formal patterns and also warn him against reacting to the poetic expression as if it was a series of propositional statements. A poetic form like the sonnet is also a similar device for restraining the reader from premature response until the poem is complete. Thus, in poetry, the meaning does not reveal itself in simple, distinguishable stages, but reveals itself in a sudden explosion at the moment when the form completes its integral shape.

The *Sphota* doctrine in the Indian tradition was an anticipation of this type of analysis. As expounded by the grammarians, the essence of the doctrine, very briefly, is that the meaning of the word is not revealed in stages by the successive phonemes out of which it is structured, nor of the sentence by the successive words with which it is composed. The integral revelation of meaning is somewhat like the quantum phenomenon, the revelation of the reality of which in energy changes and transfers by Max Planck has created a revolution in the outlook of physics. For, according to the *Sphota* doctrine, the meaning holds itself back from self-revelation till the last phoneme of the word is uttered, or the last word in the sentence, thus completing the etymological and syntactical shapes. Then the revelation takes place in a *Sphota* (literally, explosion). *Sphota* is the integral significance, which makes its discontinuous, quantal appearance when the phonetic shape is complete. The phonetic shape (*Nada*) is the suggestor (*Abhivyanjaka*), the *Sphota* is the suggested (*Abhivyangya*). Curiously enough, the insight which led to this doctrine failed when it was sought to be extended from semantics to aesthetic expression. In their anxiety to annex aesthetics also to their own realm, some grammarians tried to interpret all the powers of poetic expression, including the musical texture of the verbal tissue and the resonance of both word and meaning, as really *Sphota*. The approach would have been fruitful if the concept

had been used analogically or modulated to a higher level of significance, when it was applied to aesthetics. But these grammarians were wedded to literalism, to the deification of the denotational power of words, by themselves, and in the syntactical organisation of sentences. Therefore, if they emphasised the quantum nature of the phenomenon and the delaying of the explosion of meaning till the expression was complete in its shape, they also dogmatised that the denotational meaning, thus finally revealed, was all that there was in poetic expression. Ananda Vardhana, the expounder of the doctrine of poetic suggestion, was able to give a devastating answer to this type of claim. But we should also note that grammatical analysis itself had not always floundered thus. Bhartrhari, the author of the classic on grammar, *Vakya Padīya*, was a staunch advocate of the *Sphota* doctrine. But he was a great poet too. And therefore he was able to generalise and deepen the concept to that level where it could be extended to cover poetic expression also, without confusing poetic meaning with denotational meaning. He was able to do this because he attacked the problem at its deepest level—the profound mystery of meaning incarnating in concrete linguistic expression. Meaning, here, is not a propositional meaning intended to be conveyed through a particular expression. It is the meaning behind the visible universe. He refers to the Highest Universal (*Maha Satta*) which represents the real essence of all things and which permeates all. Words can have meaning because all meanings derive from this Great Meaning⁷⁸. For Bhartrhari, the Principle of the Word (*Sabda Tattva*) and the Principle of the Ultimate Reality (*Brahma Tattva*) are interchangeable⁷⁹. *Sphota* is indivisible (*Akhanda*) and represents spirit (*Chaitanya*) in its purest form. The Muse of grammar (*Vaiyakarana Bhushana*) is *Brahman* itself. If the other grammarians had understood the inwardness of the concept of *Sphota* in this manner, they could have used it in the case of poetry also without confusing poetic expression with denotational communication. Banville⁸⁰ assessed the situation with a correct intuition. “It is the word placed to complete the rhyme, the last word of the line of verse that, like a magician, must cause to appear before our vision all that the poet wished to communicate. But this word of enchantment, this magic word—where do we find it and how do we find it?” Banville answers his own query, the word will emerge simultaneously with the vision if the inward experience is there. But here we are in the field of poetic, not prosaic or denotational, communication. Visvanatha⁸¹ stresses the importance of the expectancy or curiosity (*Jignasa*) aroused by one word in the progressively apprehended poetic statement to know the words that follow. But he is not talking of propositional statements, but poetic expression. For he defines poetry as a sentence the soul of which is *Rasa* and the stimulation of expectancy he is referring to is a feature of the poetic sentence, it is fulfilled with the relish of the *Rasa* when the poetic expression reaches completion of form. The aesthetic relishing here traverses in reverse the

involution of the meaning in linguistic tissue in aesthetic creation. R. L. Stevenson⁸² wrote : "The true business of the literary artist is to plait or weave his meaning, involving it around itself, so that each sentence, by successive phrases, shall first come into a kind of knot, and then, after a moment of suspended meaning, solve and clear itself."

Even if integral communication of meaning in a propositional statement is delayed till the phonetic form of words and the syntactical shape of sentences are completed, it is still possible to convey the same meaning in alternative formulations. But this is not possible in poetic expression because meaning and verbalisation cannot be separated out. This is why Vamana rules out replacement by synonyms and paraphrase. Cleanth Brooks endorses this prohibition. Referring to poetic structure he says : "The structure meant is certainly not 'form' in the conventional sense in which we think of form as a kind of envelope which 'contains' the 'content' "⁸³ Nor is it a logical structure or "rational meaning" which can be apprehended adequately by paraphrasing it in prose. Most of our difficulties in criticism, Brooks proceeds to say, are rooted in the "heresy of paraphrase"⁸⁴. If we allow ourselves to be misled by it, we distort the relation of the poem to its "truth", we raise the problem of belief in a vicious and crippling form, we split the poem between its "form" and its "content"—we bring the statement to be conveyed into an unreal competition with science, philosophy or theology. Montgomery⁸⁵ repeats the thought, moving nearer to concrete illustrations. "How much the power of poetry depends upon the nice inflections of rhythm alone, may be proved by taking the finest passages of Milton and Shakespeare, and merely putting them into prose, with the least possible variation of the words themselves. The attempt would be like gathering up dewdrops, which appear jewels and pearls on the grass, but run into water in the hand, the essence and the elements remain, but the grace, the sparkle, and the form are gone." This is an advance on Vamana's formulation, for it shows that even without replacement by synonyms, by merely using the same words in prose, without the poetic rhythm, the poetic sense can be destroyed. But the study in Sanskrit poetics of the aesthetic qualities of various metres expresses the same thought, as we shall see later.

Bradley⁸⁶ gives a helpful clarification of the indissoluble union of intention and medium in art. Just as there is in music not sound on one side and meaning on the other, but only expressive sound, just as in painting there is not a meaning plus paint, but only a meaning in paint, in true poetry it is impossible to express the meaning in any but its own words, or to change the words without changing the meaning. Bradley proceeds to illustrate this by taking a line which is certainly very free from "poetic" diction. "To be or not to be, that is the question." A paraphrase would run like this. "What is just now occupying my attention is the comparative disadvantage of continuing to live or putting an end to myself." For practical purposes, "the purpose, for example of a coroner",

this might suffice. But, for the deeper poetic purpose, it is utterly inadequate. "Hamlet was well able to 'unpack his heart with words', but he will not unpack it with our paraphrases"

Bradley's analysis of the Shakespearean line which is free from "poetic" diction helps indirectly to reveal the soundness of the position taken up by Sanskrit poetics that the basic reality in poetry is the poet's action (*Kavi Vyapara*) Words themselves are neutral, it is this action which transforms them into poetic tissue Lowes⁸⁷ wrote "Words in themselves are neither poetic nor unpoetic They become poetic, or they remain unassimilated prose, according as the poet's imaginative energy is or is not sufficiently powerful to absorb them" Claudel⁸⁸ points out that while prosaic discourse uses only the denotational power of the word, in poetry it is used as the "condensed vehicle of the intrinsic energy of feeling" In poetry a word of insult is equivalent to a blow Valery⁸⁹ says that, though the words used in poetry are the words used in prose, they are not the same values Read said "Poetry is properly speaking a transcendental quality—a sudden transformation which words assume under a particular influence—and we can no more define this quality than we can define a state of grace" The mysterious transformation of words is wrought by poetic creativity, the "transcendental" nature of that creativity is something we can discuss later It is because poetry thus steps up words from the power-level of denotation to that of poetic induction that paraphrase decomposes poetry For paraphrase means a regressive descent to the denotational stratum "A lyric poem does not mean but is," wrote Williamson⁹⁰ "As plain sense its meaning becomes an abstraction, as imaginative sense it is always realizing something more than its obvious meaning, is always conveying a state of mind as well as ideas" Brett⁹¹ points out that "what the poem says is always more than what is said in the poem" If the argument were all that the poem says, it would be (as Coleridge in fact said of Pope's *Essay on Man*) not poetry, "but thoughts translated into the language of poetry", versified discourse

III TRANSCENDENCE OF SOUND AND SENSE

If, from the poetic tissue, we separate out word and meaning for purposes of analytical discussion and through analytical dissection, we could either say with Bhoja⁹² that poetic expression is one which gives parity and equal importance to both (*Ubhaya pradhana*) or with the *Agni Purana*⁹³ that both are unimportant (*Apradhana*) There is no paradox here In the poetic concretisation both are equally important But neither has ultimate importance, for neither is the ultimate source of value That is the poetic action (*Kavi Vyapara*) as the *Agni Purana* asserts Here we must remember the deeper meaning of Kalidasa's comparison of the relation between word and meaning to the relation between husband and wife as laid down in the *Smritis* (religio-ethical texts) Marriage is a sacrament

and man and woman enter the holy union for the service performed together to Moral Law (*Dharma*) to which they both as well as the institution of marriage, are subordinate. Since *Rasa* in this comparison is like *Dharma*, it means that sound and meaning are not self-determined entities but determined by the poetic emotion. Kuntaka, who attached so much importance to poetic expression as to write a whole treatise on it and included in it style and ornament and other features, ultimately derives it from the poet's creative intuition (*Kavi Pratiḥha*). The special utterance of poetry (*Vakrokti*) is, ultimately, inspired utterance.

The great advance of researches in psychology in our own age has emphasised the very important role of unconscious processes in inspiration. Albert Béguin⁹¹ speaks of the images which "ascend from the depths of the being and compose a song" not yet expressed in words. But this insight cannot be regarded as wholly the gift of psychoanalysis or Freud or other contemporary theories which have dealt with the importance of the unconscious. Carus⁹⁵ wrote in the forties of the nineteenth century "All that operate, create, act, suffer, ferment, brood in the Night of our unconscious life—all that manifest themselves there, in our organismic life and in the influences we receive from other souls and the entire universe—all these ascend, with their specific accent, from the darkness of the unconscious to the light of the conscious life. And this song, this miraculous confidence from the Unconscious to the Conscious, we call: feeling." A century still earlier, Diderot⁹⁶ traced the poetic metaphor to unconscious processes. The creation of original metaphors, the yoking together of remote spheres, the apprehension of unsuspected relationships, come about through the accumulation of delicate and varied experiences during the long life of an organism. The memory serves like a vault of images, stored in the darkness of nerve centres, from where they spring in an unpredictable and often inexplicable manner, coupling themselves to present ideas to form the metaphors of the poet and the hypotheses of the scientist.⁹⁷

The understanding of the unconscious processes involved in creative activity, thus, cannot be considered the sole prerogative of our own times. In India, long before poetics began to take shape as a distinct discipline, in the Vedic period itself, we see the intuitive understanding of the reality of the unconscious processes. The spontaneity of inner inspiration is realised by the Rīg Veda. "Like joyous streams bursting from the mountain, to the Lord our hymns have sounded."⁹⁸ The spontaneous song is a miracle. The glorious word occurring spontaneously to the poet is like "the appearance of the finely-robed loving wife before her husband."⁹⁹ But it is rapidly realised that the miracle is not external but arises within. It is realised that the goddess of poetic utterance reveals her divine self only to those who can understand her real nature.¹⁰⁰ This, of course, is a metaphor. The reality is poetic creativity (*Pratiḥha*). It is from the unconscious levels of this creativity that the poetic idea and word emerge to light.

That neither meaning nor sound has any intrinsic value and that value is created by the poetic action (*Kavi Vyapara*) are established again in Sanskrit poetics by the outcome of the speculations on the excellences (*Gunas*) and defects (*Doshas*) of poetry. Ten *Gunas* and ten *Doshas* are mentioned by Bharata¹⁰¹. Both merits as well as flaws may refer to the sound as well as the meaning. For instance, in the analysis by Dandin,¹⁰² though sweetness (*Madhurya*) is primarily an excellence of the sound stratum created by alliteration, use of soft vocables and other devices, words suggesting a vulgar sense are prohibited as destructive of sweetness, which therefore emerges as a feature of the meaning stratum as well. The important question now raises its head, whether such qualitative distinctions are invariably valid, whether a flaw is permanent (*Nitya*) or transient (*Anitya*). That is, can we define any feature as a flaw, right from the outset, and be sure that whenever that feature is found embedded in a poetic tissue, the poetic effect will be really marred?

This provokes the attack on the problem at a deeper level and Visvanatha¹⁰³ realises that, if a dangerous simplicism is to be avoided, absolutist definitions of flaws will have to be dropped. Here he was anticipating Dubos¹⁰⁴ who wrote "A work which moves us greatly must be excellent on the whole. For the same reason the work which does not move us at all, does not engage us, is worth nothing. And if criticism finds in it nothing to reprove in the way of faults against the rules, it means only that a work may be bad without having faults against the rules, as a work full of faults against the rules may be an excellent work." But Visvanatha's analysis penetrates deeper to a functional point of view which evaluates particular traits in their embedding in the organic contexts and judges them as flaws or merits in the light of that evaluation and not by any absolute criteria. The flaw (*Dosha*) is now redefined as what adversely affects the evocation of the feeling (*Rasapakaishaka*). No feature, therefore, can be regarded as a permanent flaw in any context. Visvanatha shows that what is ordinarily considered a flaw can become an excellence by actually helping and not hindering the evocation of the feeling.

As a matter of fact, the recognition of this truth is implied in the works of many writers long before Visvanatha. Thus, while mellifluousness was considered an excellence and discordant sounds (*Sruti-Kashita* or *Sruti-Dushta*) a flaw, as early as the seventh century, Bhamaha¹⁰⁵ lays down the general proposition that particular contexts make even such discord an excellence. Kuntaka¹⁰⁶ endorses this by saying that letters and sounds must be appropriate to the context and that certain sounds unsuited to certain situations may help the evocation of feeling in other situations. It is worthwhile quoting here what T. S. Eliot¹⁰⁷ has to say on the same subject. "It would be a mistake to assume that all poetry ought to be melodious, or that melody is more than one of the components of the music of words. Some poetry is meant to be sung, most poetry, in modern times, is meant to be spoken—and there are many other things to be

spoken of besides the murmur of innumerable bees or the moan of doves in memorial elms. Dissonance, even cacophony, has its place." Flaws and excellences in the poetic tissue, thus, have to be analysed with reference to the feeling which seeks incarnation in it. The poet cannot be condemned to be a bard of tender sentiments, eternally. He may be an angry man. We may find in an expressionist painting that the anger is the pigment, the coruscated surface, the aching colour. Likewise, anger may bristle in the rough texture of the words.

It is Dandin who undertakes a detailed analysis of the question from this deeper, functional point of view. One whole chapter¹⁰⁸ is devoted to the discussion of *Doshas* or flaws. But each flaw is analysed with a qualification that in certain contexts it ceases to be a flaw and becomes an excellence (*Guna*). Thus, if harsh sounds (*Stuti-Dushta*) are to be avoided in the delineation of the erotic sentiment (*Singara*) they can be a positive excellence in the depiction of the terrible or the awe-inspiring (*Raudra*). Unintelligible prattle, where syntax collapses and meaning is obscure, is generally to be shunned, not only in poetry, but in prose also. But Dandin points out that it can be ideal for a child's sweet prattle or the speech of a sick man or a mad man's raving. Dandin's analysis reaches a deeper level when he refers to contradictory speech (*Vivudhartha*). He is not referring to the utterance of a character deliberately meant to conceal from another his real intentions or misguide him. He is dealing with the spontaneous utterance in profound emotional crises, like the speech of Clytemnestra, when Agamemnon's herald arrives, in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus, where the emotion revealed in speech is utterly different from the emotion that is creating a storm within. Dandin fully justifies such utterances by arguing that there are states of mind in which such contradictory speech is the natural mode of expression. Therefore this contradictory quality is not a flaw, but an excellence, in such contexts.

Raja Sekhara sums up the drift of the entire speculation on this issue by stressing once again the importance of the creative action of the poet. With a delightful lack of inhibition, he justifies even plagiarism and details thirty-two different modes by which literary borrowing may be turned to advantage. Those who find this rather appalling should speedily reassure themselves by realising that the plagiarism referred to here is of the type which Shakespeare practised when he lifted whole stories from Holinshed and other sources. The stories undergo a sea-change because they are subjected to a creative re-handling. It is this creativity, Raja Sekhara¹⁰⁹ points out, that enables the poet to obliterate the ordinary distinctions between flaws and excellences. The real poet transmutes flaws into excellences. The poetaster ruins his poetry even with what are usually recognised as excellences.

We can now proceed to see how this creative intuition attacks the problem of poetic figures.

CHAPTER FOUR

Poetic Figures

I. THE DISPENSABILITY OF FIGURES

FIGURES of speech are called *Alamkaras* (literally, ornaments, decorations) in Sanskrit poetics and poetics itself is often designated as *Alamkara Sastira*, the science of ornament or embellishment. Many writers have demurred against this on the ground that what is embellished (*Alamkarya*) is more important than the embellishment (*Alamkara*). Poetics has kept that important distinction in mind but the term *Alamkara Sastira* has continued to be in vogue.

The pleasure we take in the pictures of simile and metaphor, as distinct from unfigurative word-picture, may be due to the shock of surprise caused by the unexpected rapprochement of two notions, that seemed, a moment before, unconnected and remote from one another.¹ Bharata² treats *Alamkaras* as part of the "linguistic representation" (*Vachuka-abhinaya*) which is the libretto of the drama. He mentions four figures. But in course of time the number enormously increased.

Vamana believed that all figurative expressions were but aspects of metaphorical expression (*Upama Prapancha*). He is, however, alone in this type of monism. Other writers found it difficult to agree that all figures implied comparison or juxtaposition of images. But there was a profound perception in Vamana's concept which should not be ignored. To describe one object in terms of another, to perceive, in Wordsworth's words, "affinities in objects where no brotherhood exists to passive minds", has always been the poet's pride and power. Vamana's concept has also affinities with Eisenstein's concept of creative montage in filmic presentation. "A work of art, understood dynamically, is the process of arranging images"³ The principle of the arrangement is montage or creative juxtaposition. "In every such juxtaposition the result is qualitatively distinguishable from each component element viewed separately"⁴ The juxtaposition shall evoke in the perception and feelings of the spectator the most complete image of the theme itself⁵ "When Vamana⁶ insisted that not only simile and metaphor, but all genuinely poetic imagery was a latent juxtaposition (*Upamya-garbha*), he seems to have been thinking of the generalised problem of concretising the theme, which, in the Indian tradition, is essen-

tially linked to the *Rasa*, in a stream of juxtaposed and integrated images. The affinity between images thus juxtaposed is, therefore, something which belongs to a deeper plane of aesthetic creativity and experience than the affinities that ordinarily suffice for simile and metaphor

But the difficulty in understanding the real meaning of Vaman.'s concept increased as the number of poetic figures defined by analysis multiplied. Jayadeva⁷ (thirteenth century) gives about one hundred and Appayya Dikshita⁸ (seventeenth century) adds a score more. The two broad divisions were the ideational figures (*Arthalamkara*) which related to the sense and the verbal figures (*Sabdalamkara*) which related to the word. The distinction is not clearly expressed in the analysis of Udbhata⁹ of the eighth century. But it is implied, for he treats the verbal figures first and then proceeds to the ideal figures. But Mammata¹⁰ in the eleventh century clearly distinguishes them and gives a helpful test for deciding whether any particular instance is a verbal figure or an ideal figure. The test is whether the example can or cannot bear a substitution by synonyms. If the figure disappears with such a substitution, it is a verbal figure. Toleration of synonym would indicate that it is an ideal figure.

The extent to which specialisation in the analysis of figures was carried can be revealed by taking a typical example : indication of the beauty of a woman's face. *Upama* or simile : "Your face is like the moon", *Rupaka* or metaphor : "Your moon-face", *Pratipa* : "The moon is like your face", *Sandeha* : "Is this your face, or is this the moon?", *Apahnuti* : "This is the moon and not your face", *Upameyopama* : "The moon is like your face, and your face is like the moon", *Ananyaya* : "Your face is only like your face", *Smarana* : "Having seen the moon I remembered your face", *Bhantimat* : "Thinking it to be the moon, the Chakora (a bird which is supposed to feed on moon-beams) flies towards your face", *Ullekha* : "This is the moon, this is the lotus, thus the Chakora and the bee fly towards your face", *Utpreksha* : "This is verily the moon", *Atisayokti* : "This is a second moon", *Tulyayogita* : "The moon and the lotus are vanquished by your face", *Dipaka* : "Your face and the moon rejoice in the night", *Vyatiireka* : "Your face always shines, but the moon shines only in the night", *Drishtanta* : "In the heavens the moon, on earth your face", *Protivastupama* : "The moon reigns in heaven, your face reigns on earth", *Nidarsana* : "Your face bears the beauty of the moon", *Apiastuta Prasamsa* : "The moon is pale before your face", *Parinama* : "By your moon-face, the warmth of passion is cooled.", *Samasokti* : "Your face beautifully spotted with black eyes and adorned with the light of smile"

This helpful string of examples given by De,¹¹ following Dandin,¹² indicates the danger of this type of intensive specialisation, of which poets could and did make capital, entirely dispensing with inspiration. That is why Ananda Vardhana,¹³ without barring images altogether, advises caution. He is afraid that the crowding of images may distract the attention

of the reader away from the feeling-import of the poem Mammata, Bhoja¹⁴ and Ruyyaka¹⁵ try to restrict the number, but the scholars proved irrepressible

It was the undeniable emotive power of the best specimens of that type of poetry which completely dispensed with figures of speech that provoked a deeper analysis of the nature and function of poetic ornament in the poetic organism The "natural description", devoid of ornament but endowed with poetic power, is called *Svabhavokti* With the definition of poetry as *Vakrokti* or "deviant" utterance there was an apparent anti-thesis between *Svabhavokti* and *Vakrokti* which urgently demanded a resolution Bhamaha accepts *Svabhavokti* as a poetic figure or *Alamkara*, as Raghavan¹⁶ has shown through a painstaking analysis Bhamaha¹⁷ includes *Svabhavokti* in *Vakrokti* because he interprets the latter term as poetic, rather than as necessarily ornamented or embellished, utterance The anti-thesis he insists on is not between *Svabhavokti* and *Vakrokti* but between *Vakrokti*, an inclusive expression for all really poetic utterance, and *Varta*, news¹⁸ News may be report of current happenings (*Loka Varta*) or technical information (*Sastriya Varta*) They have their own place but do not qualify as poetry Naturalistic description, on the other hand, can qualify as poetry, even though it dispenses with all ornament, if it has strikingness or real poetic impact

Negatively, *Svabhavokti* rules out the ordinariness and vulgarity of *Varta* Positively, it must incarnate beauty through the various qualities into which that concept resolves itself Bana,¹⁹ of the seventh century, who uses the term *Jati* for *Svabhavokti*, insists that news (*Varta*) is essentially vulgar (*Gramya*) in the sense that the language has not been chastened in the crucible of poetic action Poetic naturalism has to be *Agramya*, rise above this vulgar, prosaic level Kumara Svamin²⁰ (fifteenth century) repeats this caution Mahima Bhatta²¹ feels that naturalism in poetry should be very alert to the danger of a flaw which he calls the lapse into the excluded utterance (*Avachya Vachana*) Attributes which do not add to the significance, or words which do not heighten the impact or aspect of things which are commonplace these, if not excluded in the poetic utterance, lead to this specific flaw Kuntaka, who opposed the inclusion of *Svabhavokti* in *Vakrokti*, was obsessed by the fear that cart-drivers' talk would gain acceptance in poetry as *Svabhavokti* The danger, probably, is not unreal But the cautions of Bhamaha, Bana and others safeguard against it If Wordsworth insisted that rustic speech was suitable for poetry, he was well aware of the cautions that had to be kept in mind, as Barstow²² and Pottle²³ have shown in their studies on poetic diction and idiom Wordsworth speaks about a "selection of the real language of men", about expression "simple and unelaborated", but "purged from causes of dislike or disgust" He recognised that "selection" was necessary to "separate the composition from the vulgarity and meanness of ordinary life"

These contra-indications deal primarily with the language tissue, about which care has to be taken in the approach of naturalism which dispenses with ornament. But what makes the naturalism poetry rather than reportage (*Varta*) is not the mere avoidance of the prosaic but the presence of positive qualities. Poetic language, said Wordsworth, can be the language of general human speech but it must be in "a state of vivid sensation".²⁴ Poetic experience and imagination, thus, should be the prior reality. Camille Pissarro, in a letter of 1892 to his son Lucien, makes a very significant observation which shows that the vulgarity (*Granyata*) of which Bana and Kuntaka were very nervous in naturalism is automatically excluded if the naturalism is poetic. Pissarro believes like Wordsworth that aesthetic creation is best undertaken as recollection in tranquillity. His reason for this belief is that only those features of the scene which have intimations of value to the aesthetic sensibility will survive in memory. He asks Lucien to practise drawing from memory. "I am more than ever for the impression through memory. It renders less of the object—vulgarity disappears, leaving only the undulations of the truth that was glimpsed, felt."

The felt truth, thus, is more important than the objective truth and if the felt truth seems identical with the objective truth in a piece of naturalistic poetry, the fact still remains that it is the imagination which secured or created this identity. Bhamaha defines this imaginative quality (*Bhavikatva*) as that power of the poetic expression by which the past and the future presented by the poet are so vivid as to look like belonging to the present. Murari,²⁵ the ninth century dramatist, said that the poet is like the sage (*Rishi*) who brings through the power of his vision the past and future into the present. History is reportage of the past. Bhamaha and Murari indicate here the distinction between the mere chronicle and the evocative naturalism or *Svabhavokti*. Visvanatha²⁶ also makes the distinction. "By a mere narration on the part of the poet of what happened, the soul of poetry is not realised, because that, the mere narration of events, can be effected by chronicles and the like." What is required is not reportage, *Varta*, of the past but an integral resurrection of the life of the past, to use Michelet's phrase.

Writer after writer emphasises the living quality of the evocation in really poetic *Svabhavokti*, whether it relates to the past or to a present object or context. Vamana refers to the luminously clear seizure of the essential nature of the object (*Vastu-svabhava-sphutatva*). Dandin²⁷ demands the actuality (*Sakshat*) of the object and Bhoja²⁸ elaborates this as the portrayal of an object's actual appearance (*Svaupa-sakshat-kathan*). Taruna Vachaspati (thirteenth century) says that in the poetic evocation the object emerges as if it is right before you (*Pratyakshamiva darsayanti*). In *Svabhavokti*, more than in any other poetic intention, the content or meaning should have the most luminously perfect revelation in the verbalisation (*Artha vyakti*). Rudrata,²⁹ therefore, uses the attribute "mature in meaning or ideation" (*Pushtantha*) for poetic naturalism.

Kuntaka is the only writer who gets into some analytical difficulties regarding poetic naturalism. He starts by accepting Bhamaha's term *Vakrokti*, which is primarily meant to distinguish the accession of evocative power by language in poetic expression and only secondarily means embellished utterance, if the embellishment indicates additive elements like poetic figures. Kuntaka, further, derives *Vakrokti* from the poet's genius (*Pratibha*). Using *Vakrokti* now as a generic concept, he proceeds to analyse the poetic embellishments that can be legitimately included in it. Poetic figures are an important category of such embellishments. Thus he unconsciously comes to use the term *Vakrokti* as almost coextensive with the term *Alamkara* or ornament³⁰. The unconscious shift from his own original position should be carefully noted. To regard figures as aspects of *Vakrokti* or poetic expression is legitimate. But to see only figurative expression as poetic expression is a serious unconscious fallacy. Bain³¹ defined the poetic figure thus: "A figure of speech is a deviation from the plain and ordinary mode of speaking, for the sake of greater effect. It is an unusual form of speech." Bain does not fall into the difficulties which proved a trap for Kuntaka, but this definition is astonishingly helpful in clarifying to us how those difficulties arose. Poetry is an unusual, deviant form of speech and it is the recognition of this that caused expressions like *Vakrokti* and *Praudhokti* to emerge in Sanskrit poetics. As poetic figures are a very important aspect of this unusual form of speech, we couple them very naturally in association as Bain does, and legitimately. But the danger arises when we derive the unusual quality of poetic expression solely from poetic figures.

Dandin had noticed this danger earlier. His solution is forthright, if paradoxical. If poetic expression invariably means figurative expression, the *Vakrata* (literally, the deviation mentioned by Bain and coupled by him and Kuntaka with the search for juxtaposed images or other ornament) implied in *Vakrokti* cannot be laid down as the invariant characteristic of all poetic figures, for it is absent in *Svabhavokti* which Dandin insists is a genuine poetic figure³². He does so insist because the opposition insists that all poetic expression is figurative expression. Dandin is satisfied that *Svabhavokti* is genuinely poetic. So it has to be considered a poetic figure according to the opposition's premises. If the deviousness (*Vakrata*) is not there in *Svabhavokti*, it is a headache for the opposition, who should modify their concept of *Vakrokti*. In fact, Dandin³³ becomes heartily tired of this term because of its wide oscillation of meaning and uses *Atisayokti*, the term and the concept being derived from Bhamaha³⁴. *Atisaya* or *Adbhuta* is wonder and he refers to the wonderful transmutation by which language blooms into poetry when handled by the creative genius of the poet. There is also a specific figure of speech named *Atisayokti*. But Dandin makes it clear that he is using the term in a more generalised and profound sense, as standing, in fact, for the poetic modality that is basic to all figures as well as to naturalism. Abhinava³⁵ would later accept the concept and the

term as standing for the generic property of all poetic figures (*sarvalamkara-samanyarupam*) and since he relates it to transcendental (*lokatrna*) vision it becomes identical with the essence of poetry, embracing both naturalism as well as figurative expression. But Dandin had also stressed vision and earlier Bhamaha had related *Atisayokti* to the transcendental poetic intuition (*lokatikranta gocharata*). All this makes it absolutely clear that the sense in which Bhamaha used the expressions *Vakriokti* or *Atisayokti* exactly corresponds to the use of the expression "deviation" by Valéry³⁶ "Whenever speech exhibits a certain deviation from the most direct expression—that is, the most *insensible* expression of thought, whenever these deviations make us aware in some way of a world of relationships distinct from purely practical reality, we conceive more or less clearly of the possibility of enlarging this exceptional area, and we have the sensation of seizing the fragment of a noble and living substance which is perhaps capable of development and cultivation, and which, once developed and used, constitutes poetry in its artistic effect." This deviant expression that is poetry can take in figures, but can also dispense with them. And the upshot of the argumentative subtlety on the part of Dandin, which was provoked by the misunderstanding of *Vakriokti* displayed by so many, is that his attitude towards figures of speech stands revealed as identical with that of a writer like Housman,³⁷ twelve centuries later. Housman says that metaphor and simile are "things inessential to poetry". They are frankly "accessories", for they are employed by the poet "to be helpful, to make his sense clearer or his conception more vivid", or they are used by the poet "for ornament", because the image contained possesses an "independent power to please".

Mammata also follows Dandin in claiming *Svabhavokti* as a poetic figure. He points out that poetic naturalism has impact, strikingness (*Vaichitya*) and this is full qualification for being considered as figurative speech. Bhoja generalises the concept of poetic ornament (*Alamkara*) as that which helps in incarnating beauty or radiance (*Kavya-sobha*) in the poetic tissue. *Vakriokti*, thus, is not exclusively figurative speech. It is utterance which enshrines beauty. Naturalism or *Svabhavokti*, therefore, does not create any difficulties for Bhoja. Vidyanatha³⁸ (fourteenth century) also closes the issue by noticing that poetic naturalism can be beautiful (*Chaitu*).

But Kuntaka's difficulty is genuine. He readily admits the striking quality of pen-pictures of objects, nature and men³⁹. But he cannot accept naturalism as a figure or ornament, because the intrinsic nature of the object (*Vastu-svabhava*) should be the ornamented (*Alamkaya*), not the ornament (*Alamkara*). He admits that beauty is manifested here. But it is the intrinsic beauty of the object (*Vastu-vakrta*).

The depth of Kuntaka's difficulty is now revealed. The beauty in poetic naturalism is something intrinsic to the object, donated by the object, not donated by the poet; only if it were created by the poet could it be called a poetic ornament, so *Svabhavokti* is not a poetic ornament. The problem

here completely changes its shape. Whether naturalism is a figure or not is now unimportant. The important question is whether or not it is basically poetic, in the sense of being a creative donation by the poet. We cannot accuse Kuntaka of acute insensitiveness here, for others have felt the same difficulty. Mammata comes up against it in his analysis of the figure known as *Bhavikalamkara*. We saw earlier that Bhamaha specifically emphasised the role of the pictorially evocative power of the imagination (*Bhavika*) in compositions which attempted the integral resurrection of the past or the delineation of an idealised future. The poetic figure here was called *Bhavikalamkara*. Now Mammata raised this issue: when things of the past or future are visualised, there are two possibilities, the things by themselves may possess a power and beauty whereby their mere mention may make them seem like being actually present before us, or this quality of their becoming vivid enough to appear like things of the present may be wrought in them by the extraordinary gifts of expression of the poet. Mammata feels inclined to include the former also as *Bhavikalamkara*. His reason is that the figure here is like *Svabhavokti*, where the beauty is more or less initially given (*siddha*) and since *Svabhavokti* is accepted as a figure, this class of evocations of the "glorious" past or future should also be accepted as a poetic figure. But earlier, Bhamaha and Udbhata, dealing with the same issue, had insisted that if expression is to qualify as a poetic figure, the poet's powers must have added something. So they accepted only those instances as *Bhavikalamkara* where the power of the evocation rested on the adequacy of the verbal tissue (*Sabdanukulya*) created by the poet.⁴⁰

Mammata moves nearer to the core of the problem than Kuntaka, for although he gets involved in the difficulties created by those instances where the beauty seems to be initially "given", he also recognises that there are other instances where it is the donation of the creative poet. And, to be fair to Mammata and Kuntaka, let us also concede that the million-dollar "historical" sagas from Hollywood often lean too heavily on the themes by themselves. But in admitting such instances as poetic and in assuming that in naturalism the beauty is the object's donation, Mammata makes the same mistake as Kuntaka. And we have to look to Bhamaha and Dandin for a juster appreciation of the real inwardness of the problem.

Illustrations from Western thought can clarify the problem here and also show that Mammata and Kuntaka were not being singularly obtuse in their approaches. Drinkwater⁴¹ classifies poetry in three groups. The first group consists of impressions made directly upon the poet's mind by natural objects, by objective action, and by personal sensation, all recorded without philosophical argument. The second group consists of material which shows these various impressions not merely recorded, but recorded in their effect upon the poet's emotion. He appropriates them to the activity of his own feelings. The third group consists of material in which the poet goes beyond the record of an object or action and beyond the record of its

effect upon his emotions, and allows himself to embellish the occasion with dogmatic statement or reflection of the mind. The first group corresponds to the *Svabhavokti* of Sanskrit poetics, as is clear from the example Drinkwater uses, a poem which gives a fine evocation of winter, "of the red-breast sitting and singing betwixt the tufts of snow on the bare branch of the mossy apple-tree, while the night thatch smokes in the sun-thaw, of the secret ministry of frost hanging them up in silent icicles, quietly shining to the quiet moon". Now the difficulty here is that the distinction is not clear between Drinkwater's first and second groups. Is there such a thing as a record of the object, of objective action, in poetry, which is a separate category from the record of impressions in their effects upon the poet's sensibility? Is there such a thing in poetry as the intrinsic beauty of the object, Kuntaka's *Vastu Vakṛata*, different from the beauty of the poetic vision and expression, of *Vakrokti*?

Analyses by Coleridge, Mann, T. S. Eliot and others can help us towards an answer to this query. Coleridge speaks of the identification of "the percipient and the perceived". Even in immediate perception, images of memory flow in to coalesce with it and to form "nuclei in the reservoir of the soul". And these constellations are retained in memory as feelings, combine as feelings, emerge as feelings. For their elements were charged with feeling in the primal instant of perception, and were at that first stage in the process of gestation endowed with, and known as, feelings.⁴² Naturalistic poetry need not be written at the very instant of the impression. Even if it is, memory and sensitiveness have time for their selective, refining process. Thomas Mann⁴³ wrote: "The strange thing was that these pictures and memories had their extreme vividness and brilliance, their fullness of detail, not as it were, as first hand. It was as though memory had not originally been so concerned to preserve them in all their detail, but had to yield them up afterwards, bit by bit, word by word, out of its very depths. They had been searched out, refashioned, reproduced with all their attendant circumstances, given, so to say, a fresh coat of paint and hung in strong light, for the sake of the significance which they had unanticipatedly taken on." Eliot,⁴⁴ though he proceeds cautiously, makes it very clear that naturalistic images are retained by memory because, even at their first impact, the impressions elicited responsive feeling reactions. "Why, for all of us, out of all that we have heard, seen, felt, in a life-time, do certain images recur, charged with emotion, rather than others? The song of the one bird, the leap of one fish, at a particular place and time, the scent of one flower, an old woman on a German mountain path, six ruffians seen through an open window playing cards at night at a small French railway station where there was a water mill, such memories may have a symbolic value, but of what we cannot tell, for they come to represent the depths of feeling into which we cannot peer. We might just as well ask why, when we try to recall visually some period in the past, we find in our memory just the few meagre arbitrarily chosen set of snapshots that we do find there,

the faded poor souvenirs of passionate moments" If the last sentence raises an issue, it also provides the answer in the last two words The moment of observation of the natural object was also a passionate moment Or, as Bhatta Tauta would have said, description (*Varnana*) has life and evocative power because it is the recollection of a genuine experience of vision (*Darsana*) and vision here means seeing the object not with the eye alone, but the heart as well Virginia Woolf¹⁵ wrote "Recall, then, some event that has left a distinct impression on you—how at the corner of the street, perhaps, you passed two people talking A tree shook, an electric light danced, the tone of the talk was comic, but also tragic, a whole vision, an entire conception, seemed contained in that moment" Baudelaire¹⁶ helps to sum up the whole issue "What is pure art according to the modern conception? It is the creation of an evocative magic incorporating at the same time both object and subject, the world external to the artist and the artist himself" His own urban landscapes have the realism of reportage But they are also the objectifications of his own inward tensions and poignant emotions

Thus, Drinkwater's—and Kuntaka's—distinction between record of the object and such record irrigated by feeling is not valid in poetry Only the latter is the invariable reality, unless we take into account bald reportage, Bhamaha's *Varta*, but that is not poetry Any statement which implies that poetic beauty is the object's donation finds it necessary to correct and amplify itself immediately Leigh Hunt says in one place "There are simplest truths often so beautiful and impressive that one of the greatest proofs of the poet's genius consists in leaving them to stand alone, illustrated by nothing, but the light of their own tears or smiles, their own wonder, might and playfulness" But the poet could not have seen these truths unless he had shared their smiles or tears And Hunt himself states elsewhere "In poetry, feeling and imagination are necessary for the perception and presentation even of matters of fact"¹⁷ Wordsworth¹⁸ also, similarly, makes a statement which he has to correct speedily He opens with a statement of the powers requisite for the production of poetry, the first being "Observation and Description—that is, the ability to observe with accuracy things as they are in themselves, and with fidelity to describe them, unmodified by any passion or feeling existing in the mind of the describer, whether the things depicted be actually present to the senses, or have a place only in the memory" The evocations of things present to the senses and those abiding in memory generally correspond to the *Svabhavokti* and the *Bhavi-kalamkara* of Sanskrit poetics But Wordsworth soon finds that instead of Observation and Description, he has to speak, like Bhatta Tauta, about Vision (*Darsana*) and Description (*Varnana*) For, a little later, he radically modifies his statement "These processes of imagination are carried on either by conferring additional properties upon an object, or abstracting from it some of those which it actually possesses, and thus enabling it

to react upon the mind which hath performed the process, like a new existence”

A E (George Russel) wrote . “We have really nothing to write about but ourselves.”⁴⁹ Arnold Bennett⁵⁰ was more forthright in his demand that the objective in art should be soaked in the subjectivity “No good thing is produced with ‘perfect detachment’ or without passion None of my work is detached or pretends to be” Middleton Murry⁵¹ wrote “There is no real antithesis between personal and impersonal art the opposition is a false one” Lowes⁵² draws a symbolic picture of the poetic mind confronting the sea “I may be caught by the sea’s mystery, oppressed by its vastness, stirred by the majestic ‘Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed’. The I who see am as manifold as what I see, and what I see takes form and colour, proportion and emphasis from what I feel”

When the dust of controversy, whether to include poetic naturalism in the figurative speech that is poetry, settled down in Sanskrit poetics, the conclusion that was stabilised was that the object of *Svabhavokti* is the finest essential aspect (*Visishta svabhava*) of the thing, which the poet’s eye alone can see and his imagination alone can embody in genuinely poetic utterance Poetic vision thus becomes paramount even in naturalism As Roger Fry⁵³ said, in routine living, the normal person only reads the labels, as it were, on the objects around him, and troubles no further Valéry refers to the dead habit of seeing through the dictionary. Prosaic individuals cannot see the profound beauty of ordinary objects, with the result that they have had to invent beautiful views “Of everything else they are unaware But at the beautiful view they regale themselves on a concept swarming with verbal associations . . . And since they reject as nothing that which has not a name, the number of their impressions is limited in advance” In poetic vision, however, all these perfectly familiar things and people become linked in an associative relationship quite different from that which obtains in the ordinary contacts of daily life “They become (if you will forgive the expression) *musicalized* It is as though they affect one another with a mutual resonance of which harmony is the prime feature”⁵⁴ This is exactly what Mammata⁵⁵ meant when he said that in aesthetic vision we are no longer determined by the strong polarising influences of desire and aversion which ordinarily condition our attitude towards things, with the result that they become enjoyable in and for themselves establishing a new harmony with our being

Ifor Evans⁵⁶ has made the strong plea that poetry should be considered a way of knowing the world as valid in its own terms as science Science gives power by detaching man’s inner feelings from the outer world and exploring the latter objectively, poetry generates power by taking the world into one’s own being, assimilating objects by reacting with feeling to their essential nature that can enter into such enriching

relation with our subjectivity. "Poetry" says Leigh Hunt,⁵⁷ "begins where matter of fact or of science ceases to be merely such, and to exhibit a further truth, the connection it has with the world of emotion, and its power to produce imaginative pleasure" Shairp⁵⁸ points out that any object or truth can become fit subject for poetic utterance "Only in order that it should be so, it is necessary that the object, whatever it is, should cease to be a merely sensible object, or a mere notion of the understanding, and pass inward—pass out of the coldness of the merely notional region into the warm atmosphere of the life-giving imagination Vitalised there, the truth shapes itself into living images which kindle the passion and affections, and stimulate the whole man" Stedman⁵⁹ contrasts the Weather Bureau's description of the storm as "an area of low pressure rapidly moving up the Atlantic coast" to the poet's evocation of "the gigantic storm-wind of the Equinox descending on the Atlantic and scourging land-ward in his wrath the toiling surges laden with sea-weed from the rocks". The scientific description here does not invalidate the imaginative reaction

Shelley⁶⁰ spoke of poetry as "purging from our inward sight the film of familiarity It compels us to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know" As Mathew Arnold⁶¹ said, "the grand power of poetry is the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, and intimate sense of them, and of our relations with them" In the non-utilitarian (*lokottara*, *alaukika*, or *lokatikranta* in Sanskrit poetics) context of poetic perception, subject and object enter into a new enriching relation Maritain⁶² referred to poetry as "that intercommunion between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self which is a kind of divination" The Latin vates was both a poet and a diviner. That was also the original meaning of the word *Kavi* in Sanskrit And that is why Browning calls poets the "makers-see"

Poetry can create new myth and realities. But in naturalism or *Svabhavokti*, it sees the world afresh "We often speak of the imagination" wrote Robert Lynd,⁶³ "as though it were a brilliant faculty of lying, on the contrary, it is a faculty by which not only do we see and hear things that the eye cannot see or the ear hear, but which enables the eye to see and the ear to hear things that they did not see or hear before" This can be compared with Coleridge's statement⁶⁴ of the two-fold aim of the *Lyrical Ballads* on the one hand, "to give the charm of novelty to things of every day", by touching them with "the modifying colours of imagination", on the other hand, to give substantial interest to supernatural incidents and agents "by the dramatic truth of such emotions, as would naturally accompany such situations, supposing them real". Let us concentrate on that part of the endeavour here which relates to poetic naturalism Here Coleridge speaks of the object as touched by the modifying colours of the imagination In another passage

from the same source, he says that one great service the poet renders to us is that of "awakening the mind's attention to the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and wonder of the world before us, an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand" Here the implication seems to be that the world has its intrinsic loveliness which need only be discovered. We seem to have got back to the problem over which Kuntaka stumbled. In poetic naturalism, is the beauty donated by the object or by the poet? Does the poet "discover" the loveliness of the world or make it lovely by touching it with the "modifying" colours of the imagination?

Let us take the help of some concrete instances. Keats depicts a wave breaking, out at sea,

*Down whose green back the short-lived foam, all hoar,
Butsts gradual with a wayward indolence*

Betjeman⁶⁵ paints an ampler canvas :

*Forced by the backwash, see the nearest wave
Rise to a wall of huge translucent green
And crumble into spray along the top
Blown seaward by the land-breeze Now she breaks
And in an arch of thunder plunges down
To burst and tumble, foam on top of foam,
Criss-crossing, baffled, sucked and shot again,
A waterfall of whiteness, down a rock,
Without a source but roller's furthest reach
And tufts of sea-pink, high and dry for years,
Are flooded out of ledges, boulders seem
No bigger than a pebble washed about
In this tremendous tide*

And lastly, here is a landscape, not marine but riverine, by Bhavabhuti,⁶⁶ the seventh century dramatist. "This is the mountain Kraunchavata with its flocks of crows sitting in the vast clump of bamboos, resounding with the mournful hootings of owls. Here, frightened by the cries of the peacocks roaming about, the snakes coil higher round the branches of the old sandal trees. Nearby are the southern ranges with their peaks darkened by the clouds resting on their points and with the waters of the Godavari roaring and splashing in their caves. And these are those holy confluences of rivers with deep waters, awful with the tumult of the waves rushing forth in wild confusion and dashing against one another."

In all the three instances, there is no simile or metaphor or any other figure of speech. Initially the poet's contribution seems to be confined to the adequacy of verbal music (*Sabdanukulya*) which Bhamaha and Udbhata demanded in such evocations. (It is there in Bhavabhuti, too, but the tumult of the waves—*Anyonya pratighata samkula chalat kallola kolahalam*—defies translation, at least by this writer.) But is that the total donation of the poet?

Very luckily we have the comment of a painter, Reuben Tam,⁶⁷ on one of his own marine landscapes, entitled *Dark Wave*. This may help us to work towards an answer. "*Dark Wave* is one of a series of paintings of ocean forms that I have been doing for a number of years. In this painting I have tried to present a phenomenon of a breaking wave with its white, tumbling head, its dark shadow, its black upsurge, and its streaks of foam. But of course these are just the objective components used to bring to focus the subjective experience contained in the picture. The total experience itself is the subject matter, the concern of the painting. I might trace the experience to its origins in observation and memory, in awareness of symbols of freedom and action, and in response to movement and hiatus, rise and fall, and mass and glint, and in the need for seeking verification in the raw outer world of one's inner vision of reality. Thus each of my paintings is the expression of cumulative experience. While the outer boundaries of experience may at times be vague and endless, its core may be brought to bright focus by some aspect of the physical world like a wave suddenly breaking before one's eyes. And in turn, the specific object, when re-created, re-recorded, struggled with and worried over on canvas, reveals, finally, the general, the longer time, the larger areas of awareness and participation."

We can safely extend the truth of this statement about the *Dark Wave* to the leisurely green roller of Keats, the wave straining against the backwash in Betjeman and the tumultuous clash of waves in Bhavabhuti. If the veil of familiarity that lies over the radiant outer world is drawn aside by the poet, he also removes another veil, to reveal his own inner world where what he reveals was seen and felt by him in the first instance because the poet's seeing is experiencing. And experience here means that the entire personality, with its sensitiveness, memories and capacity for objectification, was involved in the encounter with the object, with the result that the record of the encounter presents the spirit in action as much as the object on which it acted. The objects in poetic naturalism are, therefore, not stolid, neutral physical objects. They become transformed and revealed as "*objets à réaction poétique*", to borrow Le Corbusier's phrase.⁶⁸

"In the hollow of humility" wrote Maritain,⁶⁹ "a painter meditates and gazes, he sees the vines that God had made, the olives, the nettle trees, the bulls, the unicorns—the moors and skies of Brittany—and the labours and movements, captured in slow motion, of men whom God also made,

what he receives through his eyes falls into the silence of a fervent lake of contemplation and vegetates until its resurgence in a work capable of acting as a talisman that would bring peace to the heart." The world enters the artist and poet and reemerges as his experience "Though we have travelled the world over," wrote Emerson,⁷⁰ "to find the beautiful, we must carry it with us, or we find it not. The best of beauty is a finer charm than skill in surfaces, in outlines, or rules of art can ever teach, namely a radiation from the work of art, of human character—a wonderful expression through stone, or canvas, or musical sound, of the deepest and simplest attributes of our nature, and therefore most intelligible at least to those souls which have these attributes" We come back to the fundamental position of Sanskrit poetics: that art is a representation (*Abhinaya*) of the feeling experienced by the poet through concrete objects which therefore acquire the status of *signes inducteurs* Poetic utterance can be but need not only be figurative utterance The figure is dispensable What is not dispensable is feeling and experience This feeling can find full-bodied expression without the use of figures or the juxta-position of images in simile and metaphor, in poetic naturalism But the naturalism has to be poetic Nami Sadhu⁷¹ (eleventh century) in his gloss on Rudrata, points out that whereas factuality (*Vastava*) means only a statement of a thing as it is, poetic naturalism (*Jati*) implies a living evocation that can create an experience (*Anubhava*) of the thing in our sensibility The Spanish poet Jiménez was always working towards his ideal of *depuracion* . a purification that would lead to a bare, intense statement and a limpidity like that of a pool, as he wrote, into which the spray of a fountain has disappeared leaving no trace on the surface that has received it "Intelligence, give me the precise name of things . Let my word be the thing itself, newly created by my soul Through me let all those who do not know things approach them"⁷²

Naturalism, in such an endeavour, becomes poetic experience, as Nami Sadhu points out "It is revelation what thou thinkst Discourse"⁷³

II THE FUNCTIONALISM OF FIGURES

To open a chapter on poetic figures with a long section on their dispensability may seem paradoxical But actually it was the poetic quality of naturalism or unfigurative expression that curbed the drift towards a heavy overlay of ornament and provoked a functional analysis of the role of figures in poetic expression When feeling was reaffirmed as the soul of poetic expression, the unconscious drift in theory towards the identification of poetic expression with necessarily figurative expression, which we saw in Kuntaka, was arrested Figurative expression was no longer held to be obligatory On the other hand, if figures were used, they were not to be ends in themselves, but had to serve the feeling and become the means of its realisation Ananda Vardhana⁷⁴ points out that ornament

(*Alamkara*) makes sense only when there is something of which it is the ornament (*Alamkarya*) Otherwise it is like decorating a dead body, adds Abhinava⁷⁵ What is embellished is the feeling and therefore poetic figures are functionally justified only when they help in the evocation of feeling Thus Ananda Vardhana lays down these principles the figure should suggest the feeling, it should be born along with the poet's revelation and delineation of the feeling, it should be naturally and easily introduceable, the poet should not have to pause to make a special effort to effect it⁷⁶

What is taking shape now is an organismic theory The metaphors used for the analysis are interesting, for they reveal a progressive insight into the inwardness of the situation The merely pretty figure, which has no profound organismic justification, is compared to the removable ornament, like a jewelled wristlet or hairpin (*Kataka* or *Keyura*) for instance And the caution is given that the figure should really be like an external limb (*Bahuanga*), a limb of the body which is strictly functional and structural and ideally responsive to the mind-which controls the body Both Ananda Vardhana and Mahima Bhatta⁷⁷ emphasise that the figure should be thus irremovable, structural, organic But both writers soon find that even the metaphor of the limb is not very happy, for it implies a dualism between feeling and poetic tissue, of which the poetic figure is a component, like the dualism between soul and body Effective expression is the epiphany of the poet's feeling and it is figurative speech (*Alamkara*) The figure, thus, is not like the limb (*Bahuanga*) which is part of the body that is separate from the soul, however responsive to it The figure is the concretisation of feeling (*Rasa Kshipta*) It is not realised by an effort which stands out as a separate endeavour from the primary one in which feeling moves towards its expression (*aprithag yatna nuvartya*) Thus, from feeling to resonant image or musical sound, the ideal and verbal figure which realise it, poetry is one unity, one complex of rich experience⁷⁸ Paul Valéry⁷⁹ wrote "A metaphor is *what arrives* when one views things *in a particular manner*" This is the effortless (*aprithag yatna*) accession by feeling of the figure which is its objective correlative that Sanskrit poetics speaks of Coleridge⁸⁰ refers to the opposite, the laboured (*piithag yatna*) pursuit of the striking conceit "Modern poetry is characterized by the poets' *anxiety* to be always striking Every line, nay, every word, looks full in your face, and asks and *begs* for praise I am pleased to think that, when a mere stripling, I had formed the opinion that true taste was virtue, and that bad writing was bad feeling"

It is interesting to note that Pater⁸¹ endorses what Sanskrit poetics has to say about the dispensability of ornament and the need for its full functional justification if used "As the very word ornament indicates what is in itself non-essential, so the 'one beauty' of all literary style is of its very essence and independent of all removable decorations, it may exist in all its fullest lustre in a composition utterly unadorned with

hardly a single suggestion of visibly beautiful things” This is exactly what Dandin and others claimed for *Svabhavokti* or poetic naturalism and it also echoes Ananda Vardhana’s insistence that what is embellished is more important than the embellishment. Pater also repeats the demand for the structural justification of the poetic figure made by Ananda Vardhana, Abhinava and Mahima Bhatta “And above all, there will be no uncharacteristic or tarnished or vulgar decoration, permissible ornament being for the most part structural or necessary” Spingarn,⁸² likewise, emphasises, in the manner of Ananda Vardhana, that feeling and expression form a unity He is primarily speaking of metre and rhythm, but rhythm can be a verbal figure in Sanskrit poetics and later Spingarn generalises his comment to include all ornament “Rhythm and metre must be regarded as aesthetically identical with style, as style is identical with artistic form and form in its turn is the work of art in its spiritual and indivisible self” To confuse abstract classifications with aesthetic realities is “to confuse form as concrete expression with form as ornament or a dead husk” Spender,⁸³ likewise, writes “The poet must be conscious of the profound significance and meaning of imagery, his imagery must be true Images are not still-lives to be hung on walls They are vision of the history of the race and of life and death” This is what Ananda Vardhana meant when he said that imagery should be born along with the poetic vision and its expression, not created by a separate effort

A closer study of the poetic process would indicate the need for a flexible interpretation of the demand that the image should be born along with the initial vision and experience Abhinava⁸⁴ has earned the gratitude of posterity by giving precise and careful summaries of the various previous theories about the concept of *Lakshana*,⁸⁵ which can be rather inadequately rendered as the trait or overall quality of the extended poetic tissue He summarises ten views According to the third of these, in the creative process, the poet’s imagination has three activities (*Vyapara*) which correspond to three successive and steadily expanding vibrations (*Paṇṣpanda*) In the very first vibration, the poet’s genius conceives the aesthetic emotion to be objectified and intuitively the quality of its feeling-tone (*Guna*) This is often very difficult to verbalise and all verbalisations can only be approximate Thus, if the emotion is erotic feeling (*Śingara*), the quality of its feeling-tone (*Guna*) is approximately verbalised as sweetness (*Madhurya*) The second vibration effects the creation of poetic figures (*Ālankāra*) The third selects the words and ideas (*Sabda, Artha*) which build up the actual poetic tissue or body of the poem (*Kāvya Sāra*) The poem is a unity, for there is inner congruence between the emotion, image and the overall texture of the extended poetic tissue They are all successive realisations of the same creative impulse as it evolves and expands to the various levels which analysis at least has to distinguish in an endeavour that involves both emotional experience and its objectification through literary craftsmanship The concept of phased

vibrations is useful, because in the later phases of the creative endeavour we can safely introduce the critical intellect, working, not autonomously, but in ideal cooperation with the emotional inspiration. Some images seem to emerge from the unconscious, along with the first emotional experience. But there are others discovered by the probing intellect, touched by the emotion, and the quality of the poem as basically the product of inspiration is not affected adversely in the least by the presence of such images if aesthetic sensibility has adjudged these suggestions of the poetically stirred intellect and accepted them as truly reflecting the emotional experience.

"Metaphor," wrote Whalley,⁸⁶ "by an enveloping compulsion, defies the theoretical borders between one sense and another, between sense and feeling, thought and meaning, and moves towards a self-determinate form." In this juxtaposition or comparison of realities, ordinarily widely separated, which Vamana held as the fundamental nature of all figures of speech, the danger is that the form may not be self-determinate, the self being, here, the poet's self itself, stirred by an emotion. This is why Ezra Pound⁸⁷ defined the image thus: "An image is that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time." I use the term 'complex' rather in the technical sense employed by the newer psychologists such as Hart. Here the intellect's role in the discovery of the image is not denied, but only that image is poetically valid which embodies the emotion.

Sanskrit poetry, especially in the later phase, when every scholar thought that he was qualified to write poetry, almost completely forgot the earlier caution that the image should be generated by the later phase—if not the very first phase—of the same vibration that initially arose from the heart pulsing stronger under the impact of an emotional experience. Thus, a readership, consisting mostly of scholars and not poetically sensitive minds, bestowed the title *Ghanta Magha* on the seventh century poet Magha because in his epic⁸⁸ he described Mount Raivataka as towering so high that the sun and the moon on either side seemed like metal gongs (*Ghanta*) hanging down the sides of an elephant. Titles like *Yamuna Trivikrama*, etc. bestowed on other poets clearly indicate that the image hunted out by the uninspired intellect was not distinguished from the image which embodied emotion.

Here the distinction made by Wordsworth⁸⁹ between fancy and imagination in the creation of imagery proves helpful. "Fancy does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution, from her touch, and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose, if it be slight, limited and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these are the desires and demands of the Imagination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite." Wordsworth's terms could be more precise, but the meaning is clear. The images hunted up by fancy are not the images created by the phased vibration of the poetic imagination in the expanding circles

of the creative activity For there the material of the image is plastic, or made plastic, as a mould for the emotional experience. Wordsworth proceeds to indicate the fascination of this inferior imagery which, incidentally, swept many of the Sanskrit poets off their feet. "Fancy depends upon the rapidity with which she scatters her thoughts and images, trusting that their number, and the felicity with which they are linked together will make amends for the want of individual value" Here is an instance of the rapidity that can overwhelm us with a shower of gifts, whose number makes us forget their poor emotive quality. Subandhu,⁹⁰ the seventh century novelist, describes the newly risen, ruddy moon in a chain of images "the ball of Princess Night, the golden mirror of the God of Love, like to a cluster of young red flowers on the Eastern Peak, round as drops of saffron on the foreheads of eastern damsels, a toilet dish, as it were, filled with a ball of pellucid saffron belonging to a wanton of the night" Here the same writer pays a flowery tribute to the heroine's beauty "Her lips had the glow of eventide in close proximity to her moon-like face The mouth seemed like a seal set to guard the jewels of her teeth Her brows were clusters of bees about her blue lotus eye, decorative arches for the face that was the abode of love, the shores of passion's sea" Wordsworth indicates another fascination of fancy "She prides herself upon the curious subtlety and the successful elaboration with which she can detect lurking affinities" A verse on moonlight by the poetess Chandala Vidya is an apt example "It seems as if the world, worn out with its daily routine, is bathing in the silvery water of the ocean of milk Through this stirring, the reddish stars are looking like water-bubbles" The imagery of fancy has also its place in poetry, for it is difficult to react ungraciously towards an instance like this by the poetess, Madirekshana "Over the surface of the ponds frequented by them, the bees, humming continuously, are conversing with the lotus buds, hidden under water" But such imagery does not incarnate the highest poetic power. "In the higher poetry," wrote Wordsworth, "an enlightened critic chiefly looks for the wisdom of the heart and the grandeur of the imagination Wherever these appear, simplicity accompanies them, Magnificence herself, when legitimate, depending upon a simplicity of her own, to regulate her ornaments"

The wisdom of the heart and the grandeur of the imagination regulated both the use and surrender of ornament in Valmiki, the first as well as one of the two greatest of India's epic poets Ananda Vardhana was fascinated by the creative insight of the master and many other critics noted that Valmiki provided the model for both naturalism (*Svabhavokti*) as well as the legitimate use of imagery He was equally successful in both because he made the heart's feeling the sovereign authority for deciding between naturalism and imagery, with the result that both proved equally ideal for the deeper poetic purpose In the *Ramayana*, there are magnificent paintings of landscapes and the seasons They are not decorative

additions, Spender's still-life studies that could be hung on the walls or removed. Rama, the prince cruelly exiled to the forests, wins a new realm of inward happiness when he intuits the profound reality of the great life of nature that pulses in strong, broad rhythms all around him. Involved imagery is ruled out here, as the accent is on the objective beauty of nature, though the paradox of poetry is that the objective does not exist unless the sensitive subjectivity has responded to it and thereby made it the symbol of the inner vibration. But this can be done and is probably better done—in a context of the type indicated where the intention is to lead the human spirit to communion with nature—without that second phase of the vibration of the poetic spirit in the creative process which proceeds beyond the intuition of the flavour of the feeling experienced to the crystallisation of imagery. Thus, with Sita by his side, Rama experiences the profound benediction of the rains after implacable summer had long ruled over the scorching earth and the hushed wood. "The dust settles and a cool wind blows. The heat of the summer is allayed . . . Emerging from the heart of the clouds, cool as camphor, redolent with the fragrance of Ketaka flowers, the balmy winds can, it would seem, be gathered in cupped hands and sipped. From the flowers, bruised by the downpour, the nectar drips drop by drop. The grassy slopes of the forest-tracts revived by the rain, where the peacocks dance, gleam brightly under the moon at night. Only when the birds retire to their nests and the lotus closes, whilst the evening jasmine opens, can one divine that the sun has set. Chariots and other wheeled vehicles no longer venture on the roads, deeply rutted by continuous rain"⁹¹. But when Sita is abducted by Ravana, the mood becomes poignant. Here Valmiki's profound creative intuition reveals that imagery not only need not be ruled out in poignant emotion but can ideally embody it. In fact, since remembrance is not at peace, some feature of the landscape invariably triggers an association causing a fresh spurt of pain. Thus we see a totally different painting of the rains. "The sky appears like one wounded, bound with the rags of moisture-laden clouds, stained with the vivid tints of the setting sun, bordered with red. Whipped by the golden thong of the lightning, the sky seems to be crying out loud in thunder. The lightning that leaps out from the hold of the cloud is to me like Sita struggling in the hold of Ravana"⁹². The skyscape here has the magnificence to which Wordsworth referred. It smoulders like a sunset conflagration in Turner. But the magnificence has its own simplicity, because the image is born with the feeling through the swiftness of the principle of emotive association.

Valmiki's naturalism as well as use of imagery made clear to Sanskrit poetics that the reality of feeling was the most important requirement in poetry and that the quality and the strength of the tension within would determine by themselves whether the expression would be naturalistic or whether it would incarnate figures. If the figure (*Alamkara*) is an adorn-

ment, that which is adorned by it is the emotion. And Ananda Vardhana⁹³ gives the perceptive clarification that even as the ordinary ornaments, the jewels, putting them on or laying them down, suggest to us the mental state of the person, so also does the use or the relinquishing of figures suggest the poetic emotion and mood. Sanskrit poetry cannot be accused of too puritan a resistance to the imagery of fancy. There are poetic moods, not belonging to the highest tension but still not unrewarding, where an elegant handling of such imagery is justified. But the highest type of imagery is that which is born with the emotion. "Images, however beautiful," wrote Coleridge, "do not of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs of original genius only as far as they are modified by a predominant passion, or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that passion"⁹⁴. Images which are not touched by the poetic emotions are mere verbal pretentiousness (*Vagvikalpa*) in Ananda Vardhana's opinion. As Appayya Dikshita⁹⁵ said, the image has life only when it is acceptable to the heart (*Hrdya*). The function of the image is to yield poetic radiance (*Kavya Sobha*) as Bhoja said and this radiance or beauty is, in Sanskrit poetics at least, invariably connected with the activation of the reader's or spectator's feeling. Thus, if many of the Sanskrit poets misunderstood the highest function of the poetic image, theory never relaxed in its insistence on this strict functional justification⁹⁶. If Kuntaka stumbled in the evaluation of naturalism (*Svabhavokti*) and held the opinion that the embellished word and sense (*Salamkita sabda* and *artha*) alone constituted the unique expression (*Vakrokti*) that was poetry, and if he generally identified the embellishment with figure and imagery, he made amends by deriving the image directly from poetic action (*Kavi Karma* or *Kavi Vyapara*), by seeing it as realised by the poetic genius (*Kavi pratibha nuvarita*). He clarified and vindicated his position by pointing out that the correct term for the figure is not just *Alamkara*, ornament or figure of speech, but *Kavyalamkara*, poetic figure. The genuine presence of poetic feeling is the criterion for distinguishing the poetic figure from a mere speech figure.

A view of poetry whose cardinal emphasis is on the incommunicability of emotion except through induction and therefore on the responsibility of the poet to build up a complex of objective correlatives, or sensually palpable concretisations, cannot accept the pure automatism of emotional inspiration. If emotion shapes the concretisation, the critical intellect has to adjudge it and find it really flawless. In the use of imagery also, Sanskrit poetics indicates the criteria by which the stratum of images can be appraised as to their final validity. Ananda Vardhana⁹⁷ first takes up the verbal figures and condemns alliterations (*Yamakas*) used at a stretch in such tender situations like separation in love (*Vipralambha*). Kuntaka⁹⁸ endorses this. Both Ananda Vardhana and Abhinava warn against excess (*Atinivahana*) in imagery, "loading every rift with ore" in the idiom of Keats, but when such opulence is not justified by the feeling. Like Pater,

Sanskrit writers believed that ornaments could be “diversions, a narcotic spell of the pedestrian intelligence”, and that art consisted in the “removal of surplusage”. But the concept of surplusage is a relative concept. When images emerge from the newly awakened wonder of the heart (*Aschaya-bhuta*) and when the poet’s expression has matching skill (*Vaidagdhya*) the tissue can be rich as well as emotionally genuine. But such richness as well as austere simplicity are alike functional and Ananda Vardhana⁹⁹ insists that the poet should be intuitively aware of the principle of the assimilation and avoidance of figures according to the context of the feeling (*Kale cha graham tyagau*). The principle of timely rejection (*Kale tyaga*) has to be used with subtle insight. An instance is given of a figure (*Slesha*) worked out in the first three lines of a stanza, to arouse the poignancy of separation in love (*Vipralambha*) and abandoned in the fourth line, to evoke another figure (*Vyatneka*) which also heightens the same feeling, but in another way. It is laid down that there are occasions when the figures should be incipient, merely touched upon. It can be left to the lesser artist to work them out to the bitter end.

Ruskin described memory as an “unindexed and immeasurable mass of treasure” and regarded imagination as a “brooding and wandering, but dream-gifted” selective faculty working upon the materials stored up in memory. Lowes¹⁰⁰ gave a more elaborate outline. “There enter into the imaginative creation three factors which reciprocally interplay: the Will and the Vision and the Form. Without the Vision, the chaos of elements remain a chaos, and the Form sleeps forever in the vast chambers of unknown designs. Yet in that chaos only could creative Vision ever see this Form. Nor without the cooperant Will, obedient to the Vision, may the pattern perceived in the huddle attain objective reality. Yet, manifold though the ways of the creative faculty may be, the upshot is one: from the empire of chaos a new tract of cosmos has been retrieved, a nebula has been compacted—it may be—into a Star.” A more restrained style would have saved Lowes from the rather unfair criticism which indeed has been made that he is not writing psychology at all. However, a more important criticism that can be offered is that the definition of the exact role of the will is rather blurred here. The implied sense seems to be that the will is the poet’s intellect in the role of craftsman, shaping the inner vision into a concrete, sensually palpable, objective correlative. This role is recognised as the primary role in Sanskrit poetics too. But there are several other roles also for the intellect. As Maritain¹⁰¹ has said, the spontaneous welling up of images, without which there can be no poetry, precedes and nourishes the activity of the poet, but the mind regulates the activity and gives it a direction. “It waits for the results, stops them as they issue, makes a selection and forms a judgment.” This is the second role of the critical intellect which has to keep in view the principles of the avoidance of excess (*Atimivahana*) and the timely assimilation and exclusion of figures (*Kale cha graham tyagau*) emphasised

by Sanskrit poetics. The third function, of which both Lowes and Maritain are silent, is the exploration on its own by the intellect for apt imagery. This corresponds to the imagery yielded by Wordsworth's fancy which is really the intellect touched by the imagination rather than imagination proper.

But let us go back to the image emerging from the really deepest level. What is the principle of its genesis? Maud Bodkin¹⁰² has raised the criticism that "in his general theory Lowes seems to take no account of emotional forces as determining either the selection or the fashioning of the material of the poem". This is the image, which, in Ananda Vaidhana's words, is born along with the very first poetic urge. And since the fundamental principle of Sanskrit poetics is the experience and transfer by induction of emotion, such imagery has to be the direct product of the emotional experience. Reverdy's definition of the image, which André Breton also quotes in the First Surrealist Manifesto, reads: "The image is a pure creation of the spirit. It cannot emerge from a comparison but only from the bringing together of two more or less distant realities. No image is produced by comparing (always inadequately) two disproportionate realities. A striking image, on the contrary, one new to the mind, is produced by bringing into relation without comparison two distant realities, whose relations the spirit alone has seized"¹⁰³ Maud Bodkin's criticism of Lowes can be raised against Reverdy also—that he has not clarified the exact nature of the relation of the distant realities seized by the spirit. But his definition makes a real contribution in pointing out that rapprochement rather than comparison is the basic reality of the valid image although the formal shape of figures like *similes* may apparently seem to be plain comparisons. This rapprochement of distant realities is possible because the distance is annihilated by the emotion. Here a cautious acceptance of psychoanalytic interpretations seems legitimate. The distant reality, when assimilated, is over-determined. In addition to its normal sensuous signification, it has received a baptism in the expansive flow of the emotion which has donated to it an emotional signification as well. The image it presents is now the result of a process of condensation.

Valmiki, again, is the poet who presents us with the finest instances of imagery of this level of power. We have already seen how, in the case of Rama steeped in the sorrow of separation, some feature or other of the changing seasonal landscape is rapidly assimilated by the tormented memory in an associative bond, so that the feature becomes impregnated with emotion, the lightning struggling in the grip of the clouds becomes Sita resisting Ravana with white impotent hands. Gautier said that "the Lamartinian landscape is a state of the soul". Valmiki also uses descriptions of nature for the subtle revelation of the soul of a character. When nature at times appears like a woman to Rama, he remembers the only woman in his life and we are in the presence of a pure and chaste sorrow.

Ravana, his antagonist, is no barbarian. He too has poetic sensitiveness. But his is a very sensual nature and cues in the landscape trigger this sensuality, thus annihilating the distance between a physical reality or feature and the reality of a temperament which is ever prone to be sensually aroused. Ravana and his hosts once camp by the river Narmada. The breath of the river tempers the heat and the spot is ideal for a halt. Ravana is gratified. "The sun of a thousand rays seems to have changed the world to gold and, in the sky, this orb of day, whose beams were just now intense, having observed me seated here, has grown as cool as the moon. The wind, fearing me, blows softly, diffusing a sweet perfume. Narmada appears like a timid girl." He strides towards the river "as towards a lovely and attractive woman". The river, though described by the poet and not Ravana, is seen through the eyes of that supreme hedonist. "The flowering trees formed her diadem, the lotus her eyes, the pair of Chakravaka birds her breasts, the gleaming sandbanks her thighs, the flock of swans her bright girdle. The pollen of the flowers powdered her limbs, the foam-crested waves formed her immaculate robe. Sweet was she to the touch"¹⁰⁴. A purely formal analysis might reveal that the imagery here rests on an incipient comparison. But it is really the result of the rapprochement of two distant realities and the erotic sentiment is the unconscious associative bond that annihilates the distance.

Ananda Vardhana's elucidation that the image of the highest poetic power is born along with the emotion implies that when the emotion is generated by unconscious conflicts, the image is also determined as to its form by the reality of the unconscious. One of the finest instances of this occurs in Valmiki in the scene when Rama's victory over Ravana, who had abducted Sita, is complete. Sita hears terrible words from her lord and liberator. "Know Sita, the war I waged was not for you, but to retrieve my name and that of my family. Therefore, with my leave, go as you please, anywhere. I have no need of you. What self-respecting man, born of a high family, will take back a woman who has lived in another's house?"¹⁰⁵. The fact that Rama is looked upon as an incarnation has often created difficulties in the genuine literary evaluation of the great epic. Thus, orthodox criticism, chasing the infallible incarnation, has been completely misled in the interpretation of these sombre words. It is true that Rama later says that his rejection was merely to prompt the fire-ordeal, through which Sita comes unhurt, so that the world may clearly see that Sita is inviolate. It is even very likely that Rama himself came to believe, in retrospect, that this was his motive. But Valmiki here sees the depths of the tormented human heart far more clearly than it is ever capable of seeing them. The fire-ordeal was needed not only to vindicate Sita in the eyes of the world, but to exorcise Rama's own tormented fears which he would not have admitted. The language and idiom show a harshness which is justified only because they reveal the break-through of troubled fantasies. "Will the excitable demon have been able to restrain

himself when he saw your beauty day by day?" Surely, Rama was not arguing the case of a sceptical world by proxy here. His own unconscious fears were coming to the surface. If the break-through of unconscious conflicts in the tortured emotion of this critical moment is still not obvious, look at the subtle imagery, which Valmiki causes to well forth from the depths. Rama says. "When you, whose chastity is overcast by the shadow of misgiving, stand near me, it offends my eye even as a lamp to a man of sore eyes." A sickly light would have caused equal hurt to normally healthy eyes. But the reversal of the image is more just, because it has been moulded by the unconscious realities. Sita has remained pure, like the flame of a lamp. It is Rama who is afflicted by a deep malaise. The profound nostalgia of Rama, his yearning for the absent Sita and later, the tenderness of the reunion, unmistakably show that Rama had never ceased passionately loving her and that, deep within him, he had never lost his faith in her. But the tormenting doubts of the unconscious were also real. The anguished emotion of the conflict moulds its own imagery which reveals both the acute reality of his own torment and also the recognition, very deep within, that Sita's purity could never have been violated and it is he himself who has become diseased through troubled fantasies.

Whalley¹⁰⁶ has pointed out a subtle feature of the poetic image. that it is a *feeling-vector*. Not only is it the vehicle for a "charge" of feeling, but it also has a directional character—it seeks to move in a certain direction. Whalley confines himself to the emergence of these vectorial characteristics in rhythmic pattern. But Day Lewis has pointed out the tendency of images to be congruent with one another and thus form a distinctive pattern. "If the poem is to be a whole and not a series of stabbing, meaningless flashes, a pattern of imagery must be created, a relationship equivalent to that which underlies all reality, living or inanimate"¹⁰⁷. The inanimate crystal creates its pattern through the strict functionalism of the processes of its growth by secretion. D'Arcy Thompson's great work¹⁰⁸ has shown the same principle at work in the growth of the forms of organisms. What is true of growth is also true of perception. Kohler¹⁰⁹ has shown that man perceives objects in organised wholes, *gestalts*, and that all man's observations are in terms of patterns. The poetic process involves the perception or experience of reality as an organised, meaningful whole and the embodiment of that experience in a poetic organism which again is a whole with an integral pattern. Sanskrit poetics, as we shall study in detail later, insists on the permeation of the entire, extended composition with feeling (*Rasa bhava nrantaratva*). And if the ideal imagery is co-natal with feeling, a consistent pattern of imagery, valid throughout the poetic matrix, has to be and will be realised. Bely¹¹⁰ has fruitfully explored one aspect of this reality in his brilliant analysis of the spectrum of Gogol. Among all our senses, the visual seems to be the most fertile in storing up images and yielding them back in

poetic association. Colour plays an important role in the perception, retention and creative handling of such images. Drenched in colour is this sunlit world. And the extent to which the world has soaked into the blood of a writer can be understood by studying the colour references in his work. This is what Belyi has done with Gogol. His patiently collected statistical data on the imagery of colour in Gogol's writings show the yellow graph rising steadily from the joyous *Evenings in the Village* through *Taras Bulba* and making its greatest quantitative leap upward in the second volume of *Dead Souls*, where the gold is not the gold of gold-plate and gold-thread, but the gold of the cathedrals and crosses of the Orthodox Church. At this depth, colour has become a symbol of inward temper, an objective correlative of the exalted feeling. In the Indian tradition, such an analysis can be fruitfully applied to Vyasa's *Mahabharata* to lay bare the pattern of imagery that develops consistently throughout the epic. The analysis reveals how frequently the bright lustre of fire glows throughout the vast epic in metaphor and simile. The body of a beautiful woman glows like fire. An ascetic, though clad in rags, impresses like glowing embers below the layer of ashes. Soldierly surrounds an enemy warrior like the circle of fire described in space by whirling a burning stick. The battle is like the conflagration which will consume the universe at the end of an eon. The aroused warrior glows like a burning pillar. The fiery anger of a chaste woman is like a kindled flame which no one can trifle with, without being scorched. Given random compilations from both Valmiki and Vyasa, we will have no difficulty in distinguishing the authorship with the help of the quality of the imagery alone. The lyricism of Valmiki and the molten energy of Vyasa determine respectively the dominant emotion of their epics, their forms and the pattern of the web of their imagery.

CHAPTER FIVE

Diction, Style, Metre and Rhythm

I. DICTION

THE depth analysis of poetic naturalism, which completely dispensed with figures and ornaments, re-established the primary importance of emotional experience in poetic creativity and emphasised that figures, if used, should be determined by the requirements of emotional expression. When, thus, figures were not barred absolutely, inferior talents began to use them liberally, without bothering too much about the very important principles behind their sanction. Poetic tissue began to exhibit an exaggerated colouration through imagery; and appreciation, conditioned by rhetorical concepts, was satisfied by the serial perception of images, in spite of the fact that they were atomic, separate, not functionally integrated into the poetic organism.²

Since verbal figures formed an important division of poetic ornaments and since they could be managed with skill in rhetoric, without necessarily requiring inspiration, poetic endeavour, with many, drifted into this blind alley. Artificial contortions of language and the writing of stanzas in the form of pictorial or abstract designs became a passion. This convention, known as *Chitra Bandha*, seems to have fascinated even the major poets. It is not unlikely, as De³ suggests, that it arose from the practice of writing inscriptions on swords and leaves, where the peculiar shape of the available space became a pleasant challenge to verbal skill. Bharavi³ goes all out for it in the description of a battle and some scholars have justified it as a brilliant imitation of the military art of deploying armies in different forms in the battlefield.

All in all, it is a rather puerile mannerism, but Western critics would do well not to jump to the conclusion that it was a typical excess of the Oriental mind. Purtenham,⁴ in the sixteenth century, gives examples of "shaped poems". These suggest the puzzle corner in the newspapers rather than the revelation of genius but no doubt provided harmless and elegant intellectual exercise. In the seventeenth century, George Herbert and Robert Herrick poets with a fine lyrical gift, also wrote poems which could be

fitted into pictorial shapes on the printed page⁵ Guillaume Apollinaire indulged in this pleasantry, making the typography of the poems follow the outline of a smoking cigar or a necktie or a watch or a fountain or rain, rather like the Greek poets in Alexandria who had presented poems in the shape of an altar or an egg or a shepherd's pipe. He did this in the first place because he wrote these poems on post cards, many of them from the front in the First World War, and hoped to amuse and cheer his friends by them. When he published them later, it was no doubt because he felt that his designs had a certain charm and recalled the conditions in which he composed them⁶. In India also, *Chitra Bandha* could never gain any real poetic status. It is recognised for the first time by Dandin. A misguided Magha⁷ appears to regard it as indispensable in an epic poem. Rudrata deals with it in some detail, but it is suffered by Mammata only in deference to poetic practice, discredited by Ananda Vardhana and totally rejected by Visvanatha. *Chitra Bandha* was an aberrant phenomenon, though not an exclusively Oriental failing, and it was referred to here only as an extreme instance to which literary jugglery led.

The reaction from the atomism of ornament led to the development of the concept of diction (*Riti*). Very briefly, the drift of the thought was that the impact of a literary tissue was integral, determined by its totality. This was something more than and other than the cumulative impressions left by a series of brilliant images or verbal figures. It was the effect of the continuously flowing and evolving stream of poetic narration, its subtly orchestrated music. The narrative stream was the matrix in which figures, both verbal and ideal, were embedded. This embedding is analysed by Abhinava⁸ with brilliant subtlety. A simile is a figure, an ideal figure. When it takes form in poetic expression, it has a body, it is embodied in linguistic tissue. This body (*Sana*) itself has to be beautiful. The beauty of the embodiment, or embedding, of simile, metaphor and other figures in linguistic tissue, is the *Lakshana*, the characteristic of the poetic matrix as a whole⁹. We referred to the *Lakshana* earlier. It was a more inclusive concept than the poetic figure or *Alamkara* and here Abhinava clarifies the subtle principle by which the extended poetic continuum integrates figurative embellishments like flowing water whose ripples occasionally glint by catching the light. Even an ideal figure does not become poetically perfect with the mere juxtaposition of normally unrelated images, however brilliant that juxtaposition. Its linguistic expression has to belong to the particular poetic stream in which it is used, become a cadence in its music, a shapely curve in the evolving undulation of its rhythm. Valéry¹⁰ also held, like Abhinava, that the content which resisted transformation into form should be rejected. "The true poet will always sacrifice for the sake of form—which after all is the poetic goal, in fact the poetic act itself, with its organic requirements—the thought that cannot dissolve into the poem and demands, for its expression,

words and tones that sound foreign to the tonality of the poem." The distinction between ideal and verbal figures, indicated by Mammata, was that the former would and the latter would not, tolerate substitution by synonyms. This is a valid and helpful guide ordinarily, but ceases to apply in a depth analysis. The ideal figure also cannot tolerate indefinite substitution by synonyms, for its verbalisation has to become a melody that fits into the harmony of the music of the poem. Vamana had said that with the perfect realisation of form, no more substitution would be possible. By implication this rules out substitution in ideal figures also, but it is Abhinava who gives the final, brilliant clarification.

The concept of diction was elaborated by analysis, it is clear, after differentiation in diction had become a reality in poetic practice. Just as manners become differentiated in the various regions of the country, literary manner also became differentiated. This is first noticed by Bana¹¹. In fact he relates diction to general manners (*Pravṛtti*) as literary manner. He remarks that the various regions of the country produce literature marked by differential traits in diction. Vamana mentions three dictions: Vaidarbhi, Panchali and Gaudi. Rudrata adds a fourth: Latīya. All these are geographical names. The sharpest contrast is between Vaidarbhi and Gaudi. The former is characterised by limpid sweetness, the legacy of the mellifluous Prakrit that had once flourished in Vaidarbha (area around Nagpur). The Gaudi diction of Bengal was characterised by an ornate vigour which may be related to the baroque taste of the region as evinced in its architecture and sculpture during the period from the fourth to the seventh century¹².

Certain writers seem to flounder in their analysis of the exact significance of differentiation in diction. Rudrata goes to the extent of regarding diction or *Riti* as a verbal figure (*Sabdalamkara*). For him, the Gaudi *Riti* is a species of composition which indulges in the use of long compounds, comprising seven or more words, an arbitrary number anyway. Even as late as the sixteenth century we find Kavi Karnapura¹³ sharing the general suspicion of the Gaudi diction and regarding it as the result of a passion for harsh, high-sounding words.

It is quite possible that the Gaudi diction attracted more poetasters than the Vaidarbhi with its subdued, reticent grace and this might have discredited the diction itself. But to see diction as a matter of verbal texture only, as Rudrata did, was to regress from the concept of diction as the inclusive reality, as the basic poetic matrix which integrated image and verbal ornament. Earlier, Bhamaha had shown a penetrating intuition in his approach to the problem. He not only did not make the mistake of identifying diction wholly with verbal texture, but tried to lift the whole issue to a much higher plane by relating the quality of the poetic temperament to the quality of the diction. We have already seen that Bharata had enumerated the excellences (*Gunas*) and flaws (*Doshas*) of poetic expression. Bharata had mentioned ten excellences and some of these

implied that the basic criterion applied was the adjustment of sound and sense. But sound and sense can be orchestrated in various equally legitimate ways and, therefore, for a deeper appreciation of the integrated reality we are dealing with here, we need concepts that would clearly refer to the poetic temper that determined the overall quality of the orchestrated continuum. To seek the help of an analogy from music, just as terms like *adagio*, *allegro* and *scherzo* clearly indicate the temper of a symphonic movement (and not merely its speed as determined by a metronome) we may be able to work our way towards descriptive terms which can fairly clearly indicate the temper of the extended poetic continuity. Bhamaha¹⁴ dropped those *Gunas* of Bharata which seemed to lack this depth of penetration and retained only three, which he definitely related to the poetic temper. These were sweetness (*Madhurya*), energy (*Ojas*) and limpidity (*Prasada*). If these could be fairly easily identified as qualities of diction, it was also stressed that they manifested themselves in the diction precisely because they were the qualities of the poetic temper and mood that were objectified in the poetic tissue. Here again Bhamaha took care to stress that the terms should not be misunderstood or graded down as mere descriptions of the verbal tissue only. Limpidity (*Prasada*) was not only a matter of clear, lucid verbalisation. It implied a well-adjusted, optimistic poetic temperament. (In fact, *Prasada* suggests a sunny, optimistic outlook.) This deepening of the concept enabled Bhamaha to steer clear of the facile popular preferences as between the *Vaidarbhi* and *Gaudi* dictions which noted only the features of the verbal tissue and not the fact that they revealed the deeper reality of the poetic temper. He was not satisfied with a *Vaidarbhi* which successfully spun a web of soft and tender vocables and incarnated sweetness (*Madhurya*) but betrayed a poverty of ideas and imagination. The long compounds of *Gaudi* could build up a thunderous sonority but it would be an empty rumble if the energy (*Ojas*) did not reveal itself as stemming from deep within, from the poetic temper itself. It is very interesting to note here that Udbhata¹⁵ pointed out that while the concept of the poetic figure (*Alamkara*) related either to the sound (*Sabda*) or the meaning (*Artha*), the concept of *Guna* related to word and sense together in their integrated reality. And a later commentator¹⁶ claimed that the figure stood to poetry in the relation of mere conjunction (*Samyoga*) while the excellence (*Guna*) stood to poetry in the relation of inherence (*Samavaya*) or inseparable connection (*Nitya Sambandha*). At this analytical depth, Bhamaha found no justification for rating one diction as intrinsically superior to another. They were all different literary manners and equally acceptable if they realised their functional inwardness.

Ananda Vardhana¹⁷ also steadily resisted the tendency to regard the *Guna* as a feature of the verbal tissue only. To those who tried to derive the literary excellence of energy (*Ojas*) exhaustively from the use of long compound words (*Dirgha Samasa*) he cited verses from Bhatta Narayana

and others, which had this excellence, though they did not use the complex orchestration of long compounds. Thus he was able to establish that the *Guna* should really be related to the quality of the poetic temper, of the inward event (*Chitta Vritti*). The excellence of energy (*Ojas*) depended on the sparked, incandescent feeling (*Dipti*). Ananda Vardhana now related the *Guna* to *Rasa*, which was the former's originating base (*Asraya*). But since words and their collocation can also suggest *Rasa*, the verbal tissue (*Samghatana*) can also do so, provided it takes the accompanying *Guna* as the base and goal (*Asraya*). The verbal tissue realises the *Guna* and through it evokes the related *Rasa*.

Raghavan¹⁸ has drawn attention to an analysis by Winchester¹⁹ which is identical with that of Sanskrit poetics. "While individuality is not to be classified, it may be said that there are, in general, two opposite tendencies in personal expression. on the one hand to clearness and precision, on the other to largeness and profusion. The difference between the two may be seen by comparing such poetry as that of Mathew Arnold with that of Tennyson or such prose as that of Newman with that of Jeremy Taylor. Minds of one class insist on sharply divided ideas, on clearness of image, on temperance, and precision of epithet. Their style we characterise as chaste or classic. The other class have a great volume of thought, but less well-defined, more fervour and less temperance of feeling, more abundant and vivid imagery and wealth of colour, but less sharpness of definition. Their thoughts seem to move through a haze of emotion and often through a lush growth of imagery. They tend to be ornate and profuse in manner, eager in temper, they often produce larger and deeper effects, but they lack restraint and suavity. It is a contrast not peculiar to literature, but running through all forms of art. The one makes upon us the impression of greater delicacy, temperance, charm. the other, the impression of mass, complexity, power. We are not called upon to pronounce either manner absolutely better than the other." The two literary manners Winchester contrasts closely correspond to the *Vaidarbhi* and *Gaudi* and Bhamaha also holds them equally legitimate, if genuinely poetic.

Dandin²⁰ defines the extended poetic tissue as a series of words characterised by an agreeable sense or idea (*Ishtartha vyavacchunna padavali*). This leads him to consider the question of appropriate expression of appropriate ideas, or in other words, to discuss the suitable arrangement of sound and sense for the purpose of producing poetic effect which is technically denoted by the term diction (*Riti* or *Maiga*). He does not, like Rudrata does, make the mistake of regarding diction as a matter of verbal texture only. The diction characterised by sweetness (*Madhunya*) should not only be woven with tender vocables, but also avoid words suggesting a vulgar sense. Likewise, if Bana noticed only the verbal bombast (*Akshanadambara*) in the diction of the Gaudas, Dandin sees in it the reflection of a flamboyant temperament, a mental bombast (*Arthadambara*).²¹

Excited by the discovery that in diction we have an integrative reality of a higher order than the figure or image, Vamana²² went to the extent of claiming diction to be the soul of poetry (*Riti atma kavyasya*). He elaborates this figurative description by pointing out²³ that the word (*Sabda*) and its sense (*Artha*) constitute the body of poetry, of which the soul is diction or *Riti*. He seeks to establish the integrative reality of diction by defining it as a special arrangement of words (*Visishta pada rachana*). This speciality (*Vaisishtya*) in patterning is what realises the poetic excellences (*Gunas*). Visvanatha²⁴ in the fourteenth century rejects this extreme claim by pointing out that arrangement of the elements of the "body" of poetry implies only a disposition or posture of limbs (*avayava*) and cannot make it the "soul" of poetry. The tradition of Indian poetics could not tolerate the view that anything other than *Rasa* or poetic emotion should be the soul of poetry. But a truth lay concealed in this dispute. Just as posture, the body poised for action, clearly reflects the inner temper and mood, diction reflects the inner temper, whether it is extrovert and energetic as in Gaudi or balanced and serene as in Vaidarbhi.

II STYLE

It is Kuntaka who attacks the problem of diction with an intuition that matches the depth of the understanding shown by Bhamaha. Like Winchester and Bhamaha, he divides diction or *Marga* into two broad types, the limpid (*Sukumara*) and the ornate (*Vichitra*) which approximate to the Vaidarbhi and the Gaudi. Kuntaka avoided the latter terms most probably because the regional differentiation of styles had more or less ceased to be a reality by his time and, further, he felt that the reality he was dealing with here was a matter of poetic temper not one of regional mannerism. He made it very clear that the analysis of diction could not rest on the verbal texture, in seeing whether it consisted of simple words or was an intricate web spun out of long compounds. In fact these features themselves were projections of the inner temper which, Kuntaka emphasised, also implied a clear attitude in using poetic figures and delineating poetic emotion. This approach enables him to define his two dictions basically in terms of contrasted poetic temperaments. The limpid style is dominated by beauty that is mainly natural (*Sahasobha*), the other by ornamentation (*Aharyasobha*). The former inclines to poetic naturalism (*Svabhava-ukti*), the latter to embellished utterance (*Vakrokti*). The former relies primarily on the native strength of poetic reactions (*Sakti*), the latter attempts further a poetic transformation of erudition (*Vyutpatti*)²⁵.

In Kuntaka, the analysis of diction, initially understood as a broad literary manner which reflects a broad type of poetic temperament, leads to the discovery of style, understood in the sense of a more strictly personal

manner Bhaṭṭa, with his profound dramatic insight, had indeed given a cue here when he laid down that the style of expression in dramatic speech should be in keeping with the temperament of the character who speaks the lines. But this insight was obscured in the handling of diction by several subsequent critics as merely regional manner. Bana regarded diction as literary manner (*Pravṛtti*) but his classification follows the regional alignment. Vamana²⁶ explicitly states that the various dictions have geographical names because the differential characteristics were specific to the different regions. Dandin's insight was able to penetrate to the distinction between diction and style. Though he uses the broad categorisation of diction as limpid and ornate, he adds that dictions are infinite and their differences very subtle. So subtly does the character of one poet's writing vary from that of another that it is as difficult to verbalise these differences as to verbalise the differences between various kinds of sweetness, of sugarcane, milk, etc.²⁷ Burroughs²⁸ does not share Dandin's diffidence about verbalisation but agrees with him in the catholic acceptance of variety. "Who shall say which style is the best? What can be better than the style of Huxley for his purpose—sentences level and straight like a hurled lance, or than Emerson's for his purpose—electric sparks, the sudden, unexpected epithet, or tense, audacious phrase, that gives the mind a wholesome shock, or than Gibbons's for his purpose—a style like solid masonry, every sentence cut foursquare, and his work, as Carlyle said to Emerson, a splendid bridge, connecting the ancient world with the modern, or than De Quincey's for his purpose—a discursive, round-about style, herding his thought as a Collie dog herds sheep, or than Arnold's for his academic spirit—a style like glass, or than Whitman's for his continental spirit—the processional, panoramic style that gives the sense of mass and multitude?"

But it is Kuntaka who states most emphatically that styles are indeed infinite in variety and subtle in difference, because they are based on the nature (*Svabhava*) of the poets, of which also there is infinite variety in the world. A limpid style can also assimilate erudition, usually supposed to be the mark of the ornate style. But the erudition will be seen to be handled in a distinctive manner, which will reveal the personality of the writer.²⁹ Nīlakantha Dīkshita³⁰ in the seventeenth century echoes this when he says that a poet of mark has a distinctive style and that to possess a distinctive style is to be a poet of mark. Here Indian thought essentially agrees with Rémy de Gourmont³¹ who said that "style is a specialization of sensibility" and with Ezra Pound³² who, in his study on Gourmont, discussed style as the modality of the individual voice. A typical passage from a writer of distinction, as Hudson³³ points out, will have a characteristic ring, like a well-known voice. Puttenham³⁴ states this truth delightfully. "For man is but his mind, and as his mind is tempered and qualified, so are his speeches and language at large, and his inward conceits be the metal of his mind, and his utterance the very warp and woof of his

concerts" As Carlyle says in one of his *Journals*, style is not the coat of a writer, but his skin "Literature," said Newman,³⁵ "is the personal use or exercise of language That this is so is proved from the fact that one author uses it so differently from another The throng and succession of ideas, thoughts, feelings, imaginations, speculations, which pass within him, the abstractions, the juxtapositions, the comparisons, the discriminations, the conceptions which are so original in him, his views of external things, his judgments upon life, manners, and history, the exercises of his wit, of his humour, of his depth, of his sagacity, all these innumerable and incessant creations, the very production and throbbing of his intellect, does he image forth in a corresponding language, which is as multiform as this inward mental action itself, and analogous to it, the faithful expression of his intense personality, attending on his inward world of thought as its very shadow " An identical perception is implicit, if it is not as fully elaborated, in Kuntaka when he says that diction as style is characterised not only by the way the web of words is spun (*Bandha guna*) but also by a distinctive attitude in using poetic figures and delineating emotions Style, thus, is not merely a manner of expression, it is "a way of seeing things", as Flaubert put it Patmore³⁶ emphasises the personal vision when he calls style the "rarest of all artistic merits, which consists, not in a singular way of saying but of seeing things" T S Eliot said in his study of Donne that "a style, a rhythm, to be significant, must also embody a significant mind, must be produced by the necessity of a new form for a new content" Proust³⁷ brings out the deeper meaning of style thus "Style is in no way a decoration as some people believe, it is not even a matter of technique, it is—as colour is with painters—a quality of vision, the revelation of the particular universe which each of us sees, and which others do not see The pleasure that an artist gives us to make us know one universe more"

Diction is evaluated in terms of the poetic tissue for it is initially available to us as a structure of words or *Sabda Samghatana*, as Sanskrit poetics would term it Probed deeper, diction reveals itself as the reflection of the broad organisation of temperament, self-sufficient and adjusted or extrovert At a still deeper level, when we see diction as personal style, we find in it not only the reflection of temperament but the subtler revelation of personality For, even if two poets use the *Vaidarbhi* (or *Gaudi*) diction, their personal styles can bring about a differentiation which is unmistakable We have seen that Indian poetics noticed these realities Let us now move on to another aspect of the craftsmanship of words Without running the danger of being labelled a schizophrenic case or instance of split personality, a poet, especially a dramatic poet, will have occasion to depict various emotions Therefore, even when the broad typology of his diction remains constant, he can vary his diction within a certain range in consonance with the emotions delineated in specific contexts And he should do it, if diction is really the patterning of words

determined by the inner intention. The problem here has hidden complexities and I would like to take the help of the clarification given by Olson,³⁸ in his study on Empson. Olson says: "The mimetic poet, like any other, may be said to have seven subsidiary aims, with respect to language, I call them 'subsidiary' because this essay has made it obvious that they could not be principal. These aims are disclosure, partial disclosure, concealment, direction of attention, evocation of suspense, production of the unexpected, and ornament. What must be disclosed, concealed, etc. belongs to the part of poetics which deals with plot, character, and thought, and cannot be analysed here, our present concern is simply the functioning of language as meaningful with respect to these aims. A great deal, then, of suspense, surprise, and emotion is effected by something other than diction as diction, nevertheless, diction can enhance these, and on occasion even generate them itself. It is this aspect of poetic language—of diction as diction—that I wish particularly to examine. Its problems are problems of word-choice and word-arrangement. . . . The problem of diction is not one of how a frightened man, say, would talk, or of how, more generally, speech serves as an indication of character, passion or situation, it is one of how, given all such determinations of the speech, words as words may prove most effective. As I have said, this is in one sense the least important part of poetics, for the words are determined by everything else in the poem, in another sense, it is the most important because the words are all we have to go by, they alone disclose the poem to us."

Olson's analysis is very helpful because of its extraordinary affinities with the outlook of Sanskrit poetics. First of all, in consonance with the basic position that art is the concretisation of feeling in a sensuously palpable tissue, Sanskrit poetics would affirm with Olson that words are all we have to go by, they alone disclose the poem to us. When Olson emphasises diction as word-choice and word-arrangement, he is only unconsciously echoing the definition of diction in Sanskrit poetics as *Sabda Samghatana*, verbal tissue or structure. And, finally, when Olson says that, given all the contextual determinations, words as words have to prove to be the most effective, Sanskrit poetics would be in complete agreement with him, for it insists that the web of words, the diction, should reflect not only the specific emotion delineated in a context but also the deeper truth of the personality of the poet which has created not only that context but the complete poetic organism in which that context is only one episode. The demand on poetic creativity, here, is very complex. An energetic quality (*Ojas*) in diction was found suitable for feelings of wonderment, heroism and awe (*Adbhuta, Vira, Raudra*). But this quality was also conventionally associated with the Gaudi style. Ananda Vardhana therefore raised the pertinent question whether a whole region—if Gaudi is to be regarded as a regional style—restricted itself only to themes dominated by these emotions.³⁹ This could not have been the case. The conclusion, then, is

that the Gaudī stands not so much for a regional style as for a specific poetic temperament, and if art is life seen through a temperament, the Gaudī can deal with the entire emotional range of life and not a restricted spectrum. The energetic, extrovert temperament can also delineate the tender emotions, but it will reveal its higher dynamic tension even while being faithful to the episodic context and its appropriate feeling tone. Kuntaka meant the same thing when he pointed out that not only the grand style, the ornate diction (*Vichitra Māga*) but also the limpid style (*Sukumāra Māga*) can assimilate erudition, there will be no ambiguity in the end-result about the basic poetic temper. Swinburne can at times be as full of classical memories as Milton. But while the latter mobilises them as the glittering units of a splendid processional march, in Swinburne they melt and run with the limpid stream of the verse.

*And the brown bright nightingale amorous
Is half assuaged for Itylus
For the Thracian ships and the foreign faces
The tongueless vigil and all the pain*

This truth of the deepest level, clarified by Kuntaka, does not militate against the contextual variation of diction within a certain range for mimetic purposes, as Olson recognises. Bana¹⁰ notices the differential characteristics of regional styles thus: "In the North there is mostly play upon words (*Slesha*), in the West attention is given only to the sense (*Artha*), in the South it is poetical fancy (*Utpreksha*), in the Gaudas there is verbal flamboyance (*Aksharadambāra*)". Immediately he adds that the best writer should and does combine all these four features in the best manner. Unembellished sense is acceptable as poetic naturalism provided it is cleansed of vulgarity (*Gramyata*). Word-play is acceptable if it is unforced (*Akhshta*). Flamboyance can have its own beauty, but the veil of words should not be so heavily embroidered that it obscures the emotion, which should always be transparent (*Sphuto rasah*). This catholicity leads to a rethinking of the issue in terms of functionalism. We have already seen that Ananda Vardhana exposed the fallacy in regarding any diction, understood as a broad and inclusive literary manner, as restricted to a narrow emotional range. But, within the larger flow of narration, modulations of verbal expression in harmony with specific contexts can serve the poetic intuition in a fully functional manner. Middleton Murry¹¹ called the Grand Style "a technical poetic device for a particular end" and, connecting style with the theme or myth, observed that the Grand Style was appropriate if superhuman characters were depicted. "If the characters of the plot are superhuman and majestic, it seems more or less necessary that their manner of speech should differ from that of ordinary dramatic poetry by being more dignified. The poet heightens the speech of his superhuman characters in order that they may appear truly superhuman." The

Gaudī manner characterised by energy (*Ojas*) was, similarly, found suitable for heroic or awe-inspiring characters and situations. Here it is a technical poetic device for a particular end. One technical feature of the Gaudī manner is the fact that it is full of long compounds (*Samasa-bhuyishṭa*) that build up a sonorous music, a dense, crowded splendour. Aristotle¹² says that "of various kinds of words, the compounds are best adapted to dithyrambs" which are hymns to Bacchus, the god of the vine, enthusiastic, wild, boisterous.

The need for the close functional relation of various dictions, with their specific qualities, to feeling, which is the soul of poetry, begins to be emphasised by writer after writer. Magha¹³ points out that what is important in verbal music is not the differential sensuous effects of sounds orchestrated in different ways, but the psychological resonance. Thus, the terms used for the *Gunās* or specific excellences of diction really refer to psychological realities. Magha means by energy (*Ojas*) a flaring up of the responsive sensibility, its sudden activation and exaltation. It is like the ebullient, extrovert energy (*Tejas*) of the heroic type. Similarly, limpidity (*Prasada*) is the soothed, serene sensitivity. It is like the tranquil contentment (*Kshama*) of the poised, well-adjusted mind. Magha very emphatically related the excellences of diction (*Gunās*) to emotion and sentiment (*Rasa* and *Bhava*) and the latter were the determiners (*Niyamakās*) of the former.

Mammata shows the same approach. The verbal tissue of a work cannot be said to possess the qualities of energy or sweetness, he points out, unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The excellences of diction (*Gunās*) are therefore related to the emotion (*Rasa*), as virtues like heroism are related to the soul of a man. Thus, energy (*Ojas*) in diction causes a brilliant expansion (*Vistāra*) of the mind and resides in the sentiments of heroism, awe or fury. Limpidity (*Prasada*) is the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense extending over the mind at once (*Vyapti* or *Vikāsa*) like a stream of water over a cloth, or like fire among dry fuel, the latter being a metaphor borrowed from Bharata.⁴¹ Sweetness (*Madhurya*), residing normally in the erotic mood of love-in-union, but also appropriate to, and rising successively in degree in, pathos, love-in-separation and tranquil acceptance, is regarded as causing a softening or melting (*Druti*) of the heart.⁴⁵ Viśvanātha, likewise, defined diction (*Riti*) as a specific patterning of words (*Pada Samghatana*) which helps the realisation of the poetic emotion (*Upakāśitvāśādinam*).

But it is Bhoja who makes the most brilliant contribution to this discussion. Diction is the final shape of poetic expression and the initial and primary reality that confronts the relisher. From either perspective, the first analysis has to categorise it as a web of words (*Sabda Samghatana*). What is the principle of their patterning, the prior, integrative reality that determines their deployment? At this deeper level of analysis, we come across the overall aesthetic qualities (*Gunās*) of diction like sweetness,

limpidity (*Madhurya*, *Prasada*), etc. But they too are not absolute values. It is true that in relation to the tissue of words they mould, they become principles of integration (*Samghatana dharma*). But if the words serve them, they in turn serve the poetic emotion and are the instruments of its realisation. Here, Bhoja makes a remarkably brilliant suggestion and points out that diction should be regarded as an *Anubhava*⁴⁶. In Bharata's fundamental theory of aesthetic creation and experience, *Anubhava* is the voluntary and involuntary behaviour, both expressive of emotion, of the character who is the primary stimulus (*Vibhava*) that initiates the aesthetic reaction in the aesthetic situation, plastically shaped by the poetic creativity. Ordinarily, the *Anubhava* is a mimetic form, the transposition into art of the reality of the living world, the reactions of men and women to the changing stream of situations, which are also paralleled in the episodic stream of the drama or poem. Diction, on the other hand, is a pure creation of the poetic spirit, not a mimetic form. This had better be clarified, as misunderstanding is likely. Language is the creation of the race and history and therefore it would be absurd to call it the creation of a poet. But, as Newman said, "while the many use language as they find it, the man of genius uses it indeed, but subjects it withal to his own purpose, and moulds it according to his own peculiarities". Diction, as distinguished from language, is thus the pure creation of the poetic spirit. Now, we have seen that the demands on the poet, in the use of diction, can be extremely complex. If the diction has to be appropriate to a particular character in a particular situation, those facts are not its sole determinants. Even while meeting these demands of mimetic truth, the poet has to ensure that his diction realises a higher truth as well, the truth of his temperament, outlook and vision of the world. If the emotive behaviour, *Anubhava*, of a particular character in a particular context, is the means which the poet uses to spark an emotion appropriate to that episodic context, he has also to keep in mind the integral pattern of the whole composition and see that all these transient emotional sequences are genetically derived from the basic emotion. This is the emphatic prescription of the doctrine of the derived emotions (*Vyabhichari Bhavas*). In the same way, but in a far subtler operation, the poet has to use the modulations of diction for the contextually just accentuation of the emotions as well as for the integral balance of the emotion in the total work. Diction thus is the equivalent, in the sphere of creative craftsmanship, of the *Anubhava* in the sphere of the content that is shaped by that craftsmanship, a content which is assimilated from reality by a mimetic transposition. And since the transposition of life into art is fundamentally an act of pure creativity, at the deepest level of analysis, the distinction between the given and the donated disappears and the emotion as well as the diction which embodies it are alike revelatory of the individuality of the poet, his *Svabhava*, as Kuntaka asserted.

III METRE AND PROSE RHYTHM

From diction we can now pass on to the related problems of the choice of medium, verse or prose, and the selection of the metres, if verse is the medium

"Ever since man has been man," wrote Mill,⁴⁷ "all deep and sustained feeling has tended to express itself in rhythmical language, and the deeper the feeling the more characteristic and decided the rhythm" While this relation between feeling and rhythm has been noticed very early, there are subtler realities latent in that relation Rhythm, though it is an abstract pattern, considered as pure form, can be the vehicle of unconscious feeling and therefore the symbol of it The germ of a poem may emerge from the unconscious depths of creativity as pure rhythm first and only later take on the flesh of meaning, of story and incident Paul Valéry⁴⁸ wrote "My own poem, *Le Cimetière Marin*, came to me in the form of a certain rhythm which is that of the ten-syllable French line arranged in the proportion of four to six Another poem, *La Pythie*, began with an eight-syllable line the sound of which came of itself" T S Eliot⁴⁹ reaffirms this truth "A poem, or a passage of a poem, may tend to realise itself first as a particular rhythm before it reaches expression in words and may bring to birth the idea and the image"

Operating in these subtle realities is a very precise law of genetic relationship between feeling and expression Rhythm is an intrinsic feature of expression and like its other features is determined by the feeling If rhythm has its laws of form, they are not externally imposed. Coleridge⁵⁰ said "As it must not, so genius cannot, be lawless, for it is even this that constitutes its genius—the power of acting creatively under laws of its own origination" And Baudelaire,⁵¹ the rebel, was an uncompromising classicist in the matter of form "It is clear that systems of rhetoric and prosodies are not forms of tyranny arbitrarily devised, but a collection of rules required by the very organization of the spiritual being never have prosodies and systems of rhetoric prevented originality from manifesting itself distinctively The opposite would be far more true, that they have been a help to the blossoming forth of originality."

There is an extraordinary episode in Valmiki's *Ramayana*, which may go back to the third century B C,⁵² about how the poem arose It is no mere anecdote, but a profound parable of the creative process, especially in relation to the emergence of rhythm and metrical shape The episode runs thus When Valmiki once went out into the forest in search of firewood and grass for his daily ritual, he saw a happy pair of Krauncha birds sporting on the branch of a tree Suddenly, the male bird is shot dead by a hunter's arrow and the female utters a cry of anguish and terror A spontaneous utterance wells up from the poet's heart and emerges from his lips, lamenting this tragedy⁵³ Immediately after he speaks, he notices that the flow of spontaneous expression had a perfect rhythm and

melody. He ponders on this miracle and through deep introspection and analysis of the state of his mind at the time of its utterance, he discovers for this profound mystery of the unconscious creative process a solution which he gives out to his pupils in these words "That which proceeded from me who was overpowered by emotion could be nothing but poetry or rhythmic expression"⁵¹ Ananda Vardhana saw in this significant episode the embryonic form of the *Rasa* theory according to which emotive experience is the soul, the fundamental basis and inspiration of the rhythmical expression that is poetry.⁵⁵

The profound meaning of this episode, which affirms the genetic relationship between feeling and rhythm and the verse mould, is echoed by Ker⁵⁶ when he says "The form of the verse is not separable from the soul of poetry" Poetry has neither kernel, nor husk, but is all one" Emerson also affirmed that feeling creates its own rhythm when he said that "it is not metres but a metre-making argument that makes a poem" Metres are not self-determining but determined by the feeling, as Valmiki implied The feeling is so passionate and alive that it has an architecture of its own as Emerson said⁵⁷ Thoreau said in the *Week* "As naturally as the oak bears the acorn, and the vine a gourd, man bears a poem since his song is a vital function like breathing, and an integral result like weight" Thoreau spoke of a poem as a "natural fruit," as "one undivided, unimpeded expression fallen ripe into literature", a sentence that found extension in the first preface to Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* "The rhyme and uniformity of perfect poems show the free growth of metrical laws, and bud from them as unerringly and loosely as lilacs or roses on a bush, and take shapes as compact as the shapes of chestnuts and oranges, and melons and pears, and shed the perfume impalpable to form"⁵⁸ We saw earlier that Spingarn regarded rhythm and metre as aesthetically identical with style, style with form and form in its turn as identical with the work of art in its spiritual and indivisible self

In the significant episode in the *Ramayana*, Valmiki goes on to the detailed aspects of the craftsmanship involved in the plastic objectification of feeling He says that the narration should be in stanzas of spacious metres, flawless in phonetic structure It should be musical "like a melody on strings" Coleridge said "As wine during animated conversation, they (the effects of metre) act powerfully, though themselves unnoticed" It is the melody on strings, fully resonant or muted, of Valmiki's metrical rhythms, that realise for his most poignant moments their deepest impact, enabling them to communicate their emotion while taking away the rawness so that it is savoured aesthetically even when it is reacted to intimately and personally

The form of the verse-mould or stanza is a reflection in miniature of the general structural lines of the poem It is a means of giving us an experience which is organised in a particular way, a way which brings out the highlights, deepens the shadows, and, which with imperceptible

direction, calls upon us to respond with more sensitive feelings. Expression, sound, and rhythm, arranged in a particular pattern which we call the form, require us to obey a certain order and development of thought, of imagery and emotion. And it is this shaping of a poem structurally which gives to poetry the necessary qualities of formal beauty which we find also in sculpture, music, and painting. namely, balance, symmetry, climax or focus, contrast, repetition, and that structural rhythm which includes movement, continuity, proportion, and unity.⁵⁹ But all these are instrumentalities, not ends in themselves, poetical devices for the concretisation of feeling.

The analysis of metres in terms of their efficacy to be the vehicles of feeling was begun very early in Indian poetics. Katyayana⁶⁰ (third century B C) is one of the oldest writers in this field. He discusses the appropriateness of certain metres to certain subjects and situations. Bhoja demands that the epic poem (*Maha Kavya*) should be composed in metres which are melodic and musical. Since the range of themes is great, metrical variety is necessary. The situations should forge their own metre (*Arthanuupa Cchandasa*). The very metre must be suggestive of the dominant emotion of that canto. Bhoja goes into a detailed analysis and points out, for example, that a metre like *Viyogini* is ideally suited for pathos (*Karuna*).⁶¹ Kshemendra has also written extensively on this topic while discussing metrical propriety (*Vrittauchitya*) and has pointed out that the *Anustubh* metre is ideal for narration, pointed speech and summative sequences, while a spacious metre like *Sragdhara* is appropriate for descriptions of war and generally for the emotions of heroism, valour and awe.

Among the verbal figures (*Sabdalamkara*) Bhoja enumerates is one termed *Gati*. It is the choice of the proper poetic form, verse (*Padya*), prose (*Gadya*) or the mixed medium (*Champu*). This brings us to the aesthetics of Sanskrit prose. Earlier to Bhoja, Dandin⁶² had divided prose into three varieties: savouring of verse in being pronouncedly, near-metrically rhythmic (*Vritta-gandhu*), limpid, and mellifluous with sweet vocables and no long compounds (*Churna*), and the very opposite of that (*Utkalika praya*). Here, the second category is the nearest approximation to the temper and spirit of modern prose. We find it in Sanskrit in some of the early commentaries (*Bhashya*). There it is the instrument of analysis and its simplicity and force may not unreasonably be claimed to be a donation of the scientific purpose for which it is used. In literature, we find it in the great beast-fable cycle, the *Panchatantra*.⁶³ But when the prose romance emerged, a complexly orchestrated prose style developed which, today, we would find more akin to verse than prose as we understand it.

The distinctive characteristic of the prose of the Sanskrit romances is the supremacy of rhythm. Now, metre is an abstract pattern of rhythms. Formal analysis can indicate the precise shape of this pattern. But in

any specimen which has poetic vitality, the component rhythms will be found to vary from the abstract scheme, for the excellent reasons that rhythm is really the undulation of poetic feeling as it flows into the linguistic tissue and moulds it and the pulse of feeling cannot be expected to be precisely and mechanically repetitive or regular. "When the actual movement of the stresses in a poem," points out Whalley,⁶¹ "does not vary significantly from the abstract metre, it is a sure sign that the poem springs from a shallow level of consciousness or is unduly cerebral and technical. And a poem which reiterates its metre insistently may become so soporific and benumbing that it soon fails to convey even the most prosaic and superficial meaning."

When the genuine poet handles it, metre becomes infinitely flexible. With a poet like Milton, the abstract metrical pattern remains in the back of the mind like the steady ticking of a metronome and when metre is present in this way it only serves to throw into relief the nonrepetitive movement of the rhythm. This reality suggests the possibility of another way of handling the linguistic tissue, definitely not as a replacement of verse, but as a permissible alternative form to dispense with metre altogether and concentrate on the organisation of rhythms with the maximum flexibility. It is worthwhile referring here to the very interesting comments of William Carlos Williams,⁶⁵ himself a gifted creative writer. He starts with a pleasant tirade against the iambic pentameter. "The man who can conquer the dominance of the iambic pentameter, in our verse, or find a way to subordinate it, can conquer our world." This is the mode that fixed itself in the language with Chaucer, achieved official recognition with Surrey, and an apotheosis in Shakespeare's sonnets and later plays at the beginning of the seventeenth century. "Since then, so far as any basic change in the accepted structure of the poetic line is concerned, nothing new has occurred. It is generally accepted even that no further change is possible, we have rung all the changes." Now, Williams points out that in Shakespeare's later dramatic dialogues, the line-group is often obliterated for the ear, either by run-on lines which carry over the separating pause into the body of the next line, or by phrase groups which insert pauses within the body of the line. A great prevalence of run-on lines renders this obliteration so complete that verse becomes practically without metre or line grouping. "I am strongly inclined to believe that English poetry might be a great gainer if we would at once frankly recognize this rhythmic but unmetric verse as strictly rhythmized prose and print it as such without the deceptive line-division."

Endorsing that particular suggestion was not the point in citing Williams. About that we may have reservations. But the analysis is helpful in showing that the abstract metrical pattern may sometimes deliquesce so completely that the flexible tissue may be called either prose or poetry. Williams wants to call it prose, but if metre has disappeared, the organisation of rhythms has not, and since that feature is much more distinctive

than in ordinary prose, we will have to call such tissues poetic prose. And if the complete flexibility of iambic pentameter tempts Williams to call it prose, we may be tempted to call Bana's prose poetry, for at this depth, where metre becomes no longer relevant, the distinction really gets blurred. As Philip Sidney⁶⁶ pointed out, "there have been many most excellent poets that never versified" And Wordsworth⁶⁷ wrote . "Much confusion has been introduced into criticism by this contradistinction of Poetry and Prose, instead of the more philosophical one of Poetry and Matter of Fact, or Science (Bhamaha's *Loka Vaita* and *Sastra Vaita*) The only strict antithesis to Prose is Metre , nor is this, in truth, a strict antithesis, because lines and passages of metre so naturally occur in writing prose that it would be scarcely possible to avoid them, even were it desirable "

We should not exaggerate the achievement of the Sanskrit writers in this field Thus, when the Champu form, or the narration in mixed prose and verse, arose later, by about the tenth century, there is a deplorably uniform lack of insight Handled with discrimination, the form would have had possibilities For instance, prose could have been used for narrative stretches where there is no heightening of emotion or the mood is realistic, extrovert or humorous, and verse for the more lyrical and poetic sequences It is this sensitive use of the media that has made the old *chant-fable* from Picardy, *Aucassin and Nicolette*, one of the most delightful creations in the whole of literature A Japanese master like Issa⁶⁸ can also use the *haibun* form, which is a mixed genre of prose and verse like the Sanskrit Champu, with profound sensitiveness, as can be seen from his meditations over his two-year-old daughter's death He describes, in prose, his shock when she fell ill, the long vigils by her bedside, the preparation of the mind to accept the inevitable But the tragedy remains unassimilable, and the fountain of tears, which no philosophical thought can dam, must rise high as a jet of song Note the transition and the perfect justness of the transition in terms of the increasing intensity of feeling "Our hopes proved all in vain She grew weaker and weaker, and finally, on the twenty-first of June, as the morning glories were just closing their flowers, she closed her eyes for ever Her mother embraced the cold body and cried bitterly For myself, I knew well it was no use to cry, that water once flown past the bridge does not return, and blossoms that are scattered are gone beyond recall Yet try as I would I could not simply could not cut the binding cord of human love

*The world of dew
Is the world of dew
And yet
And yet "*

But the Sanskrit Champu writers use the media haphazardly The result has been that the Champu lacks the force and directness of prose and the heightened expressiveness of poetry

Even in the earlier period of the prose romances, we cannot call the medium used by a writer like Subandhu⁶⁹ poetic prose. It is merely an artificial medium which is neither prose nor verse, nor poetic in any genuine sense. But it is different with Bana⁷⁰. In the last analysis, his *Kadambari* is meant to be enjoyed for the atmosphere it builds up, sensuous, twilit, musical. And just as the Spenserian stanza is one of the most important poetic devices for realising the soft, cloudy radiance of the dream-world conjured up by the *Faerie Queene*, Bana's highly rhythmic, cadenced poetic prose has become the finest medium for his romance which speaks of a great love that survived the vicissitudes of many rebirths. In the modern European tradition, it was Laforgue who obliterated the distinction between poetry and prose as *formal* categories. He did not abandon rhyme or rhythm. But the rhyme is no longer part of a regular scheme, and sometimes yields to assonance or alliteration. The pattern of sound, in fact, is applied evenly to a whole passage rather than at certain fixed points in it. Rilke and T. S. Eliot learned from him the art of counterpoint. Within their lines, and sometimes competing with their formal pattern, is a secondary organisation of assonances, alliterations and echoes⁷¹. This led to the situation analysed by Eliot⁷²: "It would be convenient if poetry were always verse—either accented, alliterative, or quantitative, but that is not true. Poetry may occur, within a definite limit on one side, at any point along a line of which the formal limits are 'verse' and 'prose'." Walter de la Mare⁷³ wrote: "Every good prose will reveal at a heedful reading a marked tendency in its sentence and paragraph construction towards a loosely measurable sequence of a variable pattern, occupying so much time, and therefore its equivalent of sensuous and mental activity—as in a grave and ceremonious minuet." While this may be true of all good prose, in poetic prose, the sensuous, formal features of poetry are assimilated to a far greater extent. Though prose, the verbal tissue in Bana is poetic not only in its spirit but its texture. There may be no metre, but the rhythmic organisation is distinctive. There may be no rhyme, but the assonances and alliterations build up their percussive effects, gentle or strident as the mood modulates. The tissue is not only poetic in spirit, but approaches the flavour of verse, it is *Vṛtta-gandhu*, to recall Dandin's classification.

CHAPTER SIX

The Doctrine of Suggestion

I. THE GREAT CONTROVERSY

WE can now take up one of the greatest contributions of Indian poetics, the concept of resonance or suggestion (*Dhvanī*). Its initial formulation was a brilliantly intuitive seizure of the implication that was latent in Bharata's profoundly psychological analysis of the poetic context. But it unleashed great storms of controversy which, however, proved ultimately to be a benediction, for they cleared the air of all ambiguities of analytical thought and established the concept firmly as referring to a genuine and distinctive power of poetry.

The basic text of the doctrine of suggestion is the *Dhvanyaloka*.¹ From the eleventh century onwards, the assumption becomes fairly universal that the author of this classic is Ananda Vardhana of the ninth century. But there are difficulties here. The work consists of the *Karika*, gnomic verses, and the *Vṛtti*, which is the exposition of the *Karika*, generally in prose, though with citations of illustrative verses. Buhler, Jacobi and others have pointed out some very interesting facts. Abhinava Gupta, who wrote the *Lochana*, the great commentary on the *Dhvanyaloka*, carefully distinguishes between the author of the *Karika* and the author of the *Vṛtti* and refers to the former as "the author of the original text" (*Mulagrānthakṛt*) and the latter simply as "the author" (*Grānthakṛt*). Abhinava has, at least on three occasions, to try hard to reconcile the conflicts in the views expressed by these two. He also takes care to point out certain features of the theory developed in the *Vṛtti* as not expressly taught in the *Karika*. The tentative conclusion drawn by scholars is that the *Karika* was composed by a writer of the eighth century. But it was Ananda Vardhana who, through the *Vṛtti*, stabilised the theory as a fully and brilliantly reasoned statement. Kshemendra in the eleventh century, Hema Chandra in the twelfth and subsequent writers like Jayaratha, Visvanatha, Govinda and Kumaraswamin regard Ananda Vardhana as the author of the complete work, *Karika* as well as *Vṛtti*. Since it was he who built up a complete theory from scattered ideas and cues, and since the author of the *Karika* is a shadowy figure whom we can refer to only as the *Dhvanīkara* (formulator of the concept of *Dhvanī*), we too shall regard Ananda Vardhana as its founder for all practical purposes.

The basic implications of Bharata's great formula are these. The poetic context is a creatively organised context for the communication of feeling. Feeling cannot be communicated through propositional statement. In fact, the term "communication" is itself misleading. For the poet is not the donor who can donate feeling, as a man can donate money or some physical object, to another. The feeling ultimately experienced by the reader is *his* — it is the movement of *his* sensibility, the stirring of *his* heart. Now, we cannot arouse a feeling or a mood by naming it. The poet builds up a system of objective correlatives, essentially identical with the context of stimuli in life which can elicit the emotional reaction. Bharata had used the word *Nishpatti*, emergence or outcome, for the appearance of *Rasa* when the prime and the ancillary stimuli, etc. were creatively organised. Ananda Vardhana claimed that this *Nishpatti* really meant *Abhivyakti*, manifestation, as the emotional reaction was ever-abiding, as latent reactivity, in the reader. And since what made the *Rasa* manifest itself in the poetic context was not the communication of a propositional meaning but the presentation of a sensitively organised complex of stimuli, he affirmed that stimuli and reaction, *Vibhavas* and *Rasa*, stood in the relation of suggestor (*Vyanjaka*) and suggested (*Vyangya*). Poetry operated basically through the power of suggestion (*Vyanjana*).

There were incipient, faint movements towards this formulation in earlier thought also. In his analysis of literary ornament (*Alamkara*) Bhamaha² had spoken of implied or suggested similarity (*Gunasamya Prati*) and of imbedded, implied sense. In Udbhata we find (in his discussion of the figure known as *Panyayokta*) a clear mention of a significative capacity called suggestion (*Avagama*), a capacity which is different from the denotation of words or the meaning of the sentence as a whole. But it was Ananda Vardhana who first decided to accept the full implication of Bharata's psychological analysis of the poetic context. This came close to the affirmation made by Tillyard³ that "all poetry is oblique — there is no direct poetry". Ananda Vardhana would modify this to say that all good poetry should be oblique.

In the further analysis, we have to proceed very carefully, for it is often assumed that Ananda Vardhana's theory of resonance (*Dhvani*) is a statement of this basic obliquity of poetry, emerging from the facts that poetic transfer cannot be mediated by propositional statements and that it is essentially the elicitation of an emotional reaction through the creative organisation of sensuous stimuli. As in relativity, we have to distinguish here between the general theory and the special theory. The general theory, although it needed the brilliant mind of Ananda Vardhana for its clear formulation, derives directly from Bharata's basic postulates. The special theory was a refinement, a brilliant one, but carelessness in seeing the strict limits of its application would and did lead to the rejection of much genuine poetry as inferior poetry. It is against this rejection that the critics of

Ananda Vardhana rebelled. Our task, therefore, is going to be a difficult one. We have to realise the fine critical insight revealed in the theory of resonance and pay our homage, which can never be too excessive, to Ananda Vardhana, at the same time we have to pay close attention to its limits of applicability which were clarified by his critics.

Ananda Vardhana must have been fascinated by the basic miracle in poetry—the concrete, sensuously palpable stimulus inducing an emotion, the material entity leading to an immaterial reality, actually a mode of being. This was a quantal leap. It seemed impossible to follow every phase of the transition as a continuous process, for at one critical point the track entered a tunnel, was lost to view, and the discontinuous transition was effected from the material stimulus to the immaterial emotion. Under the spell of this fascination Ananda Vardhana extended the concept of the quantal leap to within the poetic fabric itself. This fabric is a linguistic texture, because it is woven out of words (*Sabda*) which are phonetic entities, it is also a web of meaning, semantic meaning (*Artha*). The contours of the expressed sense of a linguistic construction can be precisely fixed, for language has its well-known laws for manipulating the communication of meaning. Into this basically logical context, Ananda Vardhana introduces the key concept of quantal transition and thus flings wide the windows of a magic casement opening on a landscape full of shadows, but luminous shadows, and filled with bird-voices that seem clear in their intimations but with an articulateness that transcends the means ordinarily available to language.

This, briefly, is the statement of his theory of suggestion (*Dhvani*). If, after the appearance of the expressed sense, either the sound (*Sabda*) or the meaning (*Artha*), completely subordinating itself, gives rise to another sense, it is said that, in those cases, word and meaning suggest another sense. Semantic meaning does not contradict poetic meaning, nor is it necessarily inadequate for poetic feeling. The poetic reaction, in any case, is a process further to the grasp of semantic meaning, the result of letting that meaning soak into the emotional reactivity so that it can generate the miracle of its activations there. But Ananda Vardhana concentrates on those poetic constructions which have both a semantic meaning and a further suggested meaning. In some cases the suggested meaning may be less relevant to the poetic intention than the direct meaning. He classes such instances as inferior poetry. In his opinion, it is the poetic construction where the suggested meaning is the strategic instrument of poetic stimulation that incarnates the supreme poetic power. This, of course, is not universal. For this rise of the suggested sense can be likened to two phenomena—resonance (*Anunada*) and echo (*Pratidhvan*). It is only such metals as bronze which, when struck, give rise to ripples of resonance and it is only a few special spots like caves where the voice produces an echo, similar yet so subtly different.

Poetic creativity and experience have been variously defined. Thus,

Hema Chandra, following Abhinava, summatively described them as awakening of poetic charm (*Chamatkaranivesa*), relish (*Rasana*), taste (*Asvada*), fruition (*Bhoga*), accomplishment (*Samapati*), fusion (*Laya*) and repose (*Visanti*). Grammarians, who were primarily concerned with the semantic meaning of language, had no objection to raise here, for they were willing to admit that poetic experience was really a further process which was outside their domain, grammar, in the sense that emotional reactivity received the semantic meaning and allowed itself to be activated by it. But Ananda Vardhana was formulating a quantal theory within the semantic system itself. This provoked grammarians, and writers on poetics also, to examine whether suggestion (*Dhvani*) was really a new principle, and what was more important, whether it was really necessary. Were not the familiar powers of semantic constructions adequate to explain the phenomenon of suggestion? Stormy controversies were unleashed and the *Dhvani* school fought hard in trying to establish that suggestion did not come under the province of denotation (*Abhidha*), nor of import (*Tatpariya*), nor of indication (*Lakshana*), nor of inference (*Anumana*), the categories clarified by grammarians and epistemologists.

The grammarians and logicians had laid down that the primary meaning (*Mukhya Artha*) of a word is its denotation (*Abhidha*). Why a word, which is a phonetic entity, should denote an object, is explained as due to the convention (*Samketa*) established by the practice of the world (*Vyavahara*), by the age-long association of the two. If suggestion is a reality, if the apprehension of a new sense follows after the apprehension of the denoted sense, could it not be regarded as the long-range action (*Dugha Vyapara*) of the denotative power (*Abhidha-Vritti*) of the word, asked the grammarians and philosophers of the Mimamsa school, who were committed to the literal interpretation of the texts. The single arrow discharged by a strong man, in a single movement, penetrates the armour and reaches the heart of another, similarly the apt word enables the apprehension of the suggested sense also through its denotative power, so ran their argument.

The controversy is launched and there will be many sallies and withdrawals and fresh formations by the opposition. The battles were episodes, in order to understand them fully, we must be very clear as to what the war was about. The grammarians were willing to accept that the emotional reaction to the linguistic representation was something which lay outside their field. In Sanskrit poetics, the opposition—clarified by analysis in the dissection of the unitary reality, we should add—was never between word and meaning, *Rasa* was the soul of poetry, both word (*Sabda*) and meaning (*Artha*) together formed the body of poetry (*Kavya Sarira*). The connective tissues in this body, the bonds between word and meaning, were very much their concern, the grammarians felt. Meaning may later undergo a sea-change into feeling. But it emerges first from words. Logical continuity rather than quantal transitions should govern this phase,

argued the grammarians, and not unreasonably. But poetics countered by affirming the speciality of the poetic mood where physical stimuli mature into emotional experience, where objects are not stolid or neutral but objective correlatives. It is because the poetic sensitiveness is there that the object undergoes this miraculous transformation. The logic and rationality of the workaday world cannot make a chair an ideogram of inner tension, but this miracle happens when the sensitive temperament confronts the creativity of Van Gogh. If objects themselves are thus transformed, their evocation through a literary medium also transcends grammar, and ceases to be a matter of mere logic, in the poetic context. The denoted sense, the *Dhvani* theorists pointed out in countering the Mimamsakas, brings a mere cognition, the suggested a surprise. The denotation of a prime stimulus, *Vibhava*, which gives rise to *Rasa*, is not a denotation of the *Rasa* itself. The connection between word and object is a convention. The connection between the object denoted by the word and the word itself, regarded as an object with its texture and shape, on the one side, and the feeling nuance evoked, on the other, is not a matter of mere convention. Denotation exhausts itself with the literal meaning. But poetic creativity and receptivity give it a halo. If grammar objects that the poetic mood need not be invoked as the basic reality here and that suggestion can be regarded as the extension of denotation, it might as well annex the final emotive reaction also as the long-range action of denotation. But it is the universal experience that poetic relish needs poetic sensitiveness, knowledge of grammar alone is not sufficient for the grasp of poetic meaning.

When suggestion could not be annexed by denotation, an attempt was made to see whether it could be absorbed by indication (*Lakshana*). This is the power by which a word yields a meaning other than its denotation, though based on it. Thus, when one says, "the country rejoices", one refers to the people living in the country, not to the terrain. Gautama,⁴ the founder of the philosophy of logic, has given an exhaustive analysis of the contexts in which a word can yield such a transferred sense. Bhartrmutra, as quoted by Mukula,⁵ also gives a summary. The power of indication really belongs to the sense (*Artha-vyapara*). Indication, therefore, is sometimes called the tail, as it were, of denotation (*Abhidha-pucchabhuta*). Bhatta Nayaka⁶ includes it under denotation, as only an extension of it.

Mammata counters the attempt to absorb suggestion into indication by pointing out that in the poetic context the conventional bond between word and meaning is not relevant and that just as denotation is a worldly convention (*Vyavaharika Samketa*), indication also is a convention, based, as he proceeds to clarify, on three conditions. It is built upon the expressed sense (*Artha-nishitha*), but it swings into action when the primary sense is exhausted or incompatible (*badhita*), it is sanctioned by a valid reason for resorting to it (*Prayojana*). In many cases, usage (*Rudhi*) makes

indications rest as securely on convention as denotation. The special motive (*Prayojana*) though most often prosaic convenience, can sometimes be poetic. The *Dhvani* theorists therefore concede a resonance based on indication (*Lakshana-mula Dhvani*). But it is the suggestive power of the poetic mood that counts here, not the power of indication acting autonomously. An instance cited is the expression, "a hamlet on the Ganges" (*Gangayam ghosha*). Here we must add that this type of expression, very conventional in English (like Stratford-on-Avon) is not usual in Sanskrit. The usual expression should be "a hamlet on the bank of the Ganges" (*Gangatue*). Here, analysis proceeds to show, Ganges, which denotes a river, means its bank by indication. The question now is the motive for not using the word "bank". In the poetic context, the ellipsis, made possible by the use of indication rather than denotation, suggests the ideas of the coolness and holiness of the hamlet.⁷

A third power of the language of ordinary discourse is now invoked to absorb suggestion. This is purport (*Tatparya*). The Mimamsakas had admitted that denotation gave the meaning of individual words (*Padartha*) only. The individual words of a sentence arouse individual images isolated from one another. If an integral meaning of the sentence as a whole (*Vakyantha*) is to emerge, as it does emerge, the semantic organisation of words in a propositional statement has to be conceded a power which the Mimamsakas call purport. Even if, now, a meaning other than the expressed (*Vachyad atinikta*) emerges, it is not necessary to regard it as suggested (*Vyangya*), they argued. Where this idea, which is other than the one that is expressed, is primary (*Pradhana*), it is as good as expressed. So it must also be called the expressed sense, the expression being intended to mean that. Here, the Mimamsakas argue, the primary sense which is realised first is the means for the realisation of the subsequently realised, deviant, meaning.

The connection and patterned mobilisation (*Anvaya*) of denotations are the instrumentation by which the purport establishes itself. Mammata,⁸ stating the views of the theorists of *Tatparya*, analyses this instrumentation. "When the denotations of words are connected in accordance with expectancy (*Akanksha*), compatibility (*Yogyata*) and proximity (*Sannidhi*), another sense arises, called purport, which has a distinct form and which, though not constituting the sense of words, is yet the sense of the sentence." In the attempt to absorb suggestion under purport, the fallacy of confusing prose and poetry reappears. Purport here hugs the earth as a grammatical category. It cannot wing its way into poetics. The expectancy, mentioned as a principle of mobilisation is a subtle value. But it can stand for wholly different things in different contexts. In ordinary discourse, it can point forward only to a restricted realm of possible completions, the limitations being fixed by the nature of the word, whether it is a substantive or preposition, by the nature of the object that the word stands for, which can enter into relations with the

other objects that other words indicate only within a logical or causal nexus. But the expectancy of the poetic mood can accept a far vaster world of subtle affinities and connections, condensed imageries and symbolic validities. The power of purport exhausts itself with the literal meaning, even if it be many-layered. The quantal leap to a poetic meaning cannot be powered by the grammatical resources available for mobilising denotations of words into purport of sentence. The theorists of purport are sometimes called the theorists of the "conscious manipulation of grammatical order for the farthest reach of meaning". (*Abhūtanvaya Vadins*) It is true that, in a very profound and very generalised sense, suggestion is purport, for poetic suggestion is part of the poetic intention, an instrumentation of the purport of the poet. But against such appetites for vast generalisations one has no defence. *Vakrokti*, indirect utterance, is sometimes used by Kuntaka to stand for all figures of speech and ultimately for poetic utterance which even dispenses with figures, in fact, all poetry. In that way, we need not even move on to purport from denotation to annex poetry. For instance, Bhatta Nayaka sometimes uses denotation (*Abhidha*) to mean the poet's expression as a whole.⁹ But generalisations of such spread can be very dangerous when what is being evaluated is a contest between grammar and poetics.

The most formidable opposition to the theory of suggestion came from Mahima Bhatta¹⁰. He claimed that there was no need to establish a separate function, called suggestion (*Vyanjana*) by the *Dhvani* theory, because poetic intention was realised here actually through inference (*Anumana*). The expressed sense is never a suggestor (*Vyanjaka*). It is very wide in its scope (*Maha Vishaya*) and its range includes what is regarded as suggestion, where the expressed sense functions as a ground of inference. Mahima claims that, since the word exhausts itself after denoting its literal or primary sense (*Abhidha*), even the indication (*Lakshya-artha*) is something which is inferred from the primary sense. The further reach of meaning, for which the function of suggestion is invoked, is also made possible by the extension of the inferential process. It must be very clearly understood that Mahima does not deny the realities of poetic experience to which the *Dhvani* theorists pointed. He only differed in the interpretation of the exact nature of the processes involved. He was also ready to concede that the inferential process in poetic experience was distinguished from that in ordinary discourse by especial sensitiveness and delicacy. Therefore he called the process poetic inference (*Kavy anumiti*)¹¹. But he claimed that it was inference that explained the poetic experience of the further meaning, not a separate function of suggestion.

The spearhead of Mahima's attack was his argument that a sequence (*Krama*), both temporal and experiential, could not be denied between the expressed sense (*Vachya*) and what the *Dhvani* theorists called the suggested sense (*Vyangya*). According to him, this only showed that

the two senses, expressed and unexpressed, were sequential and, being such, bore the relation of premise and conclusion¹² Here certain ambiguities in the elaboration of the *Dhvani* theory were being fully capitalised by Mahima The really poetic perception seemed to reach at the suggested meaning through the layer of words, the layers of expressed meaning built up by denotation, indication and purport, "with the ease with which a needle could pierce a hundred lotus leaves placed upon one another, apparently simultaneously" Suggestion here seemed to be of an "imperceptible process" (*Asamlakshya Kīama*) But there were difficulties here There were instances of clearly perceptible process (*Samlakshya Kīama*), which, in terms of the genuinely poetic quality of the ultimate meaning and the remoteness from the expressed meaning, could not be denied the status of resonance or *Dhvani* Pratiharendu Raja,¹³ in his commentary on Udbhata, therefore admitted both the suggestion of imperceptible process (*Asamlakshya Dhvani*) and the suggestion of perceptible process (*Samlakshya Dhvani*) which latter has a distinguishable sequence of transition (*Kīama Vyavahara*) from expressed to suggested meaning The latter was a form based on the resonance of the expressed meaning (*Artha-sakti-mulanuranana-rupam*) Inference, thus, is admissible in poetic experience

But, were not the instances of imperceptible process also cases of inference? Mahima argued that the *Dhvani* theorists could at best claim that the process was so swift as to be imperceptible, they could not totally deny the sequential nature of the reality, they did not deny a process, the needle had to penetrate the lotus leaves one by one Their diffidence was real and understandable If the *Dhvani* theorists shifted the centre of poetic significance from the expressed to the suggested meaning, the expressed meaning was still the instrument for the evocation of the suggested meaning and the leap of sensibility in poetic experience from the former to the latter could not but be a transition, a process Further, although Ananda Vardhana himself had said that, while the semantic meaning was fixed by the limits of the actual expression, the suggested meaning could be manifold, he had also indicated, as the factors determining its specificity, the speaker, the person addressed, the context Mammata¹⁴ expanded this into a formula "Suggestion is that reach of meaning, which, owing to the speciality of the speaker, the person addressed, the modulation of voice or intonation, the sentence, the proximity of another, the occasion, the place, the time and the like, becomes the cause of the apprehension of another sense in the case of persons possessing poetic sensibility" Should not all these conditions be regarded as cues for inference?

It was the basic recognition in Sanskrit poetics, dating back to Bharata, that poetic experience was fundamentally identical—in its derivation, not ultimate reach—with general human experience in the varied contexts of living, that had made Ananda Vardhana, Mammata and others insist that

poetic meaning was communicated by the entire context and not by the expression through language alone. Isabel Fry once said "Language is, in its widest sense, a part of the act of living. Tear it from its setting and it will, to a greater or less extent, become meaningless"¹⁵ But we are dealing with contexts where the cues of the setting can be perceived only by a poetic sensibility. That is why Mammata has specifically mentioned that only persons possessing poetic sensibility will be enabled by the various cues to penetrate through the expressed meaning to the suggested. Visvanatha takes his firm stand on the basic requirement of poetic sensibility. He asserts that Mahima's syllogistic method and his reliance on logical inference are entirely inadequate as explanations for the communication of meaning in the poetic context. And he cites this verse as an example. "O neighbour, could you keep an eye on our house? The father of this child does not like the tasteless water of the well. Though alone, I go quickly to the river whose banks are covered with Tamala trees. Let the densely growing reeds bruise my body." Here, the woman's going alone to the river bank with its screen of trees and her anticipating a plausible explanation why her body may seem bruised when she returns, all suggest that she is going to meet her paramour. But, Visvanatha points out, these cues in the expressed statement, although they help to reveal the unexpressed sense, are not invariable, for dalliance with a gallant is not, from the logical point of view, universally predicable of a woman going alone to the river bank with its dense trees and reeds or from her returning bruised.

The instances cited by Mammata are even more subtle. If knowledge about speaker, addressee and context are absolute requirements for full understanding here, the suggested meaning still escapes logical inference acting in isolation, and yields itself only to poetic sensibility. "See, motionless and throbless glows the heron on a leaf of the lotus, like a conch-shell standing in a vessel of spotless emerald." The speaker is a woman and she is addressing a man. By the throblessness, which is the expressed sense, an absolute sense of security on the part of the bird is suggested. And by that tranquil confidence, which is thus the suggested sense, the fact that the place is lonely, safe from the possibility of human intrusion, is further suggested. Hence the woman is suggesting to the man that this is an ideal place for an assignation. Or, if we know from the context that the two had earlier fixed this place for a meeting, the woman is accusing the man, who had arrived late but claimed that he had come earlier and gone away because she had not arrived, that he is uttering a lie. For if he had come here earlier, the bird would have flown away.¹⁶ Another example cited by Mammata illustrates the blending of poetic suggestion and preciousness which is a speciality of Sanskrit poetry. "At that time you would not take anywhere else your glance, riveted on my cheeks. Now I am exactly the same and the cheeks are the same, but the glance is not the same." The words are

spoken by a girl to her lover. The context is very complex. The lover, when he saw his beloved once in the company of another girl, fell hard for the latter. He did not want to be caught staring at her. But when his glance was riveted on the cheek of his beloved, he was relishing the image of the girl reflected on its glowing surface. An incipient figure is also suggested here, that the cheek of his beloved is lustrous like a mirror. But, today, the girl is not present and the cheek of his beloved has no precious image to reflect.¹⁷ The issue here is whether, even with the knowledge of the entanglement of the lover, the cryptic suggestion of the expressed meaning here will be understood automatically through inference. Sanskrit poetics affirms that it will not be understood and that the suggested meaning will reveal itself only to the stirred poetic sensibility.

An illustration from another poetic tradition, the Chinese, and comment on it by a Western critic, will help in establishing the universality of the use of suggestion as a power of poetry. Here is a translation of Li Po's poem, *The Jewel Stairs' Grievance*, by Ezra Pound.

*The jewelled steps are already quite white with dew,
It is so late that the dew soaks my gauze stockings,
And I let down the crystal curtain
And watch the moon through the clear autumn*

These are Pound's notes to the poem. "Jewel stairs, therefore, a palace Grievance, therefore there is something to complain of. Gauze stockings, therefore a court lady, not a servant who complains. Clear autumn, therefore he has no excuse on account of weather. Also, she has come early, for the dew has not merely whitened the stairs, but has soaked her stockings. The poem is especially prized because she utters no direct reproach."¹⁸ Here too, poetic sensitivity has to be a reality before the suggested meaning is realised, it transcends the reach of the purely logical process.

The findings of contemporary analysis can shed light on the controversy between Mahima and the *Dhvani* theorists. We have seen that Pratiharendu Raja conceded that inference could also be used by the poetic intention. But Mahima's claim that all suggestion is really inference can be valid only if what we may initially call poetic intuition is not a reality. This issue has been fought out in our own times regarding the problem of how we become aware of other selves, as their reality seems never realisable in the way our own reality can be experienced by us in introspection. The inference school holds that any experience of mental process in another can only be inferred and is inferred from structure, situation, history and behaviour only when a similar experience is or has been associated with similar structure, situation, history and behaviour in oneself. It is further claimed that the probability of the inference will be proportional to the degree of similarity, a point urged by Adams.¹⁹ The relevance of these

claims and their refutations to our own enquiry must be clearly understood. In poetry, we are trying to establish contact with the mind of another, the poet's intention and his emotive experiences. In drama, we are striving to feel as the character feels in a situation or at least understand his feeling, the cues before us being the actor's word, gesture, facial expression. The issue is whether the feeling is intuited by us from the *Vibhava* (the prime stimulus, here the actor in a role) or whether the *Vibhava* serves merely as the ground for inferring the feeling.

Against the inference school it has been urged that understanding seems to occur even in the absence of relevant previous experience. Stern²⁰ points out that at the age of one year or less infants register appropriate response to expressions of which they have had no conceivable experience. This is because latent reactivity—the *Natsangika Vasana* of Sanskrit poetics—is a reality and it enables the recognition of emotion from expression, the organism being a psychophysical unity where emotion determines the expressive act of the body. Kohler²¹ gives many instances of apes' understanding of expressions without the background of relevant previous experience. He argues that emotional comprehension is directly aroused by the structure and definition of the sensory field, without the help of association.

Even in the case of perceptions, where, due to the presence of similar funded experiences, association can be claimed to account for comprehension, the objection has been made that the awareness is not factorised in the way the inference theory prescribes. The reading of suffering in another face—in the aesthetic presentation he may be an actor—has all semblance of being a unitary act; it does not seem to be an inference from the perception of the lines on his face by the accrual to this sensory core of an associational context where similar lines on one's own face are remembered to have been brought about by one's own suffering.

Inference cannot be saved as the sole reality by arguing, as Mahima²² does, that even the imperceptible process (*Asamlakshya Krama*) is a process, a mediating sequence. Explanation of emotional comprehension in terms of empathy, which is simply kinesthetic inference or unconscious identification,²³ is confronted with similar difficulties. Empathy demands overt or incipient motor mimicry of another as a necessary condition of comprehension of another's mood, as Hirn²⁴ has pointed out. Paralytics should therefore lose their capacity to understand people to some degree. Allport²⁵ shows that this cannot be taken for granted. Against the argument that emotional comprehension follows upon a process of unconscious emotional identification, it has been urged that a mood, which is temporarily dominant in one, would rule out the comprehension of an opposite mood in another by identification. Feeling grief, one cannot, according to this hypothesis, identify oneself with another's elation.²⁶ Then, how is the understanding of an opposite mood to be explained?

It is not the intention to deny that inferential processes ever take place

in comprehension. The present purpose is to establish that intuitive perceptions also occur. Empathy, as Mead and Lipps²⁷ point out, presuppose the reality of another self which, as given, becomes the object of knowledge. But while empathy and analogous inferential processes demand an associational self-reference as an intermediate act before the mood of another is comprehended, intuitive perceptions are immediate. In fact, Kohler goes to the extent of claiming that the "Thou" is a prior perception to the "I"; because it is a *gestalt* of clearer definition. Kohler also points out that when we intuitively see that a man is melancholy or embarrassed, it is clearly he and not we ourselves who seems to have these qualities, they are luminously objective in location²⁸. The *Vibhavas*, and the poem itself, which is a literary representation (*Vachika Abhinaya*), must therefore be attributed an objective power to suggest. The facts that it is the poet's subjectivity that gifted words with this power and that it can act only if the subjectivity of the reader is sensitive enough, do not negate the truth that the power has come to dwell in the creatively moulded poetic tissue.

Lossky, Croce and Bergson have made elaborate defences of intuition. Lossky regards intuition as the capacity for knowledge of an object in its integrality. The several qualities of an object are perceived by different sense organs, which are however unable to mediate the unity of the whole complex of perceptions. While it is possible for one to see the colour, feel the shape and taste the sweetness of an orange, it is impossible to see, feel or taste its unity. Likewise, intuition and not construction out of atomistic fragments is the process by which the unity of personality is grasped²⁹. Similarly, in the aesthetic context, the poem is reacted to as a unity. The components are not reacted to individually and the total meaning obtained by an additive or logical process. Croce also stresses intuition as the perception of particularity or unity. He feels that sole reliance on associationism involves the sacrifice of the perception of unity³⁰. Bergson³¹ claims that the operation of the intellect is indirect, being composed of a number of fixed states, which, when combined, give rise to inferential knowledge, while intuitive understanding is immediate. According to Bergson, art and artists are enough proof that intuition exists.

This claim is not mere rhetoric, for it has been subjected to experimental verification. The experiment is that of S. G. Estes³². The investigator made two-minute motion picture records of the behaviour of eight subjects, whose personalities had been intensively studied by a group of twenty psychologists over a period of one year. In these films the subjects performed briefly certain "expressive" tasks (such as divesting themselves of coat, tie and shirt, playing slap-jack and wrestling with an opponent, etc.). These films were seen by a group of judges who made ratings with the same schedule of variables that had been employed in the intensive one year investigation, so that direct comparisons could be made between the judgments based on the film records and upon the prolonged experimental and clinical study. This experiment showed that

judgments of psychiatric social workers having at least two years' practical experience in addition to their formal training were much less valid than those of artists.

In the battle with the grammarians and the epistemologists on several fronts, what the *Dhvani* theorists were trying to win for poetic experience was the validity of intuition. If they did not altogether deny a process in the realisation of the suggested meaning, it was because between the cognition of the expressed meaning and the birth of wonder (*Vismaya*) and sudden expansion of the heart (*Chitta Vistara*) when the suggested meaning was realised, intuition itself could be said to mediate. But this process was imperceptible (*Asamlakshya*), a quantal transition, unlike the phased progression of inferential and analogous processes. Govinda Thakkur,³³ the fifteenth century commentator on Mammata, affirms "It is direct apprehension that yields the experience of beauty (*Chamatkara*) and not mere inference." Again, it was because Bharata had insisted that the poetic context was the representation of a living context and because poetics had evolved from dramaturgy, that linguistic expression was seen, not as the sole or total reality, but as an element of the living context, which moulded the meaning of language over a wider range than the limits fixed by a literal analysis that took into account only the functions of denotation, indication, purport, inference, etc. Logan Pearsall Smith³⁴ has emphasised the new powers of signification, the inwardness, which language develops in the living context. "If I were advising any youth of high aims, who might entertain the ambition of reviving the dead art of the English drama, or the dying art of the English novel, I should suggest to him that he should study above all the speech-rhythms, the syntax, the hesitations, the tricks of phrase and verbal sing-song of the people with whom he talks, for this shimmering texture of speech, significant as it is both with the states of the soul and with the meanings and tensions and clashes of human beings in their relation with each other, is, for the writers of drama or fiction, the very stuff of life . . ."

The human context determines mood and tension and these in turn determine, in linguistic expression, the drift of suggested meaning, which may deviate widely from the literal purport. Theorists of *Dhvani* have listed seven main differences between expression and suggestion³⁵. There is the difference in the mode of apprehension: the expressed meaning, the only one the grammarians admit, results from the rules of grammar, the suggested meaning can originate from the context or from extra-linguistic cues like glances and gestures³⁶. There is the difference of linguistic means: the expressed meaning emanates from the words; the suggested meaning may reside in a part of the word, in a phoneme, in the arrangement of letters, in the style itself. Suggestion takes colour from the speaker and the person addressed. The same utterance of a woman may have an expressed meaning for her husband and a suggestive meaning

for her lover. There is difference of time in the apprehension of the two meanings: the suggested meaning is grasped only after the expressed meaning, in other words, it is at the moment when the direct denotation has exhausted itself or is perceived as inadequate that the new value springs forth in the mind. The transition here may be relatively smooth or abrupt, as Jagannatha³⁷ points out. The expressed meaning may pass over into another sense (*arthantara-samkramita-vachya*) or the expressed sense may be made to disappear entirely (*atyanta-tiashrita-vachya*). There is the difference of number: the expressed meaning is one for example: the sun has set. The suggested meaning is multiple. According to the circumstances, the reference to sunset may suggest that it is now the time to attack the enemy, or to start for an assignation, or to take rest or to begin the evening worship. The expressed meaning may ordain where the suggested prohibits, assert where the latter denies. Thus suggestion can completely contradict the literal sense sanctioned by denotation, grammar and syntax. As Wagenknecht³⁸ says, "even when we use words, their meaning may be profoundly modified, or even completely transformed, by their inflections and by the gestures, or even the cast of countenance, that accompany them. 'You rascal, you!' is often spoken with real affection while words of endearment may be uttered in so sinister a manner that they seem more malevolent than a curse." A sensitive instance of the poetic use of contradiction between expressed and suggested sense, often cited, is this verse: "Depart, my dear! May your paths be safe! Let me be also born again in that place where you go." It is addressed by a girl to her lover just when he is about to leave on a long journey. The expressed meaning permits the lover to leave. But the suggestion is that separation will surely mean death for her and therefore a prohibition is implicit.³⁹ Finally, there is the difference of effect between expressed and suggested meaning which has the greatest significance for poetry. The expressed meaning brings a cognitive perception (*Pratiti*) pure and simple, while the suggested meaning creates a joyful feeling of surprise due to the sudden perception of beauty (*Chamatkṛiti*).⁴⁰

By steadily resisting the claim that denotational meaning is the physical cause (*Karaka-hetu*) or logical cause (*Jnapaka-hetu*) of poetic reaction, the *Dhvani* theory emphasises that, in poetic communion, sensibility is the indispensable basic requirement. But, as sensibility is sparked by the word, the poetic tissue, resonance has to be regarded as an objective power which language comes to possess in poetry, just as sensibility has to be an objective feature of the spirit in poetic experience. Valéry holds the same views. "The essence of prose is to perish—that is, to be 'understood', to be dissolved, destroyed once and for all, wholly replaced by the image or impulse that it signifies, according to the conventions of language. For prose always assumes the universe of experience and acts the universe in which—or thanks to which—our perceptions, actions and feelings must tally with one another or respond to one another in a single

way · *uniformly* The practical universe is reduced to a totality of *ends*. When a given end is attained, the word dies. This universe excludes ambiguity, eliminates it, it demands procedure by the shortest routes, and it stifles at once the harmonic relationships of each event generated in the spirit. But poetry demands or suggests a 'universe' that is quite different : a universe of reciprocal relations, analogous to the universe of sounds, in which musical thought arises and moves. In this poetic universe, resonance triumphs over causality, and the 'form', far from dissolving into its effect, is as it were *reinvoked* by it"⁴¹ If resonance triumphs over causality, it is because the sensibility is there, with the power to resonate. But with what does it vibrate harmonically? With the suggestive power of the poetic word or form. Elsewhere also Valéry emphasises that the form survives in poetry whereas it perishes in prose. "The power of poetry lies in the return to form, its conservation"⁴² The resonance of poetry is as objective a reality as the power to resonate of the sensibility that receives its intimation in relish, for the poetic word acquired this power in the first place from the creative act of a poetic sensibility.

II MUSICAL POWER AND LIMITS OF POETRY

In the very opening section of his classic, Ananda Vardhana summarises the various views about suggestion. There were thinkers who denied its reality altogether, others sought to resolve it into the familiar functions of language like denotation, indication, purport, etc. But there was a third school, which preferred a cautious agnosticism. These critics recognised its reality and also felt that the attempt to derive it from denotation, etc. was not convincing. Therefore they took the line that suggestion lay beyond the province of words, though a great testimony of its reality was available in the fact that it was perceived by men of refined sensibility (*Sahrdaya-hiḍaya-samvedyam*)⁴³ To the extent that this school recognised the reality of suggestion, it supported Ananda Vardhana. But the poem, as distinguished from the drama, worked solely with words, *Anubhavas* like glance and gesture not being actual presentations. Therefore, to agree that suggestion lay beyond the province of words would be to deny the reality and efficacy of poetic action (*Kavi Vyapara*) through the poetic transmutation of the word. Here Ananda Vardhana points out that even if the concrete ancillary stimuli of the dramatic presentation are absent in a poem, language need not be judged as inadequate for the function of suggestion. That blind alley is reached only when the reality of suggestion is sought to be resolved into functions like denotation that clip the wings of words and make them hug the earth. But words are not only signs, they are objects too in their own right. They have shape and texture and these have resonance which can be mobilised to be in harmony with, and to reinforce, the suggestion of the episodic context or of the poem as a whole.

Here, the tempered classicism of Sanskrit poetry and poetics should be noted. Ananda Vardhana did not swing to the other extreme and rely solely on the word as pure phonetic entity, abstract musical sound, for suggestive evocation. He did not want to deny the normal powers of language their utility to poetry. That would have totally destroyed the communicability of poetic experience. Denotation, indication and purport were all assimilated into poetry. But in crucial contexts these powers were transcended and the suggestive values of words as phonetic entities were also utilised. The temptation to discard the normal use of language is strong and certain European movements have wholly succumbed to it. Valéry, in a very interesting passage, indicates the increasingly specialised demands made by the poet on language which ultimately make him impatiently want to recast it. "In all language sooner or later a *mandarin's language* appears, sometimes far removed from the customary language, but generally this literary language is derived from the other, from which it draws words, figures of speech, and phrases, best fitted to express the effect which the literary artist aims at." But the poet gets increasingly impatient with the intractability of the medium. Valéry instanced Mallarmé who made up "a language entirely his own by a refined choice of words and by using exceptional turns of speech he invented or adapted always, refusing the immediate solution suggested to him on every side." Mallarmé's aim was to defend himself, "in the details and elementary functioning of mental life, against automatism." He was maintaining the integrity of his art by keeping faith with his intuitions. "In order to remain faithful to the inner language of form, the poet must invent words and create images, he must mishandle and stretch the meaning of words." Further, it is a mistake to demand an explanation of this honest subjectivity. "The poem must be received directly, without questioning, and loved or hated, until the strange words are accepted without questioning, but always with fresh recognition."⁴⁴

The danger here is that the words may be so strange that recognition of the poet's intention becomes well-nigh impossible. This may not have happened in Mallarmé whose cryptic utterance can always be decoded by sensibility and patient effort. But it has happened with many others. We may be genuinely amused by the nonsense of Edward Lear who, mercifully, does not pretend to have scaled the heights of poetic intensity. We may not even object to T. S. Eliot's reading that Lear's nonsense is not "vacuity of sense", but rather "a parody of sense." According to Eliot,¹⁷ the *Jumbles* is an expression of "nostalgia for the romance of foreign voyage and exploration", *Yongy-Bongy Bo* and *Dong with the Luminous Nose* are poems of unrequited passion, "blues" in fact. But serious difficulties arise when the poet claims oracular seriousness. Alexander Kruchenykh wrote "The lily is beautiful, but the word 'lily' ('lilya' in Russian) is atrocious, it has been handled a great deal and raped. Therefore I name the lily 'yeouyi' and the old beauty is restored." Restored for

whom, we may ask Unless the poet is going to give a glossary of all his new words, his neologisms will leave the reader cold. He is more likely to think of murder than lily Aldo Palazzeschi wrote a poem about enjoyment :

Ti ti ti
Fiu fiu fiu
Ihu ihu ihu
Uhi uhi uhi

One hopes that the poet at least, unlike the reader, was happy with his effort Marinetti wished to destroy syntax, to get rid of adjectives "because the naked substantive keeps its essential colour", and to replace existing systems of punctuation by mathematical and musical signs The Manifesto, aggressively entitled *A Slap in the Face of Public Taste*, issued by Mayakovsky and his group in December 1912 demanded respect for the poet's right "to enlarge the vocabulary with arbitrary and derivative words—neologisms, to uncompromising hatred for the language used hitherto . . . And if our lines show the dirty traces of your 'common sense', yet the first lightnings of a New Dawn of Beauty are already trembling upon them"⁴⁶ But the upshot of all the heroics was that the attempt to liberate language finally enclosed it within the prison of hermeticism, of purely private significance which the reader could not share Wilson⁴⁷ gave this verdict on Gertrude Stein "She has outdistanced the symbolists in using words for purposes of pure suggestion, she has gone so far that she no longer even suggests We are the ripples expanding in her consciousness, but we are no longer supplied with any clue as to what object has sunk there" We might also recall here the opinion expressed by a psychologist like Adler⁴⁸ that undue obsession with "a private language is a symptom of insanity"

Ananda Vardhana⁴⁹ has analysed the danger of the private language briefly but with brilliant clarity He says that words have two different aspects, the one inferable (*Anumeya*) and the other communicable (*Pratipadya*) When the intention (*Vivaksha*) of the speaker takes the form of an idea communicated through a word, through speech, the meaning is both inferable and communicable, for human evolution has made speech an instrument of communication But the intention may be unconscious, purely expressive; it may take the form of an ejaculation The excitement of the speaker can be inferred from it by analysing it as an expressive act But, Ananda Vardhana points out, such expression is a common characteristic of all animals, including man, it does not come within the sphere of speech which is a specifically human means of communication⁵⁰

Support for this analysis can be mobilised from the thought of our own times Allen Tate⁵¹ felt that the attempt to use language directly and

solely as expressive sound instead of as a vehicle of meaning was a superstition. He refers to "that idolatrous dissolution of language from the grammar of a possible world, which results from the belief that language itself can be reality, or by incantation can create a reality". Jacques Rivière⁵² has, similarly, pointed out. "It is only with Romanticism that the literary art began to be conceived as a kind of assault on the absolute and its result as a revelation—not the genuine revelation involved in poetic knowledge, but rather a pseudo-prophetic revelation, bound up with magic and the search for transmuting reality through the power of words, which was to be made in the surrealist theory of the magical revelation of absolute knowledge" Maritain⁵³ brings out the complete abdication of poetic control (the *Kavi Vyapara* of Sanskrit poetics) implied in the automatism of surrealism which was the inevitable result of the dogma that words must be used as unconscious, symptomatic expressionism rather than as controlled expression operating with meanings of many levels. "The genuine revelation aimed at by poetry—that revelation, in a work of art, of the spiritual depths of the human subjectivity awakened to the world by intuitive emotion—becomes the message of the *hasard objectif*, of the mysterious intentions ascribed to chance, and the torrent of dark forces in which man and the world communicate, transmitted by automatic writing"

If the theorists of *Dhvani* fought for establishing the incantational power of poetry, it must be very clearly understood that they resisted a regression to magical concepts. What was suggested was not a closed world of private meaning. It was *Rasa*, as we shall see in the discussion of the later phase of the evolution of the theory. They did not surrender the poet's control over what was definitely his creation or regress to an automatism where nothing was creatively shaped, but where unselected fantasies and impulses and images burst forth in a stream which was too turbid to reflect the distant star. De⁵⁴ has very rightly said "Sanskrit poetry does not aim at leaving the unexpressed to be darkly gathered, nor does the theory of Poetics regard it as indeterminate. The unexpressed is bound up by means of definite links with the expressed, without which it cannot exist, but it is wrapped up in such a manner as to make it possible only for the initiated in the poetic hieroglyphics to comprehend it in its subtlety. The unexpressed is not understood by those who know grammar and lexicon, but only by men of taste and literary instinct who know the essence of poetry. It is the province of the *Sahidaya*, the connoisseur, who is expert in discerning through the intricate meshes of veiled words and sense into the aesthetic relish of deeper significance"

Mahima Bhatta⁵⁵ who wanted to reduce suggestion to inference claimed, as part of the strategy of his attack, that only the meaning of the word was relevant in this process, not the word itself as a phonetic entity. This was a consistent position for him to take up, for if the word as a phonetic entity was conceded a direct power, the case for inference would be

weakened, for inference is the logical processing of meaning and it cannot handle elusive values like the sensuous qualities of words. But Ananda Vardhana claimed that while the expressed sense resided in the denotation, indication and purport of words, the suggested sense could inhere in the arrangement of letters or of sounds, in words as phonetic entities, in their position. Here the *Dhvani* theory insists on the sensuous power of language, though it is accommodated within a classical system which accepts the normal functions of language as the vehicle of meaning, and discourages erratically private handling of language, believing as it does that the poet should transcend semantic meaning, not destroy it, in the leap towards poetic meaning.

Whitehead⁵⁶ has said that the whole basis of the art of literature is "that the emotions and feelings directly excited by the words should fitly intensify our emotions and feelings arising from contemplation of the meaning". Sanskrit poetics, we have seen, has always affirmed that feeling is the soul of poetry, while sound and meaning together form its body (*Kavya Sana*). The concept of the parity of the two implies that sound as such also arouses nuances of feeling. Likewise, since Sanskrit poetics insists that all literary ornaments should serve feeling and as, in the verbal figure, replacement by synonyms is ruled out, it is clear that word as phonetic entity is functioning directly as a poetic cue. Analytical findings that soft vocables and vowel music suit the erotic sentiment while explosive consonantal combinations are ideal for the sentiments of anger or heroism also confirm that Sanskrit poetics realised that feeling tones could be directly excited by words. Montague⁵⁷ has a fine analysis of the sensuous qualities of words. "The writer's mind will finger single words and caress them, adoring the mellow fullness or granular hardness of their several sounds, the balance, undulation or trailing fall of their syllables, or the core of sun-like splendour in the broad, warm, central vowel of such a word as 'auroral'. Each word's evocative value or virtue, its individual power of touching springs in the mind and of initiating visions, becomes a treasure to revel in". Description (*Varnana*) enshrines the Vision (*Darsana*), to recall Bhatta Tauta, through a perfect sensuous concretisation where this direct power of words, in addition to their meanings, is also used. It is this power which Lowes⁵⁸ refers to as connotation. "Poetry, though it speaks to the intellect, is directed equally to the emotions. And that which scientific prose is bent on ruthlessly excising—namely the suggestions, the connotation of words—that constitutes in large degree the very stuff with which the poet works. For words stir our feelings, not through a precise delimitation of their sense, but through their enveloping atmosphere of associations. 'Not poppy, nor mandragora, nor all the drowsy syrups of the world'—read that and the hovering associations merge and blend, and not one word produces its effect through what a dictionary can afford. . . For over that which we call the meaning of the words a poet uses, there goes on an incessant play

of suggestion, caught from each user's own adventures among words—flashes that come and vanish, stirrings of memories, unfoldings of vistas—and the poet builds up his fabric out of both the basic meaning and the overtones” Wyndham Lewis⁵⁹ said of Villon that he possessed the word and the magic formula “by which words are changed into something beyond themselves and their arrangement transmuted into the language of another world, a language in which the very shape and size and texture of words, their resonance, their position and significance, become, as it were, faery, charged with tremendous or mysterious, or ravishing music” The affinity between Sanskrit poetics and these views is so astonishing that they read almost like footnotes to the *Dhvanyaloka* Especially significant is the fact that verbal resonance is not allowed to become a fetish but is steadily regarded as operating in conjunction with the sense The poetic tissue is woven out of both the basic meanings and the overtones When Abercrombie⁶⁰ refers to poetry as incantation, he is referring to the power which poetry develops when meaning is reinforced by the direct suggestion of words and rhythms, not the incantation of surrealism which destroys semantic meaning

Aananda Vardhana referred not only to the intrinsic suggestive qualities of words but also to their modification due to their position Walter de la Mare⁶¹ clarifies this There is an inexhaustible variety of verbal sounds, “since each such sound either in prose or verse has not only its relative accent, stress or emphasis, or lack of them, but also its quality, volume and pitch—its intonation—and is affected by those of its more or less immediate neighbours” Since Sanskrit poetics started with a fundamental equation of art and life and accepted as its basic psychological postulate that the sensuously palpable is the stimulus for the emotive reaction, it did not make a special investigation as to why the sounds of words should have this power of suggestion Dandin⁶² notes that some sounds—quite apart from their meanings—can have vulgar resonances due to quite accidental sexual puns It is a pity, however, that a more thorough analysis was not attempted But we can gather helpful cues from our own times Walter de la Mare says that good writing is the result of a natural taste and impulse, “bringing into play two sensuous activities, speech and hearing” According to Raleigh,⁶³ if poetry has favoured the way of the ear and has given itself zealously to the tuneful ordering of sounds, it is because sense was conveyed by sound before words were invented and this primitive power still survives in life as well as in letters Ananda Vardhana also recalls this phase in his reference to non-verbalised utterance as expressive reaction, which man shares with the species below him in evolution Valéry⁶⁴ wrote “What is sung or articulated in the most solemn or the most critical moments of life, what we hear in a liturgy, what is murmured or groaned in the extremity of passion, what calms the child or the afflicted, what attests the truth of an oath—these are words of a particular tone and expression which cannot be resolved into clear

ideas . Such words incite us to become, rather than excite us to understand." Inducing states of being, of becoming, is the highest function of poetry. The creative poet makes use of these deeper intimations of words also "For a sensitive reader," says Duhamel,⁶⁵ "each word changes its quality and its resonance and perhaps its meaning according to whether it is used by a poet or a prose-writer, a master or an apprentice. . . "

The expressive functioning of poetry, said Prall,⁶⁶ "does not take place through linguistic symbolism alone, which is common to verse and the least artistic prose discourse, but also through its whole artistic character, including its strictly aesthetic surface, which by means of sounds and rhythms is a verbal and auditory specification of the exact emotional effect that it embodies and thus expresses And the vitality and life of art and of its aesthetic surface depend almost wholly on this expressiveness If the 'significant form' of modern critics has any meaning, this is it " The auditory pattern in poetry is no casual accident but a created reality with a functional significance Margaret Boulton⁶⁷ called it the "phonetic form". But one has to be careful in the exploitation of the sensuous qualities of sound in literature Prall claims that of all the arts music is, in the matter of emotional expressiveness, "the deepest and richest, of the widest range and the greatest power, as well as the most flexible and most delicately precise". T S Eliot⁶⁸ gave this advice . "Let the neophyte know assonance and alliteration, rhyme immediate and delayed, simple and polyphonic, as a musician would expect to know harmony and counterpoint . . . " He also advocated the purely musical exploration of language "Let the candidate fill his mind with the finest cadences he can discover, preferably in a foreign language so that the meaning of the words may be less likely to divert his attention from the movement, for example, Saxon charms, Hebridean folk songs, the verse of Dante, and the lyrics of Shakespeare—if he can dissociate the vocabulary from the cadence" The danger here is that poetry may become pure musical incantation and rupture those links with meaning and therefore with life that are intrinsic to literary expression which utilises both the sound and sense of words, not the former alone It is clear, of course, that Eliot advocates this specialised exploration only as practice For he concludes with the caution given by Duhamel and Vildrac in their treatise on versification "But you must be a poet to begin with" . poet, not musician, the poet cannot ignore the denotational meaning of words and work solely with their sensuous qualities as sound The suggested meaning (*Vyangya*) is the overtone (*Dhvani*) of the expressed (*Vachya*), not a total cancellation of it

So strong has been the fascination of music for poetry and so clear is the strength of this fascination in the theories of French Symbolism and Indian *Dhvani* that the issue needs a clarification which will remove all ambiguity If Walter Pater claimed that all art aspires to the condition of music, it would be dangerous to accept that claim without keeping in

mind the very important qualification made by Bremond that, in aspiring thus, each medium—words, notes, colours, lines—has to work within the range of evocative power proper to it⁶⁹ An elementary fact which is too often ignored is that the medium of poetry is not pure sound, but significant sounds with predetermined meanings, which the poet may alter but never violate⁷⁰ This is why Eliot could not accept Mallarmé's claim of the identity of poetry and music He realised that sense could not be sacrificed to sound, nor—which complicates the problem—sound to sense "Words are perhaps the hardest of all material of art for they must be used to express both visual beauty and beauty of sound, as well as communicating a grammatical statement"⁷¹ He did not underrate the importance of suggestion but he came to the conclusion "that the suggestiveness of poetry . . . is the aura around a bright clear centre, that you cannot have the aura alone"

Words are the hardest material of art because they are at the same time linguistic symbols as well as art symbols This can be clarified with the help of an early analysis like that of Eugène Veron,⁷² one of the writers who influenced Tostoy's aesthetic views Art, said Veron, is essentially a language. The ordinary language of the spoken word originated from the expression of emotions by instinctive, natural reactions mentioned by Ananda Vardhana also—cries of pleasure and pain, anger or desire, vocalisations of mood and mental disturbance But as men matured in the capacity for abstract thought, they began to develop a language of purely conventional signs which served for the communication of facts and ideas This became the language of prose, informative and scientific speech, Bhamaha's *Loka Varta* and *Sastra Varta* From a form of natural expression no different in essence from other bodily gestures language became an artificial means of communication But at the same time the language of mimetic signs for the expression of concrete feelings and emotions was also developed and elaborated, becoming the language of art Prose or scientific language is communication of thought, art language is expression of mood⁷³ The word as linguistic symbol operates by denotation The word as art symbol is a direct expression of feeling and may arouse that feeling in another by sympathetic induction

Music seems the ideal art symbol because musical sound, unlike the sound of a word, has completely shed all denotation and functions as pure expression As Combarieu said, music "translates the dynamism of the psychic life" Deryck Cooke⁷⁴ clarifies this A musical tissue is built up of purely musical "tonal tensions" and the vitalising, characterising agents of rhythm, tempo, dynamics, texture and tone-colour Music "conveys the naked feeling direct", it is "emotion-converted-into-form" Cooke analyses the Gloria theme in Beethoven's *Missa Solennis* It expresses his joy in the thought of God's glory "Beethoven might have jumped for joy or shouted for joy . . . and thus communicated his sense of joy to a few people living in Vienna at that time Being a composer,

he was not merely content to transform his powerful emotional energy into such ephemeral forms of physical energy, but felt the need to convert it into a permanent, stored-up, transportable and reproducible form of energy—a musical shout for joy, as it were, that all the world might hear ”

A subtle new aspect is now revealed in the situation. The art symbol is not mere unconscious expression. It may be direct expression of feeling but it is moulded in such a way as to be able to communicate that feeling to others. Susanne Langer,⁷⁵ who has ably elaborated Veron's distinction between linguistic and aesthetic symbolism, points out that if the composer forgets the need to communicate he is merely “emoting”, merely letting off steam, and hence failing to make the vital distinction between the symptom, the manifestation of a mere affect, and the articulate symbol which “lets us conceive its object, imparts insight and the emotion which insight brings”. Cooke also emphasises this. He affirms that when Beethoven composed the Gloria theme his “joy in the thought of God's glory” was “converted by the act of the creative imagination, just as, without the intervention of this faculty, it might be converted into a vocal utterance or a physical movement”. His superb analysis of the Gloria theme (“that swift breathless rush in fast triple time, driving through the five notes of the basic term from a barely established foothold on the tonic straight up to the dominant . . .”) brings out how the affect, even while it is being directly expressed, uses what Langer calls “factors of possible expressive virtue” in musical sound considered as a medium for moulding an articulate symbol.

Thus we return to the nature of the medium, “the factors of possible expressive virtue” which are intrinsic to it and which therefore are also the determinants of the limits to which it will allow itself to be plastically moulded as an aesthetic symbol. Now the difficulties one confronts when using language as an instrument of evocation emerge from the fact that though it functions generally as a denotational symbol, it has not wholly lost its inheritance from the days of racial infancy when it commenced its evolution first as a vocal gesticulation. Carnap, following the analysis of linguistic symbolism by Wittgenstein,⁷⁶ wrote: “Many linguistic utterances are analogous to laughing in that they have only an expressive function, no representative function. Examples of this are cries like ‘Oh, oh’, or, on a higher level, lyrical verses. The aim of a lyrical poem in which occur the words ‘sunshine’ and ‘clouds’ is not to inform us of certain meteorological facts, but to express certain feelings of the poet and to excite similar feelings in us.”⁷⁷ Carnap, I am afraid, does not distinguish clearly between lingual gesticulation which is symptomatic of feeling and lingual communication of feeling. The poet feels the benediction of sunshine, is thrilled by the vision of huge clouds sailing by. In a very broad sense, the poem he writes is an ejaculation. But if he uses symptomatic expressions like “Oh, Oh”, he cannot build up his whole

poem on such expressions. If he attempts to do it he is not handling language for poetic communication but regressing to the non-verbalised ejaculation which, as Ananda Vardhana pointed out, belongs to the level of animal behaviour. Poets who think that this is what poetry should really try to do are satirised thus by Wyndham Lewis

*I sabotage the sentence ! With me is the naked word
Return with me where I am cying with the gorilla and the bud*

The poet, in Carnap's example, uses words like "sunshine" and "clouds". While Carnap can justly claim that these words are used as poetic cues and not as facts about the weather, he is wrong in denying them representative function and equating them with ejaculatory cries. The words have clear denotational reference, although, if the poet rested at that level of power, he would not be writing poetry, but only reportage, Bhamaha's *Varta*. The poet has to use the denotation but also achieve a quantal leap towards poetic resonance and suggestion. Here, if he exploits the music of the sound of words, he cannot rely solely on that alone, nor can he ignore the meaning of the words. Julien Benda⁷⁸ analyses the whole issue with greater clarity: if we ignore the meaning of words, the musical quality of the word—which is profoundly different from that of the note of music—is too feeble to evoke, by itself, the feeling in us, if we understand the meanings of words, they impose their significations on us which cannot be ignored. "Words," as Bowra⁷⁹ has said, "are limited by their meanings. The most melodious and associative poetry cannot hope to snatch his honours from the musician. Attempts have been made to justify Mallarmé's belief, but the facts are against him. His own confession '*Mon art est une impasse*', his failure to write his great poem, the failure of his apologists to show that poetry can achieve effects comparable to that of music, the unalterable truth that words cannot be divorced from their meanings, all show that his doctrine was faulty." Mallarmé⁸⁰ himself admitted at last that "syntax is essential as the guarantee, the pivot, of intelligibility" in the musical use of language.

Thus we come back to Eliot's caution that the aura of words cannot be used in isolation from their core of meaning. Lamartine⁸¹ said that the word would merit the name of Logos only when it synthesises all its qualities, which he enumerates. The musical and aesthetic qualities are sound, colour, rhythm, harmony, the referential qualities are idea and image, the emotive qualities are feeling, enthusiasm. Poetry should unify all these powers of the word. Valéry⁸² wrote "Poetry is not music, it is still less discourse. It is this ambiguity that is the basis of its delicacy. One should say, not that poetry sings, but that it is always about to sing." Valéry wants the poet to be always fashioning a purer language out of ordinary language, by revealing and activating the affective, emotive resources of language which are mixed up in ordinary discourse.

with its functions of ordinary and superficial communication in practical, day-to-day living⁸³ He defines absolute poetry as "a search for the effects resulting from the relationships of words, or rather of the interrelations of their resonances, which suggests, in sum, an exploration of the whole domain of the sensibility that is governed by language"⁸⁴ The sensibility that is governed by language is not exactly the sensibility that is governed by music, for the word, unlike the musical sound, is not only emotive but both emotive and referential Poetic handling of language ever seeks to accent its emotive capacity This can be done, as both Valéry and the *Dhvani* theory claim, by sensitive handling of the resonances of words. But their referential aspect cannot be ignored, for poetry is not pure music, the word is not just sound.

Ames⁸⁵ gives a balanced view about the whole issue which perfectly expresses the outlook of Sanskrit poetics as well "Language has texture to be respected like the grain of wood or the flow of oil, while what can be signified (he means suggested, not denoted) is like light and shadow playing over surface and drawn into design As chiaroscuro comes into the composition of painting, as highlights become accents in sculpture, as sunlight strikes openings in architecture, so the flash and nuance of meaning brighten and shadow a structure of words Yet meaning is not merely added to a neutral stuff and framework, because what is there for sense (he means what is sensuous) is not more structural than what is there for a self The trick is to internalise designation within a rhythm of thought and feeling, so that the furthest sweep of discourse does not go out of bounds of art This is possible so far as the life-reference of language is amenable to arrangement . . . What is said coalesces with a complex effect caught in a pattern transcended by its reference (he means . the suggestive reach of poetic reference or meaning) There is no contradiction, since language requires words to be patterned, and so much of man's life is lingual that to talk or to write is not to press existence into alien terms but to let it speak with its own tongue." The physical behaviour of characters in a drama is, according to Sanskrit poetics, *Anubhava*, expressive cue revelatory of the inner emotion Language is lingual behaviour and Bhoja classed poetic diction and style as an *Anubhava* The life-reference of linguistic behaviour, thus, is never allowed to be forgotten. The *Dhvani* theory related suggestion basically to the living context of the utterance and used the perception of that context to decode the exact suggestion from the expression What is there for the senses, the sensuous resonance of words, cannot cancel the expressed meaning, but it can help in the transcendence of the expressed sense and it should do so in delicately orchestrated poetry But the transcendence is also willed, the poetic power operating at its farthest reach, beyond the intimations of the pure sound and the direct meaning, though utilising both What Myers⁸⁶ has written on this issue can be a fine summing up "In poetry of the first order almost every word . . . continues to be an

articulate sound and a logical step in the argument, but it becomes also musical sound and a centre of emotional force . What is meant by the vague praise bestowed on Virgil's unequalled style is practically this, that he has been, perhaps, more successful than any other poet in fusing together the expressed and suggested emotion, . his thoughts come to us on wings of melodies prepared for them from the foundation of the world "

III. SYNTHESIS AND RESTATEMENT

So far we have covered only the initial stabilisation of the concept of *Dhvani*, its establishment as a reality of poetic experience, against various lines of critical attack which sought to reduce it to the logical and familiar functions of language . We have now to follow the further elaboration of the theory . Briefly, this is what happens . The heady delight in having discovered this subtle power of poetry leads initially to a cult, a dogma, that very nearly commits poetry to preciosity . Then the great old insights return to forge again strong links with life . This arrests the preciosity, but the reshaped theory, even with its new accents, is valid only for a special type of poetry, though it is a type with a genuine and subtle power . The final statement, however, has elements which can be used to make the special theory accommodate, though by implications and not explicitly, all types of poetic endeavour .

The *Dhvani* school had established suggestion (*Vyanjana Vritti*) as a distinct power acquired by language, when handled by the creative poetic intuition, a power which was not a derivative of the functions of denotation, indication, purport and inference established by the grammarians . The unexpressed or the suggested sense (*Vyangya artha*) to which the name *Dhvani* is applied when it is predominant, is now definitely posed as the soul (*Atman*) of poetry . But there are ambiguities here . The Dhvanikara's verse,⁸⁷ in which this view is set forth, appears, when literally taken, to state that "the sense (*Artha*) which is practised by men of taste and which has been established as the soul of poetry, has two subdivisions, the expressed (*Vachya*) and the suggested (*Pratyamana*)" . The implication here seems to be that the whole complex poetic sense is the essence of poetry, that it does not consist of the suggested meaning alone but also includes the expressed sense . But in the very first line of his work, the Dhavanikara, as Visvanatha pointed out later, had claimed that the suggested sense alone was the essence of poetry . The opposition between the special theory and the general theory, thus, is inherent in the first formulation itself . It is the special theory that gained precedence in the first triumphant flush of the analytical progress . Thus, Abhinava tries to reconcile the contradiction in the Dhvanikara's very first statements by claiming that his real object in the verse quoted is to distinguish between the expressed and suggested sense, and not to establish both as the soul of

poetry. And thus the theoretical exposition unfolds, steadily shifting the centre of gravity in poetry from the expressed to the suggested. The *Agni Purāṇa* would claim "Words attain preeminence in science (*Saṣṭra*), meaning in epic history (*Itihasa*) and suggestion in poetry."

Types of poetic endeavour are now categorised in the light of the principle of the supremacy of suggestion. The best poetry is that in which the suggested sense predominates and supersedes the expressed. This is called *Dhvanī-Kavya*, poetry of resonance, because the suggested sense (*Vyangyārtha*) is "echoed" perfectly in this class of poetry. Visvanatha⁸⁸ confirms this as the etymology of the term: here beauty resides in the suggested sense, not the expressed. The commitment of theory, here, should be noted. The *Dhvanīkara*⁸⁹ had said. "The learned call that particular kind of poetry *Dhvanī* (*Dhvanī Kavya*) in which the (expressed) word and sense, subordinating themselves, manifest that (other suggested) sense." But now it is not just a particular kind of poetry, it alone is the highest poetry. for *Dhvanī* is the soul of poetry. A poet may use suggestion, but the suggested sense may not predominate over the expressed. This type of poetry cannot be the highest but can be given only the second rank. This second class in which the suggested sense is not the predominant is called the Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion (*Gumbhuta Vyangya Kavya*)⁹⁰. Lastly, there is the poetry without any suggested element. This is reckoned as the third and the lowest kind, being merely "pictorial" in word or sense. Therefore it is called Pictorial Poetry (*Chitra Kavya*).⁹¹ There is even some reluctance to recognise this class as poetry at all. In deference to Ananda Vardhana, Mammata admits it as poetry, though of the lowest kind. But Visvanatha altogether rejects its claim as poetry.

After categorising poetry in terms of the role of suggestion, accorded the status of the supreme poetic value, the *Dhvanī* theory concentrates attention on the nature of what is suggested and this yields another system of categories. The suggested sense has three different aspects. It may be a matter or an idea (*Vastu Dhvanī*). This is the case when a distinct subject or thought (a matter of fact) is suggested. Or it may be a poetic figure (*Alaṅkāra Dhvanī*). Here the suggested sense constitutes something imaginative (not matter of fact) which, if expressed in so many words, would assume the form of a poetic figure. Or what is suggested may be a mood or feeling (*Rasa Dhvanī*). Abhinava⁹² points out that this doctrine is not expressly taught in the core of gnomic formulae (*Karika*) of the *Dhvanyaloka*, but is sanctioned by Ananda Vardhana's treatment⁹³ in his exposition (*Vṛtti*).

The heady excitement of the discovery of the suggestive power of poetry had so filled the foreground of critical perspective that realities in the background had been temporarily forgotten. But when suggestion and feeling, *Dhvanī* and *Rasa*, were thus linked in the further analytical exploration, remembrance of the already established supremacy of feeling in poetry returned like a flood and compelled a subtle but radical reshaping of the

entire doctrine In the Indian tradition, feeling had supreme status in poetry, it was the soul of poetry, no other poetic value could dislodge it and capture that status Vamana, excited by the discovery of the profoundly integrative significance of diction (*Ritu*), called it the soul of poetry and was curtly dismissed by critics like Visvanatha, who pointed out that nothing other than *Rasa* could be the soul of poetry Suggestion, likewise, could not be claimed to be the soul of poetry, however great a poetic value it was It is to the great credit of Ananda Vardhana that, when remembrance returned, he accepted the supremacy of *Rasa* without the slightest reservation in spite of his commitments regarding suggestion Affirmations about the supremacy of *Rasa* are scattered generously throughout the *Dhvanyaloka* There is no glory in poetic endeavour which does not seek to realise *Rasa*⁹⁴ The genuine poet's primary intention should be the evocation of *Rasa*⁹⁵ Neither poetic figure nor ornament nor the mere narrative, but the suggestion of *Rasa* should be the guiding principle of the poet in his composition of word and sense⁹⁶ *Rasa* is in fact the essence of poetry, as it is of the drama⁹⁷

Thus begins the subtle reshaping of theory Ananda Vardhana distinctly says in one place⁹⁸ that his object is not merely to establish the doctrine of suggestion (*Dhvanī*) but also to harmonise it with the theory of the aesthetic emotion (*Rasa*) This synthesis, however, is completed only with Abhinava's contribution In Ananda Vardhana, the return of *Rasa* to supreme status, which *Dhvanī* had tried to usurp for a while, is reflected in the special stress given to the suggestion of feeling (*Rasa Dhvanī*) as against the other two categories of the suggestion of matter of fact or of poetic figure Abhinava starts by affirming the supremacy of *Rasa* This value is the essence of poetry⁹⁹ There can be no poetry without *Rasa*¹⁰⁰ The admission of the two categories of the suggestion of matter of fact and of poetic figure need not create any difficulties For Abhinava is certain that these two categories of suggestion (*Vastu Dhvanī* and *Alamkāra Dhvanī*) resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of *Rasa* which is in fact the essence of poetry¹⁰¹

Let us see how the suggestion of matter of fact resolves itself into suggestion of feeling Visvanatha, later, argues that the suggested matter (*Vyangya Vastu*) cannot by itself constitute the essence of poetry He analyses the example of material suggestion (*Vastu Dhvanī*) given in *Dhvanyaloka*¹⁰² and argues that it is admissible as poetry because the evocation has a touch of feeling (*Rasa Sparsa*), it is not a neutral evocation or reference But Jagannatha¹⁰³ objects to such interpretations He argues that nothing is gained by this clumsy subterfuge of an indirect reference to *Rasa*, because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like "the cow moves" or "the deer leaps" Jagannatha here ignores the most important factor whether the context is that of prose or poetry In the genuinely poetic context, the apparently matter of fact description plays a really functional role in the evocation of mood It is in the

desolate landscape, where "the sedge has wither'd from the lake and no birds sing", that the poet comes across the *Belle Dame Sans Merci*.

All that we noticed earlier, substantiating the evocative quality of poetic naturalism (*Svabhavokti*), can be recalled to support the view that material suggestion ultimately resolves itself into the suggestion of feeling. But it should be noted that the argument can be carried over only analogically. For the material image, relevant to the analysis of the *Dhvani* theorists, is not the direct image of poetic naturalism (*Svabhavokti*) but an indirect image, emerging not directly from the expression, but from what is suggested by the expression. Here, contemporary insight into the condensation of imagery, especially dream imagery, yielded by psychoanalysis, should be utilised for a fuller understanding. Prescott¹⁰⁴ develops the analogy between dreams and poetry and shows that the language of poetry also reveals condensation. "Of these various meanings one may be the primary denotation, the other secondary, suggested or connoted. But often the surface meaning will be of less importance than the latent ones, the idea having true poetic significance and bearing the emotional emphasis will not be said but suggested, and the real poetry will be between the lines, the secondary meaning may be the one of prime importance." The suggested image can be charged with feeling through the condensation that is the result of the projection of inner experience upon outward reality, a phenomenon which Abercrombie¹⁰⁵ regards as an important feature of romantic poetry. Fausset,¹⁰⁶ in his study of Coleridge, has pronounced *The Ancient Mariner* to be a projection into imagery of the poet's own inner tensions. Of the images of the stagnant calm and of the subsequent effortless movement of the ship, Fausset says they were "symbols of his own spiritual experience, of his sense of the lethargy that smothered his creative powers and his belief that only by some miracle of ecstasy which transcended all personal volition, he could elude a temperamental impotence". In fact this poem and its imagery are ideal instances of what Sanskrit poetics terms *Vastu Dhvani*. The becalmed ship is the expressed reality. It suggests a matter of fact or an idea, the poet's realisation of his inadequacy, of the ebbing away of his creative energies. This suggested reality is not a mere datum in a psychiatrist's report, it is saturated with feeling. We feel with the poet in his frustration as we rejoice with him in his recovery of ecstasy.

In the case of suggested poetic figures (*Alamkara Dhvani*) also, the ultimate reality is the feeling. Kathleen Raine¹⁰⁷ refers to the juxtaposition of images which is the basis of the poetic figure. "This elaboration refines the sensible image by association with other sharp and sensible images, to produce a highly sophisticated and delicate way of looking at the visible world." This of course refers to the normal association of images in poetic figures and not specially to the image that is suggested, which is the specific concern of the *Dhvani* theory and therefore our concern also in the present context. Nevertheless, what she says further is applicable to

suggested imagery also "Perceptual images, however intense or refined, lack a dimension without which we soon begin to feel an intolerable claustrophobia" She demands "a synthesis of the symbolic and the contemporary", that is, the image, expressed or suggested, should be an objective correlative of inward feeling This is what Baudelaire¹⁰⁸ also demanded "Do not ever confuse the phantoms of reason with the phantoms of imagination the former are equations, the latter are being and memories" Baudouin¹⁰⁹ notes that in the poems expressing the "tortured and tragic phase" of Verhaeren's life, the failure of the impetus towards the real world, debility, and withdrawal into the self are expressed by images of "broken" and "flaccid" things There is also an obsession with images of reflection in water, especially in foul and stagnant water—the water of mires and marshes Kuntaka emphasised that in poetry we deal, not with mere embellishment (*Alamkara*) but poetic embellishment (*Kavyalamkara*) Ruyyaka pointed out that if elements of doubt and inference are involved in figures like *Samdeha* and *Anumana*, these should be "poetic" doubts and inference, that is, they should incarnate poetic beauty which in Indian tradition is definitely related to feeling The demand holds good for imagery and poetic figures which are not directly expressed but suggested

With aesthetic feeling restored as the centre of gravity of poetry, the *Dhvani* theory escaped the serious danger of hermeticism and preciosity to which the doctrine would have drifted if the initial position which made suggestion as such the soul of poetry had not been modified But it should be noted that even the modified theory, though it claimed to be the basic principle of evaluation of all poetry, successfully defined only a special type of poetry For, in the poetry, which the theory preferred and regarded as the best, obliquity and indirect approach were cardinal requirements The suggested image was more important than the expressed image Even in the case of factual references and ideas, things should not be what they seemed to be or the things that mattered were other than the things denoted The exclusion by this theory of other forms of poetic expression will be critically evaluated later But we should note here that the special type of expression favoured by the theory was a valid poetic expression and was indeed an astonishing anticipation of the ideals and practice of French Symbolism The affinities here are so great that they deserve to be studied in some detail Such a study would further clarify the point of view of the *Dhvanī* theorists

Stéphane Mallarmé is the Ananda Vardhana of nineteenth century France Rémy de Gourmont¹¹⁰ said of him "Like Verlaine, he believed in the suggestive power of poetry, declaring that higher realities could be expressed only through the medium of musical verse For his vehicle he created a new kind of language, freed of many of the trammels of formal grammar, and a new vocabulary likewise, with these weapons he set out to translate his inner visions that have nothing to do with logic, but constitute a kind of superior reality based for most part on analogy His

intention was to create a poetry that could be understood only by another poet . . ." However, since we cannot attempt a study of his poetry here, Mallarmé the theorist is more important to us in the present context than Mallarmé the poet. He defines his own poetic ideals through an opposition to the practice of the Parnassians like Leconte de Lisle and Heredia who had reacted to Romantic effusion with a finely sculptured, marmorean verse. "As far as content is concerned," wrote Mallarmé,¹¹¹ "I feel that the younger poets are nearer than the Parnassians to the poetic ideal. The latter still treat their subjects as the old philosophers and orators did . . . that is, they present things directly, whereas I think that they should be presented allusively. Poetry lies in the contemplation of things, in the image emanating from the reveries which things arouse in us. The Parnassians take something in its entirety and simply exhibit it, in so doing they fall short of mystery, they fail to give our minds that exquisite joy which consists of believing that we are creating something. To name an object is largely to destroy poetic enjoyment, which comes from gradual divination. The ideal is to suggest the object. It is the perfect use of this mystery which constitutes symbol. An object must be gradually evoked in order to show a state of soul, or else, choose an object and from it elicit a state of soul by means of a series of decodings." Like the *Dhvani* theorists, Mallarmé opposes direct expression, the naming of an object, for poetic enjoyment comes from divination. He prefers the suggested image (*Alamkāra Dhvani*), the image emanating from the reveries which things arouse in us. He prefers *Vastu Dhvani*, an object must be gradually evoked. He also believes that the suggested object is ultimately valuable because of its charge of feeling, the gradually evoked object must show a state of soul. He gives the most succinct yet comprehensive definition of Symbolism which is perfectly valid for the *Dhvani Kavya* as well : distil the material world, volatilise it, do not reproduce it (realism, naturalism), because the Creator has done that for us, then set this nothingness to perfect music, the poet should deal only with the essence of the material world.¹¹²

It is true that a degree of hermeticism is unavoidable in this type of poetry. But the *Dhvani* theorists had asserted that the *Dhvani Kavya* was hermetic only for those who approached it with grammar and lexicon, not for those who approached it with a sensitive heart. Rivière¹¹³ gives a fine evaluation of this type of poetic expression which could be hermetic or evocative depending upon whether poet and reader possessed genuine sensibility. "The Symbolist first invents a story, but he does not have the time to tell it. He does not see any reason for telling it . . . It is behind him. And since he himself has reached this far, why should not the reader, too ?

. His true métier begins when he has gone beyond what he had to say : when all he has in front of him is the fleeting radiations emitted by the work he has suppressed."

If the *Dhvani* theorists resisted Mahima Bhatta's attempt to reduce suggestion to inference and analogous logical processes, Mallarmé also

denied that reasoning of the type relevant to prose discourse had any ultimate validity in symbolist poetry. "The supreme musical moments are born of fleeting arabesques, and their bursting is more true, more central, more brilliant than any reasoning. When we consider their matchless efficacy, we feel unable to translate them into any language save that of the listener's ideas. Their contact with our spirit is direct and fitting"¹¹⁴ Poetic apprehension does not need the mediation of processes like inference (*Anumana*), it is direct, of imperceptible process (*Asamlakshya Krama*). "We renounce," Mallarmé wrote, "that erroneous esthetic (even though it has been responsible for certain masterpieces) which would have the poet fill the delicate pages of his book with the actual and palpable wood of trees, rather than with the forest's shuddering or the silent scattering of thunder through the foliage"¹¹⁵ It is because poetry sought to seize these elusive impressions and sensations that the *Dhvanī* theory asserted that the familiar functions of language like denotation, etc. had to be transcended.

Nevertheless, the poet's instrument for such evocation is still the word. At times, the poverty of the word, debased by so much of rough handling in the discourse of prose, tempts the poet to discard it altogether, impatiently. While commenting on the direct action of suggestion on our sensibility, Mallarmé wrote: "We feel somehow that words would be discordant and unwelcome." But he does realise that the poet has to work with words. The only solution is for words to transcend denotation and acquire another power, the power of direct suggestion which music has. "Mystery is said to be Music's domain. But the written word also lays claim to it. The written word, which is the ideal in noiseless flights from earth, regains its rights as it stands beneath that fall of virginal sounds. Both Music and lyric call for the previous discarding the spoken word, of course, in order to prevent mere talking"¹¹⁶ The spoken word that is discarded, it should be carefully noted, is the word limited to its narrow range of functions in prose discourse. But the word can acquire a higher power. And the reality of this power, of the halation which denotation acquires in the contexts of poetic suggestion, is affirmed by Mallarmé in a passage which must be read with care lest his love of paradox seriously distort its real meaning for us. "For what is the magic charm of art, if not this: that, beyond the confines of a fistful of dust or of all other reality, beyond the book itself, beyond the very text, it delivers up that volatile scattering which we call the Spirit, who cares for nothing save universal musicality. If the poem is to be pure, the poet's voice must be stilled and the initiative taken by the words themselves, which will be set in motion as they meet unequally in collision. And in an exchange of gleams they will flame out like some glittering swath of fire sweeping over precious stones, and thus replace the audible breathing in lyric poetry of old—replace the poet's own personal and passionate control of verse. The inner structure of a book of verse must be inborn, in this way, chance will be totally eliminated and the poet will be absent"¹¹⁷ Suggestion and resonance are generated where

words with various functions, denotation, indication, pure musicality, are creatively welded and patterned. In such a poetic context the hard contours of denotation melt in the ambient halations they develop, like gems bathed in the liquid fire of their own radiance. This new power is as objective as denotation. The initiative is taken by the words themselves. *Dhvani* theory also insisted that suggestion (*Vyanjana Vritti*) is as real a power of words, of language, as denotation. This discountenanced any tendency towards the automatism of the type that would be raised to the status of the prime principle of artistic creation by Surrealism. Only if chance is thus totally eliminated will the poetry of suggestion be something wholly other than erratically subjective, completely hermetic utterance and become a genuine creation of the poetic spirit.

Then why does Mallarmé lay down that the poet should be absent, his personal and passionate control of verse should be replaced? Mallarmé is against the obtrusive presence of the poet which is inevitable in rhetorical flamboyance, the passion that remains as an excess since it is not fully enshrined in the poem, caught in the net of words, the stertorous breathing of the toiling poet that can be heard in the verse since his craftsmanship is not adequate. When Mallarmé affirms that the inner structure of verse should be inborn, he also affirms that even the greatest marvel of suggestion is not a gift of chance but willed and achieved by the creativity. If now he wants the poet to be absent, his voice to be stilled, it is because the poet has finished speaking and the poem must henceforwards speak for itself, without needing any further reference back to the poet beyond what he has enshrined of himself in the poem. This is Mallarmé's last curt dismissal of any possible charge that suggestive power does not reside in the poem as such. It does, because the poet has donated that power to the words. The *Dhvani Kavya* is built up with the suggestive power (*Vyanjana Vritti*) of words, just as prose discourse and even some types of poetry are built up with the familiar functions of language like denotation. T S Eliot¹¹⁸ has said that the creative intuition can be regarded as having succeeded only if the emotion has its life in the poem and not in the history of the artist. And Flaubert¹¹⁹ said. "The artist should not appear any more in his own work than God in nature. The man is nothing, the work is everything."

IV. TOWARDS INCLUSIVE HORIZONS

Ananda Vardhana and Mallarmé, the *Dhvani* theorists and the French Symbolists, between themselves, fully establish the case for the poetry of suggestion, the subtly evocative shaping of language. But both groups proceed further, to claim for suggestion the supreme status in poetic expression. This is where the enthusiasm betrays itself as excessive. If a work like Kafka's *Castle* is a very great achievement, it still does not follow that other types of creative expression are inferior. The *Dhvani* theorists demanded that the centre of gravity in the literary creation should lie in

the plane of the suggested, definitely not in the expressed. The poetry of subordinated suggestion (*Gunibhuta Vyangya Kavya*), and pictorial poetry (*Chitra Kavya*), which did not use suggestion at all, were relegated by them to inferior status. Mallarmé also preached this hierarchical principle. But all French poetry is not symbolist, nor the bulk of the world's great literature oblique in the specifically oblique way demanded by the *Dhvani* theory or European Symbolism. The verdict on these types of expression, therefore, needs to be reconsidered.

The *Dhvani* theory demanded that the suggested should be what is embellished (*Alamkavya*) and the expressed the embellishment (*Alamkara*). When the roles are reversed, the suggested becomes the embellishment.¹²⁰ This yields the poetry of subordinated suggestion, which, according to the *Dhvani* theorists, is inferior to the poetry of pure suggestion (*Dhvani Kavya*). It is very interesting to note here that Edgar Allan Poe, who was one of the great formative influences behind French Symbolism, really extolled the poetry of subordinated suggestion rather than the poetry of pure suggestion advocated by Mallarmé later. Poe asserts that what matters in poetry is not its meaning but its mystery, or rather what he calls its "suggestive indefiniteness of meaning." He says "Give to it any undue decision, imbue it with any very determined tone—and you deprive it at once of its ethereal, its ideal, its intrinsic and essential character. You dispel its luxury of dream. You dissolve the atmosphere of the mystic upon which it floats."¹²¹ The word "mystic" can be tricky and Poe hastens to clarify it: "The term 'mystic' is here employed in the sense of Schlegel and of most other German critics. It is applied by them to that class of composition in which there lies beneath the transparent upper current of meaning an under or suggestive one. It has the vast force of an accompaniment in music."¹²²

This was cited, not to deny the validity of the poetry of pure suggestion, the completely oblique expression, but to show that the poetry of subordinated suggestion, where the suggested is an accompaniment, not the centre of gravity of the poem, has also been rated highly, not necessarily relegated to an inferior status. A rethinking which leads to this type of accommodation can be seen in Sanskrit poetics also. Mallarmé, committed to complete obliquity, wrote "The poet must establish a careful relationship between two images, from which a third element, clear and fusible, will be distilled and caught by our imagination."¹²³ This is a fairly correct definition of the way the suggestion of an image (*Vastu Dhvani*) or of a poetic figure (*Alamkara Dhvani*) is evoked. But, both for Mallarmé and the *Dhvani* theorists, this suggested element is more important than the expressed elements. Now, let us take the case of a small poem which has been used as illustration in the controversy about suggestion. It is a description of the rise of the full moon in all its glory on a clear evening. Ordinarily, the approach of night is marked by two distinct stages—twilight and dusk. But the beauty of the poem is that it records that rare benediction—a clear evening when the bright moonlight begins to flood the sky even before red

twilight has ebbed away, with the result that the darker stage of dayfall, the dusk, is not noticeable even in the eastern quarter. The clearly expressed drift of the verse is this "The moon so illumined the red commencement of night, with a few twinkling stars, that the phase of mixed light and darkness after the twilight, the dusk, was not at all noticeable even in the east." The key words used here, however, have double meanings. The word for moon in Sanskrit, *Chandra*, is masculine, unlike as in the European poetic tradition where the moon is feminine. Night, *Nisa*, is feminine. *Nisamukha* is a recognised expression for the commencement of night, but it can also stand for the visage of Lady Night. *Raga* means red, the red of twilight, it can also mean erotic passion, the red of blush. Thus, as Poe would say, there lies beneath the transparent upper current of meaning an under or suggestive one. "Lover Moon so caught to kiss the red lotus-like face of excited Night, the beloved, with tremulous eyes, that she did not notice, because of the intensity of his love, that her thin dark garment became unloosened and slipped down in front." This is an instance of a well-known figure, *Samasokti*. A poetic expression, which arouses another image besides the one directly stated, because adjuncts possess double meaning and, therefore, are applicable to the suggested, is called *Samasokti*, because the two meanings have been condensed into one expression.

It is clear that the second image is a suggested one, a resonance, *Dhvani* (Purists can of course argue that since the evocation is through the second meanings of words and since these are really denotations like the first meanings, the poem is not an instance of *Dhvani*. But we are concerned with the realities poetically experienced.) Instances of this type of incipient or suggested imagery are so numerous in poetry that some critics of the *Dhvani* theory felt that there was no necessity to invoke *Dhvani* as a special concept and that it could be accommodated in a theory of latent imagery (*Alamkara antaibhava*). Pratiharendu Raja¹²⁴ takes this line in his gloss on Udbhata. Now, in the present poem, if the reader analyses his experience and tries to find out through introspection the relation in which the two sets of images stand to each other, he will realise that it is the image constituted by the first meanings that figures predominantly in the consciousness¹²⁵. The suggested image is the embellishment (*Alamkara*), not the embellished (*Alamkarya*). It is here that difficulties arise. For the *Dhvani* theorists demand that, in order to qualify as the finest poetry, the centre of gravity should have been shifted to the suggested meaning. When the suggested meaning is the embellishment rather than the embellished, the poetic achievement, according to the *Dhvani* theorists, has to be graded lower, as an instance of the poetry of subordinated suggestion. But the fact remains that the suggested meaning has, in the words of Poe, the force of an accompaniment in music. Poetic naturalism by itself—a literal (but also literary) description of twilight—might have been adequate to arouse feeling here. But that is not the point. The quality of the suggested image blends with the quality of the literal image and what we experience is a

feeling which is both unitary and enriched. The *Dhvani* theorists themselves, after first raising *Dhvani* or suggestion to the status of the supreme poetic value, restored feeling or *Rasa* to that status later. An enriched feeling is contained in the poem. Why should it be relegated to an inferior status, just because the centre of gravity of the poem does not lie in the plane of the suggested meaning, but is found in the stratum of expressed meaning?

Let us take the case of a remarkable Vedic poem. It is the evocation of the forest, poetically personified as *Aranyani*, the forest nymph. The strange sounds that emanate from the heart of the woods, especially at the hour of twilight, the dim shapes that the eye seems to discern in the depth of the forest and, above all, the surging life of nature that attains to a lush growth without the help of a tiller or plough, are caught in this poem with a great suggestive power. "Sounds as of grazing cows are heard, a dwelling house appears to loom, the forest creaks like a cart at eventide. Here someone seems to call his cow to him, another there seems to be felling wood. Who tarries in the forest glade, thinks to himself, 'I heard a cry' Sweet-scented, redolent of balm, replete with food, yet tilling not, mother of beasts, the Forest-Nymph, her have I magnified with praise"¹²⁶ Mallarmé rejected the "actual and palpable wood of trees" and wanted the evocation of "the forest's shuddering and the silent scattering of thunder through the foliage." They are here. But Mallarmé also laid down "To name an object is largely to destroy poetic enjoyment, which comes from gradual divination. The idea is to suggest the object." The *Dhvani* theorists also ruled out direct expression. In this poem the poet has divined the shuddering of the forest. But the suggestions of the sylvan milieu are the content of his expression. Suggestion is not his technique of evocation. He directly refers to his hallucinations. Therefore, a strict analysis from the point of view of the *Dhvani* theory would give the verdict that there is no *Dhvani*, as they understand the concept, in the poem. There is not even any subordinated suggestion, as two layers of meaning, the expressed and the suggested, are not distinguishable in the poem. The poetic experience is a rich reaction to the suggestions of the milieu, but the expression refers directly to those suggestions. The poem is satisfying from the point of view of evocation of feeling. Is it to be regarded as inferior purely because the technique is not that of suggestion?

When the *Dhvani* school recast theory to restore *Rasa* to supreme status in poetry, a status which suggestion had threatened to seize in the enthusiasm of the initial formulation, it managed a brilliant synthesis by making *Rasa* the essence of poetry and *Dhvani* the instrument for its evocation. Visvanatha followed the same line, regarding suggestion (*Vyanjana*) as the function important and necessary for evoking the aesthetic emotion (*bodherasadinam*). However, in his theory, *Rasa* occupied the central position, almost to the exclusion of all qualifying conditions. Poetry is an utterance or sentence whose soul is feeling (*Vakyam rasatmakam kavyam*). When Ananda Vardhana attempted a triune classification of the suggested and said that it could be

a matter of fact (*Vastu*), a poetic figure (*Alamkara*) or a feeling (*Rasa*), there lingered an ambivalence in theory, for, here, suggestion does not completely restore to feeling the status of supreme poetic value which it had usurped. This is because the formulation does not give an unambiguous answer to the question that can be asked, whether the suggested image or poetic figure is autonomous, whether they can have final poetic validity without leading on to the suggestion of feeling, which, in this statement, seems to be merely a special case, of *Rasa Dhvani*. Abhinava came to the rescue here by clearly affirming that the suggestions of image and poetic figure ultimately resolve themselves into the suggestion of feeling. Nevertheless, the position cannot be said to have been fully clarified by the first exponents of the *Dhvani* theory. Visvanatha, on the other hand, decided to accept all the implications latent in the cue given by Abhinava. Since feeling was supreme in poetry, the exact modality of its evocation was secondary, there should not be any too hard dictation about it. Thus, even while accepting the high excellence of the poetry of pure suggestion (*Dhvani Kavya*), Visvanatha does not believe that the poetry of subordinated suggestion (*Gumbhuta Vyangya Kavya*) should be relegated to an inferior status. The acid test is whether the composition evokes *Rasa*. He accepts without any serious reservation the poetry of subordinated suggestion by arguing that the relish of *Rasa* alone is the true criterion and that the centre of gravity of the poem for the evocation of *Rasa* need not necessarily lie in the layer of suggested imagery. If the emotional cues of the suggested imagery reinforce and blend with the cues of the expressed image, as it does in the poem on twilight we analysed, the poem is wholly acceptable.

It is very interesting to note that this relaxation of theory is implied in the *Dhvanyaloka* itself. We saw earlier that when the Dhvanikara first defined poetic sense, he mentioned its two sub-divisions, expressed (*Vachya*) and suggested (*Pratyamana*), without necessarily implying that the latter was superior to the former. That shift came later as the doctrine began to build up. Later still, theory had to recant from the position that the suggested sense was the soul of poetry. This classical balance of view seems to have been there very much in the Dhvanikara, though enthusiasm in the elaboration of a new theory tended to obscure it, understandably enough. For he too gives primacy to *Rasa*. When *Rasa* is primary, whether its evocation is direct or through suggestion, whether the centre of gravity of the poem lies in the suggested meaning or whether suggestion plays a subordinate role, all become matters of detail, of secondary importance. Thus the Dhvanikara¹²⁷ lays down that poetry of subordinated suggestion (*Gumbhuta Vyangya Kavya*) can become poetry of pure suggestion (*Dhvani Kavya*) to the extent that it realises *Rasa*. This is a very important recognition, for it serves as a bridge to span the gulf between the specialised poetry of suggestion which Ananda Vardhana and Mallarmé had in mind and poetry in general. For it defines the poetry of suggestion

(*Dhvani Kavya*) in a catholic, generalised sense. What is, and should be, suggested is the *Rasa*. Whether it is evoked through predominantly direct expression, where suggested elements are subordinate, or through wholly indirect means, through suggestion, becomes secondary, a matter of taste.

Let us see whether these profounder intuitions of the theory can be used to restore the poetry of direct expression also to genuinely poetic status from which it was expelled by the more doctrinaire formulation of the *Dhvani* theory. That poetry, which is without any suggested element, is reckoned by Ananda Vardhana as the third and lowest kind. It is regarded as merely "pictorial in word" or "pictorial in sense" and is called pictorial poetry (*Chitra Kavya*). Visvanatha refused to regard it as any kind of poetry at all. We also saw a similar rejection by Mallarmé of the Parnassians who "take something in its entirety and simply exhibit it".

But can pictorial poetry be attributed any intrinsic incapacity to evoke feeling? Here the specialised study of Ruyyaka will prove helpful to us, both in its reach and its failures. It is clear that he takes his cue from Kuntaka. The latter claimed that the poet's intention need not always be to suggest something unexpressed or even to awaken *Rasa*, but may be directed simply to producing a certain strikingness of expression in the form of an expressed poetic figure. He analysed poetic expression and found that the essential value of such a figure consisted of a peculiar turn of expression (*Vakrokti*) which produced a certain charm (*Vaichutrya* or *Vicchutti-Vishesha*). Such figures, devoid of suggestion, were not studied by the *Dhvani* theorists because they formed the stuff of pictorial poetry which the *Dhvani* school regarded as the lowest type of poetic expression. But, Ruyyaka, following Kuntaka, felt that they covered an extensive field and decided to supplement the work of his predecessors by making a special study of it.

The key concept in this type of approach is poetic charm (*Vicchutti*). Ruyyaka feels some difficulties in defining it. "Then again, a poetic figure (*Alamkara*) incarnates the charm (*Vicchutti*) of sound and sense, and it is not possible to define this charm exactly, in as much as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of the poetic imagination, which is itself infinite in scope"¹²⁸. Now, the concept of this charm, and the speciality of utterance which generates it, are often used in such a generalised sense as to mean poetic expression in all its sweep. The "charm" of Kuntaka and Ruyyaka is the "beauty" (*Saundarya*) of Vamara Abhinava¹²⁹ uses the term to stand for the source of beauty (*Kamanityaka* or *Charutva hetu*). Ananda Vardhana refers to the speciality of utterance (*Ukti Vaichutrya*)¹³⁰ and also affirms the infinite scope of poetic conception¹³¹ which Ruyyaka cites as the generator of poetic charm. Kuntaka himself related poetic charm to the power of imagination of the poet (*Kavi pratibha nuvatitva*). The question now rises whether poetic utterance or charm, used with such generalised signification, can exclude emotive power, even if it does not adopt the technique of suggestion. We saw earlier that

the concept of beauty (*Chaitva*) is definitely linked, in the Indian tradition, with the power to stir the heart (*Hridyatta*)

Ruyyaka's great contribution was his specialised analysis of various poetic figures. The difficulties he ran into, in distinguishing between three figures, *Svabhavokti*, *Bhavika* and *Rasavad*, have great relevance to the present discussion. *Svabhavokti* is poetic naturalism. *Bhavika* is more or less the same, but applies specifically to the evocation of the past or the delineation of a future which is life-like in power. *Rasavad* is the direct portrayal of emotions. Ruyyaka fumbles badly here. He says that in the *Rasavad* a universalisation (*Sadharanikarana*) takes place which is not present in *Bhavika*.¹³² What he is referring to is the liberation from immediacy and practical contexts, the endowing of the particular with universal significance whereby the love of a couple in a poem resonates as the love of all persons for their beloved, which occurs in poetic experience. But why should the poetic evocation of the past or delineation of the future necessarily exclude it? Ruyyaka himself indirectly admits that it need not. For he says that when this universalisation occurs in the *Bhavika*, it becomes *Rasavad*. There is quibbling here. But it cannot conceal the tacit admission that pictorial evocation of the past or of an ideal future can have emotive power. Ruyyaka, likewise, seeks to distinguish *Svabhavokti* from *Rasavad* by claiming that while the former rouses only a mental image (*Vastu Samvada*) in us, the latter creates an emotional image (*Chittavritti Samvada*).¹³³ Drinkwater also lapsed into the same fallacy, as we have seen. Naturalism can evoke emotion, and is poetic only when it does so. All genuinely poetic pictorialism is really *Rasavad*.

The most important point for us which emerges here is that pictorialism and direct expression cannot be condemned as unpoetic in themselves. The test should be whether or not the mental image is also an emotional image. Friedrich Schleiermacher¹³⁴ has some very valuable suggestions to offer here which help in analysing how the objective image gets saturated with emotion and becomes an emotional image. Language has two functions: its musical sound and its logical meaning. Poetry is, first of all, sound, a "totality of euphony" which Schleiermacher conceives, on the analogy of music, as expressing the stream of self-awareness, "the inner changeability of being, the pure subjectivity of the inner mood". At the same time poetry utilises the meaning of language, which is always general, to represent the individual. The poet evokes an individualised, completely single, definite image. Poetry is thus double: it is plastic, representing the "pure objectivity of the image" and it is musical, representing "the inner mood". If Mallarmé dismissed Parnassian poetry, which was plastic, almost three-dimensional and sculptural, it is because he failed to notice that the Parnassian image is a perfectly expressive objective correlative. The earth baked under the flaming noon, in Leconte de Lisle, is the poet's heart squarely meeting the harsh realities of life and finding in the shock of that contact the source of a profounder ecstasy. His Condor, soaring high above

the Andes, in the heat of noon and the freezing cold of night, is the poet who detaches himself from the attitude of practical involvement with experience in order to be able to relish it aesthetically. Even while dismissing the aesthetics of fully plastic expression as erroneous, Mallarmé has to concede that "it has been responsible for certain masterpieces"

Dhvanī theory also cannot establish that the pictorial or material image can never evoke feeling. Let us take the case of the suggested material image (*Vastu Dhvanī*). Abhinava closes a gap in the earlier theoretical formulation by affirming that the suggestion of the material image also ultimately resolves itself into the suggestion of feeling. The miracle is here, in the leap from image to emotion. The fact that the image itself has been suggested is not relevant as an explanation for that miracle and, therefore, the dictum that it should be invariably suggested, not directly expressed, cannot be anything more than the statement of the preference of a certain taste and temperament. If the image can evoke emotion, the expressed image can do that as well as the suggested image. It is not the technique of suggestion that arouses the emotion but the fact that the image, whether direct or suggested, is an objective correlative. The opposition is not really between direct expression and suggestion but between prosaic denotation or reportage and the emotive image. As Nami Sadhu¹³⁵ has pointed out, whereas factuality (*Vastava*) means only a statement of a thing as it is, poetic naturalism implies a living evocation that can create an experience of the thing in our sensibility.

Poetic naturalism or pictorial poetry dispensed with suggestion as defined by the *Dhvanī* theorists and therefore one can understand why they were extremely unhappy about it. But their case against it is weakened by their own admission that the image—they specifically refer to the suggested image—can evoke emotion. When, after their initial enthusiasm, they felt the need to restore to emotion the supreme status in poetry which they had temporarily seized for suggestion, they had to change their ground subtly to vindicate their opposition to pictorial poetry. Adroit as the strategy was, it did imply a retreat from their position. Ananda Vardhana¹³⁶ describes pictorial poetry (*Chitra Kavya*) thus: "Not aimed at the evocation of feeling and sentiment (*Rasa-bhavadi-tatparya-rahitam*), not exploiting the special illuminating power of suggestion (*Vyangyārtha-Vīśeṣa prakāśana-śakti-sunyam*), basically dependent on the strikingness of expression and meaning only (*kevala-vachya-vachaka-vaichūtrya-matrasray-enopanibaddham*), this poetry merely looks like (*avabhasate*) a picture (*alekhyam*)". Abhinava¹³⁷ defined it as "solely dependent on metrical and other skills for its impact, only a picture (*Alekhyā-matratvad*), merely arty (*Kala-matratvad*), only an imitation of poetry (*Kavyānukarītvavad*)". While the *Dhvanī* theorists admitted it as poetry, though of the lowest kind, Viśvanatha refused to recognise it on the ground that it was entirely devoid of emotion and was therefore incompatible with his own definition of poetry, that it is an utterance whose soul is emotion.

There is very subtle quibbling here. In the initial formulation of theory, suggestion was the only supreme poetic value recognised and pictorial poetry was relegated to the lowest status because it did not use suggestion but relied on direct expression. When the *Dhvani* theorists recalled the importance of feeling and this led to second thoughts about their own theory, they were really operating with two independent variables, suggestion (*Dhvani*) and feeling (*Rasa*). Theory now does not have the confidence to base its verdict against pictorial poetry solely on the ground that it lacks suggestion. This defect is indeed mentioned in Ananda Vardhana's definition. But he also mentions lack of evocation of feeling and sentiment. Poetry in this clever definition does not descend to the pictorial level merely because it lacks suggestion. Earlier this defect alone would have been sufficient to condemn it. But now it must also show the defect of failure to evoke emotion. Visvanatha accepts this position and so does Abhinava when he defines pictorial poetry as that which merely imitates genuine poetry which latter has to enshrine feeling. Embarrassing questions can now be asked. Since suggestion and feeling are independent variables, what is the status of poetry which uses suggestion but is not emotive in quality? Again, what is the status of poetry which is pictorial, which does not use suggestion, but which incarnates feeling? The questions are legitimate because theory has had to admit the independence of the two variables. In the reformulation of theory, feeling regains its prime status and suggestion becomes the technique of its evocation. That is the final result of Ananda Vardhana's synthesis. If feeling is the prime value, why should suggestion be the invariable technique? Does the theory dare to assert that the pictorial image cannot arouse emotion? It cannot, because Abhinava says that the suggested image is really an emotional image. Can theory claim that only the suggested image has this power, not the directly expressed image? It cannot. For one thing, there is all the weight of the luminous clarification of the emotive power of poetic naturalism (*Svabhavokti*). Secondly, even in the poetry of suggestion, does not the image acquire its emotive power because it is an objective correlative and not because it has been suggested instead of directly expressed? If suggestion as such is the principle of evoking emotion, all suggested imagery would be invariably emotive. In other words, the poetry of suggestion would invariably be genuine poetry. Success would be guaranteed in this field as it would be impossible for a poet to write bad poetry if only he had the sense to resort to the technique of suggestion.

The *Dhvani* theory and the theory of French Symbolism added a great legacy to our poetic heritage by the luminous clarification of the evocative power of suggestion. Even in this specialised achievement, the record of the Indian tradition is far more impressive than that of the theorists of European Symbolism. For one thing, Mallarmé seems to have extended the technique of cryptic and elusively allusive suggestion from his poetry to his theoretical exposition as well. This has created difficulties. When

one argues and explains, it would be fairer to accept the rules of prose, of logical discourse. Mallarmé's theoretical discourse itself often reads like a symbolist poem and this leaves too many ambiguities scattered all round. But, in their theoretical exposition, the founders of the *Dhvani* theory were painstakingly scholastic, massively logical, as will be readily admitted when we recall their defence of suggestion against linguistic functions like denotation, indication, purport, inference. Secondly, even when Mallarmé asserted that suggestive power, when once it has been donated by the poet to the word, comes to reside in it as an objective power, in his poetic practice he became impatient with the responsibility of charging the word of prosaic discourse with this new energy and indulged freely in neologisms. This made his poetry obscure and that of his followers completely hermetic, even to genuine poetic sensibility. The *Dhvani* school successfully resisted this temptation. They preferred the harder discipline whereby the poet had to take words current in the contexts of living and charge them with a new power. This way the communicability of poetry was safeguarded even while the communication was raised to higher levels, of revelation.

It is, however, in safeguarding theory from becoming a dogma and completely closing off the vision of other horizons, that the essential superiority of the *Dhvani* theory over symbolist theory lies. Mallarmé was dogmatic in his rejection of other forms of poetic endeavour. It is true that the *Dhvani* theorists do not declare their acceptance of the legitimacy of other forms of poetic expression from the housetops. The special loyalty to their own preference has to be accepted as forgivably human. But it cannot be denied that their integrity and thoroughness of analysis enabled them to accommodate within their theory certain important recognitions—like, for example, the recognition that the material image can be an emotional image, even though they meant the suggested material image—which neutralised their verdict on the poetic approaches which they themselves may not have rated highly.

Lastly, we owe them a debt of gratitude for at least indirectly emphasising that all poetry is really suggestion. Suggestion here has to be understood in a more generalised sense than what they meant by *Dhvani*. Nevertheless, when they said that suggestion can inhere in the denotation of words, in their phonetic texture and position, they were pointing to the power of poetic expression in general, for even in what they called pictorial poetry, sound and texture and rhythm play this magically evocative role. This helps us to fling a bridge from their special theory to the general theory of poetic expression. Poetic intention is realised through "the way the assertion is made", said Susanne Langer¹³⁸. "And this involves the sound, the tempo, the aura of associations of the words, the long and short sequences of ideas, the wealth or poverty of transient imagery that contains them, the sudden arrest of fantasy by pure fact or of familiar fact by sudden fantasy, the suspense of literal meaning by a sustained ambiguity resolved by a long-awaited key word, and the unifying, all-embracing artifice of rhythm."

Every one of these values has been recognised and studied in detail by Sanskrit poetics as we have seen in the earlier chapters of this work. The poetry of suggestion has a subtle delectability. But its theory should form part of a larger theoretic system, valid for all types of poetic expression. And it will be seen to do so if we see the *Dhvanī* theory in the right perspective, against the background of the tradition of Indian poetics in its entirety.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Significance of Structure

I PLOT AS THE POET'S METAPHOR

WE have seen that Indian thought assimilates poetic experience into the general pattern of human experience, in terms of an interaction between the world and human sensibility, the former being the womb of all stimuli and the latter of all response, though the poetic response is profoundly different from the practical response. This outlook has implications which demand structure in a poem and expect that structure to be sensitive to the configuration of reality.

Recent Western thought has moved to an identical outlook. Lerner¹ points out that poetic experience "is made up of experiences of exactly the same kinds as those that come to us in other ways." And he quotes from John Dewey² "An experience has pattern, structure, completeness, and the further these are clarified, the more it is an aesthetic experience." Pattern, structure and completeness, if they are to be clarified in experience, suggest that if ordinary human experience is to mature as aesthetic experience, the emotional experiences generated by the world have to stand the test of rational validity or intelligibility and the rational understanding of the world has to have a place for a rich life of the emotions. In fact, the three theories of literature which Lerner elaborates are really hierarchical, a series of progressively inclusive conceptual systems, though he himself seems to have felt the truth of this only dimly and unconsciously. Thus, the theory of literature as expression is acceptable as a basic, but not as a complete statement. Lerner notes that expression individualises experience, it is not satisfied with broad categories of experience. Each poetic experience is a unique complex of emotions. But encysted experience, however intense remains private. Lerner's second theory, that literature is emotive expression, demands communicability of experience. The movement of thought to this level is already foreshadowed in the distinction he makes, while elaborating the first theory, between betraying and expressing emotion. In the latter case the writer is fully conscious of what is being expressed. The shaping of the experience into some sort of communicable form is already implied here. "The poet is the best of all critics", wrote

Baudelaire³ and the self-critical role is demanded from the poet by the need of his work to be communicable. The third theory deals with the cognitive aspect of literature. The Augustan framework, that art should be true to nature, to human nature, to commonsense and common experience, is found basically acceptable, though human nature and experience reach down to greater depths than neo-classicism suspected. Lerner admits that the truths we learn from literature may often appear as platitudinous as proverbs, but, he points out, literature makes us experience imaginatively what, in a sense, but in an unvital way, we knew already. Proust⁴ clarifies this. "As for the truths which the intelligence—even that of the finest minds—garners right out in the open, lying before it in broad daylight, their value may be very great, but they have harsher outlines and are all on the surface, with no depth, because no depths had to be penetrated in order to get to them and they have not been recreated." Truth as a generalisation by the intellect becomes, in art, profound experience. This experience has to be true to reality with a just correspondence. Particularly relevant here is Lerner's analysis of sentimentality. This is associated with a certain unnatural stridency, a forcing of note. Lerner deals with the death-bed scenes of Dickens where he either describes what could not have happened or is too blinded by tears to describe what could.

We can understand now why any ambitious aesthetic construction has to have a very complex structure. Basically, this requirement emerges from the fact that poetic experience is, initially, identical with any other type of human experience. Such experience is not autonomous, purely inward happening, it has its origin in a context of interaction, of the world and sensibility. Even in purely lyrical situations which can rest on a single episode and do not need a network of episodes (which are "single-minded, single-mooded, transparent and uncomplicated" in the words of Day Lewis) the intensity of poetic reaction has to be just in terms of general human experience. Otherwise, instead of genuine feeling, running clear and deep, we get turbid sentimentality. Here, the clarification of the concept of intensity by Winters⁵ is very relevant and helpful. "The intensity of the work of art, which is different from the intensity of the crude experience, lies in this, that what we call intensity in a work of art is a combination of the importance of the original subject and the precision of the judgment, whereas that which we call intensity in life is more often the confused and therefore frightening emotion resulting from a situation which we have had not yet time to meet and understand." Intensity in art is contributed by emotional sensitiveness, reacting, not alone, but in cooperation with the other important aspects of human nature, especially those with an evaluatory function. "The poet," says Winters, "tries to understand his experience in rational terms, to state his understanding, and simultaneously to state, by means of the feeling which we attach to words, the kind and degree of emotion that should properly be motivated by this understanding . . . What I desire of a poem is a clear understanding of motive and just

evaluation of feeling, the justice of the evaluation persisting even into the sound of the least important syllable”

When the poet is said to be trying to understand his experience in rational terms, it means that he is equipped with a world-view, an ethical and philosophical outlook, in his confrontation of experience. But the poem is not the exposition of that view or outlook. Valéry⁶ said “Philosophy and ethics flee the works to place themselves in the reflections which precede them.” The experience also may modify the world-view, but the modification is not an aberrant, erratic change, but a rational growth which will donate a higher perspective in the next confrontation of significant experience and its creative, poetic handling. What is emphasised here is the fact that the poetic reaction to life-experience cannot have the highest value unless it is the reaction of the whole personality, of reason also, and not only feeling. This truth makes totally unacceptable a view like the one expressed by Melchiori.⁷ “There is a truth which is seldom sufficiently realised—in most cases the poet’s faculties centre round the creation of poetry. When he works out a theory of politics or history, of magic or metaphysics, he is but trying to unravel the mystery and wonder of man’s existence and of man’s mind. Now, the mystery and wonder of the poet’s nature and his mind is the ability to write poetry. His search (whatever his subject) will unconsciously be, all the time, for the nature of poetry and the mode of its creation. The value therefore of the ‘philosophical’ or ‘cosmological’ or ‘political’ systems devised by the poets is that they may give us the key to their poetics. They may be wild as cosmology, ridiculous as philosophy or positively criminal as politics, but if we consider them as statements about the nature of the poetic process, we shall find them substantially true. True, of course, for the poetry of the particular poet who made them.” No meaning of any significance remains in this pretentious analysis when one analyses it. What it asserts is a tautology—that a man with criminal political views and ridiculous philosophy can also sometimes turn out poetry, which will then indicate the poetic process in him. But when Melchiori defends this type of poet by arguing that the poet is trying to unravel the mystery and wonder of man’s existence, he forgets that the philosopher, the cosmologist and the political thinker are also trying to do the same and the various insights should converge. Nobody can blame the poet for not writing abstract philosophy or political theory. But if the implicit philosophy in his poem is ridiculous and the implicit political outlook criminal, his poetry will be worthless. No amount of involved argument can assail the sanity of the assertion of Lewis⁸ that every poem whose intellectual basis is “silly, shallow, perverse, or illiberal, or even radically erroneous” is crippled by that fact. Melchiori would be right only if poetry meant merely the ability to versify. But actually poetry has to be—and is—profound insight into the meaning of man’s existence, as Melchiori himself claims, though without understanding the obligations implicit in that

claim If Sanskrit poetics affirmed that knowledge (*Vyutpatti*) could not create poetry in the absence of imagination (*Pratibha*), it also agreed that the former could extend the range and depth of poetic insight Rudrata defined *Vyutpatti* as understanding of "metre, grammar, the modality of art, the science of words as well as the science of matter (*padantha vijnana*)" Hema Chandra defined it as "discriminatory understanding of the world, science, and art (*loka-sastra-kavyeshu-mpunata*)" Bharata wanted not only the poet but also the reader to be well-versed in history (*chaitiabhijna*), and the various sciences (*nana-sastra-vichakshana*) Indian poetics does not accept poetry as mere "emoting", completely detached from the responsibilities of rational thought

Even lyrical expression, thus, has to have structure, understood here not as complex formal organisation but as rational balance between the intensity of feeling, primarily a function of the reacting sensibility, and the motivating context which primarily belongs to the world of external reality But the demands for complexity in structure are comparatively less in lyrical expression which rests on single episodes—seeing a river-bank full of daffodils, listening to the nightingale in the darkness, seeing the skylark soaring high The writer may sometimes present extended forms, but the structural organisation may remain simple. Middleton Murry⁹ feels that this is the case with Tchekov "The short story of Tchekov was an innovation in literature The immediate consciousness remains the criterion and the method is based on a selection of those glimpses of the reality which in themselves possess a peculiar vividness and appear to have a peculiar significance To present such episodes with a minimum of rearrangement, as far as possible to eliminate the mechanism of invention, was Tchekov's aim This is not to suggest that Tchekov invented nothing, but his constant effort was to reduce the part of invention He strove to link moments of perception, rather than to expand the perception by invention"

Linking moments of perception would give lyrical sequences but not a complex structure which, we should always keep in mind, is not sought for its own sake, as abstract pattern, but because a faithful mirroring of the interaction between sensibility and reality will necessarily have to be complex This is because the world stimulates desires in sensibility that mature into motivations and actions which in turn impinge on reality and change its pattern It is these changed patterns that confront the sensibility later and generate fresh emotive reactions which will be related to the original reactions in meaningful ways, as fulfilment or frustration The arabesques traced by the flow of external events are thus closely intertwined with the evolving pattern of emotional life with its wishes and fantasies, fulfilments and frustrations, temptations and transgressions, responsibilities and martyrdoms Therefore, if the poet is not to be isolated in a world of private fantasy, completely alienated from the world of external reality, the interaction between sensibility and the world has above all to be just

"Imagination," Strong¹⁰ emphasises, "is based upon experience experience is its taking-off ground and the more solid this basis—the stronger and deeper the poet's understanding of reality—the further the leap" The fabric of a narrative poem or novel is a mesh of events and of human reactions to them The events have to be possible and probable in terms of the world's reality The moment it tries to substitute reality by fantasy it alienates itself from the world and ceases to have any message for man who has to live in this world and confront its vicissitudes "The storyteller," wrote Sherwood Anderson,¹¹ "has taught himself to observe He wants, for the purpose of his craft, to develop to the highest possible pitch his own senses, to constantly see more, hear more, feel more The imagination must constantly feed upon reality or starve"

Skelton¹² has suggested that there is no point in presenting patterns of trivial aspects of life, however complete those patterns may be, if the only result is to give the reader a picture of an unimportant event or subject and by this means induce in him an illusory feeling of well-being This is acceptable, with the condition that we should always be sensitive in our evaluation and see whether what would ordinarily be considered trivial has been transformed into the significant by creative imagination There is another, and closely related, aspect to this "All truths lie waiting in all things", wrote Walt Whitman¹³ The poet's endeavour to pattern one aspect of life, whether focussed upon a physical object, upon a sensation, or upon a moment in time, may be an endeavour to perceive all truth by means of a complete understanding of all the implications within and surrounding that focal point The aural experience of a nightingale's song in the darkness, the visual experience of the decorative motifs on a Grecian urn, may thus lead to the profound perception of the timeless and enduring quality of the experience of beauty Thus, an ode by Keats, growing round a single rich sensation, may be able to reveal briefly but luminously all that Malraux¹⁴ needs a book to discuss

Nevertheless, since experience is essentially polyphonic in structure and texture, a web spun by the interlaced contrapuntal lines of maturing sensibility and the arabesques of the world's events, a fuller statement needs the complex organisation of episodes, where character, action, the consequences of action and the emotional reactions and adjustments to them are rationally linked From this point of view, it is significant that, today, there is a reaction from the verbal or segmental approach in literary evaluation One poet¹⁵ writes

*Oh our mistaken teachers —
It is not a proper respect for words that we need
But a decent regard for things,
those older creatures and more real*

Holloway¹⁶ has taken the robust line that talk about imaginary ambiguities, associations and poetic textures is really a ritual evasion of the

genuinely critical response. He points out that it is no good looking at a local sample of a work before you have examined its trajectory. Even with the short poem, verbal texture is not the only or even the first thing for the critic to concentrate upon. Hough,¹⁷ likewise, regards the Imagists' attempt to build up long poems by a collocation of images as a negation of method. "Whatever tradition Imagist poetry may have recalled us to, the most important tradition of all, that of a natural community of understanding between poet and reader, has been lost." According to Hough, "a poem, internally considered, ought to make the same kind of sense as any other discourse" and a poem of any length needs a principle of connection no different from that which would be acceptable in any other kind of discourse. Theme and plot are not outmoded, old-world apparatus. The fabric of theme is spun by experience and reflects the pattern discovered or created in experience by the aesthetic sensibility. "Our talk of themes," wrote Knights,¹⁸ "is simply a way of pointing to centres of consciousness that exert a kind of gravitational pull, to the dominant tones and emphases of a living mode of experience." Allen Tate held the poet responsible both for the just seizure of reality and its expression, "for the mastery of a disciplined language which will not shun the full report of the reality conveyed to him by his awareness, he must hold, in Yeats' great phrase, 'reality and justice in a single thought'." The poet, according to Tate, "must recreate for his world the image of man, and he must propagate standards by which other men may test that image and distinguish the false from the true"¹⁹ And no image of man can be valid if it shows him in isolation from the life of the world that pulses around him in eddying currents.

As far back as 1923, Middleton Murry,²⁰ who, as the husband of Katherine Mansfield, was certainly not unfamiliar with, or unmindful of, the merits of psychological fiction, voiced a strong plea for plot, for story, on the ground that art is necessarily concrete. Devoting attention to characterisation alone, in isolation from incident and action, may lead to distinguished psychography, but not to the fiction which is a seizure of reality. In fiction of this type, Middleton Murry concludes, spiritual realities must be externalised, you can realise your characters and resolve your conflicts only through plot. If we can concede that great art always implies the search for, or the creation of, a meaningful image of man and a meaning in reality and experience, we can also concede Heilman's claim that in an art form like the drama the plot is a metaphor. "A series of dramatic statements about one subject," writes Heilman,²¹ "does constitute a bloc of meaning which is a structural part of the play. This bloc may be understood as one of the author's metaphors. It is a metaphor just as a body of recurrent images, with its burden of implications, is a metaphor. The dramatist's basic metaphor is his plot. All of his metaphors are valid parts of his total meaning, the search for which must include a

study of the relationship among the parts All the constituent metaphors must be related to the large metaphor which is the play itself "

II LITERAL NARRATION, ALLEGORY, MYTH

If plot is a metaphor, it can still take diverse forms the literal (but also literary) story, the allegory, the creatively rehandled myth Let us study each type with the help of an example

We now return to the significant parable of the creative process in the *Ramayana* whose wealth of meaning was not exhausted in the earlier discussion, which was confined to the genetic relation between stirred emotion and rhythmic utterance Latent in the episode is also the realisation that art is not pure spontaneity or lyricism Conscious thought unites with spontaneous emotion and the unconscious activity of inspiration triggered by the emotion, to give form to mood, body to feeling, plot and structure to emotion The introspective power of Valmiki, which made him analyse the unconscious link between stirred sensibility and rhythmic expression, led him to think further on the problem of finding objective correlatives, creating the artistic form, building up an organic complex where a logically connected sequence of episodes would at once give body to emotion and make it meaningful Here Valmiki makes a very important demand on poets including himself the poetic creation should have meaning for all, for scholar as well as layman²² An aristocrat like Valéry would oppose this and prefer poetry to be "inaccessible to the crowd, the luxury of a few" with the finest sensibility²³ T S Eliot²⁴ also is an aristocratic type and one is therefore pleasantly surprised to see him to be in agreement with Valmiki "The most useful poetry, socially, would be one which could cut across all the present stratifications of public taste—stratifications which are perhaps a sign of social disintegration" He brings out the universal appeal of Shakespeare "In a play of Shakespeare you get several levels of significance For the simplest auditors there is the plot, for the more thoughtful the character and conflict of character, for the more literary the words and phrasing, for the more musically sensitive the rhythm, and for auditors of greater sensitiveness and understanding a meaning which reveals itself gradually" Eliot adds "I myself should like an audience which could neither read nor write ' The chances of an unlettered mind getting any meaning out of the *Waste Land* are, to say the least, remote But throughout the centuries, *Ramayana* recitals have been the most felicitous educational influence on the minds of the Indian masses Valmiki's work has inspired great traditions of folk poetry, art and drama while, for the poets, he has been the First Poet (*Adi Kavi*)

Let us return to the study of Valmiki's creation of a web of episodes which was the objective correlative of the feeling which was his initial inspiration It was the tragic cry uttered by the bird when it was sepa-

rated from its mate by the cruel blow of destiny that first stirred the poet's heart. And this episode, of parting and separation, lives on as the core of the story, in numerous transformations, like a poignant theme whose recurrence in varied forms links together the vast spread of a Beethoven symphony.

King Dasaratha who was very fond of the chase hears a sound in the forest which he interprets as that of an elephant drinking water and shoots an arrow in the direction. But it was really the sound of a boy, the son of an old hermit couple, filling his pitcher. His helpless parents do not want to survive their son and before they themselves leave the world they curse the king that he too shall die of the sorrow of separation from his son. Years later, the king wants to crown Rama, his eldest son through the senior queen Kausalya, as heir-apparent. But the other queen, Kaikeyi, insists that her son, Bharata, should be made the heir-apparent and Rama exiled to the forest. Dasaratha does not survive the separation. There are subtle variations of the leading motif here. Bharata is devoted to Rama and his mother's intrigue, though intended to benefit him, separates him from his brother who was his hero. Mother and son are also alienated by this episode. After a spell of quiet happiness in the forests, Rama has to suffer the anguish of separation from his wife Sita because Ravana, the aggressive tyrant of Lanka, abducts her. After long preparation a battle takes place and Sita is recovered. They return to their kingdom and Rama is crowned king. But when his subjects whisper calumny about a queen who was in the power of Ravana in Lanka, Rama feels that he has no choice but to abandon a wife who is unacceptable to his people even though it will break his heart. Exiled to the forest, Sita gives birth to two sons. There is a final reunion, but it is tragically short. The ground opens and goddess Earth, the mother of Sita, takes her away from an existence which had offered to her the brimming cup of suffering again and again.

There is no space here for a study in depth of Valmiki's great poem, which, besides, has been attempted elsewhere, in this writer's history of Sanskrit literature. But it can be shown that all the acceptable conclusions of current thought, which we have briefly reviewed, were brilliantly anticipated by Valmiki. Artistic expression, in Valmiki, synthesises all the three theories indicated by Lerner. Primarily it is emotional expression. The parable of the origin of the epic emphasises this. It is also the communication of expression. In his further meditation over his spontaneous reaction to the bird's death, Valmiki states that the form which grows out of the emotional experience must have the highest virtues of communicability. The language should be grammatically flawless, intelligible to scholar and layman. The narration should be in stanzas of spacious metres, flawless in phonetic structure. Above all, it should be limpidly clear, communicating its meaning and feeling to the reader, and musical like a melody on strings. But one cannot stop with texture or

metrical music or any other segmental value. Art has to be cognitive too, in the sense of being capable of yielding a vision of life. This vision, says Valmiki, takes in all the values of human life, but recognises a hierarchy among them. It should give its due place to the satisfaction of sensuous but legitimate impulses, to Eros (*Kamathaguna samyuktam*). But the dominant accent should always be on man as a moral being *Dharmathaguna* (*vistaram*), on moral responsibility, on the dignity which man gains when he accepts the obligations implied in an ideal character. The serious poem which seeks enduring human significance should, thus, deal with the idealised man because it seeks to make man move nearer to the ideal.²⁵

Only the contours of the magnificent ordering of experience which Valmiki achieved in his aesthetic creation can be sketched here. He refines the first lyrical impulse he received, the profound but still raw intensity of the experience of separation through sudden and tragic death, into an extended pattern woven out of interrelated incidents, where the incidence of tragedy is genetically related to character and the interaction of characters. The experience does not shed its pain, but in becoming analysable it does shed its power to stun the sensibility into a blind stupefaction. The initial experience, standing in isolation, could not have borne a heavy load of lyrical emotion without running the danger of degenerating into sentimentality. Here reality, understood as the natural and probable reactions of characters, becomes the springboard of the imagination which is thus able to leap to an all-embracing vision of life. The theme of separation is continually recurring. But it is given innumerable variations. There is psychological alienation between Ravana and Mandodari, his queen who is as chaste a figure as Sita. From the dictatorial, near-tribal social structure of Lanka, a character like Vibhishana, the brother of Ravana, is seen struggling hard to separate himself and alienation here is really alignment with the progressive urges of the human spirit.

But the profoundest insight in the whole poem is revealed in its confrontation of the problem of the transience of all things earthly. The separation that death brings about has no solution on its own plane, for all things living have at last to confront the reality of death. The manner of its advent, therefore, is relatively insignificant. It was the hunter's arrow that brought death to the bird. Kaikeyi's inordinate ambition shot the arrow that carried off Dasaratha who could not survive the separation from his son when the latter was exiled to the forests. When Bharata goes after Rama to persuade him to come back and also to give him the tragic news of their father's death, Rama tries to comfort him. "Man cannot do as he pleases. He is not wholly his own master. All acquisition ends in loss, all rise in fall, all union in separation, all life in death. Bodies become infirm by age like mansions. Night passes like a flood and returns not. Man forgets death in the exultation of living. But death is man's shadow, sitting with him when he sits down,

walking with him when he walks, hastening with him when he accelerates his pace, lying by his side when he lies down Every sunrise and every season we greet take away a part of our life Beings come together and separate in life like logs of driftwood on the sea. One cannot wait for another, even as a caravan cannot stop for a wayfarer Our father has lived a righteous life and has attained heaven We need not grieve over him because he has laid down here his decrepit body Wise and firm men ought not to grieve"²⁶

If the mood is sombre here, the image of man created by Valmiki is not one of a helpless being drifting in the vast flood of the world's currents This is made clear beyond the shadow of doubt by a scene that follows immediately The sage Jabali was listening to the advice given by Rama and also to his final answer that he was not returning to Ayodhya He tries to turn Rama's own arguments against his decision and as a basis for a philosophy of hedonism. If beings meet and part like driftwood, "he who thinks 'this is my father, this is my mother', and becomes attached to this relationship is without sense Dasaratha is nought to thee as thou to him" Why then be bound to a promise given to Dasaratha or the latter's promise to Kaikeyi? "O Rama, be wise There exists no world but this, that is certain. Enjoy that which is pleasant and abandon that which is unpleasant Adopting this universally valid principle, receive the kingdom offered thee by Bharata"²⁷

Rama's reply shows how profoundly existential, how much akin to that of Sartre or Camus in certain respects, was Valmiki's vision of life An extensive analysis for substantiating that statement cannot be undertaken here, but if any reader feels sceptical about it, he might keep in mind the generic features of "humanistic existentialism" listed by Hazel Barnes²⁸ after a detailed study of Sartre, Camus and Simone de Beauvoir and read the *Ramayana* to see for himself whether or not these features are found in that great poem too Barnes enumerates the features as being "the concept of the absurdity of existence, the concern to justify man's resolve to live meaningfully in the face of an indifferent universe, the ideas of authenticity and bad faith, the refusal to accept a society based on the assumption of absolute Good and Evil a feeling for the absolute value of the individual combined with the recognition that one cannot today live wholly innocently—all this based on an explicit or implied psychology which holds that every man is free but that we are responsible for the situation within which a freedom must 'choose itself'" Rama, in his reply to Jabali, affirms his conviction that the man of high ideals can and should create meaning even if it be that life lacks meaning in itself In the last analysis, life is not obedience to exterior command, but a self-attestation "It is his conduct that renders man virtuous, a coward or a hero, and transmutes impurity into purity The self in our heart is the witness of all our good and bad thoughts and words and deeds With my five senses contented I lead my life in this world without deceit, with

faith . in values and with competence to distinguish right and wrong
 The sea will overflow its shores before I transgress a promise given to my father” If the world is a casual drift, the accidental can yet be transformed into the significant When that happens, man’s character creates meaning out of the neutral drift of events, just as an artist creates a meaningful form out of line and colour, in themselves neutral in meaning The inner movement of the epic is from the tragic as the imposed to the tragic as the sought and accepted. Rama and Sita are suddenly separated from their happy life at the court and sent out into the forest because of the foolish promise given by Dasaratha to his wife, the tragic implications of which for himself are accepted by Rama Here, Valmiki also suggests that what seems casual may not be so, that through a far-sighted integration of such disparate elements as the folly of some and moral discipline of others, the thoughtless promise of Dasaratha and the unquestioning acceptance of its terrible implications for himself on the part of Rama, some vaster power is plastically mobilising the drift of events for great purposes For Dasaratha’s weakness, Kaikeyi’s ambition, Rama’s high moral perception and Sita’s loyalty to her husband which made her go with him on exile, all move steadily towards the clash with Ravana and to the final emancipation of the earth from his tyrannical rule Descending again to the plane of personal destiny, when all the travails seemed over, Rama has to take the decision to exile Sita, because a king cannot have a queen unacceptable to the people whom he serves And no quick death follows as with Dasaratha when he had to exile Rama His personal life steeped in grey twilight, he has to go on attending to the duties of state through the slowly dragging years Both in the acceptance of exile, earlier, and of a life which would ever afterwards be irredeemably bereft, now, Rama was exemplifying through his life the truth that the tragic is not the repugnant, that it can be something to be sought rather than shunned, that in this seeking and acceptance lies victory, for the pain is conquered and values are realised that are lifted far above the order of things that decay The whole web spun out of the interactions of character and events constitutes the plot of Valmiki and the plot is his metaphor for an integrative vision of life I A Richards²⁹ has said that we read “to discover how life seems to another, partly to try how his attitudes will suit us, engaged as we also are in the same enterprise” The poet’s attitude to life can affect us as genuine only when his involvement with reality is intimate and, above all, true in a profound sense The predicaments in his plot must be genuinely human predicaments Impossible idealism is as much to be ruled out as morbid surrender to pessimism Valmiki saw the tragic context as a salutary challenge to the human spirit for a self-attestation The plot of his epic is the large metaphor in which this vision is embedded

It has been said that art is inspiration formalised and science is intellect methodised ³⁰ an attractive antithesis which could, however, be danger-

ously misleading Inspiration and formal elements are being recognised today as playing no less important a part in science than in art And the searching explorations of the intellect contribute as much as poetic reactivity to the formation of the poet's world-view More specifically, in structural articulation the intellect plays a very important role

When we referred to the plot as the poet's metaphor, the expression was used at that level of generalisation which would cover all narrations of interwoven incidents and trajectories of personal destinies As this is the most usual approach, the analysis of Valmiki's narration can apply to a whole type of creative writing which would embrace the short story and novel, drama, the narrative poem and the epic But the plot can become a metaphor, in all these forms, in a more special sense. This is what happens in allegory And just as we studied Valmiki's epic as the ideal specimen of one type, the literal representation, we can profitably study Vyasa's *Maha Bharata* as the ideal specimen of the allegorical approach

In a very perceptive study of the allegory as a form, Honig³¹ says . "The progression of an allegory is spiritual—virtuously simultaneous in three directions, backward to the thing represented (the story, the literal description of reality), which is itself symbolic, pregnant with signification, and forward and upward to the consummation of its meaning in the whole work" Honig's distinction between the prophetic and the apocalyptic will also be very useful to us for the study of Vyasa's epic When the allegory takes its authority from the voice of God, when it is directly concerned with enforcing the truth of a traditional text, and when it calls attention to man's moral obligations, it is prophetic When it derives from the dedicated experience and judgment of the individual, "when it concerns the personal vision supported by pre-literary lore, apocalyptic books, the anonymous symbolism of the dream, or, more significantly, the knowledge derived from the contradictory nature of experience, the emphasis is apocalyptic" Bunyan represents the prophetic allegory, Kafka the apocalyptic But Vyasa synthesises both For, if he seems prophetic in the authority he seems to derive from the religious and philosophical texts of the Hindu tradition, he is apocalyptic in the extremely unorthodox and intensely personal reinterpretation he gives to them and also in his ultimate reliance on his own vision of life which is a poetic vision

This is the philosophical background An antithesis between transcendence and immanence, soul and nature, absolute reality and historical existence, had developed in many currents of thought The *Upanishads*, the great meditations of thinkers who had taken refuge in the quiet forests, away from ritual-ridden religion, had not denied the reality of this world But there did linger an impression that the world implied a lower plane of reality, as contrasted with the changeless, ever-enduring Absolute In some of the post-Buddhist texts, like the *Maitrayana Upanishad* for example, the balance is indeed upset and thought becomes oppressed with the transience of things Samkhya thought had kept the soul or *Puruṣa* com-

pletely aloof from nature or *Prakṛiti*. But Vyasa, the poet, could not accept the relegation of historical existence, of the world, the arena of storm and stress and myriad challenges which alone could furnish man with an existential context for a self-attestation, to an illusory or even inferior plane. As consciousness dawned with birth only to perish in death, which also seemed to be the utter extinction of personality, metaphysical thought was caught in a quagmire, and was inclining to the conclusion that unconsciousness was a higher state than consciousness and that the idea of personality—even in the profoundest sense of the concept, which rules out all anthropomorphism—should not be associated with the Absolute.

Vyasa moved to a radical interpretation all along the line. He posited a Supreme Self—not impersonal but sublimely personal—and this Self stands higher than even the immutable Absolute, for the transcendent, withdrawn Absolute and the immanent world-soul are but aspects—and not necessarily higher or lower aspects—of the Supreme Self. At best there is only the contrast of static and dynamic aspects between the two, while, reigning above and integrating both, is the Supreme Person. The world is no longer a negation of absolute existence. Vyasa uses the Rīg Vedic image of the world as a mighty tree with roots above and branches spreading below.³² Soul is not aloof from matter, God from nature. God is the vital force that sustains all life.³³ He is the principle of creativity that launches nature in her tremendous drama of evolution. Flux is seen, not as irrevocable transience or as continuous perishing, but as the dynamism of process, as a trend towards a goal and fulfilment. Historical existence, therefore, is not a degradation or a pale reflection of absolute existence. It is the realisation of God's programme in time and man marches with the hosts of God when he aligns himself with this programme.

Isolated by analysis from the living tissue of the epic, this vision need only have been one reached by the intellect, however brilliant its integration. But actually it is embedded in a rich poetic tissue, integrated with its substance. Ambition grows to mountainous proportions and the dark flames of bitter hatreds shed weird light on intrigues and treacheries, though there are also many quiet pools unruffled by the winds of passion, in Vyasa's vast epic of the rivalry of two warrior clans for empire. The clans are close blood relations, in fact first cousins. Identical human material, Vyasa indicates here, can shape itself in widely divergent lines. The Kurus take the path of inordinate ambition and amorality. The Pandavas are also moved by the normal human ambitions. But they are tempered by social consciousness and moral conscience.

Right in the centre of this teeming world Vyasa places his magnificent pivotal personality, Krishna. With incredible daring he makes Krishna an incarnation of the Supreme Being. And the lesson he teaches is the lesson of activism. The epic gives clear indications of a long prior contest

between asceticism and activism as exemplified in a tension between the Brahmin and the Kshatriya (warrior class) for higher social status. If asceticism will win heaven, the warrior too is assured, as in the *Chanson de Roland*, a high place in heaven if he falls in the field. These beliefs, nursed to strength by the group mind of each community to support its ethos, can be seen to endow with a rare dignity even the fall of the villains. But, as yet, heroic activism remains the ethos of a class, though it is a class with an important function in society, the maintenance of social, political and economic order. The greatness of Vyasa lies in the fact that he deepened the ethos of a class to make it a profound philosophy for man. At this depth, the synthesis becomes truly dialectical, for the ascetic attitude is also purified by Vyasa to contribute to his integral vision.

Krishna is the figure through whom Vyasa achieves this deepening of meaning. He is the relative of both the Kurus and the Pandavas and both groups ask for his help in the clan war. He leaves the choice to them. The Kuru prince Duryodhana wants the armies of Krishna and he gets them. The Pandava prince Arjuna is content to choose Krishna by himself, without his armies, without even the right to be a combatant. Krishna promises to be his charioteer in the battlefield. The metaphor of the soul as the charioteer of the chariot that is the body, drawn by the team of horses which are the five senses, is one which has recurred in previous religious poetry. Here it develops into a crucial episode of the epic, at once dramatic and symbolically significant.

In the battlefield, just before the vast armies are locked in mortal combat, Arjuna experiences a profound crisis of spirit. He begins to wonder what use an empire would be if it is to be won by lifting arms against one's own kinsfolk. It is at this critical moment that the spiral progression of allegory, emphasised by Honig, makes its greatest upward leap to the consummation of the meaning of the whole work, while at the same time clearly referring backward to the story, the literal depiction of reality, which is the vesture or embodiment of that meaning. A pinnacle of thought has to be ascended towards an integrative vision, because the highest insight is needed to take the decision, here and now, to fight or not to fight. Arjuna's chariot of war suddenly becomes a cell of meditation. He is the tormented human soul and Krishna is the soul's charioteer, God. The only religious figure to select the battlefield as the venue for spiritual instruction, Krishna—or Vyasa through him—thereby clearly indicated that the crisis of action was an existential crisis which could be resolved only by profoundly moral decisions.

Arjuna's desire to withdraw from the war was really a rationalisation. He had not examined his own motives. If he was fighting for empire, his reluctance to fight his kinsmen, however unjust they were, is understandable, for a dynastic empire is in one sense only an expansion of the ingroup attachment expanding from ego and family to clan. Therefore, a dynastic empire to be won by the slaughter of one's kinsmen does look

repugnant. But this is not the issue at all. Arjuna is told that he is not fighting for an empire for himself and his brothers, but is being called upon to fulfil, primarily as warrior, more profoundly as man, his duty, which is to resist evil, irrespective of whether he will win an empire or lose his life. When the realisation dawns on Arjuna, the thunder of the battlefield, which was stilled during the interior dialogue between man and God, once again storms into consciousness like a peremptory call of the world demanding immediate attention to its crisis and the epic action is resumed. If the upper convolution of the spiral scales the pinnacles of thought and touches the stars, the lower curve is moored in the earth, deeply embedded in the sensuous substance of the story which is the embodiment of allegorical meaning.

The dialectical profundity of Vyasa's synthesis is revealed in the fact that at this depth he resolved the opposition between activism and asceticism and integrated into the final vision an essential truth which was morbidly distorted in ascetic extremism. The shallower type of asceticism was really a panicky withdrawal from life, prompted by its continuous perishing, its transience and decay. Samkhya philosophy dealt with the situation with a more penetrating subtlety, but still not with a classical justness of vision. Samkhya indeed anticipates Nietzsche who suggested that the wisest way to view the world is as an aesthetic and dramatic spectacle. A commentator on Kapila, the founder of the system, wrote "The evolution of nature has no purpose except to provide a spectacle for the soul." And Isvara Krishna, another great thinker in the Samkhya tradition, states "As a dancer, after showing herself to the audience, leaves off dancing, so does nature reveal herself to the soul and then disappear." But there does linger the impression that the aesthetic attitude here had an inherent weakness, because it excluded active participation in life. And this exclusion was probably a shying away from life because it seemed corroded by a transience that damped the spirit. Kapila's thought was indeed touched by a pessimism that bordered on defeatism. "Few indeed are these days of joy, few are these days of sorrow. Wealth is like a swollen river, life is like a tree on the crumbling bank."¹ Samkhya seems to have posited an absolute dichotomy between soul and nature because it wanted to maintain the spirit uncontaminated by the vicissitudes of matter, of historical existence which seemed such a sorry mess after all. The world, in this attitude, might become an aesthetic spectacle, but the participation of the witness in the drama witnessed is lacking here.

Vyasa has no illusion about the permanence of things earthly. The central episode in the whole epic is the battle for empire. That empire, however, goes the way of all empires and the epic, instead of stopping jubilantly with its winning, goes on to describe the confrontation of all the Pandava heroes with the ultimate confrontation of man with death. But since moral action is a value by itself irrespective of what happens to the moral agent later, this death is as irrelevant as was the probability

of defeat when the battle was about to break. Vyasa prolongs his epic to this terminal to show that his vision is unclouded by fond illusions and he can afford to do this because the fact of the transience of matter cannot assail the imperishable values which the spirit can realise. Above all, he moves far beyond the terminal of Samkhya thought and imposes upon the individual the difficult, but heroic, obligation to be a participant and witness at the same time. His hero participates energetically in the dramatic action of the world. But he has the detachment of the aesthete, because, for one thing, he is not pursuing personal ends, and secondly because he has reached the pool of quiet waters within himself beyond the reach of the hurtling currents of the maelstrom of the world's troubled sea, because he has acquired poise, "being steadfast and unshaken by even the heaviest of storms"³⁵. Vyasa, with his genius for synthesis, reconciles the doctrine that "action is superior to non-action",³⁶ with the claims of the aesthetic attitude. And because he was not a philosopher who turned to poetry, but a poet who mused profoundly on nature and man, historical existence and man's destiny, he was able to write one of the world's greatest allegorical masterpieces where full-blooded story and subtly soaring sense have become a unity in presentation. The *Gita*, the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna, which is the timeless dialogue between God and Man that takes place in the secret recesses of every soul in every epoch, is most usually read as an independent religious text. But this is seriously wrong. For the dialogue is an episode in a vast epic and it is a strictly functional episode, for it takes place at the central crisis of the epic action and is meant to resolve that crisis so that the epic action can flow forward. Isolating the allegorical meaning by analytical dissection is to deprive ourselves of a complex experience which is fundamentally poetic. Lawlor³⁷ has pointed out that correspondence with reality may sometimes be better achieved through myth and symbol than through unwavering adherence to "deeds and language such as men do use". Vyasa's greatness lies in the fact that his epic is as valid, considered purely as a heroic poem, as a *Chanson de geste*, as it is when we penetrate deeper and realise it as an allegory.

The third type of presentation of the story, regarded as the poet's metaphor, is the myth. Here we should distinguish between the myth as the unconscious creation of the group mind, especially in the racial infancy, and the myth that is created, or creatively reshaped, by the poet. Under the impact of the Freudian revelations about the unconscious, the condensation, displacement and substitutional gratification implied in dream imagery, the belief in ritual as magically effective action on natural processes and of Jungian speculations on the collective unconscious, our age has taken a very great interest in the myth. Perhaps, in some circles, there has also been an unhealthy tendency to develop a *mystique* of the myth. Reacting against it, Richard Chase³⁸ deplores the attempt to make myth autonomous, "a religion without calling it a religion". Chase

does not want the hard-won results of the objective disciplines to be relaxed and therefore insists that myth cannot perform the duties of science and philosophy and that it cannot enable us to perceive reality as the rational objectivity of the mind perceives it. At the same time, he fully recognises myth as art, literature. Since he specifically studies the myths associated with the sacraments, he comes to the conclusion that myth is an imaginative statement which evokes a sense of the uncanny and portentous in "the crises of birth, infancy, initiation, marriage, death and so on". The marriage of Charles and Emma Bovary in Flaubert's novel is not mythical, but Edmund Spenser's *Prothalamion* and John Donne's *Epithalamion* are. "And they are mythical because they contain epiphanies of the uncanny."

This is a fair assessment, but it does not quite bring out the vital distinction between the racial myth and the creative rehandling of myth in literature. The racial myth is pre-reflective. It embodies the realities of the emotional life, not their evaluation and reshaping by rational judgment. But this evaluation can and does happen in the literary rehandling of myth. The "uncanny" element here is due to the recognition of the urges and needs in the depths of our being and their gratification, through the acceptance of a pattern of belief and action. Spenser and Donne, with the strength of a complex body of Christian tradition behind them, assert the beauty, sanctity and loveliness of marriage. The symbols, the rhythms, and the drama of the two poems give the assertion its luminous quality, or as Rudolf Otto would have put it, its numinous quality, its "epiphanies of the uncanny". The rational disciplines can be employed to criticise the weight of this assertion, but they cannot supersede the myth itself.³⁹ The sacramental conception of marriage in the *Vedas*, similarly, has back of it an exalted life-view. Addressing the bride, the bridegroom chanted thus: "I am the *Saman* (melody of the hymn), you are the *Rik* (lyric of the hymn). I am heaven, you are earth. I take your hand in mine that you may live to old age with me, your husband."

"In the myth", William Troy⁴⁰ has said, "the interplay is between the principle of form and the principle of life". In the racial myth this interplay is unconscious. But the literary myth can deepen it with the contribution of reflection and judgment. In fact, Troy's occasion for this comment is a study on Thomas Mann, an analysis of the *Death in Venice* as an initiation ritual and the Joseph novels as a complex social myth. "To Mann", Troy says, "must be credited the abundantly fertile suggestion that only in the myth do we get the dialectical process working itself out on the whole ground of human reality". Irrespective of whether or not this is a just evaluation as far as Mann's achievement is concerned, the fact remains that the creatively rehandled myth can deal with reality far more exhaustively as well as penetratingly than the unconsciously evolved racial myth. It was primarily of such myths that Schorer⁴¹ wrote, in his study

of the relation between the poet and myth. "The myths of one age are better than those of another, that is, some myths include more of the total experience of a culture than others, and in the great ages, ages of amplitude and spaciousness, they include everything. Then poetry attains its full stature, its vitality is not lessened by shifts of sensibility, because it has achieved density, strata of various meaning." Since the myth arises spontaneously in response to the profound as well as universal need of a whole group, there is some justification for Wheelwright's claim⁴² that the loss of myth is the most devastating loss humanity can suffer. Myth-consciousness, he proceeds to claim, "is the bond that unites men both with one another and with the unplumbed Mystery from which mankind is sprung and without reference to which the radical significance of things go to pot." But if the myth emerges from what Bergson called the *fonction fabulatrice* of the human mind and which he defined as nature's defence against domination by the intellect, there have also been myths that weighed down on the spirit of man. The creatively rehandled myth can be more wholly positive. Santayana⁴³ wrote: "A rational poet's vision would have the same moral functions that myth was asked to fulfil, and fulfilled so treacherously, it would employ accurately the same ideal faculties which myth used confusedly."

We have seen both the myth of ritual and the poetic myth that arise in response to the profound need for transforming the social institution of marriage into a sacrament, just as the biological urge was stabilised as a social institution in the first place earlier in human evolution. This union spontaneously becomes a symbol, in many climes and many epochs, for an unplumbed mystery, the relation between God and the human soul, their longing for each other. In Europe we have Teresa of Avila and St John of the Cross. In India we have the tradition of Vaishnavite lyricism represented by Chaitanya, Meera and others. But the great fountain-head of the tradition in India is the *Bhagavata*⁴⁴ of Vyasa.

There is an extraordinary story given in the opening section of the *Bhagavata* about how it came to be written. It reveals that the myth here is not unconscious racial myth, but a myth created by a poet. The allegorical presentation of the storm and stress of outward and inward existence in the *Maha Bharata* had made its narrative full of violence. Outwardly it was a story which told of gambling, dishonouring women, treachery, attempted assassinations and a war where the flower of India's chivalry fell in the field. The sage Narada became acutely nervous about the life and strength of this concrete imagery. He told Vyasa, "However much your ultimate idea may be the inculcation of moral duty, you ought not to have given to the people stories with loathsome themes and incidents. By nature addicted to the obvious pleasures of the senses, they revel in the doubtful material and miss the inner message." Narada called for a devotional composition. "Renunciation without devotion to the Lord and action without dedication to Him are not good." Vyasa met

the demand by composing the *Bhagavata*, an idyll where God is the lover and the human soul the maiden He sports with

He was creating a myth exactly in the same way that Eliot was creating a myth in the *Waste Land*—a fact which has been completely missed in the evaluations of Vyasa's great works. But the myth in *Waste Land* is a crazy quilt of motifs drawn from the lore of many peoples and epochs and critics like Herbert Read have referred to the "archaeological" nature of the resulting amalgam. Vyasa, on the other hand, was careful to develop the germinal elements that were already available in the racial heritage. Therefore, in his work the myth has become an organic growth and for centuries after his time, it has continued to spread its bouquet of leaves and renew its crown of blossoms through folk poetry, art and drama as well as innumerable literary creations.

Poignant exchanges between God and the human soul, tender and moving like the murmured colloquies of lovers, were heard as early as in Vedic poetry. God is the "dearest guest, bosom friend"¹⁵. Guilt brings a troubled sense of alienation from this dearest friend. "What has become of our ancient friendship, when without enmity we walked together? If he, your true ally, has sinned against you, still, Varuna, he is the friend whom once you loved"¹⁶. Pure and movingly tender is this prayer: "Cast all these sins away like loosened fetters, Varuna, and let us be your own beloved." God becomes the lover and husband of the human soul. "Like the husband to the wife, may God, the upholder of the heavens, Lord of all bliss, turn towards us"¹⁷. Duality is at last forgotten in a close embrace. "Thou art ours and we are Thine"¹⁸.

While this tradition gave the cue to Vyasa for his central myth, the conception of God and the human soul as lovers, another current gave the cue for the sublimation of the vital urges which alone makes the erotic symbol in this context truly poetic, because truly sensuous. This was the current that led to the emergence of the Soma deity. The Soma is the intoxicating drink crushed from the Soma plant. But a fine web of poetic associations begins to build up rapidly around this exhilarating draught. Its tonic action on the vital powers makes it the symbol of the vital energy (the Dionysian life-force or the Bergsonian *élan vital*) by which the universe itself is sustained. Indra (the god of life-giving rain), gets his energy in his mighty battle with the demon Vritra (drought) from drinking deep draughts of Soma¹⁹. The moon, the golden gleaming drop in the sky, now becomes identified with Soma. It is a drop of the nectar of the gods. The phases of the moon suggest the moon-vessel filling itself day by day with the precious liquor. When the full moon overflowed then was the time of nature's supreme vigour, the time when men would plant their seeds to ensure the highest fertility. The Soma, now identified with the moon, becomes the most potent of health-giving medicines and the god of medicinal plants. The web of poetic association extends still further. The plant world is preserved in health by the streams

and rivers So Soma becomes the god of the streams also He is described in one Vedic poem as rejoicing in the streams like a youngman sporting with graceful maidens⁵⁰

The plenitude of vital existence, the Dionysian ecstasy of living, is now made to resonate and yield harmonic vibrations on a higher plane of meaning The bliss of vital existence is finite, but it can become the symbol of the bliss of a timeless existence "There is no bliss in finite things, the infinite alone is bliss", the *Chhandogya* Upanishad⁵¹ had asserted Whatever bliss there is, is borrowed from the Supreme Self. "On a particle of this very bliss, other beings live"⁵² And thus Vyasa creates his great myth, investing the figure of Krishna with new meaning Here, again, Vyasa was attempting a radical poetic mutation in yet another current, that of tribal lore and folk legend For Krishna was originally a tribal god, of the tribes of Western and Central India, like the Vrishnis, the Satvatas, the Abhiras and the Yadavas He was at first opposed by the religion of the priestly classes and the memory of this opposition lingers in the episode in the Krishna legend where Indra, the god of the priestly class, sends rain to flood Krishna's village, Gokul But Krishna lifted up the Govardhana hill like an umbrella and the episode ended in the defeat of Indra Krishna thus got his access to the Hindu pantheon. But the profoundest transformation took place when Vyasa used the Krishna figure for musing on absolute and historical existence, earthly life and divine life, man and God, in the *Maha Bharata* and later in the *Bhagavata* In the *Bhagavata* Krishna speaks thus. "I am always present in all beings as their soul That devotion is absolute which renders a person fit to become one with Me"⁵³ A lyrical-romantic myth is used to indicate this union Krishna, the cowherd boy, enchants the maidens of Gokul with his flute

The story of this dalliance is spun by Vyasa out of the loveliest material that nature can furnish, moonlight on the river, the scented breath of the night breeze flowing from the heart of the woods and the call of Krishna's flute heard by the maidens even in their sleep The imagery used has always a significant resonance. "The rains set in Clouds hid the moon, even as egoism hides the soul Rain poured down like blessings The fresh water, like the service of the Lord, provided a fresh richness and beauty in all Then autumn came Sky and water became transparent like minds in meditation, the mire of the roads slowly disappeared like the false notions of the ignorant The sea was still like a self-realised soul The moon shone like true knowledge" This repetition of imagery with a deeper resonance, where the detail in nature is used to suggest a state of the spirit, prepares the way for the entry of the flute, pouring out as much longing as its listeners in the hushed hamlet felt for its player "Wearing yellow silk, with a peacock feather on his head and a garland of woodland blossoms, Krishna played his flute in the heart of the woods The magic music fell on the ears of the cowherd lasses who became

jealous of the flute that drank the sweet breath from the ruby lips of the Lord. Cows stood still, drinking in the music of the flute with upturned ears. The sages sat, like the still birds on the boughs, listening in silence to those strains. The Yamuna eddied all the more and appeared to stretch her waves, like arms to clasp the feet of the Lord."⁵¹ The human soul is feminine to God, the eternal male. This is brought out in a story in the *Naradiya Purana*, which closely follows the *Bhagavata* in inspiration and incidents. The sage Narada seeks the help of Brinda in participating in the Orphic mystery of Gokul. She asks him to take a dip in the lake. He suddenly finds himself transformed into a maiden. And it is as a maiden going to her lover, like an Indian St. John of the Cross, that he enters the presence of the Lord.

But the uniqueness of the myth in Vyasa is that it embodies a classic, integrated world-view, unlike those instances of the unconscious emergence of erotic symbolism—St. John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila—where there may be intensity but not necessarily an all-embracing world-vision. First of all, Vyasa does not seek shelter in any amnesia about the transience of all earthly phenomena, including the social and the historical. But instead of seeing helpless decay here, he sees the termination of a phase of a programme. If, for his aesthetic-philosophic purposes, Vyasa conceived of Krishna as an incarnation, he still has to go when the purpose of his intervention in a historical crisis is fulfilled. If history is God's programme, man is his instrument and the instrument cannot transcend the transience of the natural condition. Krishna acted on the plane of history as a man and therefore he has to go. Vyasa here gives a most profound turn to his argument. "The clan in which the incarnation of Krishna had manifested himself became elated with pride and it became necessary for the Lord to remove them before he himself departed from the world." Vyasa here resolutely opposes the tendency, which has created difficulties in certain religious traditions of the world, of making what could be called *legal* claims to inheritance of charismatic authority from a personality that is regarded as an incarnation. The *Gita* carries Krishna's august assurance that he shall return again and again whenever man needs divine help in a historical crisis. It is the spiritual leaders of humanity in every clime, epoch and race, who symbolise this return, the recurring epiphany of the divine in man. But they cannot transcend their mortal condition, because history is not exhausted with their crises and their solution. History will move forward and present other challenges to other generations. Therefore, their mission over, they have to go and the groups among whom they appeared do not inherit their authority automatically. The courageous opposition to the growth of exclusive cults in this deliberately casual dismissal should be noted. The sea sweeps over his capital, Dwaraka. The Yadava clan, who thought they would inherit the earth because Krishna was born in their midst, move to Prabhasa from their sea-wrecked city, indulge in heavy drinking, quarrel

and fight each other to the last man Krishna himself leaves when a hunter shoots him by mistake And with that, the great symbolic stage which Vyasa's genius had structured revolves away from sight, lest it leave too concrete and legal a legacy, and takes its abiding place in the memory of men in its pure status as profound myth

We should remind ourselves again and again that here we are dealing with the myth of a poet and not a primitive racial myth In the poet's myth we see the "transition from unconscious creation to creative consciousness", a profound distinction which Dmitri Merejkowski emphasised when referring to the contrast between Pushkin and Gogol Since Vyasa rejects the doctrine that nature and history are degradations of absolute existence and asserts that they are fulfilment of a divine programme where man too fulfils himself by freely choosing to be the instrument of that programme, he boldly uses nature as a reservoir of mythical intimations, not of a flux where nothing abides, but of a symbolic teleology which changes the flux into a process, by aligning with which the free human spirit can find its fulfilment The world, the human soul and God form a perfect alignment Krishna advises Uddhava, his cousin and minister "With senses and mind under control, see the world within your heart and your Self in Me, the Over-Lord The wise exalt themselves by their own self-endeavour The Self is the greatest teacher" When the world is seen in the heart with the poetic and mythopoetic imagination, it yields precious intimations "Learn from these objects of nature From these mountains which bear their minerals and other resources for the weal of the world, learn that you should live for others and not for yourself Persuasive, touching everything, yet itself untouched, the ether is indeed the best example of the Yogi You should be limpid, pure, purifying, pleasing and refreshing like water, effulgent with the lustre of knowledge like fire, reducing to ashes all impurity Like the sea, deep and unfathomable, neither swell up by what flows into you, nor get exhausted by what is taken from you Like a bee, take in little by little, and from good and bad, extract the essence even as the bee does the honey`

Vyasa saw that men's temperaments differed and they started their spiritual journey from different points Some sought certitude through the intellect Others were troubled by the perplexities of moral life Yet others yearned for an enriched emotional life Vyasa wanted to integrate all these different trajectories so that they all converged to the same terminal The *Vedas* or scriptures were being used by all these types But Vyasa felt that the approaches were not profoundly perceptive He dismissed the literalism of the orthodox with contempt "What use there is of a tank in a place flooded over with water, only so much in all the *Vedas* is the use for a knower of the Ultimate Reality, equipped with his higher knowledge"³⁵ He exiled the impersonal Absolute and established in its place in men's adoration the Supreme Person "That which is to

be known in all the Vedas am I"⁵⁶ All paths converge Knowledge, when it attains the final vision, kindles into lyrical rapture The knower cannot but be the adorer "He who knows Me worships me"⁵⁷ Devotion and emotional identification are the perfect understanding "Fix your mind in Me, into Me let your understanding enter You shall surely live with Me hereafter"⁵⁸ The priests had exalted ritual as complete moral action Vyasa's Krishna drastically simplified ritual, shifting the accent from the obligatory ceremony to the devotion of the heart "Whosoever devotedly offers to Me a leaf, a flower, a fruit or water—I accept the pious offering of the man who is pure of heart"⁵⁹ The spiritual act is not the ritual deed, but moral action All life and action must become an offering "Whatever you do do that as an offering unto Me With your mind firmly set on the way of renunciation, you shall become free and come to Me"⁶⁰ Vyasa, the poet, does not want to restrict the plenitude of life into ascetic grooves All legitimate impulses can be gratified "In your pursuit of meritorious duty, material gain or emotional gratification, take your stand in Me" If Krishna asks men to dedicate themselves to him, it is because the self of man is identical with the divine reality of which he is the incarnation and therefore dedication to him is the same as dedication to the higher self in every man The dedicated act cannot be the same as the act motivated by ego-centered drives "I am established in every being That man of invidious perception who draws the line between himself and another, him Death pursues with his dangerous fear Therefore, with charity and honour and with friendship towards all, one should worship Me, the soul of all beings, as enshrined in all beings Honouring them, one should mentally bow to all beings, realizing that the Lord has entered them with an aspect of His own being" Here is a profound reiteration of Wheelwright's claim that myth-consciousness is the bond that unites men both with one another and with the unplumbed mystery from which mankind is sprung

While closing the discussion of the great poems of Vyasa, we should keep in mind that our analysis was a dissection which cut out the nerve network of ideas that, in the poem, lies deeply embedded in the poetic tissue, organically one with it even while being in full functional control of it What Mark Van Doren⁶¹ had to say of Dante's allegory can be said of Vyasa's allegory as well as myth "The allegory declares itself in silence One thing is another and that is all, except that it is itself too The mutual meanings are as immediate, and as noiseless as communication among mirrors The result is that the poet does not have to call our attention to what he is doing, the poem is doing it as we read and understand"

"Without the creative arts" Herbert Read⁶² has asserted, "there would have been no advance in myth or ritual, in language or meaning, in morality or metaphysics" The poetic myth, the myth that is not an unconscious creation, but the fruit of creative consciousness, achieves in Vyasa

a tremendous vitality, which seems beyond the reach of the archaeological piecing together that provides the myth in some modern poets. The most eclectic of T S Eliot's work, the *Waste Land*, was described by Read⁶³ as "a mythical landscape, a landscape of broken columns and discarded masks" It is the rejection of this archaeological approach by Vyasa that explains his vitality He used the racial myths, like that of the Soma dcity for example, which had grown up through the centuries as a common heritage, though he profoundly deepened their final significance The result is that this great stream has irrigated thought and life throughout the subsequent centuries In the Vaishnavite movement of Bengal⁶⁴ represented by Chaitanya⁶⁵ of the fifteenth century, Jiva Goswami of the sixteenth and Baladeva⁶⁶ of the eighteenth, it flowered into the metaphysical theory of the trans-logical dual-non-dual relation (*Achintya Bhedabheda*) between God and soul Vyasa's classicism prevented the devotional cult from becoming an orgy of emotionalism which forgot the responsibility man owed to his brother In the devotional aphorisms of Narada⁶⁷ and Shandilya as well as in the philosophy of Ramanuja⁶⁸ there is no *mystique* of mere emotionalism All of them insist on an elaborate preparation for the life of devotion The discipline includes discrimination, emancipation from material obsessions, doing good to others, wishing well for all, non-violence, integrity, compassion, and pervasive optimism This devotion, therefore, is not mere emotionalism but includes the training of the will as well as the intellect It leads to a consistent ethics and it is very important to remember that the devotional movement proved to be one of the greatest solvents of caste distinctions in India's social history The myth of the erotic bond of God and the human soul inspired the superb lyrics of Vaishnavite poetry, the entrancingly lovely songs of Meera, Tagore's *Gitanjali* of our own days and the thousands of paintings, jewel-like miniatures, of the Rajasthani and Pahari schools

III ORGANIC STRUCTURE

From the analysis of plot as the poet's metaphor and its presentation as literal narrative, allegory or myth, let us now move closer to the problem of structural articulation Here we should again keep in mind the interesting detail about the evolution of poetics in India, that it emerged first as dramaturgy and was generalised later to cover the other literary forms As the themes of dramas were mostly drawn from epic poetry, Bharata took especial care to emphasise the transformation needed to make a poem which is enjoyed by reading (*Shravya Kavya*) into a visualised presentation (*Drisya Kavya*) Dhananjaya⁶⁹ in the tenth century and Sarada Tanaya⁷⁰ in the thirteenth amplified Bharata's directions The latter says : "Incidents have to be carefully distinguished into two categories Only certain incidents can be seen or heard, visually and aurally presented Others can only be narrated and suggested Bulky,

uninteresting stretches of the story, where there is no glow of emotion, must be indicated by brief narration or suggestion. Only the significant aspects of the story, shot through and through with emotional intensity, are to be selected for visual presentation."

In Greek drama, Euripides developed the Prologue because he selected the less known myths or made radical alterations in the well-known legends. The obscure myth or the legend in its reshaped form had to be communicated to the audience before the dramatisation could take off. The opening words of the Sutradhara, a key role stabilised by the evolution of the bard of the hero-ballad as director of the drama, serve the same purpose in Sanskrit drama, with the difference that his prologue does not have to be lengthy as the story and plots were familiar to the readers. The bold, initial confrontation of audience and director and sometimes the chief actor—as actor, not yet the character—served also a profounder purpose in clearly establishing Bharata's basic approach to the drama as the poet's presentation, not as the illusion of an interior with the fourth wall annihilated by the poet who thereby also sought to annihilate his obvious presence in his presentation. There is here a remarkable affinity with Berthold Brecht's dramatic theory of our own day and also with Anouilh's technique in his version of *Antigone*. If the problems that emerge here seem insoluble at first, it is because we have been strongly conditioned to the naturalistic illusion. There do exist problems here, but in no more acute a sense than in any other specific literary form and stylisation is the solvent of these problems.

The greatest challenge is the mode of transition in time and space, from the present occasion and venue, when the director and actors have assembled to stage a play, to the location and epoch which form the coordinates for the dramatic action to trace its parabola of take-off, crisis and resolution. And meeting this challenge often transcends the rather negative level of merely solving a difficulty and becomes something positive, a significant revelation of the characters or theme of the play. For instance, Visakhadatta's *Mudra Rakshasa*⁷¹ has for its hero the great diplomat of imperialism, Chanakya (Kautilya) who saw the collapse of a divided India before the Greeks and was bent on establishing a strong monolithic state under Chandra Gupta Maurya. He drives to his aim with ruthless vigour and the opening of the play itself is characteristically vigorous. The director refers to an eclipse, the Sanskrit word for which would literally mean the capture of the moon (*Chandra*)—by the earth's shadow which in popular mythology was regarded as a monster, Ketu. There is a pun here, for besides the ambiguity of the word "Chandra", Ketu could stand also for Malaya Ketu, a powerful prince who opposes Chandra Gupta. Thus, the moment the word "eclipse" (*Chandra Grahana*) is mentioned, we hear Chanakya thundering behind the stage: "Who threatens the King when I am alive?" The transition has been effected in one plunge and the dramatic action is launched in its swift, hurtling career.

Even more brilliant and profoundly subtle is the solution of the problem of transition in Bhavabhuti's *Uttara Rama Charita*⁷² The play deals with the return of tragedy in the lives of Rama and Sita when they had felt certain that the days of exile and separation were over. Rama's subjects whisper calumny about a queen who was a prisoner of Ravana who had abducted her and taken her to Lanka. Immediately after the war for her recovery she had established her chastity through a fire ordeal but its memory cannot stop the scandal. And ultimately Rama has to abandon a queen who is not acceptable to his subjects though this breaks his heart. Bhavabhuti's plays were presented during the festival of Lord Mahakala whose temple was the centre of religious celebrations in Ujjain. The stage-director greets the assembly, makes a brief reference to the dramatist and the play and initiates the transition by saying, "Now, in deference to the matter in hand, I am transformed, into an inhabitant of Ayodhya and a contemporary of Rama." The context is immediately after the coronation of Rama. The director looks around and is puzzled that not one of the many bards who had come for the coronation festivities is present in the deserted courtyard. An actor—not yet a character—enters now and says that the Queen-Mother, the royal ladies, the elders and the bards have all left for a great ritual in a distant hermitage and the ladies especially left reluctantly as they were leaving behind Sita who was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. The resonance here is that Sita has only Rama for company during this critical phase of a woman's life and that the same Rama has to exile her and his decision has also to be taken in tragic isolation, without the advice or solace that could have been offered by others if they were present. Implying that Rama too is now in a strained mood due to the sudden descent of loneliness in the palace, the actor requests the director to be very careful in the selection of words for the benediction with which to greet Rama. Agreeing with him, the director says, "You cannot be too careful either of composition or of woman. People will misunderstand their purity." "That reminds me," whispers the actor, "do you know, our people are talking scandal even against Sita on account of her stay in Lanka? They do not believe in the fire-ordeal." The director expresses the fear that if this scandal reaches the ears of Rama, the consequences will be disastrous. But the scandal does reach Rama and this is what initiates the tragic action. In the whole of this prologue, the director and the actor are poised in the interface between the world's reality—that of the people come to witness a play, and the world of aesthetically represented action, the drama's reality. The solitude of the scene they refer to stands both for the bareness of the stage before it becomes peopled with actors playing their roles and the loneliness that has flooded the palace at Ayodhya and this latter has profound psychological implications for character and action in the drama. The care they have to take about their style and idiom refers initially to their professional task, for they are about to stage a play. But it is linked by

resonance with, and points forward to, the dramatic crisis. The threshold of the interface is fully crossed and the transition completed when, after the actor announces that Rama is hurrying back from affairs of state to console Sita in her loneliness, both director and actor leave, and the scene opens with Rama and Sita on the stage.

Since the drama only begins, and is not completed, with the prologue and since the day-to-day world can intrude into its world at any time before it concludes, the transition from raw reality to creative reality need not be confined to the prologue. In the concluding act of his play, as the immediate context of the dramatic resolution, Bhavabhuti introduces with exceptional brilliance a play within the play. This has as its theme the vicissitudes of Sita after she was abandoned in the forest. The director of this play announces that it is by Valmiki, "the speaker of the Truth." He quotes Valmiki: "Here is what dawned upon us in our spiritual insight

Do you therefore, because of its importance, pay attention." This is the poetic truth which destroys the barrier, erected by the insensitive heart, between the day-to-day world, which alone is normally accepted as reality, and the world created by the poet. Rama, as a character of the main play, is a member of the audience that witnesses this play within the play. Its consummate artistry destroys the barrier for him, transforms the confrontation as witness to participation as one involved in the emotional eddies represented. Throughout he forgets that the scenes enacted before him are a dramatic presentation and he swoons when it concludes. Rama's immersion in the dramatised action of the playlet reinforces the immersion of the audience itself in the main play. There is also an extraordinary wizardry in the handling of the transition from the crudely real moment, the time of the audience, to the dramatic time. The play within the play begins by showing the abandoned Sita jumping into the river to end a life that had become unbearable. From the point of view of Rama, this is an incident that must have occurred many years ago. But he reacts to it as a present occurrence, something which he wants to prevent. He cries out: "Queen, my queen, just tarry but one instant!" The emergence of the past as the dramatic present in the playlet helps in achieving the same magical restoration of the past for the audience of the main play. And when the playlet ends, the action of the main play is resumed by the transformation of the initial scene *represented* in the playlet as a *reality* for the characters of the main play. The playlet had shown Sita making her entry supported by two goddesses—Earth and the Ganges—who had rescued her from the river. Sita is admonished that she has to live to rear her children. Sita repeatedly requests the goddesses to take her away from the misery of life on earth. At this point Rama swoons, all the characters of the playlet make their exit and Lakshmana, the brother of Rama, calls upon Valmiki for succour for Rama lying in a faint. "Help help, exalted Valmiki! Was this your poem's end and aim?" A voice from behind the stage orders the removal of the stage properties of the

playlet The playlet is over, it is abruptly terminated because of its terrific impact as reality, not representation, on Rama, who is the hero of the main play What now happens is a reality for the characters of the main play The playlet had been staged on the banks of the Ganges As if churned by some unseen agency, the river becomes agitated and the goddesses Earth and Ganges emerge, as in the opening scene of the playlet, but this time as a reality for Rama, and restore Sita to him. The maturing of a representation in a playlet as a reality in the main play and, earlier, its impact as reality on the hero of the main play, are powerful forces of suggestion which enable the audience of the main play also to achieve perfect identification with the dramatised reality, the truth of which is the truth of Valmiki, the Poet, the poetic truth accepted by the sensitive heart

Lengthy stretches of the story, intractable for dramatic handling, were covered in interludes known as *Vishkambhas* and *Pravesakas* It is probable that of these two forms, the *Vishkambha* was more important to the development of the plot, summarising important events supposed to happen off the stage, like the Greek chorus, while the *Pravesaka* was an interlude to cover the scene-shift Even if the Sanskrit drama is a stylised presentation, the solid base still remains the plot Bharata indicates the course the episodic action should take Thus, any play, in general, has five main phases in the unfolding of its incidents To open with, the story of the play is narrated in outline The particular incident or incidents that give rise to a dramatic situation should then be introduced The drama is now moving towards the climax The situation that actually brings about the climax by coming into conflict with the preceding incidents and the movement generated by them is now presented A dramatic resolution has now to be suggested to steer through this conflict The parabola now gently descends to the tranquil conclusion where remembrance, even if it is poignant, is at peace with itself Broadly this scheme corresponds to the phases of the evolution of action in Greek drama: Protasis or exposition, Epitasis or growth, Peripeteia or turning point, Catabasis or falling action and Catastrophe, which is just conclusion and not a necessarily tragic ending, since it is used for the happy issue of comedy as well⁷¹ Bharata likes the involution of plot which will create suspense and its subsequent resolution which will lead to delightful surprise (*aschavaya-l-abhukhyanam*)⁷² The story should be a knotted strand of complications smoothly unravelled at the end Using a homely simile, he says the story should be like the cow's tail (*gopuchhagra*) bushy at the end with a crowd of surprise⁷³

With the help of the devices for the coverage of undramatic sequences in narration, Sanskrit drama is able to observe the unities of time and place in a restricted sense The interludes can cover long gaps of time But the dramatised section should not extend over more than five Muhurtas⁷⁴ (about eight hours) Similarly, the scenes of action within

an act cannot lie so far apart from one another that they cannot be reached by the characters within the time available for the presentation of the act. As for the unity of action, Sanskrit drama insisted upon it in a profounder sense than Greek drama. For, in the latter, the principle, strictly, applies to the episodic evolution. In Sanskrit drama, apart from this objective unity, there is the very important subjective unity, the orchestration of episode and character for the realisation of the dominant emotion or *Rasa*.⁷⁷

This leads us to the careful and repeated insistence of Sanskrit poetics on the demand that all structural and stylistic elements should serve the delineation of the emotion. That literary merit of the whole composition considered as an organism (*Prabandha Guna*) which Bhoja calls the pervasiveness of emotion (*Rasa Bhava Nivartatva*) demands that the whole composition should have one *Rasa* as its dominant mood.⁷⁸ This does not mean exclusiveness or monotony. For, in the development of that one *Rasa* throughout the composition, all the rich variety of human sentiments shall be portrayed in a subtle orchestration which strengthens the focal sentiment in its supreme status. The sentiment may be of a very complex kind and it can assimilate a conflict in a dialectical synthesis. Thus, in Bhavabhuti's *Uttara Rama Charita*, the basic *Rasa* is the one 'inherent in the agonising situation in which Rama finds himself, torn between his love for his wife and his devotion to his subjects. Vamana claims that poetic radiance or lustre (*Kanti*) is realised by the composition only when the various *Rasas* are thus plastically, hierarchically moulded.⁷⁹

We noted earlier Sarada Tanaya's prescriptions for the dramatisation of epic or ballad narratives. This does not imply that the dramatist is not allowed any personal deviation from the emotional pattern of his source. He is allowed the maximum liberty in reshaping the narrative content as well as in remoulding the emotional significance. Kuntaka sanctions changes by the dramatist in the traditional plot (*Prakarana Vakriata*)⁸⁰ if they justify themselves by contributing to the development of the *Rasa* he has in view. In the original version of the Shakuntala story in the *Maha Bharata*, King Dushyanta woos the forest maiden and later forgets the episode. Kalidasa introduces the accident where the ascetic Durvasas curses Shakuntala that the king shall not remember her. Kalidasa's intentions are very subtle in introducing this change. He does not want a harsh accentuation of the king's tendency for easy seductions and as easy and convenient an amnesia. Nevertheless, through other subtle changes, he does establish the king's guilt and the inner evolution of the play is the purification of his character through suffering. Shakuntala's travails are also suggested as the natural consequence of her immersion in her own day-dreams, for it is this which makes her ignore the guest and provokes his curse. She too has to undergo a purification through suffering. Kuntaka also sanctions a complete change in the main story (*Prabandha Vakriata*)⁸¹. Such a change is illustrated by Bhatta Narayana's *Vem Samhara*⁸² where

the dominant emotion is the heroic (*Vira Rasa*) while the dominant emotion of the *Mahā Bharata* on which the drama is based is tranquillity (*Śānta Rasa*). Thus, if the bulk of Sanskrit drama is based on the material of epics and ballads and if Rāja Sekhara gives tips for plagiarising, it must be strictly understood that creative mutation and not plain literary stealing is the implied reality. "When a Shakespeare takes a plot or even a metaphor from Plutarch or Ovid", says Read,⁸³ "he absorbs it into his own poetic system and reproduces it in terms of his own poetic essence." Rāja Sekhara wants all literary appropriations to be assimilated into a unity which can be the vehicle of the *Rasa*. T. S. Eliot⁸⁴ would wholly agree with him. "One of the surest of tests is the way in which a poet borrows. Immature poets imitate, mature poets steal, bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different. The good poet welds his theft into a whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that from which it was torn, the bad poet throws it into something which has no cohesion."

The fact that Sanskrit drama always kept before it the difficult ideal of synthesising the humanism of feeling with the aestheticism of stylised presentation comes out clearly when we read Bharata on the creative direction and integration of stage-craft, costume, gesture, speech, emotive expression, music and dance. While he gives detailed treatment of each of these topics in separate chapters, he concludes the discussion of each of them with an important section called *Rasa Prayoga* where he points out what treatment suits which particular emotional nuance. Each dramatic element or technique is a representation (*Abhinaya*) and what it represents or embodies in a concrete, sensuously palpable, objective correlative is the *Rasa*. This is why Maṭṛgupta,⁸⁵ later, speaks of the *Rasa* that can be generated as well by the stage set (*Nepathya*) as by the character portrayed (*Svabhāva*). The term *Ahārya*,⁸⁶ in Bharata, covers not only stage decor and scenic effects, but also the costume and make-up of characters. Representation through these (*Ahārya Abhinaya*), says Bharata,⁸⁷ must be appropriate to the *Rasa*. Art is the concretisation of feeling in form or technique. Bharata therefore did not make the mistake of regarding technique as something autonomous—a mistake which it is very easy to make. Referring to technique in music, Tovey⁸⁸ wrote: "The line between the technical and the aesthetic is by no means easy to draw, and is often, even by musicians themselves, drawn far too high, so as to exclude as mere technicalities many things which are of purely aesthetic importance. The greatest musicians, whether composers or performers, have often not cared to draw the line at all. They prefer modestly to regard everything as technique." As Bharata conceived it, none of the elements of dramatic representation was a technicality, everything was to be a technique for the evocation of *Rasa*.

The absolute emphasis on the integration of all elements and techniques in the drama as a whole is reflected in the care taken by theory to integrate

costume, speech and gesture or action as expressive, each according to its modality, of the character portrayed. As Raja Sekhara⁸⁹ formulates this principle of integration, costume (*Pravriti*) is the style of dress and decoration (*Vesha Vinyasa Krama*), speech (*Riti*) is the handling of language and idiom (*Vachana Vinyasa Krama*) and physical action (*Vritti*) is the style of motor movement (*Cheshta Vinyasa Krama*), all of which are intimately related to the unique organisation of personality represented by a specific character. They are all *Anubhavas* in the technical sense of that term, asserts Bhoja.⁹⁰ A fascinating line of specialised investigation for which there is unfortunately no time here would be to link this formulation with the immense research done in recent times on the consistent reflection of personality in various forms of sensory reactions and motor behaviour. Lavater saw this inner consistency in "voice, walk, manner, style, passion, love, hatred".⁹¹ One experiment by Allport and Vernon⁹² showed that the length of the walking stride and the area of the subject's normal writing correlated. Here there is no question of identical nerve processes, for the motor systems for the two actions are different. The consistency emerges from deep below, from the personality itself as a whole. Anita Muhl⁹³ showed that handwriting reflected personality. Individuals capable of adapting and adjusting themselves showed balanced zones, writing angles which were neither too rigid nor too oscillating, balanced size, pressure and spacing. Personality or the "form quality" of the individual could be intuited from the voice. In one experiment,⁹⁴ several voices speaking identical words were heard successively over the radio. After hearing the unseen speakers, judges attempted to tell which of various specimens of handwriting, data of ages and heights and which of several photographs fitted each voice. The voices were likewise matched with statements concerning the vocation and political preferences of the speakers and with the results, previously obtained from the speakers, of three personality tests for extroversion, ascendance and personal values. The tests yielded a positive correlation.

Bhoja elaborates the cues given by Bharata and Raja Sekhara on the expressive nature of costume and personal ornament. Determined to be thorough, he lists twenty-four dress-determining conditions (*Pravriti hetu*).⁹⁵ The milieu is important. One condition, termed *Sadhana* by Bhoja, relates to the decorative material available. For instance, even the most powerful tribal chieftain or hunter does not sport fashionable jewellery but only things like peacock feathers. Another condition (*Sakti*) is the means at one's disposal. Even the urbanite does not dress himself in the latest fashion if he is poor. The more important conditions are the psychological. Mental mood and emotional condition (*Avasta*) are important determiners of dress. For instance, a lady separated from her lover and feeling depressed is not in a mood to decorate herself even if she has fine garments and jewels. *Vyatyasa* is misplacing of ornaments due to excitement. City damsels rushing to their windows to see Aja

in Kalidasa's *Raghu Vamsa* or to gaze on Siva in his *Kumara Sambhava* and the Buddha in Asvaghosha's *Buddha Charita* are described as in lovely disarray, with toilet unfinished. Apparel not only proclaims the man (and woman) but also the transient mood.

To return to the dramatic media Bharata analyses, *Angika*⁹⁶ deals with stylised gesture and Bharata's discussion laid the foundation for this tradition which plays such an important role in Indian dance-drama. *Vachika*⁹⁷ is representation through speech, the personalised idiom and its stylised delivery. *Satvika*⁹⁸ is the climactic effort, because it involves the realisation of all the bodily changes symptomatic and revelatory of changing inner mood and emotion, including change of colour, tremor and horripilation.

It is important to realise that it was Bharata's attempt to elevate drama as an organic synthesis of various arts, including music and dance, that laid the foundation of the arts themselves. The early sections⁹⁹ of his great treatise deal with the *Purvaranga* or elaborate overture which included dance sequences. It is here that we get the earliest description of the hundred and eight poses of the Tandava dance. Elsewhere¹⁰⁰ he gives the first scientific analysis in the Indian tradition regarding musical notes, scales and modes. He analyses the various musical modes (*Jatis*) suited to different emotions. Kasyapa and Abhinava Gupta elaborated upon these later. While the songs in the various scenes reflected the emotional mood of specific episodic developments, the music of the overture, according to Abhinava¹⁰¹ was intended to create in the spectator the receptive aesthetic mood, the absence of which was a hindrance to *Rasa* realisation. If the wounded man does not sing in real life, neither does he speak in iambic pentameter. But verse drama and musical drama are stylised presentations and style is the means for reaching depth and intensity, for stepping up aesthetic receptivity right from the beginning to a higher level of tension and sensitiveness.

If Sanskrit dramaturgy gives very detailed instructions regarding the various dramatic elements and techniques, an absolute requirement is their integration into a creative unity. This is very clearly revealed in the concept of *Vritti*. It is a subtle concept and its discussion by later writers has not always been very helpful. To begin with, we can translate the term *Vritti* as motor action of the body. In a lyric, there need be only one physical event, a sensuous perception, seeing daffodils by the river bank or hearing the nightingale in darkness. It is a physical event in the sense that sensory experience is, scientifically, a physical event. Light waves in vision and sound waves in aural experience make an impact on the organism. The lyric now can unfold without the help of any further physical event, any motor reaction by the agent—as a sequence of emotional reactions. But even if these reactions are not motor events they are psychological events of the profoundest significance. In the drama, the form imposes limitations on such extended construction based on purely

psychological events. It has to unfold in episodic developments which are motor events. If now we think for one moment of the contrast between, say the Elizabethan drama and Maeterlinck's static theatre, we shall realise that, even if the drama cannot wholly dispense with motor action, the physical episodic development, there can be very wide differences in the quantum of such action mobilised by dramatists. If there are no alarms and excursions in the static drama, there are profoundly significant psychological events continuously taking place. The quantum of the physical action thus determines that elusive value which we can call the temper, mood, atmosphere or key of the play. It is for clarifying this principle that Bharata¹⁰² uses the concept of *Vritti*.

Bharata says that dramatic action, drama itself, is born of *Vritti*. *Vritti* is the bed of drama, the mother of drama. Different types of drama present different kinds of actions which, in turn, create different atmospheres. Therefore, Bharata says, *Vritti* is the factor which differentiates one type of drama from another. If, earlier, we started by equating *Vritti* with motor behaviour, we have now to extend the concept to cover not only physical action, but also speech which is really expressive, motor, lingual behaviour and, further, emotional expressions of the involuntary kind so brilliantly studied by Darwin¹⁰³. This last category is not strictly motor reaction in the science of physiology, for it is not voluntary, or initiated by the motor nerves of the central nervous system, but involuntary, initiated by the autonomous nervous system with its intricate linkages with the hormonal and endocrinal systems whose activation brings about the changes in blood flow, pulse and heartbeat. But Bharata accepts them as *Vritti* because they are really motor phenomena even if the initiating impulse is involuntary in the technical physiological sense. Even more clearly and directly than in the case of any other category of bodily action, they reveal the activity of the mind and heart. Dramatic action is really an inward action and motor action on the stage a reflection of the speed and turbulence or tranquil flow of the inner stream. Thus the quantum and quality of overt action can determine the mood, atmosphere or key of a play, understood not only as the quality of the sensuously palpable presentation, but also the degree of its inner tension. Representation through the larger movements of the limbs (*Angika Abhinaya*) is really representation through the most important motor organs of the body (*Kaya Cheshta*). Here too there can be wide differences in degree. Where action is vigorous, wild, the episodes evolve in violent physical conflicts and the dramatic texture becomes gross. The term should not be misunderstood. It does not imply a poverty of inward content. The outer storm, in nature as well as the world of men, in *King Lear*, is the objective correlative of the inner storm. But the turbulence thus built up creates its distinctive atmosphere. It is like a sombre painting executed in large, vigorous brush strokes. Representation through similar large actions of the limbs creates the dramatic mood known as *Atabhati Vritti*. The limbs

may dominate the motor expression, but the tension may be lowered. The feet may keep time to a hilarious dance instead of doing the steps of a duel. Even if representation relies mainly on physical action, the latter may be infused by grace and delicacy instead of tension and conflict. This creates the category known as *Kaisiki Vritti*. Action may evolve primarily through speech which is lingual behaviour or action (*Vak Chesta*) or verbal representation (*Vachukabhinaya*). This is the third category, the *Bharati Vritti*. Lastly, the dramatist may dispense to the maximum possible extent with physical action, reduce speech and dialogue also to a minimum and rely primarily on the capacity of the body, especially the face with its cheeks that can glow and eyes that can brim with unshed tears, to reflect the shifting inner mood through the swift, smooth, sensitive chemistry of the hormonal and other autonomous systems that determine the expression of emotions. This is representation through the mainly involuntary expressions of emotion (*Satvikabhinaya*) and what it represents directly, with the minimum magnification through grosser motor action, is the reactions of the heart, the inward activity (*Mana Cheshta*). This is the *Salvati Vritti*. This is the essence of Bharata's doctrine of the four *Vrittis* as luminously clarified by Abhinava.¹⁰¹

Ransom¹⁰⁵ made this distinction. "Science gratifies a rational or practical impulse and exhibits the minimum of perception. Art gratifies a perceptual impulse and exhibits the minimum of reason." This is a seriously unfortunate distinction, for perceptual and rational impulses play equally important roles in both science and art. One has to interpret perception here as a reaction to the sensuous which generates feeling. Feeling can become communicable only if it is structured as a system of objective correlatives and this effective structuring needs the powers of reason and judgment. This is why Leon-Paul Fargue¹⁰⁶ says that it is necessary that in art mathematics should place itself at the behest of the phantoms of the imagination. Arnim, likewise, said, "There has never been a poet without passion. But it is not passion which makes the poet. No poet has done lasting work in the instant when he was dominated by passion." T. S. Eliot clarifies this: "There is a great deal, in the writing of poetry, which must be conscious and deliberate." Baudelaire,¹⁰⁷ who used the material emerging from the depths of the unconscious, insisted that they should be given a durable structure. "Construction, the armature, so to speak, is the most important guarantee of the mysterious life of the works of the mind." Poetry is the product of unconscious inspiration and conscious reason. To deny either or confuse their functions leads to failure. "The bad poet is usually unconscious where he ought to be conscious, and conscious where he ought to be unconscious", says Eliot.¹⁰⁸ While the conscious faculties are absolutely necessary, they cannot dominate without destroying the poetic organism. The predominance of art over inspiration, of body over soul, makes poetry mildewed, says Francis Thompson.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, it has been pointed out by Day Lewis¹¹⁰ that the

impression which the poet himself has that the poem "writes itself", cannot stand a deeper analysis. In the first phase of composition, the intellect is relatively inactive and the poet accepts, in a trance-like state, everything that comes up. But a most arduous phase of intellectual activity has to follow when the constellating material is critically evaluated. The two phases constantly overlap, making it impossible to give a precise, step-by-step commentary on the making of a poem. The mind, says Lewis, "moves gradually over from passive to active, as it tries to perform the two functions of making and exploring".

Vedic poetry was essentially lyrical, with the fountains of inspiration running clear and strong. But even in this early phase, the importance of structure and craftsmanship is recognised. "As an expert craftsman constructs a chariot, so have I composed this hymn for thee, O Agni!" The chariot, streamlined for mobility, cannot handicap itself with redundant structural elements and the same applies to the poem which is meant to reach the heart and make the feelings activated, more mobile. In a work of art, as Clive Bell said, nothing is relevant but what contributes to significance. Description and ornament cannot move into poetry and occupy its terrain under their autonomous power. They should be structural elements which are accepted or rejected (*grahitamukta*) by the sovereign poetic purpose, says Rudrata¹¹¹. Ananda Vardhana¹¹² expands this into the principle of using or discarding according to the poetic need and context (*kale cha grahana tyagau*). This does not mean that the tension has to remain at one pitch throughout the poetic matrix. In his discussion of the qualities of the composition as a whole (*Prabandhalamkara*), Bhoja mentions excellence of build (*Sannivesa Prasastyam*), which means, according to him, that the minor descriptions in a long poem must be so set in the frame-work that they do not appear irrelevant or overdone. In spite of their lowered tension such sequences become functionally justified because they are assimilated into the poetic organism. Koffka¹¹² clarifies this in his analysis of the "extraneous" in art. "What is 'extraneous' to a work of art, in the sense used in defining the purity of art, is determined by the subject and its self-limitation. A work of art is a strongly coherent whole, a powerful *gestalt* and such self-limitation is a definite *gestalt*-property. But this determination of the term extraneous is still too narrow, a demand arising from a part of an object is extraneous, and, therefore, an effect produced by it is artistically impure, if it is not itself demanded by the total pattern of the work. For a *gestalt* not only makes its own boundaries but also within its boundaries rules and determines its parts in a sort of hierarchy, giving this a central position, this the role of a mere decorative detail, that the function of contrast and so forth." The "decorative detail" thus can have a place in the composition considered as a functional whole. Matisse¹¹⁴ also has clarified this issue which is often misunderstood. "Expression for me is not to be found in the passion which blazes from a face or which is made evident by some violent gesture. It

is in the whole disposition of my picture—the place occupied by the figure, the empty space around them, the proportions, everything plays its part. Composition is the art of arranging in a decorative manner the various elements which the painter uses to express his sentiments. In a picture every separate part will be visible and will take up that position, principal or secondary, which suits it best.” Differential tensions and secondary roles of certain elements, thus, are necessary for the total pattern, not merely tolerated by it.

If areas of low tension are creatively utilised, they cease to be failure or inadequacies and become functionally justified strategy. Looking at the situation from a different point of view, elements not thus assimilated into the poetic organism remain as faults and these faults cannot be localised in their ultimate effect in a poem. Mammata claims that any structural element is a fault in the last analysis because it is contrary to the underlying sentiment of the whole composition. Therefore, such faults mar the whole poem and cannot be indulgently treated as localised inadequacies.¹¹⁵ Paul Valéry says that we use strict form in a poem so as to prevent ourselves “saying everything” in it. Though poetry is the objectification of feeling in words, too many words can betray the poetic intention. Sanskrit poetics condemns this type of utterance as utterance of what should be unuttered (*Avachya Vachana*). This is the dross (*Avakana*) which Mahima Bhatta¹¹⁶ wants to be swept out of poetry, for it is born of a mind lacking inspiration (*Apratibhodbhava*).

In the discussion of the literary creation as an organism, Nietzsche¹¹⁷ referred to the “anarchy of atoms.” “How,” he asked, “is decadence in literature characterized?” By the fact that in it life no longer animates the whole. Words become predominant and leap right out of the sentence to which they belong, the sentences themselves trespass beyond their bounds, and obscure the sense of the whole page, and the page in its turn gains in vigour at the cost of the whole—the whole is no longer a whole.” The collapse of structure is due to the hypertrophy of elements far beyond the limits where they can functionally interlock and maintain a dynamic unity. And this excessive growth takes place when the poem is not a product of inspiration and judgment but a more or less external unification of rhetorical categories. The importance of the inward conception of the poet (*Kaver abhiprayah*) which should control the details and reside in the poem as a whole is stressed in Sanskrit poetics from very early times. Bharata¹¹⁸ speaks of the poet’s inward conception (*Kaver antargato bhavah*). The word for conception here is *Bhava*, which, it should be remembered, is not the same as the word now familiar to us that refers to sentiment. Belvalkar translates the word in the present context as “sustained intuition”. *Bhavika* is the distinctive effect obtained when the poetic tissue is energised by this inward life. In early Sanskrit poetics there is some uncertainty whether it is to be regarded as an ornament (*Alamkara*) or a pervasive quality (*Guna*). Later it is given the status of a quality that relates to the composition as a

whole (*Prabandha Guna*) It is Dandin who clarifies the whole concept *Bhavika* is derived from *Bhava* (*Bhavayatta*) and *Bhava*, here, is the inward conception of the poet that creates a poetic organism out of the materials that lack life in isolation¹¹⁹ It is when inspiration and inward conception are embodied in a system of objective correlatives that the poem develops the organismic quality which Bhoja calls pervasive emotion (*Rasa Bhava Nuantaratva*) Strictly, what Bhoja seems to mean by this concept is that the whole poem should have one *Rasa* as its main mood But, since, in the development of that one *Rasa* throughout the entire length of the poem, all the rich variety of human sentiments is to be orchestrated with subtlety, the emphasis is on focal organisation and this should rule out the baroque overlay that is not born of inspiration (*Apratibhodbhava*) and thereby presents what Nietzsche calls the anarchy of the atoms and realise organic unity which De Witt Parker¹²⁰ defined thus "By this is meant the fact that each element in a work of art is necessary to its value, that it contains no elements that are not thus necessary, and that all that are needful are there" It is only when inspiration and judgment, feeling and reason, thus unite that we, in the words of L C Knights,¹²¹ experience the play not as a succession of parts, but as a living whole, that we are able to listen to the whole orchestration of the play and not just a few of the more obvious tunes

We have noticed already that, in the Sanskrit tradition, the principles of poetics were first elaborated in connection with the dramatic form and then extended to other forms, especially the long narrative poem or *Kavya* This extension of theory was not wholly smooth Bharata uses the same term *Kavi* (Poet) for both dramatist and poet He uses the word *Kavya*, strictly the narrative poem, to mean the text of the drama Bharata's classical approach here does not seem to have been fully understood in subsequent interpretations The feeling that drama is the only full-blooded form and that the poem is a derivation from it with an inevitable loss in vitality seems to persist in the speculations of Bhatta Tauta as conveyed to us by his disciple, Abhinava¹²² Briefly, this seems to have been Tauta's view *Rasa* or aesthetic emotion is fully realised only in drama Therefore the poem also has to approximate to the state of dramatic presentation Descriptions in the poem have to be as powerful and concrete as to give the illusion that the scenes are being enacted before our eyes The powered utterance (*Praudhokti*) of the poet should have the capacity to make the heroine or the garden or moon appear as if they are seen with the eyes (*Pratyakshavatsphuta*) The categorisation of drama as visual representation or visualised poetry (*Drisya Kavya*) and the poem as aural experience (*Shravya Kavya*) has caused a subtle confusion here, for it has led to the fallacy that full-blooded vitality is reached only with visualisation The fallacy persisted in the distinction of poetic categories themselves Since Abhinava believed that the concrete, visual realism of dramatic presentation was necessary for the full realisation of the aesthetic emotion (*Rasasvadas-*

yotkasha) he regarded the long narrative poem less adequate than the drama and the short poem (*Muktaka*) less adequate in its turn than the long poem (*Kavya*) or story (*Prabandha*). Earlier, Vamana¹²³ also had made the same mistake, when he said that among the literary forms the dramatic was the best since it was full in its representation, like a picture (*Chitrapatavad*). Bharata's intention was certainly not this. He laid down the technical requirements which had to be met if visualised representation was the objective. Nowhere has he implied that the poem is not an autonomous category or that it is a pale, attenuated approximation of the concrete, dramatic representation. The poetic centre was the feeling. In exploring for the sensuously palpable objective correlative for its communication, the creative artist could orchestrate sensory experiences of many kinds, as in drama, or be selective. The resulting forms could not be graded as superior or inferior in an absolute sense.

Bhoja swung to the other extreme. Concentrating on the inwardness of all poetic experience, he favoured a minimal sensuous incarnation. "Rasa is realised by the audience when presented by clever actors, or when they are meditated upon as described by poets in their poems. In this respect, things are not so charming when they are seen directly as when they are narrated by men of gifted speech. Therefore, we regard the poets as greater than the actors, their poetry (poem or text of the drama) as greater than acting"¹²⁴. It is interesting to note that Aristotle felt the same about acting. "It has an emotional attraction of its own, but of all the parts it is the least artistic and connected least with the art of poetry. For the power of tragedy, we may be sure, is felt even apart from representation and actors. Besides, the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage mechanist than on that of the poet." Referring to the age of "theatricalism rampant" in France in the middle of the nineteenth century, J. E. Spingarn has used the expression, "dramatic materialism". Giraudoux¹²⁵ has stressed the distortion of the poet's intention by the actor. "The first actor to play the part constitutes the first in a series of reincarnations in which the character becomes more and more distant from the dramatist and steals away from him forever." Dryden tells us that his ambition—as a dramatist—was to be read, which he considered "the more lasting and nobler design". Voltaire asked in the *Notes to the Tragedy of Olympe*: "What has stage decoration to do with the merit of the poem? If the success depends on what strikes the eyes, we might as well have moving pictures."

Bhoja, thus, is not aberrantly unique in his attitude. But he did recover Bharata's classical perception that what is important is not the number and variety of the representational media used but the saturation of technique with significance. For we know from reliable authorities like Sarada Tanaya, Sarnga Deva, Parsva Deva and others that Bhoja wrote later another work dealing with acting, music and other elements of classical dramaturgy, although this text has not come down to us. For Bharata,

the focal intention in aesthetic creativity was the aesthetic emotion or *Rasa* and its evocative representation (*Abhinaya*) through various systems of objective correlatives—Decor, dance, music and acting were all such representations. The libretto also was a representation, through the medium of language (*Vachikabhinaya*). Bharata's section¹²⁶ on the text of the drama is earlier in substance, if not in date, than the earliest existing *Kavya* or long narrative poem. Here we get a developed theory of poetics, as distinguished from dramaturgy. Bharata enumerates the thirty-six characteristics (*Lakshanas*), the ten excellences (*Gunas*), ten defects (*Doshas*) and four poetic figures (*Alamkaras*) of poetic composition. All these, he emphasises, should serve the awakening of the aesthetic emotion. This chapter, thus, has become the foundation of Sanskrit poetics, understood here as a specialised discipline distinct from dramaturgy.

As this discipline becomes enriched by the subtle analysis of various aspects of the poetic form by many writers, the extended poem becomes as distinctive a stylised presentation, an aesthetic creation, as the drama. But it should never be forgotten that if Sanskrit poetics stressed the autonomy, the creative freedom, of poetry, it did not imply the severance of the linkage with life and the world. The very opening lines of Mammata's treatise make this absolutely clear. He begins by stressing the creative freedom of the poet: "Victorious is the Poet's Speech, which unfolds a creation that is unfettered by the laws (*Niyama*) of nature (*Niyati*), that consists of joy alone (*Hladaikamayi*), that is not dependent on anything else (*Ananyapamatanttra*), that is saturated with the nine *Rasas*"¹²⁷. If the autonomy of poetry is affirmed here, it is immediately shown to be the product of both creativity and experience of the world. "A particular power (*Sakti*), proficiency (*Nipunata*) arising from the study of the world, the sciences, poetical works and the like, practice under the instruction of those who know poetry—these conjointly form the cause of its origination"¹²⁸. This classical synthesis of inspiration and world-experience, art and life, is really the legacy of Bharata, as we shall see when we will have finished the discussion of an important structural concept, propriety.

IV THE CONCEPT OF PROPRIETY

Structure is the articulation of various elements and techniques. Only if this articulation is a perfect functional integration will the poetic structure begin to live as an organism. A relational analysis therefore, is absolutely necessary here for, as Koffka said, any artistic creation is a *gestalt* where the position and accent of elements are in perfect functional relation. This relational justness or propriety is called *Auchitya*¹²⁹ in Sanskrit poetics.

No analysis of any structural element, be it verbal texture, diction, ornament or characterisation, can be complete without touching on this requirement even if it be by implication. In fact, as we shall see later, after the fullest elaboration of the concept, analysis returns to the profound

insights of Bharata for the last essential link, the link between life and art. The term *Auchitya* is first used in poetics by Yasovarman, the eighth century ruler of Kanauj and the patron of Bhavabhūti, in the prologue to his drama, *Ramabhyudaya*. The work has been lost, but Bhoja¹³⁰ quotes the key reference. Though the statement is brief, Yasovarman manages to indicate the two cardinal planes on which the concept can be elaborated. First of all, there is what can be called the justness of external congruences: dramatic speech should be appropriate to the nature and rank of the characters (*Patiauchitya*). Secondly, the entire external structure of expression is related to the development of the *Rasa* in the proper place (*Svavasaie Rasa*). This is the inward justness that makes the pattern of relations within the *gestalt* a hierarchical pattern. Rudrata and Ananda Vardhana further develop the concept and stabilise it as an important literary principle. Subsequently, almost every important writer offers his treatment of the concept and Kshemendra¹³¹ attempts a very useful and systematic codification of all this material.

A summary of all that has been said by various writers on *Auchitya* is not being attempted here, for it will involve repeating much of what has already been said in the analysis of various elements and techniques of composition. But it is worth while studying some of the general implications which are of great theoretical interest.

Even in the discourse of prose, language can weave its web of semantic meaning only if the categories of linguistic expression are in a precise interrelation. We are of course in the domain of grammar here, not of poetics. But it is interesting to note that in his treatise on word and sentence, Bhartrhari,¹³² as early as in the seventh century, uses the word *Auchitya* for the concept required for determining the meaning of a word in a context when the word has more than one meaning. If the concept is deepened, it can be fairly smoothly transferred from grammar to poetics, to cover the miracle of prose blooming into poetry, semantic meaning sprouting wings, and soaring as poetic meaning. We see the wings growing when Kuntaka¹³³ equates the justness of the word (*Pada-auchitya*) with the poetic quality of the word (*Pada-vakīata*). It is clear that *Auchitya* is being transformed here from a grammatic principle to a concept of poetics. The word now has got to be not only grammatically just, but also poetically just and this poetic justness is beauty, Kuntaka's *Vakīata*. Mahima Bhatta,¹³⁴ in fact, claimed that the qualitative "deviation" (*Vakīata*) of word and idea in poetry from word and idea in scientific discourse or reportage on which Kuntaka laid so much stress, seemed to be nothing but the appropriateness (*Auchitya*) to *Rasa*, which is the soul of poetry.

All grammatical categories and relations continue to be utilised in the poetic handling of language. But here they modulate from propositional precision to resonant poetic intimation. Bharata had given ten grammatical divisions of words. In his commentary on Bharata's section¹³⁵ on the

libretto, or linguistic representation (*Vachikabhinaya*) as he calls it, Abhinava Gupta says that everything in poetry, gender, number, noun, case, etc has to have strikingness (*Vaichitrya*, Abhinava's term for what Kuntaka means by *Vakrata*) Earlier, Ananda Vardhana had analysed the power of poetic resonance (*Dhvani*) which all these elements, basically grammatical categories, acquired in the state of grace implied by creative inspiration Kuntaka had cited sensitive, poetic uses of grammatical categories like the present participle and all these cues are used by Kshemendra for his elaborate treatment of the poetic use of gender, number, verb, active and passive constructions, etc

Expression should build up as a system of external congruences Here, a very interesting contribution is Ananda Vardhana's three minor principles of *Auchitya*, of character (*Vakta*), of subject (*Vachya*) and literary form (*Vishaya*)¹³⁶ The last is specifically mentioned by Bharata¹³⁷ himself, as especially important in the dramatic form Long drawn out sentences evolving in musical periods and complex constructions are inappropriate in drama since it relies mostly on dialogue, on the words that fall on the ear and fade in a second Therefore, in the drama, the diction must be simple, delicate and sweet to hear Thus, while style has to be true to character and situation in all forms, there is a flexible range of modification, possible and expected according to the literary form Bhoja also speaks of language according to the character (*Patianurupa-Bhashatvam*) and refers to a flaw (called *Apada*) which results when the poet uses vocabulary not suited to the character who is speaking

But it is not enough if poetic elements go on constellating in increasingly complex patterns if what builds up is only a brilliantly coloured but empty shell The whole fabric of expression should obey the law of an internal congruence Ananda Vardhana¹³⁸ and, following him, Abhinava¹³⁹ stabilise the concept of poetry as a triune unity, based on feeling (*Rasa*), resonance (*Dhvani*), and propriety (*Auchitya*) Just adequacy presupposes something to which an element is justly adequate (*Uchita*) and that to which everything else has to be functionally adequate is *Rasa*, the soul of poetry *Auchitya*, thus, is perfect functional relation in the service of *Rasa*-evocation It implies subordination and superordination, hierarchical pattern, focal principle and centripetally patterned elements, chief (*Angin*) and subsidiary elements (*Angas*) Mahima Bhatta sees poetic tension as a polarisation between feeling or poetic meaning (*Rasa*, *Artha* or *Vastu*) and expression (*Sabda*) The former he terms the inward reality (*Antaranga* or *Abhyantara*) and the latter the external concretisation (*Bahuranga*)¹⁴⁰ Kshemendra, who was the disciple of Abhinava, introduces a refinement, which, though scholastic is very interesting He makes a distinction between the soul and the life of poetry Feeling is the soul (*Atman*) and propriety is the life (*Jivita*)¹⁴¹ Categories like literary ornaments and merits cannot have an abstract existence They cannot abide by themselves in isolation They have value only when they are in a meaningful

relation with the spirit, only when they are the plastically moulded expression of poetic inwardness "Enough with ornaments (*Alamkaras*)", says Kshemendra. "Of what use are the literary excellences (*Gunas*) if there is no life there? Ornaments are ornaments, excellences are excellences, but *Auchitya* is the life of the *Rasa*-ensouled poem"¹¹²

The central status of *Rasa* thus stabilised, the further analysis of the concept of *Auchitya* unfolds with luminous clarity, the essentially functional nature of all categories never again being allowed to slip into the penumbra of the critical searchlight. We can attempt only a rapid survey of the vast field, especially because many aspects have already been touched upon. To begin with, since most of the Sanskrit poems and dramas were rehandling of epic or ballad material, Bhoja insists on the plastic reshaping of the source material. The poet must discard the sequences which hinder *Rasa* and conceive the plot in a new manner. He calls this operation of the poetic intelligence the removal of aesthetic irrelevancies (*Anauchitya Parihara*)¹¹³. Another principle of *Auchitya* (called *Gati*) mentioned by Bhoja is the choice of the form, prose, verse, or mixed style, appropriate to the theme¹¹⁴. An extension of this is the use of metre in harmony with the theme (*Arthanurupa-Chhandastvam*)¹¹⁵. The *Auchitya* of letters (*Vanna*) and word-complexes (*Samghatana*) mentioned by Ananda Vardhana¹¹⁶ requires that the orchestration of verbal music should be in harmony with the feeling. Ornament (*Alamkara*), points out Abhinava,¹¹⁷ can be evaluated as such only if there is something of which it is the ornament (*Alamkariya*). Economy and plenitude, says Mahima Bhatta, are relative terms. When feeling demands a fuller expression, brevity really involves withholding what should have been expressed (*Vachya-avachana*). Likewise, on occasions when the rill of feeling should run limpidly, a too expansive treatment really amounts to uttering what should not have been uttered (*Avachya Vachana*). Hema Chandra¹¹⁸ calls such sequences "descriptions which are not organic, which do not serve feeling" (*Anangasya rasanupakarasya vannanam*). Ezra Pound¹¹⁹ also refers to this flaw "Incompetence will show in the use of too many words. The reader's first and simplest test of an author will be to look for words which do not function, that contribute nothing to the meaning or that distract from the most important factor of the meaning to factors of minor importance." Action inconsistent with character is the flaw called *Patradushita* by Rudrabhatta. Ananda Vardhana analyses this flaw in depth and points out that as the tempo, volume and quality of action determine the atmosphere of the play and as action flows from character, inconsistency here can destroy the whole mood, ruin the value known as *Vritti*. It thus results in improper atmosphere (*Kaisikyadi Vrittiyanauchityam*).

This functional analysis also leads to the finding that the abstract discussion of categories like style and poetic excellences can be useful only up to a point, beyond that it can even become dangerous, by obscuring the fact that they are not static in their nature but undergo radical muta-

tions according to the context Dandin points out that the literary excellence (*Guna*) is what ultimately enriches the poem (*Kavyotkarsa hetu, Kavya-sampatti hetu*), the flaw (*Dosha*) is what mars its integral impact (*Kavya-pakarsha hetu, Kavyavipatti hetu*) This means that they are to be evaluated strictly as aids in the evocation of feeling (*Rasa Dharma*) Ananda Vardhana declares all these categories to be unfixed in their essence (*Anitya*) What is usually regarded as a merit may become a flaw in another context and *vice versa* "Without integration, the merit becomes a flaw, integrated, the flaw is transformed into an organic merit", says Raja Sekhara¹⁵⁰ It is the embedding, the base (*Asraya*) on which a detail rests; that counts, says Bhamaha¹⁵¹ and proceeds to give a fine illustration Collyrium is a black mess, but in the eye of the beloved it is a glory, it donates a new lustre to the glance which now arouses feeling with stronger power Bhoja states the principle of the adaptation of stylistic qualities to the feeling (*Rasanarupa Sandarbhatvam*) To describe young hearts in love, the soft (*Komal*) music of liquid consonants and plenty of vowels will be ideal, but it is totally inadequate when flaming wrath is to be delineated, here the brasses should blare and a harsh (*Kathor*) orchestral texture is needed¹⁵² Implicit in this analysis are, first, the demand that the poet should have a command of range and, second, that he should be able to communicate experience both as immediate impact as well as mellowed memory A reference to the recent rethinking on Tennyson, compiled by Killham,¹⁵³ will be helpful here T S Eliot called him "the great master of metric as well as melancholia" Graham Hough felt that the entire poetry of Tennyson was a siren song "about absence, distance, desolation, partings, forsakings" Grigson¹⁵⁴ analyses why this is so Tennyson, facing language, was too much the sculptor who could work only in soft, semi-liquid materials, which are easily managed If he had unerring feeling for the sound of words, he was primarily sensitive to vowel music He had no certainty of the consonantal wiriness of words or of their entire nature and possibility Thus, "he is most often the liquid poet of Then, instead of the hard poet of a recurrent Now"

Bhoja¹⁵⁵ gives a whole section on demerits creatively transformed into merits (*Dosha Gunas* or *Vaiseshika Gunas*) The principle of imitation (*Anukarana*) is used by Rudrata, Bhoja and Nami Sadhu to justify grammatic flaws (*Apasabda*) and crude (*Gramya*) expressions, ordinarily ruled out in poetry, as necessary for realism in character portrayal Dandin uses the principle at a deeper level of significance Speech may contradict the truth of the heart Dandin claims that there are emotional crises where such contradictory speech (*Vuudhartha*) becomes the most genuine revelation of the truth of the tormented heart, in life as well as in art¹⁵⁶ This type of analysis shows that there is only one valid definition of the flaw (*Dosha*) It is the unorganic, unintegrated element, it is impropriety (*Anauchitya*) It is impropriety because it becomes a block in the realisation of the poetic intention (*Abhimata,tha vighna-hetu*) an obstruction

to the evocation of feeling (*Rasa Vighna*), the destruction of the prime meaning (*Mukhyartha-hati*) But what determines the propriety of any literary category is the poetic context The categories cannot be tabulated in the abstract as merits or flaws Criticising the critics who seemed to be content with a peripheral analysis, with the adequacy of the interrelations between elements in the expression, which is merely the surface, Abhinava¹⁵⁷ wrote . "One cannot be indiscreetly using the word propriety by itself Propriety (*Auchitya*) is ununderstandable without something else to which things are appropriate (*Uchuta*) Propriety is a relation and that to which things are or should be in that relation must first be understood That is *Rasa*, nothing else"

The formulation that no literary category is fixed in its essence and adequacy is a functional, contextual value, is the basis of the theory of the comic in Sanskrit poetics Bharata had established impropriety as the basis of the comic and had given homely illustrations For instance, a person who wears a girdle round his neck instead of around his waist cannot but be a comic figure¹⁵⁸ In his commentary on Bharata's references to the comic sentiment (*Hasya Rasa*) Abhinava¹⁵⁹ further stabilises impropriety (*Anauchitya*) as the root of the comic Abhinava uses propriety as the technical or procedural principle which should govern all phases of creativity which ultimately transform the dormant sentiment (*Bhava*) into a relishable state, into *Rasa* This leads him to the definition of the concept of poetic failure or contradiction (*Abhasata*) A poem (*Kavya*) which does not have *Auchitya* is not poetry but the caricature of poetry (*Kavyabhasa*) Bharata¹⁶⁰ himself had said that the comic emerged from this *Abhasata* which, again, rests on impropriety But here impropriety is the very objective of the creative strategy. Impropriety, which is the greatest flaw in the delineation of *Rasa*, becomes the greatest propriety in the comic torsion The situation has to be handled dialectically, because the degree of impropriety has also to be judged as proper or improper in this new context of the comic Similes, where the distant object or image, to which the main object or image is compared, is deficient or inadequate (*Nyunopama*), or excessive in its intimations so as to lead to imbalance (*Adhukopama*), are ordinarily flaws in poetry, for they result in impropriety But these understatements and overstatements are the secrets of satire and parody Nevertheless, at a deeper level in this situation, propriety regains its sovereignty, for the whole expression, welded from deliberately improper description, ornament, idiom, has to obey internal principles of propriety, precisely adjusted to the strength of the intended comic sentiment which can range from a whimsical smile to a Rabelaisian guffaw

Propriety, said Ananda Vardhana,¹⁶¹ is the great secret of *Rasa*, nothing hinders *Rasa* as impropriety Stabilising feeling as the poetic centre, the concept of propriety can be used as a magnificent principle of order, which mobilises all poetic elements and techniques in appropriate orbits around

it and organises the whole as a system. But the concept can be applied at the highest level, to *Rasa* itself, and then it becomes revealed that the ultimate testing ground of art is life.

Yasovarman emphasises the need for the "nourishing of the *Rasa* at the proper time" (*Rasasya svavasare pushti*). There are interesting prescriptions about treating the subsidiary *Rasas* in such a way as to strengthen the main *Rasa*. Rudrata mentions a flaw which he calls *Vnasa*. This is the flowing in of an irrelevant or contradictory sentiment into the current of the main *Rasa*. Now, all these rules can be obeyed and the result need not necessarily be more serious than preciousness. That is, an aestheticism, insulated from life, can accept them as principles of craftsmanship. But this becomes impossible as the analysis proceeds. For instance, Rudrata mentions another kind of *Vnasa*. This is the fault of over-development of even the proper *Rasa*. Ananda Vardhana¹⁶² warns that the erotic sentiment (*Sringara*) should not be so overdeveloped as to cloy. He also cautions against the excessive development of pathos (*Karuna*) which will make the heart dejected (*Mlana*). In a closed aesthetic system, there is no standard to decide whether any emotion is developed excessively. It can be shown to be excessive only by testing the context against similar contexts in life. When Ananda Vardhana insists on the propriety of stimulus (*Vibhava*), of the suggestive emotional cues present in it (*Anubhavas*) and of the transient modifications of the main sentiment (*Sanchari Bhavas*) for the just evocation of the sentiment (*Bhavauchitya*), he hastens to add that this justness of sentiment ultimately resolves into the objective truth of human nature (*Prakityauchitya*). The constellation of poetic elements which violates this truth evokes, not sentiment, but sentimentality (*Rasabhasa*). Bhamaha¹⁶³ also mentions a flaw, *Loka Virodha*, going against nature, violating the truth of human experience. We return to the great insight of Bharata. "That drama alone deserves the world's sanction which is derived from human nature (*Loka-Svabhavajam*). The world is the authority (*Pramana*) for the dramatic representation. Whatever sciences, morality, arts, behaviour derive from human nature, all that is (the theme of) drama. The reactivity (*Bhava*) and behaviour (*Cheshta*) of the world, of all that is mobile or immobile in it, have not been exhaustively determined in the texts. Great is the world's variety of behaviour. Drama is based on this behaviour. The dramatist must make the world the source of authenticity. Even if I may have not mentioned it, anything is valid in drama if it is observed in the world"¹⁶⁴ Elsewhere also Bharata emphasises that the creative artist has to know the infinite variety of human nature, its inborn traits (*Prakriti*) and the patterns of behaviour, attitudes, mores into which they grow in the context of social living and interaction (*Sila*). Only then will the delineated *Rasa*, which is the soul of poetry, have objective truth, validity as reference to the soul of man. It is also very important to recall here that if art imitates life, the imitation is Aristotelian. Bharata does not use the word *Anukarana* but *Anukritana*.

The significance of this term has been analysed earlier Art imitates nature in being creative like her

Paul Valéry said "I can say that I put nothing above *consciousness* I would have given many masterpieces that I believed undeliberated for one evidently fully considered page" This is the temper of perfect classicism and the approach of Sanskrit poetics is classic in this sense Art, here, is not so much the creation of spontaneous inspiration as of the poetic intelligence There is no contradiction between poetic intelligence and feeling It is consciousness at its subtlest, based on rich emotional reactivity, but capable of mobilising that reactivity for precise realisation of the poetic intention The sense of propriety, understood in its deepest sense, can be termed the prime feature of this poetic intelligence Bharata¹⁶⁵ stressed the perfect awareness of the contextual demand in the creative task (*Jnatva Kanyamavasthamcha*), the context itself being a precisely planned detail of the overall poetic structure Magha¹⁶⁶ compared the poet to a king The latter uses both force and conciliation according to their relative effectiveness in specific contexts Likewise, the poet, in his handling of style, should use mellifluousness (*Prasada*) or *fortissimo* orchestration (*Ojas*) according to the *Rasa* Visakhadatta¹⁶⁷ compared the dramatist to the statesman Both are capable of working on slender materials, or of developing the same, concealing at the same time the possibilities which would mature later, and of keeping that development throughout under their control even as they confront and solve problems *Vyutpatti* is ordinarily intellectual culture, knowledge of the world, and as such it is often ranked as inferior to inspiration But Raja Sekhara¹⁶⁸ uses it in the sense of poetic culture, the poetic intelligence of classicism and says (he seems to be quoting Yayavariya) that *Vyutpatti* is the discrimination of the proper and the improper (*Uchita* and *Anuchita*)

The poet, as Sanskrit poetics conceives of him, is the supreme strategist, in full control of his resources and their logistics Valéry¹⁶⁹ also gave the highest place to this control "The ability to bend the common verb to unexpected results without breaking the 'established forms', the capture and subjection of things difficult to state, and especially the simultaneous control of syntax, harmony, and ideas (which is the problem of the purest poetry) are in my eyes the supreme aims of our art" The poet must control not only his medium of expression, but his own feeling and imagination which seek expression "The creation of beauty", said Tagore,¹⁷⁰ "is not the work of unbridled imagination Passion when it is given its full sway becomes a destructive force like fire gone out of hand" If there is something of the delirious in poetic creation, Supervielle¹⁷¹ said, this excitement has to be "decanted, separated from its useless and harmful residues, with all the precautions this delicate operation implies" Poets experience considerable difficulties in defining this state where the mind, moved by passion, has to move that passion towards clear expression

Graves¹⁷² distinguishes between a deep creative trance which yields clumsy texture, eccentric phrasing and an atmosphere charged with unexplained emotion, and the light trance where the critical sense is not suspended. Indian poetics would also affirm that consciousness has to reach its highest peak in poetic creation. We shall study this concept in detail later¹⁷³. Here we may note that Valéry¹⁷¹ gives a more subtly adequate assessment than Graves or Supervielle. The creative moment is "a reverie in which the agent, like the object, is *conscious consciousness*". That is, if the resources of the unconscious, like the free association of images managed by unconscious affect, are fully utilised, a supremely alert and wakeful consciousness keeps careful supervision over these processes. "It is necessary *to will and not to will*". The will has to be suspended to let the unconscious material rise to the surface. Once the material is thus available, the will comes out of the ambush to reject and select and mould what is selected. Poetic creation thus needs the "maximum consciousness possible"¹⁷⁵. But this consciousness is not to be equated with the merely analytical intelligence, for it is at the same time poetically sensitive and critically analytical. Intelligence, as ordinarily understood, cannot create, as Claudel stressed, "it can only watch us create"¹⁷⁶. Poetic consciousness, on the other hand, is intelligence and sensibility functioning as a unified power of the personality. The objective is the concretisation of feeling, which is the supreme object of poetry in the Indian tradition also. And it is this feeling which is the umbilical cord that links art to life. It is in gaining the maximum strength for this ultimate linkage that the concept of *Auchitya* made its profoundest contribution in Sanskrit poetics.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Ends of Poetry

I. PRIMACY OF POETIC DELIGHT

SPECULATIONS in the Indian tradition on the ends of poetry, the significance of literature to man, first defined a trinity (*Trivarga*) of values profit, pleasure and virtue. To this, later on, the system of four values (*Chaturvarga*), anticipated by Bhamaha,¹ adds the liberation of the soul (*Moksha*).

The mention of profit may strike a jarring note. But it is interesting to note that Brande Mathews,² struggling to adjust his thoughts to the theories of the economic interpretation of history, states that there are four motives which inspire literature—accomplishment of an immediate end, self-expression, fame and money, sometimes all four combine, but the most insistent is the need for money. But, as one critic³ has pointed out, whatever one thinks of this hierarchy of motives for writing, it is clear that the desire for money is more relevant to the sociology of the writer than to literature as an art, as profound human expression. Nevertheless, the issues this raises are very important, in their own plane, for belonging to this field are the problems of the status of the writer in society, his legitimate demands on his fellowmen and their recognition of the value of what he has to offer on which the stabilisation of writing as a means of livelihood or career depends, the nature of the patronage which the writer obtains, etc. The poet can exist only in a social milieu which is sensitive to his gift. Even in the Vedic period men realised the enduring quality of poetic utterance. Two personified rivers, addressing a poet, say "Forget not, singer, this word of thine the after-ages will echo"⁴ Men want to be immortalised through song. "May we be victors, celebrated in the songs of poets"⁵ Bilhana⁶ in the eleventh century called on his royal patrons to realise the magnitude of the service of poets as a class. "Ye lords of earth, prosperity, the lightning of the cloud of fate that moves at its own will, cannot be chained. Ever soundeth the drum that proclaims the hour of man's departure. Honour, therefore, and take as your guides, laying aside all pride, those skilled poets whose poems provide the drink of immortality to your bodies of fame." To want to endure in the memory of men when one is no longer a living presence in their midst

may not be the highest ambition, but it indicates a higher level of sensibility than an existence completely closed within the orbit of the satisfactions of those needs which man shares with animals. Kalhana rose to a greater height and claimed that the poet as the judge should be recognised as far more valuable than the poet of panegyrics. "That noble-minded poet alone merits praise whose word, like the sentence of a judge, keeps free from love or hatred in recording the past"⁷ What this poet-historian of the twelfth century donated was the dispassionate analysis of the reasons of decay which made a society unable to respond to the challenges of history. A higher order of sensitivity is required in the public if it is to appreciate such unflattering revelations. Thus, although the profit of the poet is a sociological issue, we should note that it is intimately related to the level and pervasiveness of poetic sensibility in his social milieu. We can now pass on to the other gifts yielded by that sensibility to the human spirit.

"Delight", says Dryden,⁸ "is the chief, if not the only end, of poetry". And Coleridge⁹ adds that as "the proper and immediate object of Science is the acquirement or communication of truth," so "the proper and immediate object of Poetry is the communication of pleasure". Bharata¹⁰ conceived of the drama as the generator of delight (*Vinoda*), a pleasure-giving device (*Kridaniyakam*). If the Indian tradition, with its classical thoroughness, defined four ends of poetry, it also insisted that delight was the primary end and that the other values were realised through it and in it. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem endowed with relishable emotion (*Sarasa*), Rudrata¹¹ says that to those who have poetic sensibility but fight shy of abstract theoretical instruction, realisation of the four ends of man (*Chatuvarga*) is easier through the medium of delectable writing, and this is the chief motive, in his opinion, for inspiring meaning in poetry with *Rasa*, for ensuring that poetry is "musical thought", as Carlyle¹² would put it. If one recalls the etymological linkage of the word *Rasa* to the flavoured sweetness of fruits or beverages, the affinity between the thoughts of Rudrata and of Valéry will be very clear, for Valéry¹³ says "Thought should be hidden in the verse like the nutritive principle in a fruit. A fruit is nourishment, but it is seen only as relish. We perceive only the delight but we receive a substance". Mammata calls delight the chief object of poetry and the source of its all other great utilities (*Sakala-prayojana-maulibhutam*).

Abhinava gives his view while commenting on Bhamaha. He first cites Bhamaha who had said "Fame, *Kirti*, (he means the repute that comes from assured economic status and moral worth) and delight (*Prithi*), yielded by the skilled pursuit of *Kama*, libidinal satisfactions, *Artha*, economic ends, *Dharma*, the moral life and *Moksha*, ultimate liberation (these are the four great ends of man formulated by India's moral philosophy) as well as skill in the practical arts of elegant living, are also yielded by the appreciative experience of genuine poetry"¹⁴ Abhinava comments

on this "Here delight is the fundamental value. Otherwise, this question can be asked since the literature of authority (*prabhu-sammita*) like the religious texts and ancillary disciplines, and imaginatively handled history (*Itihasa*) which guides us like a friend (*mitra-sammita*), both can lead to the culture of mind and heart (*Vyutpatti*), what is the distinctive modality of poetry in leading to the same end? As similarity with the beloved (*jaya-sammitatva*) has been recognised as the distinctive feature of poetry, the answer to that question is that delight (*Ananda*) is fundamental (in poetry). In the culture that results from the realisation of the four great ends of man also, delight is the ultimate and fundamental fruition (*Paryantikaṁ mukhyaṁ phalaṁ*)"¹⁵ This is a great and complex affirmation and the rest of this work, in one sense, is its extended elucidation.

Before proceeding to see how poetic delight becomes the means for realising the other values, we have to study the problem how poetry incarnates delight. For the Indian tradition, as we have noticed, insisted on seeing poetic experience as derived from life experience. The emotions that we experience in the contexts of living are not invariably pleasant. How do they become transformed into delight in poetry? The solution lies in the subtle but profoundly significant transformation that has to be effected in the context of experience before ordinary life-experience can modulate as poetic experience.

Abhinava moves weightily to the clarification of this basic principle of poetic experience. Cognition, he says, is of a whole (*Abhasa*), a *gestalt*. But, confronted with an external object, the *gestalt* cognised is always a *gestalt* selected, some alone of the features of the object abstracted and re-structured as a whole. The object itself, thus, will reveal wholes within wholes.¹⁶ For instance, if we analyse our experience of a jar, we find that though ordinarily it is taken to be one complete and single entity, the object of knowledge, it embodies as many wholes as there are words which can be used with reference to it by various analytical procedures, looking at it from different points of view. To the ordinary perceiver it is a whole structured out of the features of roundness, materiality, certain colour, spatial location, etc. An electronic analysis would totally change the features because the compact, stationary object will be revealed to be mostly pure space with material concretions, the particles only few and far between relative to the space in which they are scattered. The particles are also in violent movement. The object thus, is a system of many possible *gestalts*. Its efficiency for conveying a specific meaning (*Artha-kriya-karitra*) depends on its determinate cognition and the latter depends on the inclination, immediate need and cognitive capacity of the individual. The jar is an object of utility and can be used as such. It is also pure shape and can be reacted to as such in aesthetic contemplation.

But such aesthetic reaction is possible only through a far-reaching

psychological discipline which lifts the individual above the basically utilitarian approach to things, conditioned by the exigencies of practical living. We saw earlier that Indian psychology categorised human motivations as the blind impulses of unconscious instincts (*Tamasic*), or as conscious, extrovert action (*Rajasic*), or as poised, untroubled participation in the world's life (*Satvic*), where action is neither the result of a blind drive nor of the pull of ego-centered desire. Bhatta Nayaka analysed the aesthetic attitude and came to the conclusion that it was possible only when *Tamasic* and *Rajasic* motivations were eliminated in the confrontation of subject and object and the approach was *Satvic*. Abhinava¹⁷ also accepts the analysis. Aesthetic experience cannot be *Tamasic* because it is not instinct-impelled or unconscious, it needs a heightened consciousness. It is not *Rajasic* because it is not utilitarian in its motivation. It is *Satvic* because it is a mood of poised, tranquil relishing.

Long before Freud, Schopenhauer outlined a metaphysical system which saw life condemned to the continuous tension of striving, willing. In this sombre philosophy, there is no God and Will is evil and can be overcome only by a revolt, a reversal of the Will, its negation through complete identification with others in pity and asceticism. The pervasive gloom of this thought is relieved somewhat when it refers to aesthetic experience¹⁸. Art is a second (but inferior because less permanent) way of negating the Will¹⁹. In aiding us towards the aesthetic contemplation of the world, the artist gives us a means of escaping the treadmill of the Will. Schopenhauer's ordinarily sober language becomes charged with emotion when he describes this blessed release through art. "It is the painless state Epicurus prized as the highest good and the state of the gods, for we are for the moment set free from the miserable striving of the Will, we keep the sabbath of the penal servitude of living, the wheel of Ixion stands still"²⁰. Indian tradition with its belief that life embodied life, is a journey towards a goal (*Sana Yatra*) would assert that disciplined willing is also a way to self-realisation. Therefore, it cannot subscribe to the dark pessimism of Schopenhauer. But it would agree with him that the aesthetic context makes possible—and is made possible by—disinterestedness, not in the sense of lack of interest, but freedom from the domination of utilitarian motivations. Moreno's definition would be more unreservedly acceptable to Indian poetics. "Whereas a living act is an element in the causal nexus of the life process of the real person, the spontaneous creative act makes it appear as if for one moment the causal nexus has been broken or eliminated"²¹. Indian poetics has always claimed that even if poetry imitates life to generate the emotions which the contexts of living generate there is still a profound difference. The plastically shaped stimulus-situation in art (the *Vibhavas*, etc.) is not just the logical cause of mere cognition (*Jnapaka-hetu*), nor the trigger which releases an emotional reaction (*Karaka-hetu*) identical with the reaction in real life²². These are the normal functions of the object when the sub-

ject approaches it with utilitarian motivations in the ordinary contexts of living. But emotion here would lead to motor action, for emotional reaction is the physiological build-up of nervous energy for such action. In the aesthetic context, however, the object is relished in contemplation, not practically reacted to. This is essentially what Adrian Stokes²³ refers to as the "benignity of art, the non-anxious character of aesthetic experience." In aesthetic experience, pure consciousness confronts the object, discarding those layers of conditioned reactions which always bring about distortions, compelling the perception of the object as a mere instrument of practical utility. It is this "unveiled consciousness" which Jagannatha²¹ designates by the term *Bhagnavarana Chit*.

The affirmation that consciousness can thus liberate itself from the conditionings of life clearly establishes that Sanskrit poetics would reject any theory which militates against the freedom of the human spirit, whether it takes the form of Schopenhauer's romantic theory of the Will or the theory of conditioned reflexes propounded by Watson²⁵ and others. In fact, in the case of human beings, as distinguished from the animals with whom Pavlov²⁶ and others experimented, investigations have shown that it is not possible to establish dynamic correlation between behaviour and stimulation in the facile manner envisaged by the Behaviourists²⁷. In the integrated personality, dispositions sort out stimuli in a way directly contrary to the rigidity assumed by the theory which seeks to reduce the totality of human behaviour as reflex behaviour.²⁸ The concept of an inner threshold is recognised today as absolutely essential for the full understanding of the actual sequence that follows the stimulation. The major component of this threshold is the temperament, understood in a broad sense as the whole complex of innate tendencies, their development through the years and the level of culture these indicate. Temperament can decide the quality of the ultimate reaction over a range which is far wider than the reflex theory can allow. The pompous man slipping on a banana skin will suffer a mortification which will remain long with him. Another man in the same predicament will be able to laugh as heartily as if it had happened to somebody else. In the physiology of sensation, however, the concept of the threshold is used in a more restricted and specific sense. The physiological condition, special factors of fatigue or preoccupation, may raise the threshold against a stimulus. The aesthetic context is specially moulded for the selective reception of stimuli. That is why Abhinava said that the overture in the drama (*Purvanga*) is primarily meant to enable the spectator to attune himself to what follows, the music both eliminating the preoccupations that linger after the day's work and stepping up the receptivity to the complexes of stimuli that follow, so that they will be reacted to aesthetically, not as leading to practical involvement, or even emotional involvement of the type that takes place in the confrontation of the same situations in daily life.

Sanskrit poetics has developed an important concept to clarify the capacity of the aesthetic context to raise the threshold against the power of stimuli to develop the urge towards practical participation or elicit emotions which have the rawness of confrontations in day-to-day living. This is universalisation (*Sadharanikarana*). The suggestion of the concept comes from Bharata²⁹ himself. The objects presented by poetry are not the raw objects of life. Art achieves what can be called the ideational representation to consciousness of objects³⁰. Considerations of utility recede. The jar in our earlier example may hold some precious liquor. But the thought of that utility is not relevant. It becomes a pure shape for aesthetic contemplation. The phenomenon analysed by Sanskrit poetics is the same as what C.T. Winchester refers to as "idealisation". The object is stripped of whatever is individual and local, it becomes a type that holds good at all times and in all places, an abstract reality that can be contemplated. Abhinava lays down as the primary qualification of the relisher of poetry (*Sahodaya*) the capacity to see with the eye of the imagination. He has to have the power to identify himself with the object as presented by the imaginative representation of the poet (*Vainaniya tanmayibhava-yogyata*) and this object is no longer the object of practical utilities that one confronts in life. Owing to the fact that aesthetic experience is gained through imaginative relishing and not through practical exploitation, Abhinava³¹ points out that it becomes impersonal, universalised (*Sadharani-kṛta*). In fact, there cannot be poetry without this universalisation. Coleridge would agree with this, for he says that "the essence of poetry is universality"³².

We saw earlier that Bhatta Nayaka posited this special stimulation of poetry as a specific power (*Bhavakatva*) and the special attitude of the recipient of the stimulus as a specific power (*Bhoga*, *Bhojakatva*). Abhinava rejected this type of specification because he felt, for one thing, that it was unnecessary and restrictive. It was unnecessary because, beyond the perception of feeling (*Rasa Pratiti*), he was not aware of any other process needing Bhatta Nayaka's special term (*Bhoga*). If it was relish or enjoyment, it was already admitted and nothing was gained by giving it a new name. It was also restrictive. For Abhinava's linking up of the theory of aesthetic experience with the instinctive, extrovert and poised personality types which we noted and with transcendental, religious experience which we shall study later made him unwilling to restrict the attitude of detached, contemplative relishing to aesthetic experience alone. The whole personality was involved here, not just one of its segmental functions. Likewise, Abhinava felt that it was unduly restrictive to regard the capacity to elicit the impersonal response as the exclusive function of poetry. It was also unnecessary to introduce a special concept, for, what Bhatta Nayaka called *Bhavakatva*, Abhinava pointed out, consisted really of the expressive moulding of language by the poet's genius and craftsmanship. The finished poem contained this power pervasively distributed

in its music and imagery. The transformation of a context in life into an aesthetic context implied the swinging into action of this power of the poet (*Kavi Vyapara*). By the very fact that the stimuli (*Vibhavas*, etc.) are components of an aesthetic presentation, they become, as Jagannatha points out, removers of obstacles (*Vighnapasarakas*)—the obstacles to detached contemplation which ever seek to pull aesthetic experience down to the level of day-to-day experience, by generating raw emotions that are really the build-up of the nervous energy for immediate action.

In the work-a-day world we confront the raw situation. It is indeed a complex *gestalt* with prime and enhancing stimuli, the expressive behaviour (*Anubhava*) of those involved, etc. But, in the aesthetic presentation, there is an important additional element. Bhoja regarded style as an important expressive component in the aesthetic context, in fact he termed it as an *Anubhava*. In the aesthetic context, therefore, we do not face the emotive stimulus-complex with only those components they have in real life. The whole complex comes to us bathed in a medium, embedded in a matrix, the poet's expression. It is this great donation that removes the rawness, eliminates the narrowly personal references of the situation, calms down the drives towards practical reactions and enables the pure relish of aesthetic contemplation. Vagbhata (the Elder),³³ the twelfth century critic, puts the whole issue with helpful clarity. The content of poetry must be drawn from actual life, but it should also be judiciously idealised. The purpose of the idealisation is two-fold. In the first place, it is that, having its source in the poet's imagination, it may appeal to the same faculty in others and not to their intellect merely. In the second place, the purpose is that particular things of common experience may thereby be transformed into general ones, and thus readily induce a detached attitude in the reader or spectator which is the essential requirement of aesthetic experience.³⁴ Ames³⁵ echoes this. "Life is wrapped in language and men breathe idiom yet what is understood in a novel must be imagined, being held within the range of attention while kept for the moment out of reach of practical response. The novelist evokes sense qualities, emotion, action, characters and situations, felt to be no further than the page, while the fact that only words are there keeps the experience at arm's length, keeps it in the key of contemplation, incipient and ideal." The expression—"only words are there"—is rather clumsy, for imagination also has to be there, as Ames himself points out. It is this imagination, of the poet as well as the reader, that achieves the universalisation of the particular. Hegel, who affirmed that art "makes the sensuous spiritual and the spiritual sensuous", ranked poetry as the most spiritual art since it is made up entirely of signs, which are meaningless in themselves and receive meaning only through the spirit, through the mind and imagination. Poetry is thus awarded its position as the highest art because it is most similar to thought.³⁶ Hegel affirms the ideational nature of aesthetic experience by declaring that the concrete aesthetic

presentation is the "sensuous semblance of the idea" Beauty is the concrete universal itself A work of art is a totality, organised in every detail, creating a self-enclosed world, lacking external purpose³⁷

Aesthetic emotion, thus, is not born of practical encounter, it is not to be identified with the emotion that is aroused by that type of involvement The 'essence of aesthetic experience, its life, consists of the activity of relishing (*Chai vyamanika-pīanah*) It is a relish in which the *Rasa* alone, apart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness It is therefore described as a relish in which the contemplation of any other thing but the *Rasa* itself is eliminated (*Vigalita-vedyantara*) or which is free from the contact of aught else (*Vedyantara-spaisa-sunya*) This state of intense absorption is also a state of equanimity, of repose (*Visanti*) Leon³⁸ refers to this absorption and repose "Aesthetic experience is an absorption, it is complete and self-contained, it is marked by repose and finality It has these characteristics because its object is a complete self-subsistent universe We do not come to a poem with questions, and its interest does not depend on answers given elsewhere"

Sanskrit poetics uses several expressions to indicate the loftiness of poetic vision Bhamaha speaks of the revelation that comes from beyond the horizons of the world (*Lokatikānta-gocharata*) Ananda Vardhana³⁹ refers to it as reaching beyond the world (*Alaukika*) Jagannatha⁴⁰ speaks of the transcendence of the world (*Lokottaratva*) These are resonant terms and have a deeper meaning, indicating a transcendental, super-mundane experience We shall try to penetrate to that deeper plane later For the present we need interpret them only as indicating the transcendence of the world of practical involvements and therefore as referring to the detachment of the aesthetic attitude This transcendence becomes possible due to several circumstances, the universalisation (*Sadharanikarana*) of the stimulus being the primary As Dhanika,⁴¹ the eleventh century commentator on Dhananjaya, said, the object becomes an ideal representation in art it sheds its particularity (*Parityakta-visesha*) This means that it becomes lifted out of the coordinates of space and time that frame it in the practical world It sheds its accidents of location and context in the work-a-day world Mammata dwells on this feature at length, using a painting of a horse as an illustration Coleridge said that the symbol was characterised by the "translucence of the universal in the general and above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal"⁴² All objects in art are symbolical in this sense Bowra⁴³ gives a fine clarification of this truth with the help of references to the specific experience of poets For Blake the man who exerts his imagination "lives in Eternity's sunrise" For Wordsworth, the elements of natural scenery in the Simplon Pass are

*The types and symbols of Eternity
Of first and last, and midst, and without end*

For Keats the lovers on the Grecian urn are the embodiments of a timeless joy which is the counterpart of what the poet himself knows in the act of creation. "So too in our time poets have claimed that, while inspiration is at work, time is transcended or annihilated. Rilke finds the ideal condition of the poet in something akin to childhood, when what lies behind is not the past and no future lies before, when, in what he calls some interspace between the world and a plaything, we entertain ourselves with the everlasting. So too Alexander Blok tells how amid a miraculous transformation of experience time stands still, the present disappears, and the future mirrors the past."

We should remind ourselves at this stage that what we set out to analyse was the assumption that poetic experience is invariably a delight. Detachment from practical involvement may eliminate anxiety and tension, but should it necessarily lead to something more positive? T.S. Eliot¹¹ has gone on record with a statement that seems to commit him to the position that poetry gives only negative relief, not positive pleasure. "To me it seems that at these moments, which are characterized by the sudden lifting of the burden of anxiety and fear which presses upon our daily life so steadily that we are unaware of it, what happens is something negative—that is to say, not 'inspiration' as we commonly think of it, but the breaking down of strong habitual barriers which tend to reform very quickly. Some obstruction is momentarily whisked away. The accompanying feeling is less like what we know as positive pleasure, than a sudden relief from an intolerable burden." But he moves towards the discovery of positive values, elsewhere¹⁵ Referring to the state of poetic creation and experience, he says: "It is a concentration, and a new thing resulting from the concentration, of a very great number of experiences which to a practical and active person would not seem to be experiences at all." Sanskrit poetics not only affirms this qualitatively new experience but affirms also that its quality is one of unalloyed delight. Mammata¹⁶ asserts that the poet's expression consists of joy alone (*Hladaiikamayi*). In the same verse he indicates another feature of poetic expression which really clarifies why it should invariably be a delight—poetic expression unfolds a creation, that is not dependent on anything else (*Ananyaparatantra*), that is unfettered by the laws of nature (*Niyatikṛta-mayama-rahita*). The word used for "nature" has also the resonant meaning of "ordained" in the sense of "determined". The causal order of nature is ordinarily the determiner of the texture and quality of experience. In the practical world, stimuli have the almost objective power of causing pleasure or pain by virtue of their nature. But the aesthetic context is one where the pure subjectivity has won its emancipation from the causal nexus. The object also is emancipated, for it is no longer viewed as an instrument of utility, but as a value on its own, by virtue of its intrinsic reality which is totally different from its accidental relevance to egocentric ends.

The causal order of the day-to-day world, thus, is replaced in art by the order of freedom. Kant⁴⁷ defines this order with clarity and also weightily. The two main categories defining this order, which is a truly non-repressive order, are "purposiveness without purpose" and "lawfulness without law". Egocentric, utilitarian purposes are shed in the aesthetic confrontation, but a higher purpose does rule the context, the desire to relish feeling, rather than merely to feel. The laws that govern the normal relation between stimuli and responses to them, painful or pleasant, are replaced by the law of aesthetic transformation by which pain also is transmuted into joy. In the aesthetic context, the object is represented as free from all utilitarian relations and properties, as freely being itself. Aesthetic experience, which releases the object into its "free" being, is the work of the free play of the imagination. Subject and object become free in a new sense. From this radical change in the attitude towards being results a new quality of pleasure, generated by the form in which the object now reveals itself.⁴⁸ Its "pure form" suggests a "unity of the manifold", an accord of movements and relations which operates under its own laws—the pure manifestation of its "being there", its existence. This, asserts Kant, is the manifestation of beauty. "The objective and purpose of aesthetics is the perfection of sensitive cognition. This perfection is beauty."

Abhinava also asserts that in aesthetic experience the emancipated subject confronts the liberated object. In fact, with exceptional brilliance, he derives the living power of the poetic image from the fact that it is realised through this type of confrontation. We saw earlier that Abhinava had argued that any object was a system of many wholes, capable of yielding several different *gestalts* in perception. In the confrontation of daily living, what determines the selection of the *gestalt* for cognition is the purposive attitude of the percipient. The image of the object selected by this attitude is a dead image in that the object is seen only as a tool, valueless in itself, valuable only because it can serve some satisfaction. But in the imaginative confrontation, the spirit, neither pushed by instinctual drives nor pulled by desire, freely confronts the object and in such a context the object is no longer a dead tool, but a living reality. The aesthetic image, thus, has life which the cognitive image of the practical context lacks. Or the object reveals itself as living to the imagination. Abhinava⁴⁹ defines imagination (*Pratibha*) as this power of clear visualisation of the aesthetic image which is really the seizure of the object in all its fullness and life.

There are remarkable affinities between Abhinava's analysis and the concepts of *inscape* and *instress* developed by Gerard Manley Hopkins. Peters⁵⁰ has helpfully defined *inscape* as "the unified complex of those sensible objects of perception that strike us as inseparably belonging to and most typical of it, so that through the knowledge of this unified complex of sense data we may gain an insight into the individual essence of

the object" To Abhinava also, the image is a complex of sense data of perceptions This is true both of the image of the object obtained in the practical confrontation as well as the image realised in imaginative experience But it is only the latter that penetrates to the essence of the object Whalley says "The word *inscape* carries just that sense of vitality, of dynamic interpenetration, which the English word *pattern* lacks and which the German word *gestalt* to some extent sustains" Abhinava also stresses this dynamic interpenetration and goes on to clarify that its strength and genuineness depend on the imagination (*Pratibha*) When the imagination has power, the image acquires vitality, the object lives The stress of the object its deep penetration into the subjectivity, is possible only when it confronts a receptive sensitivity

Only a through-going idealism can take the stand here that this life of the object is wholly donated by the sensibility We saw earlier, in the discussion of the concept of beauty, that Sanskrit poetics does not accept this type of idealism in spite of the compulsions of certain philosophical systems Therefore we can assume that Sanskrit poetics would be in complete agreement with the analysis of the situation by Clive Bell⁵¹ "If an object considered as an end in itself moves us more profoundly (that is, has a greater significance) than the same object considered as a means to practical ends or as a thing related to human interests—and this undoubtedly is the case—we can only suppose that when we consider anything as an end in itself we become aware of that in it which is of greater moment than any qualities that it may have acquired from keeping company with human beings Instead of recognizing its accidental and conditioned importance we become aware of its essential reality, of the God in everything, of the universal in the particular, of the all-pervading rhythm Whatever the world of aesthetic contemplation may be it is not the world of human business and passion, in it the chatter and tumult of material existence is unheard, or heard only as the echo of some more ultimate harmony" Goethe⁵² always emphasises that the roots of poetry (particularly of his own) are in external reality He wants to give the "real a poetic content" and he adopts with pleasure the saying of Hemroth that his thinking is "objective". This does not mean a preference for extrovert imitation of nature Goethe's whole conception is based on a conviction of the profound identity of subject and object, mind and nature In penetrating to the core of nature the artist expresses his innermost being, in surrendering to the deepest instincts of his mind he grasps the essence of things⁵³ The ideal artist must "succeed in penetrating into the depth of the objects as well as into the depth of his own mind in order to produce something, in competition with nature spiritual-organic and to give his work of art such a content and form that it appears both natural and supernatural"

In a luminous analysis, Schiller⁵⁴ points out that man in primitive society experiences nature the objective world as dominating him In

civilised society, in a technocratic culture especially, nature, on the other hand, is dominated by man. But, in aesthetic experience, nature becomes the object of contemplation. Released from violent domination or exploitation, nature is liberated from its own brutality and becomes free to display the wealth of its purposeless (i.e. not of practical utility) forms which express the "inner life" of its objects. And this revelation is always a source of delight. As an old Vedantic stanza has it, "when one has overcome self-centeredness and realised the highest truth, he will be in rapt ecstasy wherever he may turn"⁵⁵

The old issue, whether beauty is subjective or objective, reappears here and therefore it is worth while clarifying it further. Bowra⁵⁶ says that when the verbal expression is adequate (poetically adequate, realising the *Sabdanukulya* of Sanskrit poetics), it conveys to the reader that "special thrill" which is of the essence of poetry and which is "something powerful and overwhelming which gives, not intellectual light, but a sense of more abundant life". Though true as far as it goes, this still does not make it clear whether the thrill—the *Vismaya*, *Atisaya* or *Adbhuta* of Sanskrit poetics—emerges from the discovery of the object in the plenitude of its real significance or as a donation of the subjective prowess of the poet. Mathew Arnold⁵⁷ seems to believe in an objective discovery but he too lacks a final certitude. "The grand power of poetry is its interpretative power, by which I mean, not a power of drawing out in black and white an explanation of the mystery of the universe, but the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new and intimate sense of them, and of our relations with them. When this sense is awakened in us, as to objects without us, we feel ourselves to be in contact with the essential nature of those objects, to be no longer bewildered and oppressed by them, but to have their secret and to be in harmony with them, and this feeling calms and satisfies us as no other can." Though this seems definitive enough, ambiguity returns in the further comment. He says that "to awaken this feeling in us is one of the greatest powers of poetry", irrespective of whether this feeling that we "possess the real nature of things" is illusive or not.

Is the poet a creator, who creates new values out of his material or a craftsman who brings out the values hidden in the material? More important should these functions be necessarily regarded as mutually exclusive? Indian thought has repeatedly claimed God to be the supreme poet and in a fascinating study Nahm⁵⁸ has shown that the divergent views of poetic creation have led to divergent views about the creativity of God in the European tradition too. In *Timaeus*, Plato developed the concept of God as the Demiurge who works on pre-existing material though this material was Chaos. God here is the supreme craftsman. In the Jewish-Christian tradition there is no pre-existent material. God's act is an absolute creation. Returning to the field of poetic creation Nahm claims that this type of traditional dualism can be resolved. "We

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shall argue that the work of fine art, the total structure, is also a product of artistic technique, but that, while it is describable in terms of freedom of choice, such description is incomplete without reference to freedom of originality. The latter, we shall argue, is explicable by reference to regulative conceptions of perfection and originality. The product of creativity, that is, of these two freedoms, is an intelligible and individual work of fine art, re-created by the aesthetic perceiver." The analysis cannot be claimed to be crystal-clear. But Nahm does stress an important truth: if the significance of the object—which is what is handled by technique—is real, the discovery of that significance cannot be denied the status of an act of creative originality. This is because the discovery is not a passive, casual accident, chancing upon something that lies there in broad daylight, obvious to everybody; it is the creation of value by the spirit for itself, though it is a value-in-things.

The objectivity of value, thus, can be established only by anchoring it in the interaction between object and subject, not solely in either in isolation. This demands a subtle equation between relish, which is the subjective experience of value, and the object which gives rise to that relish. Without this equation, art can degenerate into sensational theme without any creative donation by the poetic spirit or into private fantasy and auto-suggestion without any profound rapport with objective reality. It is interesting to note here that Bhanu Datta,⁵⁹ the fifteenth century writer, distinguished three categories of aesthetic relish (*Rasa*): enjoyed as in a dream (*Svapnika*), fanciful like a castle in the air (*Manorathika*), as realised in poetry (*Aupanayika*). In all the three cases the relish is unworldly (*alaukika*). But day-dream and fantasy mean flight from reality, while poetry is a creative transformation of the world or the discovery of its deeper essence through creative vision. Howell,⁶⁰ following Kant, emphasises like Bhanu Datta that the object is as real as the subject in aesthetic experience. The purpose of art, he says, is to express aesthetic apprehensions. An aesthetic apprehension, for instance a visual one, involves selecting and ordering perceptible elements (lines, colours, spaces, planes) together with their "indicative meanings" in a "unified ideality of relations"; this ordering is done by "imagic interplay" between the image-forming power of the perceiver and the image-offering character of what he perceives. This, in effect, is what Abhinava also asserts. The profounder significance of objects is a reality irrespective of whether it is being imaginatively apprehended by any one, but it is to be the experienced reality of a subject: the subject has to discover the deeper life of the object through intuition. Claudel⁶¹ makes the same affirmation: "By the *image* (he means in the exercise of the image-forming power) the poet is like a man who has ascended to a higher ground and who sees all around him a vaster horizon, where new relations are seen to establish themselves between things, relations which are not determined by logic or by the law of causality (*nyati-kita-niyama-rahita* : Mammata)

but by a harmonic or complementary association governed by a meaning. The new values revealed by the object now are not donated by the subject's fantasy. As Abhinava said, the object is revealing its inner life to the imagination, the faculty which can perceive it. If the object is a symbol, it is a symbol, not of anything extraneous to it, but of its own deepest significance. Norman MacCaig⁶² brings this out beautifully

*Even a leaf, its own shape in the air
Achieves its mystery not by being symbol
Of ominous of anything but what it is,
Such is the decent clarity you bear
For the world to be in*

Another poet, John Wain,⁶³ makes this exhortation

*Believe in the shape of a cactus, believe
In the cloud's shadow racing across fields
Believe in things and you shall be saved*

But the things are not the objects whose utilities exhaust their meaning for us in practical living. They are the same objects glimpsed in the reality of their essential nature. "If the doors of perception are cleansed", wrote Blake,⁶⁴ "everything would appear to man as it is, infinite." And this perception, as the Vedantic stanza quoted earlier affirms, is the source of profound ecstasy.

The "renaissance of wonder", which Watts-Dunton regarded as the chief feature of romanticism, is an essential component of this ecstasy. Narayana, an ancestor of Visvanatha, was the first to emphasise this aspect. The dull objects of the daily world reveal a startlingly fresh aspect and fill the heart with wonder (*Vismaya* or *Adbhuta*). This leads to a generous expansion of the spirit (*Chitta Vistara*). Tensions have ebbed away already in the aesthetic context since it is one of repose (*Visranti*), rest from practical involvements. But the state is not one of mere release from tension. The confrontation of object and subject, both freed from the causal nexus of practical living, leads to expanded horizons of rich experience. Wonder is inevitable in that discovery of new horizons and it is followed by the expansion of the liberated heart. Max Schoen⁶⁵ wrote "Experience that is its own reason for being has a vitality of its own, for it is experience in which life is attained in contrast with experience through which life seeks attainment. Such experience is a joy that is a delight as a respite from the life of struggle and strife, and it is a joy that is a wonder, as an aspect of life that is encountered but rarely."

We have clarified how the object, which ordinarily would have no relevance except for its utility, can become a source of delight in poetic

experience Imagination can obliterate the distinction between the useful and the useless It can also obliterate the distinction between the physically real and the imagined But there are objects and situations in life other than those which can be used by us at our pleasure There are situations which hurt us, bring a load of pain There is the finality of death, of those dear to us, and our own, waiting patiently for us to arrive when our days are over The heart is deeply wounded by all this Can the bruised heart find in the knife-wounds of life the keen edge of pleasure? Here we have to confront squarely the problem of the tragic, for we cannot establish the primacy of delight in poetry unless we can show that the tragic is miraculously transmuted in aesthetic experience

II THE TRANSMUTATION OF THE TRAGIC

Even in the earliest records of the lyrical reactions of the Indian mind to the world and existence we find the profound impact made by the transience of life It is very significant that this realisation awakes with the awakening of the aesthetic sensibility, with the perception of beauty For it is beauty that shocks the mind into awareness of the fact that it is not allowed to man to be here for ever to enjoy that beauty This poignant perception wells up like a sudden jet in the Vedic hymn to dawn⁶⁶ After looking on entranced at the burst of glory in the eastern sky, the poet whispers to himself this poignant melody on muted strings "Vanished and gone long since are all those mortals who looked upon the dawn's bright radiance in former ages We now behold her brightness, and they are coming who will see her in times to come Dawn awakens every living creature, but him who is dead she wakes not from his slumber"

Time is an irrevocable drift to decay "The year is death For it is the year that destroys, through the means of day and night, the life of mortals"⁶⁷ In a remarkable poem in the Rīg Veda,⁶⁸ we find the child lamenting that his father, the chief of the clan, has taken the road to the realm where death rules In the very next stanza, we find that the messenger has arrived to take the child also to this realm The abrupt transition shows that all generations will have to travel along this route, sooner or later In the *Maha Bhārata* there is an extraordinarily powerful parable of a man who falls into a well but is temporarily saved by being caught in the matted creepers that grow from the sides of the well Dark and white mice are, however, gnawing at the roots of the creeper They are night and day and the well is death

We are caught in a flood of pessimism, similar to that which is the basis of the existentialist outlook In a profoundly perceptive study, Ignazio Silone⁶⁹ analyses the picture which post-Nietzschean and existentialist literature has drawn of the human predicament He summarises it as follows all links between the existence and the being of man are

broken, existence has no meaning beyond itself, what is human is reduced to mere vitality. And since that drifts irreversibly to death, existence has no durable meaning. Silone feels that an honest depth-exploration of this situation to its farthest limit must lead to either of two things. One is the abyss of suicide. He cites Camus who bluntly dismissed all reasons for living as absurd. "To die voluntarily", wrote Camus, "implies that one has recognised, at least instinctively, the absurd nature of this habit, the absence of any serious reasons for living, the senselessness of this daily agitation and the futility of suffering." To kill oneself means "simply to recognise that life is not worth the trouble." Silone also recalls, in this context, the suicides of Essenin, Mayakovsky, Ernst Toller, Kurt Tucholsky, Stefan Zweig, Klaus Mann, La Rochelle, F. O. Matthiessen, Cesare Pavese and others. The other road leads to the discovery of some valid meaning in human existence. Camus, later, found the cure for the desolate sense of the absurdity of life in compassion. "The world in which I live repels me", he wrote later, "but I feel with its suffering inhabitants." The intoxication of action for its own sake and the sense of a new brotherhood of man are the defences which Malraux discovered, in *La Condition Humaine* and *Le Temps du Mepris*, against nihilist despair.

Schiller established close affinities between the play impulse and the aesthetic impulse. The key concept here is the overflow of energy which, in play, is not exhausted by the demands of survival tasks, and, in aesthetic creation, proceeds to create new realities, not being content with the forms finished and presented by nature. It is significant that Indian thought has developed this concept right from the beginning, from the period of the Vedas. Creation is the playful sport (*Lila*) of God. God is also called the poet. "He who is the supporter of the worlds, of life, He, Poet (*Kavi*), cherishes manifold forms by his poetic power"⁷⁰. At one place, God is called a dancer⁷¹. Dancing is the beauty of movement. Pure being may be static, but in creation, being becomes rhythmic becoming. And the ultimate validity of this becoming, of experience, is aesthetic, for God becomes the universe for no conceivably utilitarian end and the becoming is through the magnificent rhythms of cosmic evolution. This becoming is a creation of beauty. In Vyasa's *Gita* also the Supreme Being refers to himself as poet,⁷² and the world is glorious because it is his mighty poem. "Whatever is sublime good auspicious, mighty, in the universe understand that it exists as a spark of My splendour"⁷³. Vyasa, like Malraux, insists on a philosophy of action though he formulates it at a far higher level of poetic and metaphysical intuition. The Absolute as the dynamic is, if anything, on a higher level than the withdrawn, static Absolute. "Know action to originate from the *Brahman* (the static Absolute) and *Brahman* from the Imperishable (the Supreme Person). Whoever, in this world does not help in the rotating of the wheel thus set in motion—he is of sinful life, he indulges in mere pleasures of sense

and he lives in vain There is not for Me, in the three worlds, anything that has to be done nor anything unobtained to be obtained And yet I continue to be engaged in action For if ever I did not remain engaged in action unsleeping, men would in every way follow in My track. These worlds would fall into ruin if I did not do My work. I would then be the creator of chaos and would destroy these people"⁷¹ The world evolves by action, work There can be no withdrawal from this duty "The wind blows through work Causing day and night, through work, the sleepless sun rises everyday The sleepless moon too goes through its phases and the fire enkindled by work burns, doing good to the creatures of the earth Earth carries this great load and the unwearied rivers carry their waters with speed, satisfying the desire of all beings The sleepless rain comes down in its time and makes every corner resound"

Let us carefully analyse the concepts in this grand vision of God's purpose, nature and human destiny so that we can proceed further to clarify their significance to the problem we are studying just now the aesthetic transmutation of the tragic First of all, the creative act is an overflow of energy Pure static being had no utilitarian ends to be achieved in creating the evolving world Aesthetic creation, likewise, is an overflow of energy, which cannot be wholly contained by the essentially utilitarian survival tasks of the individual, into creative channels Secondly, to be means to act God acts in creating and sustaining the world The universe evolves by virtue of its dynamism Poetic creation is also action, just as the material it plastically shapes is the action of the world Thirdly, this sustained action means change, for nothing is static when an active principle is continuously operative But, in this conceptual system, change, the incidence of which on the individual may be tragic, cannot be regarded as an irrevocable decay, a continuous perishing Change, on the other hand, is the phase of a process, which takes shape through the phased changes, like a melody that takes shape in the sound that lingers and in the sound that has already ceased to be heard And this process, rightly viewed, will be seen to incarnate beauty Let us develop each of these concepts in relation to the specific problem we are now studying

"Admitting the existentialist analysis of man's position in the universe", said Herbert Read,⁷⁵ "it is still possible for the individual to react positively or negatively, with despair or courage, with fear or confidence" The positive reaction is possible when there is an excess of energy that is not wholly contained or completely exhausted by the demands of the tasks of routine living Heroic activism was raised by the *Gita* from the ethos of a class, the warrior class, to a philosophy for man Since all life is action, even in the life in the world this heroic energy is an absolute requirement for worth-while achievement on any plane, otherwise the individual will drift passively in the casual drift of the world's events Poetic creation is also a way of active living Therefore the poetry of

pure pessimism can only be regarded as a failure, a task attempted without the required resources, which is a spiritual energy, not exhausted in the battle of life and thought. It becomes a record of the passivity with which the impact of the world is suffered. Strictly, it is not so much bad poetry as no poetry, for poetry must mean a creative energy rising triumphantly above the challenges of life that seek to submerge it.

Read points out that if existentialism is initially defined as the awareness of the tragic in life, the reaction to the tragic need not invariably be one of pessimism, compelled by a basic mood of dread. There can be a diametrically opposite reaction to the existential situation, one which is affirmative, eudemonistic, optimistic. The upwelling of energy is clearly the secret of this reaction. Read points out that the biological metaphysics of Bergson—whose concept of the *élan vital*, we should note, is in profound harmony with Indian concepts of ontology and evolution—constitutes a challenge to the excessive intellectualism of Husserl and Heidegger. And he cites Woltereck⁷⁶ who opposes a “natural” ontology to the (pessimistic) existential ontology, acknowledging the same ground, but reacting with quite opposite feelings. To the dread (*Angst*) of existentialists like Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Jaspers, born of the consciousness of emptiness or the meaninglessness of life and the feeling of shipwreck, Woltereck opposes cheerfulness (*Freudigkeit*). It is very significant that, in the memorable passage in the *Ramayana* where Rama, even though he says that death is man’s constant shadow, and friendships are like the casual coming together of driftwood on the sea, rejects hedonism and opts to continue in his life of exile, he insists that the self-attestation must not be a dour obedience to imposed duty, but a joyous fulfilment of a way of life chosen freely. “A man must set about his duties and good works in a spirit of joy and purity of heart. We must go forward in life in a spirit of truth, righteousness, kindness, sweetness, spokenness and reverence.” Woltereck states, further, that the amazement (the *Vismaya* or *Adbhuta* of Narayana) in face of the world’s wonders lacks the narrow self-preoccupation (basically *Tamasic* or *Rajasic*, not *Satvic*) of world-dread. Instead, something positive, lacking in dread, attaches to it, a joyfulness (the *Chitta-Vistara* of Narayana and Visvanatha). This joy is intimately related to the inner impulse to assimilate (to take in the pure object through the imagination, *Pratibha*, as Abhinava defines it), examine, understand, create. And, according to Woltereck, the sciences as well as the arts are born of this impulse. This is identical with the Indian position that poetic action is basically identical with the action of living. In the latter, man moulds the utility of nature for his practical purposes. In the former, he moulds the power of nature and circumstances for emotive stimulation as nourishment to his spirit.

Woltereck speaks of the new values which emerge with the renaissance of wonder. “Out of this, even for the single life, genuine and lofty values may rise, for amazement may be heightened until it becomes that which

moves and overpowers the whole being. In the experiencing of pure expression in the form of great art, great scenes in nature, of great—or beloved—individuals, transcendent summits of existence may be attained, as certainly as in the immediate appeal of the transcendent. It depends on the profundity of the experience that falls to a person's lot. The Parthenon, the *Eroica*, the Moses of Michelangelo may constitute such experiences, but they may also be given to us by a single tree, a single hawk, a single human individual, or by the recognition of a single truth⁷⁷. This is valid as far as it goes. But we cannot confine ourselves to the experience of profound pleasure and wonder in the confrontation of great works of art or even of neutral objects aesthetically contemplated. The simple truth confronted may be the truth of the tragic and the pain may grow so big as to blot out the vision of any horizon. Can this type of pain be transmuted into pleasure? The experience of pain can fail to stimulate thought only in the insensitive. As De Sanctis⁷⁸ said, "poetry, since it cannot avoid the encounter with thought, must mould it, transfigure it and incorporate it. The only serious aesthetic question that remains is that of deciding how far the great have succeeded in so doing. For the mediocre this is an insurmountable cliff". I A Richards⁷⁹ pointed out that tragedy has to be "the supreme instance of the inclusive organization of impulses, perhaps the most general, all-accepting, all-ordering experience known—a balanced poise, stable through its power of inclusion, not through the force of its exclusion". Thought cannot laze in the soft bed of complacency by running away from the encounter with the tragic. It must meet it, wrestle with it, assimilate it. Poetic creation, we saw earlier, is action. The transmutation of the tragic is the difficult target of action which life presents to the aesthetic consciousness.

Poised thought can discover hidden features in the tragic situation that significantly modify the rawness of the tragic impact, the stupefying incomprehensibility it has in the first shock of the encounter. The fact of death is the most stunning of such tragic realities with which life has to come to terms. But when transience is seen, not as continuous perishing, but as process that takes shape through changes, the fact that any one phase cannot be eternally enduring loses its tragic sting. The Vedic Aryan conquered the terror of death with the help of such a deeper perception. Eschatological concepts had not hardened at that time and there was no fantasy about a paradise beyond the earth, beyond death. "There is no waiting for a world to come. We must be happy here and now. Make us today enjoyers of wide room and happiness!"⁸⁰ But there was no anguished demand that the festival should be ever-lasting. The Vedic Aryans prayed only for a reasonable length of days, a hundred autumns, and they also asked for a capacity to relish experience keenly, so long as life lasted. They prayed for life with its full powers, with sight and hearing, the strength of the arms and the keenness of the mind, unimpaired⁸¹. When the melody of life was completed, they were

perfectly willing to leave the concert-hall of life "Let not my thread of life be snapped while I am weaving my song, nor the measure of work be broken up before its time"⁸² When the song and the revelry were finished, death would actually be a relief Death is the unseen companion, the comrade of the race of man (*Manava Bandhu*)⁸³ The song of life, for the individual, was finished when his children had grown to manhood When their sons had become fathers in their turn, they were ready to go⁸⁴

The individual accepts with tranquillity that each generation has to give room to the next and that he can endure only in the life that springs from his loins The great funeral hymn⁸⁵ in the Vedas reveals that the first to enter a bereaved household for the funeral gathering were the women "Let those women, who are not widows and who have good husbands, enter, anointed with unguent and balm Let the women without tears, without sorrow, well-adorned with jewels, proceed to the house first" Against black death are placed the beauty and glory of womanhood to suggest the motherhood of the future generations which carry on the torch of life though individuals pass away The complete exorcising of the tragic impact of death and the tranquil acceptance by the individual of the fact that his life can endure only in the life that it generated, are seen in the benediction uttered by the father when he first took the newborn child in his arms "From each limb of mine are you born You are born especially from my heart You are my own self bearing the name son May you live for a hundred autumns!"⁸⁶ The funeral hymn also shows that the responsibility of the living was not allowed to be affected by excessive regret for the departed It was realised that, with death, the individual returned to nature from which he had gathered form to live his specific existence for a while Burial returned him to the earth "Go to the bosom of thy mother earth, this earth extending far and most propitious The freshly turned earth is soft as wool Cover him up, O earth, as a mother covers her child with the skirt of her garment" Cremation, likewise, returned man to the energy of nature from which he was first moulded "Let your eye go to the sun, your life to the wind" The individual is no more, but the sun shines, the air endures earth, the great mother, will bear and nourish fresh generations So the lament, though poignant, is brief and it allows a speedy return to the tasks of living The speaker, probably the heir of the departed individual, refers to the bystanders and chants "These living ones are from the dead divided Our calling on the gods is now auspicious From the dead hand I take the bow he wielded, to gain for us dominion, might and glory"

Lest any one feel that this analysis is scarcely relevant to the discussion of a problem in poetics, we should emphasise that art cannot be torn apart from life The Indian tradition, at least, does not allow such a separation and we are discussing Indian poetics When a tradition equates aesthetic experience with experience in living, the life-view of the people is the

background against which their view of poetry has to be seen and understood. Further, the tragic is a specific form of encounter with life, and art cannot propose a strategy for that encounter which will not be valid in life. Above all, the analysis will help in revealing that the tragic can be resolved only by an enlarged perspective. If the tragic stimulus is allowed to blot out the distant perspective, the spirit will be submerged in pessimism, just as if we concentrate too much on the death of the individual, the continuing life of the race will be forgotten and life will be seen only as a hollow mockery. In the hymn to dawn, the stream of feeling is turbid when it first bursts forth. The relishing of the beauty of the dawn brings to mind the thought of the generations that had greeted her with the same keen pleasure but are today no more. But the mood clears rapidly and if the awareness remains with the poet that there shall come a day when the dawn will miss him, her adorer, it can no longer detract from the genuineness and the preciousness of the present experience of her beauty. "Dawn awakens every living creature but him who is dead she wakes not from his slumber. We have arrived at the hour of dawn where men prolong existence for a new day. Shine then, today, on him who lauds thee." The threnody for yester-year becomes a triumphant paean to the present, the intense experience of which remains an absolute fact, irrespective of whatever happens in the future.

The aesthetic attitude rewards us with the vision of a beauty that is "exalted above the earth" (*Alaukika Chamatkara*)⁸⁷. This means that just as aesthetic experience obliterates the distinction between the concretely real and imaginative reality, it also rises above the distinction between desire and aversion of the type that determine behaviour in daily existence. But it must be very clearly understood that this obliteration is not a flight but a conquest, not an ignoring but a transmutation. The stoic refuses to smile, because if he allows himself to be affected by life enough to smile today, he may be so affected by it tomorrow as to have to weep. But this is a descent into insensitiveness, into the *Tamasic*. Aesthetic experience cannot be *Tamasic*, it has to be *Satvic*, it can be a reality only when consciousness is operating at its subtlest sensitiveness, in absolute freedom from the considerations of the practical context which dictate that what is useful for survival needs should be sought as pleasant and what is hostile shunned as pain. The poem to dawn brilliantly clarifies that the aesthetic synthesis confronts the duality of pain and pleasure and transmutes it wholly into unalloyed pleasure, whereas the stoic strategy is to neutralise that duality, which can offer a stimulating challenge to the human spirit, by a deliberate insensitiveness to both pleasure and pain. Schelling⁸⁸ said: "To be drunk and sober not in different moments but at one and the same moment—this is the secret of true poetry. Thus is the Apollonian different from the merely Dionysian ecstasy." He is actually referring to the poet's responsibility to be genuinely inspired as well as critically alert at the same time, for he goes

on to say "To represent an infinite content in the most perfect, that is, in the most finite form, that is the highest task of art" But if the poet has to mould his content, his heady inspiration, into crystalline form, he has also to fight another battle in the determination of the content itself, and win his victory over pain so that pain may become a delight He has to win his victory over pleasure too, of the sort that determines behaviour in the contexts of daily life, for it has no enduring strength that strength can be realised only when this type of pleasure is transmuted into poetic delight

The contrast between the Apollonian and the Dionysian to which Schelling refers is studied at this deeper level by Nietzsche The Dionysian sensibility reacts intensely to both pleasure and pain, birth and death, desire and destruction—so intensely that both types of experiences become orgiastic It is at once shuddering and triumphant, ghastly and ecstatic, rapturous and loathsome It is naturally stimulated by the approach of spring and sometimes artificially stimulated by narcotic drugs It vents itself, for of expression it is incapable, in shrieks and apathy, in leaping, in the barbaric, clanging rhythms of cymbals, and in suicide Apollo is the god of poetic intelligence The swiftly infectious but nihilistic fury of the Dionysian mood necessitates the Apollonian antidote, as the only salvation for mankind, and the union of the two in tragedy, conceived in Dionysian debauch and consummated in a Sophoclean calm begot from the very whirlwind of passion, is the flower of art, the ultimate reconciliation of religion, the justification of the world⁸⁹

The strategy of the tragic poet consists in distancing the pain This is completely different from the stoic distancing which drives it away to such a remoteness that it loses its relevance to the spirit altogether Aesthetic distancing is really holding pain at arm's length so that even when its impact is not enfeebled, it can be contemplated This can bring about a restructuring of the whole field, even at the level of practical, as distinguished from aesthetic, experience Even in the practical world, the exigencies of life compel a liberation from too great an obsession with unit experience, the single incident Man realises that the rough has to be taken with the smooth, that pessimism is excusable only if the overall pattern of life shows far more shadows than lights The demand for a total elimination of shadows is realised as a very unreasonable demand to make on life This type of long-term perspective is possible only when unit experience is not allowed to overwhelm the spirit This requires the distancing of experience, which is the essence of the aesthetic attitude And when such a long-term perspective is gained, what is immediately painful is seen sometimes to mature into the significant later The way is paved for the discovery of a moral pattern in existence As Ribner⁹⁰ rightly says in his study of Shakespearean tragedy, "moral patterns provide an emotional equivalent of an intellectual statement" The statement that life is a blessing or a curse is an intellectual statement

a verdict The data for the verdict are experiences Life seems a curse when pain is in excess of pleasure in the long-term span of life But if the pain is seen as accommodated within a rational system, it ceases to be unintelligible, or irrational The rationality of pain can be the content of an intellectual statement But pain is seen as rational only when it is experienced as rational, as accommodated within a moral order, seen to be valid for human experience Ribner analyses the "cognitive function of tragedy", its value as a way of knowing, and finds it in the moral basis of tragedy, its ability to postulate a moral order Valmiki's poetic intuition also discovers this truth, as we saw earlier Rama's tragic exile from Ayodhya and the loss of Sita lead ultimately to the destruction of the predatory regime of Ravana, thus becoming the means for a purpose of history, the realisation of the moral order in the life of social and political groups and in their mutual relations

I A Richards⁹¹ asserts that in the full tragic experience, "the mind does not shy away from anything, it does not protect itself with any illusion, it stands uncomfited, unintimidated, alone and self-reliant" Then he proceeds to say "The joy which is so strangely at the heart of the experience is not an indication that 'all's right with the world' or that 'somewhere, somehow, there is justice', it is indication that all is right here and now in the nervous system" What began as a fine intuition seems to be choked by adherence to a dogma For Richards has come under the spell of the theory of the conditioned reflex elaborated by Pavlov and others That theory sought to dispense even with consciousness and to reduce behaviour as wholly explained by the stimulus-reflex arc The build-up and subsidence of tension within the organism were, thus, neural phenomena, the build-up of energy for a motor reaction and the relaxation that follows the discharge of the energy But man is motivated by the desire to understand as well and concepts which either create an order in the phenomena of the world in which he is immersed or deny such an order can make and mar his life The analysis of the quality of his adjustment is not complete till we study the quality of the concepts he uses Confronted by the tragic, here, on earth, he may draw comfort from eschatological concepts, of a heaven beyond death, where every frustration here will be richly compensated This may be an illusion of the type which Richards justly rejects But what he fails to understand is that the conviction which sometimes emerges from the profound experience of the tragic that "somewhere, somehow, there is justice" in the natural order, that it is indeed a moral order, cannot always be dismissed as an illusion, if we regard illusion as some sort of wish-fulfilment, gratification in fantasy It cannot be so dismissed, because he who perceives a moral order in the world through tragic experience has no illusion about his own predicament as an individual In fact, the profound exaltation he may feel at the discovery of a hidden moral order can be possible only by an absolute transcendence of himself as an individual, for the most authentic proof

of that order, for him, may be his own suffering. In fact the whole notion of justice has to be rejected here, if it only means reward or punishment for action in terms of the world's goods. But a higher justice emerges in profound experience. If Richards rejects that idea, Wallace Stevens affirms it with supreme confidence. He calls poetic experience a "liberation", a "purification", a "justification" meaning "a kind of justice of which we had not known and on which we had not counted"⁹².

The tragic hero, said Maxwell Anderson,⁹³ "must pass through an experience which opens his eyes to an error of his own. He must learn through suffering. In a tragedy he suffers death itself as a consequence of his fault. . . but before he dies he has become a nobler person because of his recognition of his fault. . ." This is the Greek concept of tragedy. It is also that of Shakespeare, for even though Lear dies, the senile king of the earlier scenes grows to realise that "ripeness is all" and what brings about that growth is the storm of tragic events through which he passes. And it is this identical concept of tragedy which inspires Bhasa's great play, *Urubhanga*,⁹⁴ where Duryodhana falls in the field, but serenely accepts that fate as punishment for his violations of the moral order of the world, before he dies.⁹⁵ One is of course prepared to take Richards' word that the nervous systems of all these heroes were agreeably stimulated at the moment of the illumination. But one is still tempted to protest mildly that this is not wholly a matter of soothed nerves, which an injection of morphia could have achieved equally well, but a very significant growth in personality, the glimpse of wider horizons, the acceptance of one's own pain, even when feeling it most intensely, as proof of something august that rules existence and makes it noble by the quality of the order it achieves in human existence in the world. The perception of the moral order need not be an illusion.

The mind has to stand "uncomforted, unintimidated, alone and self-reliant" even here, for the purely personal predicament continues to remain unresolved. It is not as if, once the vision has been gained, Lear and Duryodhana can recover and live happily ever afterwards. Their death is not stayed. But what happens is that they themselves no longer regard their fate as gratuitous, meaningless, evil. If existence is a casual drift one can still refuse to drift into a casual hedonism as Valmiki's Rama refused when Jabali suggested it to him, and face the pain by giving it a meaning or using it to realise a meaning. That type of hedonism is moral suicide, not different from the actual suicides which Silone mentioned. The individual can pull himself back from the brink of the precipice only if he discovers a value which makes life worth living. But this discovery is often a willed creation. Rama says that man has to create values, if existence is a casual drift which can reveal no value in itself. One has to be "unintimidated and self-reliant" to achieve this type of transformation of the tragic.

Wallace Stevens⁹⁶ has said that while both the poet and the philosopher

share the "habit of probing for an integration" which is part of the "general will to order", the poet seeks integrations not so much for their own sake as for "some quality that an integration possesses, such as its insight, its evocative power or its appearance in the eye of the imagination. The philosopher intends his integration to be fateful the poet intends his to be effective" The meaning of the last sentence is not very clear, but I feel that what Stevens means is that while the philosopher's integration seeks a generalisation by the intellect which has or claims to have objective validity, the status of natural law, the poet is not satisfied till his integration is effective in being richly acceptable to the human spirit, besides having objective validity. The acceptance of the tragic, on account of the vision of a moral order yielded by it, can be a philosophical integration. In the poetic context, it is definitely a poet's integration, but it is also something which can be arrived at independently by a purely philosophical analysis. The purer transmutation of poetry, without this overlap, has to be sought in those confrontations of the tragic where what is ordinarily painful becomes a poetic delight, even without the need to relate that particular experience to its germs in the transgressions of the past or to the moral perceptions it can ultimately yield. The encounter here takes place in a closed ring and victory lies in the ability to charge the specific experience, by itself, with the evocative power mentioned by Stevens. Knights⁹⁷ also deals with this close encounter. "When the imagination judges it does not hold at a distance, it brings close and makes vivid, and of any mode of being it asks only one question. Does this, when most fully realised, when allowed to speak most clearly in its own name, make for life?—life being understood not as random impulse, but as power proceeding from an integrated personal centre, rational, clear-sighted and deeply responsible to all human claims." What Knights has to say about imagination annihilating distance should not be misunderstood. We saw earlier that the stoic distancing of experience is so extreme as to make it almost irrelevant. Poetry cannot work at that degree of remoteness. It cannot hold experience at such a distance but must bring it close to make it vivid. But a precise distancing is necessary for poetry also, as otherwise the spirit will be overwhelmed by the shock of the tragic encounter and the imagination will not be able to ask the question Knights says it does ask in poetic experience.

The essential preliminary, thus, is the right distancing. Henry James⁹⁸ wrote "I have ever, in general, found it difficult to write of places under too immediate an impression—that prevents standing off and allows neither space nor time for perspective. The image has had for the most part to be dim ('soft' would have been a better word) if the reflection was to be as is proper for the reflection, both sharp and quiet, one has a horror, I think artistically, of agitated reflections." If this type of distancing is essential for all poetry, it is especially important in tragic poetry and it is more difficult too. It is more difficult because recollection in tranquillity

which is what mellows other types of emotions, is not ideal for tragic experience, which has to conserve its immediacy and impact as shock. Time assuages grief, but the task in the poetic encounter of the tragic is to master the grief without having to wait for the distancing of slow time, conquer it here and now. The tragic impact steps up the probability that the reflection will be agitated since what is reflected is an agitation. Therefore the aesthetic endeavour becomes acutely difficult, for what has to be achieved is a sharp and quiet image of a stormy impact. Too great a distancing will make the storm an old, unhappy, far off tale. The context would thereby lose its strength as challenge. On the other hand, too close an impact would involve the spirit in eddies when it was seeking to rise above them. What is required is the right distancing that maintains a steady state of strong bipolar tension between the subject and tragic event. Anne Douglas Sedgwick⁹⁹ has recorded that the writing of the novel, *Paths of Judgment*, had been of enormous value to her. "It was an objectivising of all my thoughts, all my fears and faiths holding them all at arm's length, making them visible, and really grasping them—or, at least, getting more hold of them than I have done before." The experience has to be close enough to allow a hold, provided of course the strength to hold it can be summoned up from the depths of one's being.

If the right distancing is the first preliminary, spiritual strength is the basic requirement. As Lerner¹⁰⁰ points out, good poems expressing anguish transmit also a mastery of anguish through expression. Donne¹⁰¹ wrote

*Then as th'eath's inward narrow crooked lanes
Do purge sea water's fretful salt away,
I thought, if I could draw my paines,
Through Rhyme's vexation, I should them allay
Grief brought to numbers cannot be so fierce,
For, he tames it, that fetters it in verse*

Exactly what happens here has to be very clearly understood, as serious misunderstandings are possible. The content of the expression paraphrased into the propositional form of prose, may reveal unrelieved despair. But the truth of the greatest human significance here is that the despair did not lead to apathy and silence but to creation which is poetic action. D. D. Raphael¹⁰² said in his study of the tragic paradox that the pleasure in the tragic resulted from the exhilarating experience of a conflict between the sublimity of the powers (fate, necessity, character chance) which sought to overwhelm the tragic hero and the grandeur of his defiance, even if vain. Plot is the poet's metaphor and therefore the defiance of the tragic hero is the reflection of the resistance of the poet himself to the onslaught of the tragic. His image may be sombre, but it is a clear, unagitated image of a tremendous agitation. It is a willed creation and in that willing is latent a victory.

Serious difficulties arise when the dialectical nature of tragic creativity is not understood. The study of Kafka by Anders¹⁰³ has been vitiated by this lack of understanding. Anders attacks Kafka's work as a "plea for de-individualization and servility", Kafka is not only "the realist of the dehumanized world, but its exalter"; he makes of "atheism a theology". But Heller¹⁰⁴ has pointed out. "Only a mind keeping alive in at least one of its recesses the memory of a place where the soul is truly at home is able to contemplate with such creative vigour the struggle of a soul lost in a hostile land, and only an immensity of goodness can be so helplessly overcome by the vision of the worst of all possible worlds". Perceptive as this reading is, perhaps the suggestion that Kafka was "helplessly overcome" is one that cannot stand an analysis in depth. It is true that Kafka wrote in his diary. "Accept your symptoms, don't complain of them, immerse yourself in suffering". But this is the right nearness that is essential to the tragic encounter. Suffering cannot be dulled by fantasy or cultivated insensitiveness, otherwise the tragic problem is not being squarely faced. One has to immerse himself in suffering, to feel how terribly real it is. That statement of Kafka could be interpreted as a confession of defeat only if it had led to apathy or masochism. But Kafka's *Kavi Vyapara*, poetic or creative action, produced a literary marvel. The reference to the key concept in Sanskrit poetics that poetry is action is fully justified here, for a later entry in Kafka's diary reads. "Mount your attacking horse and ride it yourself. But what strength and skill that requires! And how late it is already".

Among the profoundest analyses of the nature of tragic experience is the one given by Giacomo Leopardi. His attitude vindicates what Read said about the possibility of a reaction which could be at the opposite pole of existentialist nihilism even if the existentialist reading of the world is accepted. For Leopardi's philosophy "tore every cloak from the concealed and mysterious cruelty of human destiny". But like Valmiki's Rama, even when existence was found to be a casual, hapless drift, he refused to float passively where the currents drifted. Leopardi pointed out that it was one thing to remark the absurd in the root of life and quite another to elevate absurdities into 1001 principles. The tragic situation had to be mastered, and without the help of illusions. Leopardi warned that despair should not be confused with emptiness, the sort of emptiness which led either to the suicides noticed by Silone or to the hedonism which Jabali advocated to Rama and which was a moral suicide. Leopardi felt that the tragic philosophy of the specific type he had in mind gave a proud satisfaction to strong men, in that they could face the bareness of existence with no illusion, with only the equipment of their own spiritual strength to resist that withering climate. He proceeds to a profound analysis of the poetic creativity that springs from—or in spite of—this despair. "Works of genius have the peculiarity that, even when they represent the nothingness of things, even when they

clearly demonstrate and make us feel the inevitable unhappiness of life when they express the terrible mood of despair, yet to a great mind, even though it may be in a state of extreme depression, disillusionment, blackness, and weariness of life, or in the bitterest and most paralysing misfortunes they always serve as consolation, rekindle enthusiasm, and though they treat and represent no other subject than death, they restore to such a mind at least momentarily that life which it had lost. Consequently that which when seen in the reality of things stabs and kills the soul, when seen in imitation (Leopardi is clearly referring to Aristotelian imitation, the *Anukūta* which Indian poetics emphasised as profoundly different from *Anukāṭana*) or in any other way in works of genius opens the heart and restores it to life. The very contemplation of nothingness is a thing in these works which seems to enlarge the soul of the reader, to exalt it and to satisfy it with itself and its own despair. Moreover, the feeling of nothingness is a dead and death-inflicting thing. But if this feeling is alive its liveliness prevails in the mind of the reader over the nothingness of the thing which it makes him feel, and the soul receives life, if only for a moment, from the very violence with which it feels the perpetual death of things in its own death"¹⁰⁵

We reach here the profounder meaning of Abhinava's statement that both subject and object really live only in the encounter of the poetic imagination (*Pratibha*) which takes place within an order of freedom. In the practical context, an object or situation is dismissed after exploiting its utility. In the poetic context, its real essence is savoured, disassociated from any accidental reference it may have for day-to-day needs. The same attitude operates on a higher plane in the case of the poetic experience of the tragic. In practical life, the tragic is avoided as hostile. In the poetic context, that hostility becomes an irrelevant accident and is dismissed as such. The dread it may ordinarily evoke is a dead and death-inflicting feeling. But it lives when it is aesthetically relished and from that relish the soul receives life, for this higher life can relish pain and despair just as daily life can relish the instrumental aspects of things, their utility. In fact what we are dealing with is a higher order of action: poetic action, which transforms pain into an instrument through which an exaltation of feeling can be gained. For the soul proves to itself that it can rise above pain and relish it. This exaltation, in Indian poetics, is the experience of beauty.

Bullough¹⁰⁶ clarifies exactly what happens here. "The painful images within the vision are at once intimately known and felt, and also 'distanced' like the objects in a far stretching landscape, 'estranged by beauty'. So far as the memory material used by the imaginative activity comes from personal experience, it has undergone separation from the concrete personality of the experiencer and extrusion of its personal aspects." In one of the greatest moments of Greek tragedy, Hecuba, the mother who has to outlive all her sons in the *Trojan Women* of Euripides,¹⁰⁷ caught

in the-maelstrom of suffering, relishes and distances it at the same time in a-profound transmutation of the tragic

*Lo, I have seen the open hand of God ·
And in it nothing, nothing save the rod
Of my affliction, and the eternal hate
Beyond all lands, chosen and lifted great
For Troy! Vain, vain were prayer and incense smell
And bulls' blood on the altars! . All is well
Had He not turned us in His hand, and thrust
Our high things low and shook our hulls as dust
We had not been this splendour, and our wrong
An everlasting music for the song
Of earth and heaven*

This transmutation, by which wrong becomes a song, and sorrow a splendour, is so radically unlike the experiences of every day life that it does cause difficulties in analysis. The twelfth century writers, Ramachandra and Gunachandra,¹⁰⁸ feel that the aesthetic emotion cannot possibly be always a bliss. *Rasa* can be bliss or pain, joy or sorrow (*Sukhadukhatmakā Rasa*). They feel that it is contradictory to the truth of experience to say that emotive experiences of the pathetic (*Karuna*), the fearsome (*Bhayankara*), the gruesome (*Bibhatsa*) and the terrible (*Raudra*) are of the form of pleasure. If, in the representation by the actor, these unpleasant feelings are rendered pleasant, the acting must be hopelessly defective. But the spectator does have an experience of beauty. This, however, is contributed by the skill of the actor in representing the feeling, not by the feeling itself. The attribution of beauty and the experience of delight to the feeling itself is due to a confusion. Rudrabhatta¹⁰⁹ (tenth or eleventh century) also feels the same way. Pathetic and similar feelings continue to be painful (*Dukharupa*) in the aesthetic context as well and our delight is wholly a delight in the histrionic skill—or poetic skill, by extension, in the case of the narrative literary forms.

The delight in the Apollonian mastery of the tragic, the plastic shaping of pain even when its turbulence is fully felt, is very important in poetic experience, as we have already seen. Both the tragic poet and the tragic actor have to achieve this mastery. Nevertheless, the above analyses fail in the deepest perception because they do not realise that feelings undergo a profound modulation in poetic experience. They no longer remain confined within the closed orbits of their relevance to the practical life. In the practical context the hostile becomes the dreaded, loss or denial becomes a frustrating sorrow. In the poetic context this type of reference ceases to be relevant and the feeling is relished in itself. *Rasa* is not ordinary feeling, or feeling as ordinarily experienced,

but aesthetically relished feeling. The practical approach establishes contact with the object in only one of its aspects, its utility, neutrality or hostility to human purpose. The poetic approach discovers the object or situation in its liberated, essential quality. Ramachandra and Gunachandra come near to this perception when they say that feelings like terror and pathos are like the hot and sour spices which also add to the taste of dishes as much as sweet ingredients. Relishing sorrow is totally different from being overwhelmed by sorrow. As Fontenelle¹¹⁰ said, "the heart loves to be moved, therefore the sad and the painful are also acceptable to it, if something softens their sting". This moving is the melting (*Druti*) of the heart which Sanskrit poetics mentions.

The philosopher Madhusudana Sarasvati¹¹¹ (sixteenth century) uses the concept for an attack on the problem which is far more perceptive than that of Ramachandra and his colleague or Rudrabhatta. The *Sthayin* in Sanskrit poetics is sentiment as latent reality, *Rasa* is the aesthetically relished emotion. Madhusudana is emphatic that for a *Sthayin* to become *Rasa* it has to become *Satvic*. This has reference to the principle of three qualities, powers or potentialities with which Samkhya doctrine sought to explain both the dynamism of physical nature and the quality of human reactivity. *Satva* is static, potential or controlled energy, psychological poise, moral perfection. The poise of detachment from ego-centered practical involvements is absolutely essential for poetic experience. But take the case of an emotion like sorrow. To the extent that it partakes of the nature of despair, it is *Tamasic*, for *Tamas* is both physical inertia and mental apathy. Similarly, the feeling of anger is *Rajasic*, for *Rajas* is dynamic energy, psychological extroversion, impassioned activism. The *Satvic* mood leads to happiness (*Sukha*). The *Rajasic* mood can yield the joy of achievement but can also lead to sorrow (*Dukha*), for the prehensile seizure of the world by the active temperament cannot always lead to the elation of victory, it must occasionally confront the pain of defeat. The *Tamasic* mood leads to delusion (*Moha*), to wish-fulfilment in fantasy or plain stupor and lethargy. How can sorrow which leads to lethargy in life, and anger, which is often frustration blocked desire, become pure delight in poetry? These are *Tamasic* and *Rajasic* emotions and they must be transmuted to the *Satvic* state before they can become aesthetically relished emotion, *Rasa*. Here Madhusudana first of all checks with experience, lest theorising lose its anchorage in reality and finds that sorrow (*Soka*) and anger (*Krodha*) do become relished delight in the enjoyment of a drama. Therefore he propounds as a law of experience that when these *Tamasic* and *Rajasic* sentiments are presented in poetry they attain a modulation or transformed growth (*Prakarsha* or *Udreka*) and produce a melting of our heart, thereby becoming *Satvic*, of the essence of delight (*Sukhamaya*), and attaining the status of aesthetically relished feeling (*Rasatva*).

Madhusudana, however, does not concede that the emotions shed their

real nature as *Rajasic* and *Tamasic* even in the poetic context Raghavan¹¹² finds this apparent paradox a most unsatisfactory feature in Madhusudana's analysis "This however spoils the case and Madhusudana Sarasvati has to say, quite contrary to the generally accepted notions, that *Rasasvada* (relishing of the aesthetic emotion) or *Ananda* (delight) therefore necessarily differs in quantity and quality in such cases" That is, Raghavan interprets Madhusudana to mean that feelings yield differential delight in poetic experience, according to their nature in day-to-day encounters I feel this reading does not do justice to the real profundity of Madhusudana The great power of poetry lies in the fact that it can transform into delight not only the naturally pleasant feelings—like the erotic sentiment (*Rati*) for example—but also those emotions which, in the natural context, are unpleasant Analysis here must do justice to the profoundly dialectical nature of the transmutation Pain has to continue to be pain since, if it were naturally a delight, poetic transmutation has nothing particularly significant to achieve And yet it must receive a charge of delight because the experience is creative, poetic

Difficulties arise here because we insist on applying concepts of hypostasis in a situation which needs concepts of a field of force, of dynamic equilibrium, of a stabilisation that can be realised only through a process, a continuing action, a sustained tension What happens is something like what happens within the nucleus of the atom. Because the particles are close together, the forces of electrical attraction and repulsion that can operate only with greater separation between particles cannot be invoked for explaining the equilibration here Polarity, the attraction between positive and negative, is nevertheless needed for bonding, for maintaining the field of force This polarisation is managed by the field making particles continuously change in the charges they carry The meson may be negative one moment but becomes positive the next, to maintain the field with other particles that also change, but always antiphonally If the analogy seems unnecessarily pedantic, the author apologises But it does seem to him to be ideal for a clarification of the extremely subtle and complex reality of the poetic synthesis Affect that is ordinarily disagreeable is not staticised as agreeable for ever afterwards in the poetic transmutation The transformation is real only so long as a poetic field or mood exists Within the field and as long as it lasts, the negative receives a charge of positive significance which it will have to surrender when the field ceases to exist If the transformation were a mutation, the first line of the poem itself would probably have effected it and creativity would not be under the obligation to maintain the poetic tension any further, the transformation will also endure even after the return from poetic experience to ordinary living What happens is really a modulation When a melody modulates to a different key, there is no total destruction of the previous pattern In fact, the pattern remains fairly constant, but it is seen in a different light, altogether lifted to a

different plane Sorrow remains sorrow, but its meaning to the spirit is profoundly altered

For this modulation of meaning, subtly precise "distancing" of experience and its "filtering" are necessary, to borrow the expressions used by Bullough.¹¹³ The modulation cannot take place in "over-distanced" (unconsidered or else theoretically considered) experience. The distance therefore has to be reduced, but the "antinomy of distance" demands that this reduction has to be halted at a critical point. The precise requirement is "the utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance." For, if there is no separation, the experience is "under-distanced", that is, emotionally overwhelming, and functioning as the dynamism for action. In the precise distancing required for aesthetic relish, experience is not allowed to recede too far lest its heat may not be felt, but it is not allowed to come so close as to scorch the sensibility. The experience is also "filtered" now. "Distance is obtained by separating the object and its appeal from one's own self, by putting it out of gear with practical needs and ends. But distance does not imply an impersonal, purely intellectually interested relation. On the contrary, it describes a *personal* relation often emotionally coloured, but of a *peculiar* character. Its peculiarity lies in that the personal character of the relation has been, so to speak, filtered. It has been cleared of the practical concrete nature of its appeal."

Pain and terror are raw experiences when the subject is obsessed with their purely practical intimation which is an ominous import. Yet the pathetic (*Karuna*) and the terrible (*Bhayankara*) figure in Bharata's list of *Rasas*.¹¹⁴ This means that the poet's action (*Kavi Vyapara*) can make them shed their rawness and make them modulate into precious intimations, into relish. Many of the Sanskrit hymns, especially those to Siva, reveal this modulation of the terrible into a sense of the numinous. "Thine heart shall fear, and be enlarged", said the Hebrew prophet.¹¹⁵ Yeats was no democrat and had no particular esteem for the masses. But, during the Irish rebellion, when he saw the same motley crowd as fighters round the Four Courts and the Post Offices he wrote

*All changed, changed utterly
A terrible beauty is born*

A subtler experience is recorded by Wordsworth in the *Prelude*. He rowed out on Esthwaite one summer evening and suddenly a huge peak, black and high, till then hidden behind a range, upreared its head, an ominous shape in the gathering darkness. Panic fear descended suddenly on the boy's heart. For many days, his brain was haunted by "a dim and undetermined sense of unknown modes of being." The pleasant images of sea and sky and the colours of green fields were expelled by this profound impression. "Huge and mighty forms, that do not live like living men

moved through the mind by day, and were a trouble to my dreams ' The sensitive poetic objectification of the impression is proof of its transmutation into relish But it is very important to understand that the relish was not made possible by "over-distancing" the experience, by reducing and dismissing the fear as a hallucination "The experience", as Kemp Smith¹¹⁶ emphasises, "is inexplicable in the absence of fear, and yet involves, in some measure, a transcendence of fear" It would be perhaps more correct to say that the experience reveals the modulation of fear, for transcendence may imply over-distancing, which is definitely ruled out by the nature of the actual, final experience here Wordsworth himself confirms this truth in retrospect

*Fair seed-time had my soul, and I grew up
Fostered alike by beauty and by fear*

Perhaps difficulties have arisen in analysis because, when pain is said to become pleasure in poetic experience, both terms retain the associations they have in ordinary living In the practical context, pain cannot become pleasure In the poetic context also, the painful cannot become the pleasant if poetic pleasure is to be equated with pleasure in daily living Poetic relish is neither pain nor pleasure in the natural sense which is found in the ordinary emotions of life associated with personal interest It is disassociated from all such interests and consists of a transcendental (*Alaukika*) joy which is free from the contact of everything else perceived but itself An ordinary emotion may be pleasurable or painful, but a poetic sentiment, transcending the limitations of the practical attitude, is lifted above such empirical pleasure and pain into pure joy, the essence of which is the relish itself Visvanatha¹¹⁷ elaborates this brilliantly In the contexts of practical living, a stimulus (*Vibhava*) becomes the source of either pleasure or pain In the poetic context, the stimulus undergoes a radical transformation because it becomes an impersonalised, transcendental stimulus (*Alaukika Vibhava*) In fact, while the emotion is the reaction to the stimulus in the practical context, in the poetic context, the emotion becomes the *Vibhava* or stimulus for a higher reaction, its aesthetic relishing Like bites and the like in amorous dalliance in this context, what is ordinarily painful yields unalloyed pleasure We shed tears in witnessing a tragedy It has been argued that this clearly suggests that sorrow remains mere sorrow without also becoming delight in poetic experience Visvanatha answers that this reading is utterly imperceptive Tears constitute no proof that anything but joy is felt in poetry For the tears shed by the spectator or reader are not those of pain, but of acute relish Jagannatha¹¹⁸ also agrees with this and says that the shedding of tears and the like are due to the nature of the experience of particular pleasures, not to pain Abhinava asserts that the final experience of the spectator of the tragic sequences in a drama is delight, not pain (*Samajikanam hai-*

shaika-phalam natyam, na sokadi-phalam)¹¹⁹ This also vindicates what Madhusudana had to say about the dialectical complexity of the poetic experience of the tragic. Sorrow brings on tears, pleasure smiles. Sorrow does not cease to be sorrow in aesthetic experience. The tears continue to flow. But there has come about a profound change in the inwardness of the whole situation. For the tears are no longer of pain but of the relishing of the pain by a heart that can melt in sympathy and perceives in that melting a new proof of its own life and sensitiveness excited by yet another significant experience.

CHAPTER NINE

Aesthetics and Ethics

I THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS

WE now return to the great affirmations of Abhinava that poetic experience is always a delight, that it can yield all that is yielded by the pursuit of the four ends of man (*Puushantha*) clarified by the great tradition of Indian thought, and that the ultimate objective of the four paths also is delight which is the essence of poetic experience. We have seen how the claim that poetry always yields delight, even in the tragic encounter, can be vindicated. We may now attempt to clarify the related affirmations of Abhinava that poetry can realise what moral life can realise and that delight is the fruition of moral life as well.

The outlooks of ethical systems regarding existence in the world have varied. Pessimistic views would regard the world as a vale of tears. But even in their case, since life has to be lived through for the appointed term, interest speedily shifts from the negative, pessimistic mood to the clarification of a programme of living. Ethical commands thus emerge among social groups regarding the conduct of life. Pessimistic systems may be harshly restrictive, joyless in their prescriptions. But in more tolerant systems, the world will not be seen as a trap or a temptation, and a rich enjoyment of life will be sanctioned, provided it is controlled by ethical law. Basic to this outlook is the warm acceptance of life and the world, in strong contrast to their resigned acceptance, as things which have to be endured, by pessimistic systems. This warm acceptance is necessary for art for it works on and through the sensuously palpable. An ideational culture—as Sorokin defines it—can also yield art. But even here, the sensuous has to be used as the symbolic, however schematic the creative handling of sensuous material, and there is the inevitable concession here that the perishable material world can mirror imperishable, transcendent realities, it cannot, therefore, be completely negative.

The dark suspicion that the entrancing beauty of the world might be as false as a mirage does appear in Vedic culture, but this happens only very late. Throughout the vigorous ascending phase of their culture, the Vedic Aryans frankly accepted the world and life. "This world is the most beloved of all", says the Atharva Veda.¹ And the Rig Veda² says

at one place "There is no waiting for a world to come We must be happy here and now Make us today enjoyers of wide room and happiness" To the Vedic Aryans also the poets' highest calling was what it was to Wordsworth :

*To exercise then skill
Not in Utopia—subterranean fields—
On some secreted island, heaven knows where,
But in the very world, which is the world
Of all of us, the place where, in the end,
We find our happiness or not at all*

Attitudes reveal philosophical outlooks or, at least, implications, on analysis In the lyrically responsive attitude of Vedic poetry to the world, we find a joyous world-acceptance Here it may be a matter of the healthy pulse of the blood, the warm beating of the heart But, later, philosophical thought destroyed this organic optimism and yielded its bitter harvest of pessimism and world-weariness, ending up in a world-negation which saw man's life as a corruption and contrasted it with the immutable existence of absolute being The humanised intellect, the intellect warmed by the emotions, of Vyasa then took up the challenge and yielded a system which was equally valid as poetry and philosophy, analytical thought and integrating intuition Nature and historical existence were no degradation of eternal existence, but its prolongation, its evolution according to a programme

The correlative of the rejection of the superiority of withdrawn, absolute existence over historical essence by metaphysical thought is the rejection of excessive introversion and withdrawal from action in mental life Both rejections are extremely difficult St Augustine is a case of the failure to reject the temptation to world-negation in metaphysical thought Across the centuries we hear him musing dangerously "We were saying then If to any the tumult of the flesh were hushed, hushed the images of earth, and waters, and air, hushed also the poles of heaven, yea, the very soul be hushed to herself, hushed all dreams and imaginary revelations, every tongue and every sign and whatsoever exists only in transition, since if any could hear, all these say, we made not ourselves, but He made us that abideth for ever Could this be continued on, and other visions of kind far unlike be withdrawn, and this one ravish, and absorb, and wrap up its beholder amid these inward joys, so that life might be for ever like one moment of understanding which we now sighed after were not this, Enter into thy Master's joy?" It is a great meditation, but is it necessary to forget the world to remember the power that made it, shun whatever exists because it exists in transition, when it is open to regard cosmic process as a divine programme? Wallace Stevens³ criticises the type who makes the wrong sort of abs-

tractions, the "Nabob of bones" who never supposed

*That he might be the truth, himself, or part of it,
That the things he rejected might be part
And the irregular turquoise, part, the perceptible blue
Grown denser, part, the eye so magnified, so played
Upon by clouds, the ear so magnified
By thunder, parts, and all these things together,
Parts, and more things, parts .*

Vyasa also gave the same answer when Krishna said in the *Gita* that all that was mighty and glorious in the world, the splendour of the sun and the beauty of the starlit heavens, was a spark of His splendour.

Equally strong is the psychologically closely related temptation towards the withdrawal of mental life from the world. In Villiers' *Axel*, life is nothing and imaginative experience—one which is completely alienated from life—is everything. "Live?" cries Axel. "Our servants will do that for us." In Mallarmé's *Herodiade*, the ice-cold virgin symbolises the complete withdrawal from life into an exotic aestheticism. It is in Valéry's extremely subtle creations that we find the whole conflict handled by poetry and resolved poetically. In *La Jeune Parque*, the young goddess of Fate becomes the symbol of a conflict between desires for an active life and for independent, passionless contemplation. In *La Pythie*, the Pythian priestess feels intensely the struggle within herself between her virginal thoughts and her passions. At last she reaches a harmony between her two natures, intellectual and physical, private and public. Without the body the mind lives in an abstract, unreal world, without the mind the body is turned into a turmoil of indeterminate emotions. The mind or soul needs the body.

The aesthetic attitude accepts the world and accepts other beings as necessary for the full realisation of its own being. In Valéry's *Fragments du Narcisse*, the pool is the symbol of the world as the self-obsessed soul sees it. Narcissus loves the pool because it reflects himself. He does not want it to reflect any one besides himself and in fact assumes that it reflects no other life. "No flock ever comes to drink from its ripples." But later he finds that the pool has had other visitors and holds its own secrets—"the dead bird, the ripe fruit fallen after slow length of days, the fitful gleams from lost rings." The pool, in its time, has mirrored "stars, roses, seasons, bodies and their loves." Narcissus is troubled by the thought of others who have been there, especially the lovers, with their ignorance, their illusions, their weaknesses. He insists on treating them as unreal, but their rejection is really a self-deprivation and he feels troubled. But when he persists, his own image refuses to speak to him and in the end disappears. The self is not self-sufficient. It grows only in the humanising bondages of historical and social living.

Des Esseintes, the hero of Huysmans' novel, *A Rebours*, wishes "to hide himself, away, far from the world, in some retreat, where he might deaden the sound of the loud rumbling of inflexible life, just as one covers the streets with straw for sick people" That unconscious image betrays the morbidity of the attitude, for it is a sick attitude In Vedic lyrical poetry, when the blood by its own vitality was able to say "Aye" to life, the tolerant, optimistic, well-adjusted outlook that emerged comes out in a poem where the poet looks on with pleasant humour at the world of men, including himself, seeking their desires and the livelihoods which are the means of their satisfaction "We all have various thoughts and plans, and diverse are the ways of men The carpenter desires a rift so that he can repair it, the leech looks out for a fracture which he can set right A bard am I, my father a leech, my mother grinds corn, with the millstone Striving for wealth, with varied plans, we follow our desires like kine" This is the way of the world, as natural as the desire of animal life for the favourable natural milieu, as normal as sex "The male desires his mate's approach, the frog is eager for the flood"¹ We find also the Brahmin, the priest-mediator, in this crowd "The Brahmin seeks the worshipper"

Unnoticeably but steadily we have been led to the confrontation of the ethical problem here The male desires his mate's approach, this is the great libidinal urge which Indian tradition accepts as one of the four ends of man, *Kama* As the frog seeks the flood as its favourable natural milieu, men seek wealth, for wealth can create the secure social milieu This is another great objective of human effort, *Artha* The Brahmin lives by giving ethical instruction This is the third great end of man, *Dharma* But the situation can now become extremely complex, for in the social context great tensions can arise through the collision of individuals each pursuing these ends, especially the gratification of the libidinal and acquisitive urges The leech seeking a fractured limb may not create any difficulties But men may fracture the limbs of others in the greed to acquire what they have Ethics is supposed to eliminate these conflicts, but it can also harden as orthodoxy and generate social tensions

Acceptance of the world is easy when the tenor of life is easy But that acceptance has now to survive the shock of the discovery that the world can be as often a battlefield as a playfield Here again, the vitality of the blood may solve the problem by itself, for tension and conflict can be exciting The Vedic poets paid their deep-felt homage to the fertile earth of the Indo-Gangetic plain, the earth "on whom the ocean and the rivers and the waters, on whom food and corn-lands come into their being, on whom lives all that breathes and is active" They accepted both the struggle and the joy of the earth, "whereon men sing and dance, whereon men meet in battle, and the war-cry rises and the drum resounds"⁵ The excitement of conflict accepted by the blood can

be accepted by thought also after long musing and debates within In Yeats' *Dialogue of Self and Soul*, the latter, which stands for the transcendental life, summons the empirical self to the "winding ancient stair for the steep ascent to the breathless starlit air . to that quarter where all thought is done" But the Self pleads for life even with all its ignominies and tensions The same conclusion is reached in Yeats' *Vacillation* where the Soul and the Heart debate and the transcendental rejection of the world is rejected "Homer is my example and his unchristened heart" Like Homer, Vyasa also loves the battlefield, but his approach is infinitely more profound The battlefield represents symbolically the tensions and conflicts of life at their most explosive and offers the greatest challenge to ethical thought in the resolution of the crisis of action The transcendentalist rejection of the world is rejected by Vyasa and he welcomes the world as challenge for a self-affirmation

Vyasa gives a poetic resolution to the problem of ethics. Let us, however, go back to the formulation of the problem as well as the solution by ethical thought in the *Dharma Sastra*, the wisdom literature of India Ethical speculations elaborated a great doctrine of the four goals or ends of human existence They are *Dharma* (ethical conduct), *Artha* (economic interests), *Kama* (satisfaction of libidinal, emotive and aesthetic impulses), and *Moksha* (salvation or ultimate liberation) It is very important to realise that these are not independent values, but an integrated hierarchy of values We have to distinguish in them ultimate ends and proximate values *Moksha* or liberation is the ultimate end But its seeking accommodates the other values also "One must not observe the ordained duties with a worldly end in view . But as when a mango is planted to bear fruit, shade and fragrance also result concomitantly even so the ordained duty that is performed is attended by material gains"⁶ Thus, liberation is the ultimate end, moral life is the means to it and material prosperity and emotional satisfaction are concomitant results Once this great perspective is established, the satisfaction of legitimate impulses is given the most liberal recognition Thus Vatsyayana's treatise on erotics raises sex to a science and an art, but it also states that ethical conduct is the highest goal of man, the pursuit of libidinal satisfactions being controlled by it⁷ Likewise, even Kautilya, the greatest devotee of economic power, concedes that whenever there is any conflict between any secular consideration and ethical obligation, the ruler should go by the latter⁸ This perspective made possible a full-blooded living, piloted life away from all repressions stemming from unbalanced ascetic attitudes and yet guaranteed that the broad course of life was always flowing towards the ultimate goal

Moral prescriptions are required for regulating the social seeking of proximate values, for it is here that competitive tendencies can emerge as a serious threat to social harmony As Nowell-Smith⁹ says, "it is difficult to imagine what life in society would be like if we abandoned them"

Therefore, initially, the ethical rule has to be given the status of a dictate which has precedence over preference. Macbeath¹⁰ clarifies this: "When we consider the ends which men pursue to discover which of them are really good, we find that we have to consider these ends, which have their origin in man's needs and the desires to which these needs give rise, as parts of a system of ends, in which not only the ends of the individual but those of other individuals as well, are so integrated that they can find realization consistently with one another. Only ends which fit into the structure of this system are really desirable, and they are desirable only in the form in which they fit into it. So that we cannot discover which ends are good without taking account of the structural pattern of the form of life in which they are realised." This is the approach of Indian ethical thought also. It starts with the clear recognition that the ends which are really desirable may not be felt to be so initially by the individual. It thus rejects the "emotive theory" of ethics of the type formulated by Robinson,¹¹ Ayer¹² and others. This theory has been vigorously criticised by Stroll,¹³ Harris¹⁴ and others. According to the emotive theory, when anybody says that something is morally good what he means is merely that he feels favourably disposed towards it. The theory confuses momentary feeling with considered, final approval. As Harris, rather testily, points out, the theory cannot explain such attitudes as those revealed in statements like this: "Though it would give me great pleasure to knock him down, I disapprove of violence." Conversely, it would have given pleasure to Arjuna in the *Maha Bharata* to lay down his arms and withdraw from the battle. But he is told that he has to fight evil. The "ought" need not be, and often is not, the "liked." Hare¹⁵ is essentially right when he writes: "It is important to point out a fact which has been singularly ignored by some moralists, that to say of someone that he has a feeling of obligation is not the same as to say that he has an obligation. To say the former is to make a statement of psychological fact, to say the latter is to make a value judgment." But this only means that ethical thought can discover in this situation a conflict, because feeling may not align itself with the obligation. The obligation, however, may be valid for reasons which belong to a higher plane than the preferences of the individual, which may, further, be temporary, uninformed, emerging from a low level of mental culture. The defenders of the emotive theory affirm that all recognitions of moral obligation are derived from the prior decisions of our own regarding ethical and moral values and "can be only verified by reference to a standard or set of principles which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own."¹⁶ The ambiguity here lies in the "we." Initially it is the social group, as reflected in the tradition of its ethical thought, which accepts a standard. If the individual makes it his own the concession is implicit that the individual can evolve, for initially his feeling may reject it. Sartre¹⁷ said: "What has value has value only because

it is chosen" Valmiki's Rama also asserts that value is a choice This type of choice, by the developed emotional subjectivity, implies a distinction between momentary preference and reflective acceptance, the growth, maturing and orientation of the emotions themselves

The momentary preference is dictated by a very elementary hedonism, the Pleasure Principle of Freud, while the mature preference is guided by the Reality Principle The latter may or may not be attended by pleasure If it is not, it is pure obedience to an ethical command This does not necessarily mean that the feeling of obligation is obsessional or blind, a mere conditioning by the social environment The individual may rationally judge it as valid, but he may not, initially, derive joy from it Herbert Spencer¹⁸ has contributed an analysis to clarify how evolution, both biological and moral, can bring pleasure also in the execution of obligations Since organisms seek pleasure and avoid pain, sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts Since sentient beings strive to exercise functions which give pleasure and avoid those which yield pain, it follows that in the organisms which actually result from evolution, pleasure and pain will be correlated with biologically beneficial and injurious processes respectively Though Spencer thus gives evolutionary priority to egoistic motives, his analysis provides also for the development of altruistic motives He regards the latter as consequences of the struggle of the family or tribe for existence In course of time, by the socialisation of the human being, altruistic acts come to give pleasure as well to the individual, though he may initially perform them only because they are the dictates of the group for ensuring group stability

Indian thought has also linked the vision of the family and tribe growing into a family of the whole of mankind—expressed in the great, resonant expression, *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*—with its ethical speculations Sankara reached that vision through pure intellectual analysis His monism posited an absolute unity of being When the empirical self has realised this deep reality of itself, it cannot think of itself as separate from others "He who has reached the all-penetrating *Atman* enters into the all" Therefore he has to work for the weal of the world (*Loka Samgraha*) But a truth reached by the intellect can spark a joy only if it is absorbed by the emotional reactivity It is the vision of the world through feeling that can make the discovered truth an inspiring vision instead of a cold fact In the Vedic discovery of cosmic order (*Rita*) and in the deeper perceptions of the ethical treatises about the nature of moral law (*Dharma*) we see this emotive appraisal of the world But before we proceed to discuss them, we have to see whether emotion, as distinguished from the intellect, can be safely relied upon as an instrument of cognition, for cosmic order and moral law have in fact been presented as objective principles, cognised in reality.

II EMOTIVE COGNITION AND BELIEF-SYSTEMS

Let us start with the notice of some affirmations that art is indeed a way of knowledge, if only to give us an initial confidence that we are not on the wrong track. "To the modern poet", says Allen Tate,¹ "poetry is one of the ways that we have of knowing the world." This attitude need not be confined to the modern poets alone. Ouspensky²⁰ gives the claim a generalised validity. "Like science and philosophy, art is a definite way of knowledge." Ker²¹ also says "Both art and science have their end to make things clear to the mind." T. S. Eliot²² has observed that "art may be said to approach the condition of science" and Fernandez²³ has urged that art alone can furnish to the analytic researches of philosophy a sum of experiences equal in objective value to that offered by science.

But affirmations by themselves will not be helpful, without clarifying argument. Day Lewis²⁴ helps us here with an extended analysis. Both poet and scientist are explorers, seeking to clarify the relationships between themselves and the world. The scientist explores objectively while the poet explores in the light of his own feelings. The poet, like the scientist, must try to see things as they really are, but nothing "really is" in isolation pure and self-sufficient, reality involves relationship and as soon as you have relationship, you have—for human beings—feeling. The poet cannot see things as they really are, unless he is precise about the feelings which attach him to them. "Enlightenment about one's own feelings is as valuable as any other knowledge." The poet needs to find things out for himself and record them. For him, as a poet, all human experience, however common or trivial is virgin soil. "Each poem is a fresh experiment in the chemistry of human soul."

Earlier, in the discussion of the concept of beauty, we saw that the opposition between "objective" scientific fact and "subjective" poetic experience cannot be maintained today. Either can be regarded as subjective or objective. The capacity to feel is as real as the capacity to perceive through the senses or to think. Knowledge of fact is gained only after perception. Knowledge of feeling is gained only by feeling. Certain truths can be apprehended only in a flood of passion. "Poetry communicates ideas, but does more", says Lowes²⁵. "It is concerned with truth carried alive into the heart by passion." Wordsworth wrote

*It is the hour of feeling
One moment may now give us more
Than years of toiling reason*

Why should not the insight given by feeling be regarded as objective? Pasternak's *Definition of the Creative Power*²⁶ affirms.

*Gardens, ponds, palings, the creation
Foamed with the whiteness of our tears,
Are only categories of passion
Gathered by the human heart*

The perception of truth by the subject does not make the truth "subjective" in any sense which rules out objective validity. Likewise, the subjective experience of feeling, when confronted with the objects of the world, need not be denied objective validity. The factuality of the object does not exhaust its reality. The factuality is perceived by the analytical reason while sensibility discovers another aspect of the object—its power to arouse feeling. Whitman²⁷ wrote "the true use for the imaginative faculty is to give ultimate vivification to facts, to science, and to common lives, endowing them with the glows and glories and final illustriousness which belong to every real thing and to real things only. Without that ultimate vivification—which the poet or other artist alone can give—reality would seem incomplete." St John Perse²⁸ asks: "Has one not the right to hold the poetic instrument to be just as legitimate as the instrument of logic?" It is legitimate because experience of feeling is as real, in the confrontation of the object, as the experience of its truth. "More than a mode of knowledge", he adds, "poetry is a mode of life—integral life. Refusing to dissociate art from life, knowledge from love, it is action, it is passion, it is power and innovation always, whereby it transcends boundaries." Abhinava Gupta claimed that the object is known in its pure essence, as living reality, only in aesthetic contemplation, while the practical approach can establish rapport only with its instrumental aspect. "The forceps of our minds", said Wells,²⁹ "are clumsy forceps, they crush the truth a little in taking hold of it." "By intuition", said Bergson,³⁰ "is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible." The contrast between scientific and poetic knowledge may cease to be valid at the deepest level. As a character in one of Durrell's novels³¹ says, "science is the poetry of the intelligence and poetry the science of the heart's affections." "Poetry", said Wordsworth,³² "is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge and the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science." The parable about the origin of drama given by Bharata³³ is that it was synthesised with the essence of all the four Vedas. Brahma borrowed the art of expressive speech from the Rig Veda, music from the Sama Veda, acting from the ritualistic gestures of the Yajur Veda and poetic feeling from the Atharva Veda and created a fifth Veda, the Nāṭya Veda, the Veda of drama. Rāja Śekhara³⁴ calls poetry the finest essence of all the four sciences (*Vidyas*).

The opposition between science and poetry becomes untenable for many reasons. For one thing, in microphysics, the observer cannot be sepa-

iated from the process observed. The "fact" discovered is not the behaviour of the particle but its reaction to the act of observation. In poetry, similarly, we get the reaction of the subjectivity when it observes the object through its sensibility. Secondly, inspirational elements play as great a role in the higher operation of science as they do in poetry, in the patterning of facts into hypotheses. Thirdly—and this is the most important consideration—the separation of analytical thought and intuition, reason and imagination, is most often a dissection in retrospect. In both scientific and poetic exploration, the faculties work in harmony. Extensive data collected by Hadamard³⁵ show that disparate facts constellate into theory in the scientist's unconscious exactly in the manner images constellate into the continuous poem in the depths of the poet's mind. In poetic endeavour, further, sensuous reactivity or feeling does not work in isolation. Garrod³⁶ wrote "Truth in and for poetry is given by the report of the senses. Poetry begins in the free surrender of ourselves to the impressions of the senses. To be poets, we must trust our senses, and we must speak in the language of the senses, and not in the conventional language of Reason. The cardinal dogma is that the only knowledge worth having (worth having for the poet) comes from the senses." Fry,³⁷ likewise, wrote "Art as created by the artist is in violent revolt against the instinctive life, since it is an expression of the reflective and fully conscious life." These are extreme statements, for they suggest an unreal separation between emotion or sensuous perception and intellect, instinct and reason. "In mature life," says Lorimer,³⁸ "poetry ceases to be mere uncontrolled affective association and primitive rhythm and becomes charged and controlled by reflective enquiry." Howes,³⁹ similarly has pointed out that "the emotions, rooted though they are in instinct, are the finest flower of human evolution without which reason itself is barren and may become evil." Hydes,⁴⁰ likewise, points out that the synthesis of intellect, emotions and intuition is necessary for an organic philosophy of man. Emerson first vigorously opted for an exclusive reliance on sensuous perception. "Culture is to cherish a certain susceptibility, to turn man into eyes. Let us deserve to see." ⁴¹ My life is optical, not practical. ⁴² I admire perception wherever it appears. That is the one eternal miracle. ⁴³ Nevertheless, he corrected what he saw by what he thought, though thought also becomes musicalised in his poetry.

Thoreau⁴⁴ felt that the truest seizure of the object was its poetic seizure. "The most poetic and truest account of objects is generally given by those who first observe them, or the discoverers of them." Observation is used here in the same sense as Zola⁴⁵ uses it. "The thing is to look at anything one wants to describe long and clearly enough to discover in it an aspect which nobody else has seen or reported. There is the unexplored in everything, because we are accustomed to use our eyes with the remembrance of what people before us have thought about the thing we are

contemplating The smallest thing contains something that is not known." Abhinava means the same thing when he says that the object reveals its life only to emotional reactivity. The very important claim made here is that feeling seizes the truth of the object, this is the claim which leads to the great generalisation of Keats that truth and beauty are identical. But this seems totally different from the truth of practical perception, of science. Let us examine the nature of that type of truth. It means the acceptance of an idea or statement on account of its place in that single system of references which Bosanquet⁴⁶ has called "the continuous affirmative judgment of the waking consciousness"—a judgment which he says is an "extension of our perceptions by an interpretation considered as equally real with their content". Here "practical consciousness" would have been better than "waking consciousness", for even emotional perceptions—with which scientific perceptions are ordinarily contrasted—do not take place in sleep or opium dreams but in the waking consciousness. However, the valid essence of the definition is that the perception is true because what it perceives is real. But the judgment takes place within a single system of references, in a pursuit which seeks to establish rapport with only one aspect of the object, its physical reality. There can be another system of references. The exploration may be to see what the object means to the emotional sensitivity. Why should not the judgment here also be given the status which practical judgment has? Why should not aesthetic perception also be held "equally real with its content?" Poetry is the record of an experience which Whalley⁴⁷ calls "paradigmatic", because it is self-evident and bears within itself an intrinsic recognition of value. "The recognition of value is also a grasp of reality carrying with it the conviction of genuine knowing. . . Poetry . . . is at once a discovery and a fashioning of some aspect of reality and of the self."

Practical perception of physical reality is held to be true because it can be worked into a scientific system and checked by prediction and verification. When an object with certain well-defined dimensions and properties is reported by the perception of an individual, others can explore it and verify the report. But the universality of poetry implies that it can also stand the test of this type of operationalism. Kant⁴⁸ said "One can establish universal laws of understanding, that is there is a science of sensuousness, namely, aesthetics, and a science of understanding, namely, logic." Verifiability is guaranteed by the laws of objectification of poetic experience. Read says "All art originates in an act of intuition or vision. But such *intuition* or vision must be identified with *knowledge*, being fully present only when consciously objectified. This act of vision or intuition is, physically, a state of concentration or tension in the mind. The *process* of poetry consists firstly in maintaining this vision in its integrity, and secondly in expressing this vision in words." This vision or experience is a real event for the self and its expression is also an event. This is why Valéry⁴⁹ said that "a work of art, constantly taken

up again and remade, gradually takes on the secret importance of an enterprise in the remaking of one's self"

Whalley⁵⁰ clarifies the point "Paradigmatic experience presents itself as an extreme disturbance of consciousness, as a complex and distinct state of heightened awareness, and this seeks to discharge itself in such a way as faithfully to preserve the structure, intricacy and directness of the associated feeling. In the process of symbolic extrication, the state of feeling is transmuted into a patterned artefact, this transmutation plays an indispensable part in clarifying the event of reality, the state of feeling, and the poet's self. The poem in this way makes accessible to contemplation some aspect of reality." Sanskrit poetics can put all this more simply. Vision (*Darsana*) is embodied in description (*Varnana*) which in turn becomes an objective correlative (*Vibhava*) that can help another to experience the vision himself. But in order that the poet's verity can thus be verified by others, his objectification must be sincere. Keats, as Read⁵¹ points out, distinguished the "false beauty proceeding from art"—the merely "arty" (*Kalamatīa*) expression condemned by Abhinava—from the "true voice of feeling"

Practical perception is true perception because it reports on the real physical aspect of things and its truth can be verified by independent retest. Emotive perception, similarly, is also true perception because it reports on the impact of objects on sensibility and its truth can also be verified by a retest in which the poem yields back to the reader the experience which the poet had embodied in it. Comprehensive world-views emerge when such perceptions are integrated into systems. Rémy de Gourmont⁵² said that all criticisms of life, all philosophies, whether secular or religious, all ideologies, whether formal or informal, are endeavours to explain a personal attitude towards life, to turn "personal impressions into universal laws". While such an interpretation unduly stresses subjectivity and ignores the procedure, the correct observance of which can legitimise the formulation of universal laws, it has at least the merit of not discriminating between the conceptual systems of science and the life-views of poetry. Such discrimination is too often an automatic assumption of critical thought. But, as Richards⁵³ has argued, just as the undifferentiated beliefs and assumptions of everyday are intellectually ordered, extended and criticised till they become science, so they are emotionally ordered, extended and criticised till they become poetry. Poetic ordering is for the sake of the attitudes and the emotions which ensue and the satisfying organisation and interconnection of these attitudes. Just as the scientist becomes the legislator of the physical world, poets, in the words of Shelley, become the "unacknowledged legislators of the world" in the field of emotional experience. Coleridge was thinking of this truth when he said that "no man was ever a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher"

"The concept", said Gasset,⁵⁴ "is one of man's household utensils, which

he needs and uses in order to make clear his own position in the midst of the infinite and very problematical reality which is his life. Life is a struggle to maintain itself among men. Concepts are the strategic plan we form in answer to the attack." While essentially true, this needs to be restated at a higher level. If social and political concepts are needed for giving the individual a confident notion of his own place in society, concepts of a higher order are necessary for man to gain a confident belief about his own place in the scheme of the universe. Science deals with such concepts regarding physical reality. The test of such concepts is their operational success. Descartes proposed to compare the universe to a clock and to see where we got from there. Day Lewis who cites this example adds that Burns, in his love poem, is also in effect saying: "Let me compare my love to a June rose and see what follows." While this is true, a poetic concept which can match in magnitude and significance the Cartesian world-view is the concept of the world as a moral order. And here we are led back to the main theme of the present discussion, the nature of ethics and its relation to aesthetics.

Vedic lyrical poetry, long before the rise of the philosophical disciplines, of the purely intellectual analysis, had attained the vision of an order (*Rita*) which integrated inorganic and organic existence and psychological life as one unified realm of law.

A great Rig Vedic poem⁵⁵ stresses the pervasive presence of God. "As light He dwells in the luminous sky. As air He dwells in the mid-space. As fire He exists in the sacrificial altar. As a guest He exists in the house. As life He exists in man. As order He exists everywhere. As Supreme Being He exists. He shines in sacrifices, in the sky, in water, in light, in mountains and in Truth." The profound implications here must be clearly understood. The basic attribute is being. The supreme entity exists. Now, existence is also an order and this order encompasses the whole realm of creation from the inorganic world of air, light and fire to the world of living things, to man and his domestic hearth. In fact the supreme truth is identified with order⁵⁶ and the gods themselves become subordinate to it. "Gods chant the song of Order"⁵⁷

The Vedic poet saw everywhere the evidence of a great order, in obedience to which the stars and sun wheeled in their orbits, the earth rolled through night and day, the seasons came and went and the rivers, after many wanderings at last found the sea. The moral life of man is but an extension of this order in nature. For the very possibility of human existence depends on the assured regularity of the rhythmic processes in nature. "The waters, they are Law. That is why, when the earth receives waters regularly, everything is in accord with law. But when the rain fails, the strong victimise the weak, for the waters, they are the Law."

We see here a profound, integrative deepening of the concept of reality or being. The word *Sat* is reality in the metaphysical sense. Reality is

not brute, disparate, isolated fact. It is a system, an order. God, the ultimate reality, reveals himself through *Rita*, eternal order⁵⁹. In nature, this order establishes the steady rhythm of processes. It is that rhythm which makes organic life, and finally the social life of man, possible. Thus, in the sphere of human life, *Sat*, the real, becomes *Satya*, truth or moral integrity. For moral law is the extension of the natural law which inorganic and organic nature obeys. A failure of natural law will bring about anarchy in nature and render creaturely existence impossible. Likewise, if men do not obey the moral law, social anarchy will threaten the orderly existence of human societies. Both natural law and moral law are the phased manifestations of the eternal law which is God. If God is pure being (*Sat*) in the beginning, in the latest phase of evolution He becomes truth or moral integrity (*Satya*). That is why God is called *Satya-dharmān*, "one for whom truth is the law of being", *Satya-sava*, "one for whom truth is the source of power" and *Satyasya-Sunu*, "son of truth"⁶⁰.

The most important thing to note here is that we are dealing with a belief crystallised in a poetic experience and not one puzzled out by intellectual analysis. The poetic belief leads to fellow-feeling and the moral life. Moral thought also can converge towards it. Thus, Blanchard⁶¹ says that "to fulfill and satisfy what nature prompts" is what goodness means. But he arrives at that conclusion after a very closely argued evaluation of the conflicting claims of deontologists, who argue that what is right is not necessarily based on what is good, of naturalists, who endeavour to reduce ethical judgments to judgments about psychological and sociological facts, and of emotivists who deny that ethical utterances are judgments at all and claim that they are mere expressions of preferences. Transcendental philosophy can also converge towards the Vedic vision. Thus, Sankara's monism also led to the finding that man should work for the weal of the world. But the whole background to that finding is a dialectic of Kantian complexity. Poetic attitude, elsewhere, has also converged to this vision. The artist's role, according to Conrad,⁶² is to try "by the power of the written word to make you hear, to make you feel before all, to make you see". The ultimate aim is to invoke "in the hearts of the beholders that feeling of unavoidable solidarity which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world. He reached this solidarity through his poetic reaction to the "surrounding vision of form and colour, sunshine and shadows. Behold! all the truth of life is there". The Rīg Vedic lyrics likewise, are a poetic testament of a people's emotive reaction to the wonder and mystery of existence. They are poems of praise to the beauty of the earth and the order glimpsed behind the radiant veil of nature rather than magical hymns or philosophical analysis.

Abhinava's great affirmation is that poetry can yield all that ethical thought can yield. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify beyond any

ambiguity that the concept of the moral life, which ethical thought would later elaborate in the *Dharma Sastras*, emerged as a poetic vision in the Vedic lyrics. The poetic quality comes out in the prayers and rituals which expressed that vision. The belief at which the Vedic poet had arrived made him realise that moral conduct was expected from him if he was to benefit by the bounties of nature. He prays for the benediction of nature. "May sweet to us be the night and sweet the dawns, sweet the dust of the earth. Sweet be our father sky to us"⁶³. Only a poetic mind could pray for the benediction of a radiant dawn, instead of asking for more wealth. But the poet prefaces the prayer with an acknowledgment of his own obligation. "For one who lives according to the Eternal Law, the winds are full of sweetness, the rivers pour sweets. So may plants be full of sweetness for us". The early ritual was simple and it created an aesthetic form of worship which corresponded with the poetic quality of the insight. The chanting of the lyrics, the lustre of the blazing fire, the sweet fragrance of the burnt butter, the blades of grass and the crushed Soma juice combined to form a delicately orchestrated form of worship with a sensuous appeal of colour, sound and fragrance. But the most significant feature of the ritual was its symbolic expression of the poetic world-view. The fire of the altar is a god, the supreme priest, the mediator between men below and the gods, aspects of eternal law personified, above. He is the bearer of the oblation to the gods. The butter and incense poured into the fire are transformed by it into pure space, the ambient blessing. Sunlight and rain come from the depths of the sky and the prosperity of the earth depends on the regularity of their rhythms. Therefore, the cultivator pours into the fire milk and clarified butter, the distilled essence of agricultural prosperity, so that vapourised by the fire, they will pass into the sky and nourish its energy. Fire is the vehicle of this antiphonal response between earth and sky, men and the forces of eternal order.

This poetic vision unites the whole of mankind into one family. "God Varuna belongs to our own land and also to the foreign land"⁶⁴. This recalls the realisation which Akhnaton of Egypt obtained, again through a poetic vision, that the Sun God was the protector of other lands besides Egypt. In fact, in his great poem he mentions Syria and other lands first, and Egypt only later, as being under the protective benediction of the deity. Vedic poetry, on the crest of this wave of poetic feeling, floats swiftly to the ideal of friendly co-existence, not only with all mankind, but with the entire world of living things and natural forces. "May all beings look on me with the eye of a friend. May I look on all beings with the eye of a friend"⁶⁵. With mind and heart thus uplifted on the flood-tide of feeling, the Vedic poet rises to a sublime invocation of peace, where the peace he yearns for himself is something shared by the entire universe. "Peace of sky, peace of the mid-region, peace of earth, peace of waters, peace of plants! Peace of trees, peace of all gods, peace of *Brahman*,

peace of the universe, peace of peace, may that peace come to me . 66
 With these invocations of peace, I render peaceful whatever here is terrible, whatever here is cruel, whatever here is sinful "67

The fact that Vedic religion was complete with ritual and prayer may tempt some to deny that the attitude behind the outlook was poetic. The unconscious assumptions here are that poetic vision and experience cannot yield systems of belief and that these can be crystallised only by scientific thought or religious doctrine. But we must penetrate deeper in our study of the morphology of belief-systems and see the attitude within that crystallises into a particular form. Marxism and the very illiberal economic liberalism of *laissez faire* are—or assume that they are—doctrines or belief systems founded on the laws of social process. In religion, the dread of ununderstood natural forces and the magical concepts the dread provokes as a defence can also lead to hymn and ritual which outline an implicit belief system. A radiant poetic vision can also yield a system. T. S. Eliot⁶⁸ wrote "I cannot see that poetry can ever be separated from something which I should call belief, and to which I cannot see any reason for refusing the name of belief, unless we are to reshuffle names altogether." He proceeds to distinguish this poetic belief from religious belief. "It should hardly be necessary to say that it will not inevitably be orthodox Christian belief, although that possibility can be entertained, since Christianity will probably continue to modify itself, as in the past, into something that can be believed in (I do not mean conscious modifications like modernism, etc. which always have the opposite effect)."

The fact that Vedic ethical belief was basically poetic is clearly proved by the fact that while the bulk of the hymnal literature that grew up later so closely followed either iconography to become concrete descriptions of handsome anthropomorphised figures or the Puranic myths and legends to become hero-ballads about the exploits of gods and goddesses, only gifted poets could recover the original poetic vision of a moral order. Kalidasa, in love with the radiant world, preferred the immanent God to the transcendent, withdrawn Absolute. A prayer to Vishnu in *Raghu Vamsa*⁶⁹ reads "Far, far removed, yet ever near, untouched by passion, yet pitiful of heart, ancient, yet free from age art Thou." He tells us that in matters of doubt about one's duty, the authority is the voice of conscience, the wisdom of the heart. He heard in conscience the voice of the human soul which was also the voice of the world-soul. For, in the altruism to which conscience leads, he saw the most authentic of the many proofs of God. The invocatory verse of *Shakuntala*,⁷⁰ for instance, indirectly asks the atheist why he should be troubled about proofs of the existence of God, when there are eight direct evidences for His existence: the earth which supports all life, the air which pervades all space; fire which purifies and carries the offerings to the ambient space, water which is the first of created things, the sun and the moon which regulate time, the sky (space or ether) on which everything is rooted, but whose base

itself is not visible, and the men with sacrificial spirit who work for others' good

The conclusion is the same as that of the school of naturalist ethics of today. However, it is not arrived at through logic and argument but verified by the heart in a poetic experience of the world. The difference is important. The moral law is natural law according to the naturalists and since the further claim is made that it can be recognised by any one who exercises his own understanding, it is spoken of as the dictate of reason. Ross, for instance, speaks of a set of self-evident propositions which attribute a *prima facie* rightness to certain sorts of acts. "The moral order expressed in these propositions is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible universe in which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry and arithmetic"⁷¹ This, of course, is a restatement of what St Thomas Aquinas said long ago. "The precepts of the natural (moral) law are to the practical reason what the first principles of science are to the theoretical reason"⁷² Ross claims a fundamental similarity in the ways in which we come to know moral principles and truths of pure mathematics. "If we now turn to ask how we come to know these fundamental moral principles, the answer is that it is the same way in which we come to know the axioms of mathematics. Both alike seem to be both synthetic and *a priori*"⁷³ Prichard⁷⁴ holds the same view. "This apprehension (that such and such action ought to be done by us) is immediate, in precisely the sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate."

But the difficulty here is that the truths of mathematics are knowable *a priori* and with complete certainty simply because they are all analytic. Einstein⁷⁵ said: "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality they are not certain, and as far as they are certain they do not refer to reality." Russell⁷⁶ clarifies why this is so. "Pure mathematics consists of tautologies, analogous to 'men are men', but usually more complicated. To know that a mathematical proposition is correct, we do not have to study the world, but only the meanings of the symbols. A mathematical equation asserts that two groups of symbols have the same meaning. . . ." Popper⁷⁷ gives the most uncompromising statement of the similar, tautological, nature of ethics. "Perhaps the simplest and most important point about ethics is purely logical, I mean the impossibility to derive non-tautological ethical rules—imperatives, principles of policy, aims or however we may describe them—from statements of fact." When the premises are given, conclusions follow, because they are implicit in the former and are only an elaboration of the implicit. Ross himself reveals the weakness of the position unconsciously when he says that moral law will be self-evident in any universe where there are moral agents. Once the moral agent is assumed in the situation, the theory is not illuminating with regard to the birth of the moral sense itself. The moral agent may be a

man who recognises that to survive is better than to perish. On that premise, some sort of moral law will become self-evident. An attitude which relies on analogy with pure science is more likely to be a logical attitude of this type. The trouble with it is not that it is unsound but that what it regards as the discovery of a self-evident truth is a game in tautology, possibly involving self-deception. A logical clarification like this need not spark anything deeper in the human personality. The "moral" agent may even feel that it is a terrible nuisance that the structure of social reality is such that he cannot do others in the eye and continue to demand that others should pat him on the back. But the situation is wholly different in the case of poetic perception. Here the need for solidarity is not something to which cold logic first gives a grudging assent, thus initiating the troublesome task of disciplining the emotions to accept the finding. Emotional exaltation is the prior reality and moral solidarity with the entire world only an analytical explication of that experience. A poetic truth, whose authenticity lies in the delight which attends its very first vision, is seen later to have moral consequences as well.

"It is in the hands of feeling, not of thought, that the government of life should rest", wrote Macmurray⁷⁸. Perhaps there is no need for such a harsh opposition. What is glimpsed by poetic feeling need not be rejected by logical thought. Thus, here, the solidarity with the world felt in the blood, attested by the stirred heart, can be endorsed by the logical enquiry of naturalist ethics. The difficulty arises when logic wants to bag the entire credit to itself. Ethical thought, being an analytical enquiry, has to start, perhaps inevitably, with logic. It has also to claim initially the status of a command, for human solidarity cannot be threatened by the centrifugal tendencies of anti-social, egocentric individuals. But, at the same time, it has to strive to ensure that the feelings mature into harmonious alignment with the ethical dictate. Ethical analysis is, thus, completed only in a poetic synthesis. Traditional ethical systems realise the insufficiency of logic and use the strategy of the ritual for the further task. We studied earlier the significance of myth as poetic belief. Here we may profitably glance at the significance of ritual as poetic discipline.

The *Samskaras*, about which elaborate prescriptions are given in the *Dharma Sastras*, were the sacraments, essentially poetic devices, which sanctified the rhythms of domestic life. Sabara explains the *Samaskara* as that which makes a certain thing or person fit for a certain purpose. And Kumarila⁷⁹ says that *Samskaras* are those rites which impart fitness by removing taints and generating fresh qualities. They were devised to synchronise with the inner changes that took place in the individual during growth, conferred a new status on him and impressed upon him the consciousness of a new responsibility. By conferring privilege and exacting duty, they prepared the individual for corporate life. But their basic approach in this task was to stimulate the feelings, to foster the

poetic attitude Thus, the marital bond was both a holy as well as a poetic sacrament "As a gift from the gods does the husband receive the wife."⁵⁰ Here the ritual of the ethical manuals was seeking to recover the approach of the Vedic period, which was even more poetic, as can be seen from the quality of the imagery used in the wedding hymns of the Vedas⁵¹ Addressing the bride, the bridegroom says . "I am the melody (*Saman*), you are the lyric (*Rik*) I am heaven, you are earth I take your hand in mine that you may live to old age with me, your husband."

But the ethical manuals were thorough in their social control and they sought to infuse with poetic grace not only the most important moments of life in the long term but also the rhythm of daily life Even the ablution, basically a prescription for the formation of hygienic habits, was given a poetic resonance Let us begin the day with Gautama⁵² We arise in the last quarter of the night, with a composed mind, casting off sleep The ablutions follow . cleansing the teeth with a green twig of fragrant smell and a bath in river or lake Such a bath before the actual sunrise cleanses sins, we are told But the bath should be a ritual symbol of a more significant ablution "A mental bath is one that is secured by contemplating the all-pervasive Lord of the form of infinite bliss and knowledge" The poetic discipline is built into the ritual Risen long before the dawn, we welcome the new day by remembering the sun about to rise and the lotus which shall open its petals with the dawn But we are also asked to remember the abiding source of light of which the sun is only a spark and the lotus of our heart begins to unfold to this invisible sun That the whole approach in this ritual is poetic is revealed by a convergent thought in Byron, who was not particularly interested in ritual as such. "I am always most religious upon a sunshiny day, as if there was some association between an internal approach to greater light and purity and the kindler of this dark lanthorn of our existence"⁵³

The danger in the use of the strategy of ritual for the disciplining of sensibility is that the ritual deed may harden as literal orthodoxy—just as poetry often becomes versifying Therefore, there is a continuous effort to maintain the vitality of the inwardness of the ritual act The Rig Veda⁵⁴ had extolled forests, valleys of mountains and rivers flowing from the snows of hills to the salty sea, as sacred This was because the Vedic mind saw the world in a lyrically poetic vision and it also felt that man's communion with nature would lift him out of the routine preoccupations of daily living But pilgrim centres developed with their priests canvassing for custom and exploiting the gullible by convincing them that a physical ablution was a spiritual cleansing Therefore a warning had to be sounded No one lake or river or place has more sanctity than the other, the sanctity lies in the attitude of the mind and every place can purify if the mind seeks purity. The *Padma Purana* says that all rivers, whether flowing through a valley or a forest, are holy : a place where a chaste wife dwells, or where one's teacher stands or where a noble father and a worthy

son dwell are all holy⁸⁵ The caution is given that pilgrimages cannot be made an excuse for a flight from obligations "That person who abandons his proper duties and resorts to holy places does not reap the fruits of pilgrimage in this world or the next"⁸⁶ The physical act of ablution has no efficacy "Fish are born and die in holy waters, but they do not go to heaven"⁸⁷ A pure mind is what is required The man with the impure mind can bathe in all the holy waters on earth, but will still remain impure It is in the clarification of the pure mind that the poetic inwardness of these rituals is brought out "Charity, sacrifices, austerity, cleanliness, frequenting sacred places, learning—all these are no purifying ablutions if the mind is not pure"⁸⁸ The very significant meaning of this is that not only the ritual but even the virtuous act will fail to purify if it is merely an outward act without an inward resonance, without being an expression of active kindness of the spirit In the *Maha Bharata* Tuladhara tells Jajali that one's soul is the sacred pool and advises him not to go wandering all over the country in search of holy waters⁸⁹ In the *Vamana Purana*, this beautiful image is expanded The soul is a great river full of the waters of self-discipline, speeding with the momentum of truth, breaking into waves of compassion for all beings It is the holiest of waters How can it be purified by immersion in the waters of the earth?⁹⁰ Religious poetry uses this image again and again Sankara said that all places of pilgrimage, all sacred waters, were within "The body is Benares Knowledge is the expansive Ganges Devotion is Gaya Lord Visvesvara is the inner self If everything abides in my own body, what other shrine is there?"⁹¹ The worship is internal "The stupid man enters deep lakes and wanders over lonely and terrible forests and massive mountains, in search of flowers Alas, do not people here know to offer you the single lotus of their heart and rest in happiness?" Chakrapani Natha of the eleventh century also recovers this poetic inwardness "Bathing in the internal sacred waters, the lake of my own being, and wearing the pure garment of knowledge, I worship Siva"⁹²

The problem which ethics has to solve is to mould human nature in such a way that moral law, at first a dictate, insinuates itself into the heart to become its own prompting and delight This is law as dictate "One who desires happiness should look upon another just as he looks upon himself Happiness and misery affect one's self and others in the same way"⁹³ This is the vision of the ultimate moral evolution "Assiduously do that which gives satisfaction to the inner self"⁹⁴ It was the Buddha who exemplified and taught the ideal of the complete emotional assimilation of ethical law "May all living things, weak or strong, small or great, seen or unseen, near or far, may all alike be happy As a mother protects her only son so let everyone cultivate a boundless compassion towards all that has life" Santi Deva of the seventh century brings out with fine intuition the inner transformation of law into love The Buddha says in his work "The virtue of generosity is not my

helper I am the helper of generosity Nor do the virtues of morality, patience, courage, meditation and wisdom help me. It is I who help them'⁹⁵ The great truth that even virtues become dead and uninspiring the moment they are felt to be impositions, even if self-impositions, is glimpsed here with luminous insight. The tidal flow of the heart's purer emotions should be in every action, if it is to be a warm self-affirmation instead of a dead habit Ethical commands seek to achieve harmony by making social conduct as smooth and automatic as habit But the same target is achieved in a far finer way by a poetic intuition of the unity of being and an emotional sensitiveness that can receive hurt when others are hurt Social conduct is of great value to society even if it rests on the mechanism of habit which arises as interiorisation of the dictates of the group But the mission of ethics is complete only when its dictates become superfluous in a context where the heart throbs in unison with the pulse of the world due to the welling up of love rather than the force of a command

Thus aesthetics and ethics converge at the point where each fulfils itself The analysis of the nature of the poetic image led Day Lewis⁹⁶ to a Leibnitzian doctrine of relations whereby every smallest thing in the universe mirrors in itself to some extent the whole universe "Relationship being in the very nature of metaphor, if we believe that the universe is a body wherein all men and all things are 'members of one another', we must allow metaphor to give a partial intuition of the whole world Every poetic image I would affirm, by revealing a tiny portion of this body, suggests its infinite extension" It is the poet's task to communicate, not by logic but by feeling, the conviction of this unity of all things The truths of poetry are not verifiable but carry immediate conviction by their "emotional logic" And their convincingness is based ultimately on the mystical feeling of unity and oneness with the universe "The poetic image is the human mind claiming kinship with everything that lives or has lived, and making good its claim" Here, emotion, not analytical thought, leads the poet to the discovery of the unity of the universe It is this unity which is the central teaching of ethics Moral analysis, however, tries to reach this truth through logic But it is very interesting to note that logical analysis warms into emotion in the thought of two contemporary writers, who are not dealing with poetry but are analysing the principles of moral philosophy The main principle of C I Lewis⁹⁷ at first looks almost tautologous, as just being the law of conforming to objective actualities But it soon expands into the law of compassion which requires us to consider the happiness of others Daiches Raphael,⁹⁸ likewise, states that in order to be capable of having the idea of obligation, a person must be able to enter imaginatively and sympathetically into the conations and affections of other people This act is said to constitute or give rise to an inter-personal bond or mental tie between the agent and the claimant What this bond requires of the agent, Raphael

holds, is that he promotes the interests of the person to whom he is thus related, which means that he feels towards his interests as he would towards his own, that is, he strives to realise them, and this striving or conation is what the idea of obligation refers to

In the humanising mission of both poetry and ethics, thus, a steady, sustained culture of the emotions is of paramount importance. This is because there is a lag in biological development as contrasted with the needs and realities of social growth and this lag can be a source of serious maladjustments. Steckle⁹⁹ says "Equipped largely with a neural mechanism designed for life under jungle conditions where desire and action are synonymous provided only that one be strong enough, man faces the inhibitions, the regulations and the postponements of today with the biological equipment of a million yesterdays." Serious difficulties arise because the emotional functions are looked after by the phylogenetically old brain, significantly called the visceral brain. This region of the brain, the rhinencephalon, appears to be so strategically situated as to be able to correlate every form of internal and external perception. Not only visceral and oral (smell, taste) sensations, but also impressions from the sex organs, body wall, eye and ear are brought into association here. And in contrast to the new brain, the cortex, this old region has many and strong connections with the hypothalamus for discharging its impressions. Thus, although our intellectual functions are carried on in the newest and most highly developed part in the brain, our affective behaviour continues to be dominated by a relatively crude and primitive system,¹⁰⁰ perceptively characterised as *Tamasic* by Indian psychology. Since the intellect and will cannot be completely disassociated from the emotions, there is also a tendency for psychological and intellectual constructions to be built upon the archaic emotional reactivities, as Weil¹⁰¹ has pointed out. A familiar instance is the cynicism of dyspeptics. Rationalisations are also phenomena of this type. But if emotional disturbances excite the intellect, there is not the slightest need to rush to the formulation of a pessimistic philosophy of the determination of higher psychisms by the lower. The careful culture of the intellect can benefit the life of the emotions. A simple instance is the perception of order and regularity, structural strength and compositional values in the sensory field, in scientific theory and artistic creations. These factors are grasped first by the intellect. The cognitive experience matures into an experience of values because intellectual perceptions irradiate into and colour emotional life. Likewise, the spontaneous movement of the heart towards the world can be the germ of a moral philosophy, just as the moral command, absorbed into the blood, can transmute an intellectual conclusion into a rich emotional experience.

The significance of all this is that the biological lag—between the visceral brain and the neopallium, between *Tamasic* and *Satvic* energies—is not irremediable. Malinowski¹⁰² has developed a thesis according to which the ideal measure of the individual's freedom is the extent to which the

motivations of his personal life are the result of deliberate choice in the light of values instead of being automatic suggestions of the external field. The social evolution of man emphasises both the practicability of this and our obligation to make efforts in that direction. The real nature of discipline now emerges with clarity. The basic requirements under which the right type of discipline can develop consist of inner freedom and internal control. True discipline does not mean the repression of instinctual or emotional energy. It requires that the individual is not afraid to use his impulses, the energy is at the service of the individual and he is independent of the pressure of the environment in the control of his impulses. Only when this is achieved, can there be an internalisation of superego commands, resulting in real discipline and personality growth¹⁰³

III. CONVERGENCE OF ART AND MORALITY

Even if both ethical and aesthetic values develop from a common ground, the personality of man, growing and evolving through experience of the world, the needs of analytical precision have to define them as distinct fields. There is of course a great region of overlap and it is here that ambiguities can arise. The cultured mind would reject a chill, imposed morality that does not richly nourish the emotions. But the converse demand that art should respect morality is often regarded as a prudish, unenlightened demand. "Morality" writes Fry,¹⁰⁴ "appreciates emotion by the standard of resultant action. Art appreciates emotion in and for itself." We have to proceed very cautiously here. There are subtle emotions which can be developed by poetry which are not verbalisable because they are different from the emotions involved in practical living, for which language, as an instrument of social interaction and communication, has already coined words. Morality is not concerned with such subtle feelings and no conflict need arise between ethics and aesthetics in their case. But anti-social emotions can be expressed in art. There certainly can be such a thing as Fascist art. Here ethics can raise the question whether such art has value for man. The hot rejoinder often given is that art is sovereign and autonomous in its own field, which is the objectification of feeling, any kind of feeling.

Maritain¹⁰⁵ described Romanticism as "the religious eviction of reason and its works, the sacred unbridling of sensation, the holy parade of self and the adoration of primitive natural instinct, pantheism as theology, and emotional stimulus as the rule of life." Mario Praz¹⁰⁶ has given a similar verdict with the support of extensive documentation. But, as Croce¹⁰⁷ has pointed out, it is necessary to distinguish between Romanticism proper and what is called later Romanticism or Decadence. In the former, he says, "besides sexual pathology, the macabre and the diabolical, there existed ideals of liberty, of humanity, of justice and of purity which fought against the pathological interest and alternated with it." But as the cen-

ture proceeds, there gradually makes itself felt "the aesthetic conception of a life to be lived as passion and imagination, as beauty and poetry, which is in fact the opposite of actual life, which strives after the distinction, and with it the harmony, of all its forms and does not admit the pathological preference and supremacy of one single form over all the others which are equally necessary each in its own particular capacity, and is also the opposite of poetry, which is an overcoming of action in cosmic contemplation, a deliberate pause in practical activity, though it may at the same time be a preparation for renewed activity" Croce clarifies the classical attitude which harmonises life and poetry, but the subtle relation between poetic experience and practical living needs a little more elaboration for full understanding. Poetry fights the root of all evil which is philistinism, as Plato describes it "to believe in nothing but those material things which can be seen and handled, eaten, drunken and lusted after"¹⁰⁸ And of such a character he describes the genesis, how "it grows slack and blind and dull since it is not aroused or strengthened nor its sensibility clarified by any tincture of art or letters or philosophy"¹⁰⁹ In one sense poetry liberates man from his passions by giving him something else to do with them than to gratify them—to make them the object of his contemplative relish. By putting man into a spiritual instead of a brutal relation with his feelings it delivers him from their tyranny. But the mood of aesthetic relish is not one which can be insulated from life. The emotional experience persists and can colour reactions in the contexts of practical living. Therefore the fact that any emotion can be aesthetically relished cannot be twisted into an argument that aesthetic activity should be free to culture any emotion irrespective of the value of its relation to life.

Critical practice generally, though unconsciously, assumes this relevance of art to life, and difficulties emerge only in abstract speculations about the "philosophy" of art. Thus, Moulton¹¹⁰ has pointed out that, of what passes current as commentary on Shakespeare, "the vast proportion is comment upon human life itself, touched as life is at myriad points by the creations of the Shakespearean drama" But when the issue becomes the subject of a polemic, the absolute autonomy of art and the doctrine of art for art's sake begin to be asserted with increasing stridence. Then the issue has to be faced squarely, as Mathew Arnold¹¹¹ faced it. "It is important to hold fast to this that poetry is at bottom a criticism of life that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life—to the question. How to live. Morals are often treated in a narrow and false fashion. They are bound up with systems of thought and belief which have had their day, they are fallen into the hands of pedants and professional dealers, they grow tiresome to some of us. We find attraction, at times, even in the poetry of revolt against them, in a poetry which might take for its motto Omar Khayyam's words. 'Let us make up in the tavern for the time we have wasted in the mosque. Or we find attractions in a poetry indifferent to them, in a poetry where

the contents may be what they will, but where the form is studied and exquisite. We delude ourselves in either case, and the best cure for our delusion is to let our minds rest upon the great and inexhaustible word *life*, until we learn to enter into its meaning. A poetry of revolt against moral ideas is a poetry of revolt against *life*, a poetry of indifference towards moral ideas is a poetry of indifference towards *life*."

Pottle¹¹² seeks to separate the aesthetic and moral judgments as they probably have to be separated for purposes of analytical clarity. "We must explicitly separate the critical judgment into two judgments : the aesthetic and the moral, or, as Tolstoy said, into 'judgment of art considered apart from subject matter' and 'judgment according to subject matter'. Poetry is good in the aesthetic sense (is good as art) when it is expressive and infectious, when the poet, contemplating an experience, has succeeded in finding verbal equivalents for it which enable another person to build an experience in *his* mind which is (as we suppose) recognizable like the artist's in quality, and not too much inferior to it in intensity. That the experience of the artist may be vicious makes no difference in the first judgment. Goodness or usefulness is no part of the basic definition of art. And if you are talking about poetry as something to be distinguished from other things, expressiveness is of much greater importance than goodness." But Pottle realises that what is separated by analysis is synthesised by life. Life has to reject the vicious even if it comes in the form of art. And life accepts the morally sane even if it comes in the form of a dictate. But when the dictate is warmly accepted by the sensibility we have art that is of great human significance. He rightly points out that "moral profundity cannot in any way make up for expressive weakness". A moral lesson cannot save a bad poem. But he concedes that "moral profundity may add value to what is expressive . . . A group of words may be expressive and moral, in which case it is poetry, and poetry of a particularly valuable kind". This is all that was claimed by Pater¹¹³ when he wrote : "The distinction between great art and good art depends immediately, as regards literature at all events, not on its form, but on the matter. It is on the quality of the matter it informs or controls, its compass, its variety, its alliance to great ends, or the depth of the note of revolt or the largeness of the hope in it, that the greatness of art depends, as the *Divine Comedy*, *Paradise Lost*, and the English Bible, are great art." T. S. Eliot also has said : "The 'greatness' of literature cannot be determined solely by literary standards, though we must remember that whether it is literature or not can be determined only by literary standards."

A sober, responsible concept of living cannot give complete autonomy to feeling. As Craghton¹¹⁴ pointed out, feeling develops as the mind develops and is "transformed and disciplined through its interplay with other aspects of experience". And it has to, if maturity is to be realised. Auden¹¹⁵ warns this to be kept in mind in literary evaluation. "Not only

should the critic realize the necessity of coordinating his aesthetic values with values in all other spheres of life, but he has a duty in a democracy to tell the public what they are. If I am to trust a reviewer's judgment upon a book I have not read, I want to know among other things his philosophical beliefs. If literature deals with life, it will have to deal unavoidably with values—not only aesthetic but moral values as well. "The most elementary thing to observe", says Trilling,¹¹⁶ "is that literature is of its nature involved with ideas because it deals with man in society, which is to say that it deals with formulations, valuations and decisions, some of them implicit, others explicit." This inevitably means that the aesthetic life has to be integrated with the moral life in some comprehensive system like the concept of the four *Purusharthas* or ends of human existence elaborated by Indian thought. I. A. Richards¹¹⁷ makes a brave attempt to integrate aesthetic experience into a system which is really an ethical system, though Richards tries his best to mask that fact by eliminating the notion of obligation. "What is good or valuable is the exercise of impulses and the satisfaction of their appetencies." Anything is valuable which "will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or more important appetency." Therefore the most valuable states of mind are "those which involve the widest and most comprehensive coordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation and restriction." Immediately one recognises that appetencies form a hierarchy, that some of them are more important than others, and that, since the individual is living in a society consisting of other individuals who have similar appetencies, he will have to work out some sort of comprehensive system of values where aesthetic values will get their recognition, the due recognition, not overriding priority. Mann points out "the indivisibility of the problem of humanity, which at no time and in no place has a 'narrower' sense, but includes within itself all spheres. The aesthetic, the moral, the socio-political are one within that problem of humanity."

If aesthetic experience is an experience of delight, that delight cannot be abstracted as a principle sanctioning autonomy, for delight does not emerge by itself, but only as a quality of an experience which has its own specificity. "Pleasure", says Richards,¹¹⁸ "seems to be a way in which something happens, rather than an independent happening which can occur by itself in a mind. We have, not pleasures, but experiences of one kind or another, visual, auditory, organic, motor and so forth, which are pleasant." Elimination, by abstraction, of the specific features of the context will yield a pleasure which is indistinguishable from the pleasure, so abstracted, derived from any other context. "As a matter of fact", says Kulpe,¹¹⁹ "there is no qualitative difference discoverable between the pleasantness of a colour and that of a successfully concluded argument, when careful abstraction is made from the very wide differences in all their attendant circumstances." But it needs growth to be able to derive

pleasure of the intellect, from a successfully concluded argument and, similarly, it needs growth, a growth demanded from us by life, to be able to derive pleasure from moral obligation. Pleasure, said Schlegel,^{1,20} "rises in value in proportion to its affinity with that perfection of beauty in which moral excellence is allied to external charms".

What often causes serious difficulties in accepting this analysis is the confusion between the morphology of a conceptual system or psychic activity and its actual human worth. The moral is initially defined as the good. Though vast ambiguities inhere in the term "good", this initial definition is still legitimate as a working principle, for ethical thought can explore the meaning of the concept of goodness also. But the mistake the puritan does is confusing the moral concept of his time and group as a proved, eternal verity and using it as a standard to measure poetic worth. His concepts here have the morphology of a moral system, but he forgets that moral concepts have also been evolving, gaining deeper insight. In tribal life, the sanction of blood revenge by individuals is really a "moral" institution to curb social anarchy. Art can align itself with it. In the tremendous theme of the crimes of the Attidae, handled by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, Sophocles is stirred to no misgivings by the murder of Clytemnestra by her son Orestes, since she had connived with Aegisthus in the murder of her husband Agamemnon. Apollo enjoins the revenge as the sacred duty of Orestes. Euripides queries the validity of this type of morality. He concentrates mercilessly on the fact that Apollo—here the symbol of a primitive morality—drove Orestes to matricide. The harassed youth asks himself in agonised doubt.

*Stay! How if some fiend in hell
Hid in God's likeness, spoke that oracle?*

Euripides sees that the ethical-religious dictate cannot but reflect the level of social evolution.

*This land of murderers to its gods hath given
Its own lust*

And therefore he realises that man has to make an effort to evolve towards a more enlightened ethics. In Aeschylus also, the resolution of the tragedy is achieved by the accession of a loftier moral vision. Apollo, representing the instinctive justification of any deed that punishes crime, defends Orestes against the Furies who stand for the instinctive horror of a crime like matricide, before the supreme tribunal of Greece which dispenses justice in the name of Athena, the protector of cities, of social and civilised life. The court divides evenly but Athena casts the deciding ballot in favour of Orestes and declares him free. She commands the tribunal to punish crimes swiftly in the future so that the land may be free from

blood feuds. The Furies now undergo a strange transformation. They announce: "This day a new Order is born" and acquire the name Eumenides or well-wishers.

The new order is the regime of a more progressive social ideal, of justice impartially administered by the state. Now, the supporters of the doctrine of art for art's sake can twist the significance of all this to support their view. They can argue that the fact that morality has only relative validity, that it is inevitably conditioned by the level of social evolution, clearly indicates that it should not come butting into art and judge aesthetic values in the light of its precariously tentative ethical values. This is sound—as far as it goes. But the evolutionary approach which can help in judging the relative merits of ethical concepts can, and has to be, used in judging the relative merits of aesthetic presentations too. If flawless expression is to be the only criterion, as the doctrine of the autonomy of art would assert, Sophocles would probably rank above Aeschylus, the rugged Titan, and Euripides, ever full of agitated queries, in any case, his own times judged him as greater for he won twenty first prizes in the drama competitions as against the fifteen of Aeschylus and the five of Euripides. Nevertheless, are we not justified in regarding the moral vision of Aeschylus and Euripides more profound and therefore the literary creations in which this moral vision is embodied, more precious to the human spirit?

That type of query often provokes lofty sneering in high-brow circles. It is argued that even if a moral lesson is thrown in as a "bonus" with any work of art, the intrinsic merit of the latter still continues to be what it is, that this "additive" approach is really an irrelevant approach in the consideration of the intrinsic quality of poetry since it brings in extrinsic issues. But this is stating the problem with complete lack of insight. Because a belief-system has the morphology of a moral system, it cannot ask for exemption from critical evaluation. It may be a tentative adjustment to be replaced when the society which devised it as an instrument of social control evolves towards a vision of greater heights. Likewise, the morphology of art is easily defined: it is feeling embodied in an objective correlative. Any feeling can be so embodied and then it will be impossible to deny the presentation the title of art or poetry. To claim, now, that if the objectification is achieved, we cannot or should not indulge in an evaluation of comparative merits, is to claim that all feelings are of equal worth to the human spirit. This is seriously absurd. Nor is it correct to say that in the comparative evaluation morality is being brought in as an extraneous consideration. For feelings are here checked, not against fully crystallised moral concepts, but against the demands of a purer, more wholesome living. Both the poetic culture of feelings and morality, which latter can be defined in this context as a dictate which acts with authority during the time lag before feelings and preferences align themselves harmoniously with the social need that threw up that dictate, serve human life.

The vision of a more humanised living, obtained in the floodtide of purer feelings, is often the precursor of a more enlightened morality, rather than its result. Like Arnold, Bharata also wants us to let our minds always rest upon the great and inexhaustible world, *life*. The world and life are the ultimate authority (*Pramana*) for art. The sheer logic of the definition of art compels us to accept the objectification of any feeling as art by virtue of its form. If the demand is now made that the feeling must be evaluated in terms of its value to responsible living, it is not to be interpreted as a crude demand that art should be subordinated to the judgment of Sunday school teachers. It is life, the paramount need of enlightened living, that alone can judge art, as it can and does judge moral concepts.

It is because the humanistic significance of art is proportionate to the intensity and spread of its contact with life that a vast landscape and a large field of action, individual, social and political, emerge in the great fresco of Valmiki's *Ramayana* and Dandin, later, prescribed these features as essential to the *Maha Kavya*, or extended narrative poem. The poet's silence about any important feature of the world and life is really a suppression just as his mention of it confronts the reader with yet another aspect of reality. Sartre¹²¹ makes this clear in a brilliant analysis: "Language is a human act of revelation. For me, and for others, words bring an object out of the shadow and integrate it into our general activity. All of us do many things which we prefer to ignore because we do not want to be responsible for them. . . . We gloss over them in silence, we go through our lives passing actions over in silence just because we do not want to name them. . . . To name one of these actions is to present it, whatever it may be, to its author, saying, 'This is what you are doing now, come to grips with it'. The deed, thus named, loses its innocence. It brings the person face to face with his responsibilities. If therefore a writer has chosen to be silent on one aspect of the world, we have the right to ask him, 'why have you spoken of this rather than that?'" Writing thus, becomes an act, a commitment, just as it confronts the reader with an aspect of reality about which he too has to make a decision and a choice. Since these issues belong to life, the choice is a moral choice.

Here again, what is sought is not a decisive choice of an eternal value in a context of abstract, theoretical discussion. Eternal values have to be confronted in concrete contexts. "A man throws himself completely into his plan for freeing Negroes or restoring the Hebrew language to the Jews of Palestine, he throws himself into it completely and at the same time expresses man's fate in all its universality, but it must always be through a unique and dated undertaking"¹²². This is why Dandin¹²³ insisted that the subject of the *Maha Kavya* should be taken from old narratives, and not invented, as regards its main episodic stream. The word for old narratives is *Itihasa* which, etymologically, means: "It happened thus". That is the moral crises which the hero of a poem is shown as confronted

with must have historical validity, a prescription which will assure, even when it is not strictly obeyed, that they will have solid reality and be such as man confronts in life, not in fairy tale. The need for unique, dated confrontation is also superbly illustrated by Valmiki in the episode where Rama has an abstract, theoretical disputation with Jabali on hedonism and an existential choice of the tragic. For, immediately following the argument, Rama gives concrete substance to the abstract discussion by rejecting the invitation to return to rule Ayodhya and deciding to continue in exile. Vyasa, too, affirms, and with characteristic brilliance, that eternal verity is confronted and realised only in a concrete historical context. The *Gita*, which is a message of heroic activism, is an episode which resolves a crisis of epic action. In the battlefield, Arjuna is suddenly overcome with weariness and wants to lay down arms rather than fight his kinsmen. It is at this critical moment that a profound transformation takes place in the narrative. A pinnacle of thought has to be ascended towards an integrative world vision, towards eternal verities, because the highest insight is needed, to take the decision, here and now, to fight or not to fight. The message of the *Gita* is complete only when Arjuna once again takes up his arms and the epic action is resumed.

The poem deals with the acts of men. But the demand can be made that it should also be an act. "We want the man and the artist to win salvation together", says Sartre. "We want the work of art to be an act as well, we want it to be expressly conceived as a weapon in man's struggle against evil"¹²⁴. Here, evil is not to be confused with the pet aversions of the puritan. Unawareness is an evil and the poet fights it by seeking intimate contact with all aspects of reality. The tragic is also an aspect of reality. The distinction between the poet who chooses the tragic theme and the man who is a victim of the tragic lies in this: the passive sufferer makes his suffering the basis of a verdict on life, the poet realises that the verdict should depend, not on the fact of suffering, but on its ultimate impact on him. As Sartre says, one cannot *put* one's misfortunes into a book any more than one put a model on a canvas. One can only record one's reactions to them. And here, his own courage enters the situation as the most important factor, for if his courage can transmute suffering as a challenge which gives the opportunity for a self-attestation, the tragic becomes meaningful and stays the pessimistic verdict on life. When Coleridge wrote in his *Ode to Dejection*

*I see them all so excellently fair
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are*

he accepted that the healthy or ecstatic response to the world was an affirmation, a spiritual deed, that needed the mobilisation of all our inner resources. The demand on one's own being, here, is essentially a moral demand even

though Sunday school teachers may have never heard of it. When Ananda Vardhana said that the sentiment of pathos (*Karuna*) should not be so excessively developed as to make the heart dejected (*Mlana*), he was not citing any 'moral' command as such, but invoking the need for the right attitude of the spirit—the courageous confrontation of the world—which is ontologically and logically prior both to aesthetics and ethics, for it is from attitude that art as well as the moral way of life derive their form and content. "We declare", wrote Sartre, "that salvation must be won upon this earth, that it must be won for the whole man by the whole man, and that art is a meditation on life, not on death"¹²⁵

The problem of the relation between aesthetics and ethics has been complicated by the crudity of the manner in which it is stated. The unreal opposition between the two can be completely exorcised in a profounder approach. As Carritt¹²⁶ has pointed out, if the experience of beauty be a thing of worth it is one of the things which it is moral to cultivate. One of the good things without which morality would lack employment. This was also the view of Bhartrhari¹²⁷ when he turned, towards the close of his life, from the erotic poetry of his youth to the poetry of philosophic comment and analysis. He analyses extensively the requirements of the moral life. But the development of the aesthetic sensibility is also recognised as a moral imperative. "The man who has no sense of literature and music is like a beast, though he has not horns and a tail. He may not eat grass, yet he lives a life exactly like that of cattle." Again, as Carritt proceeds to argue, if the experience of beauty be a form of the experience of truth, it is not only involved by but presupposed in morality. Not only one of those things in whose seeking morality subsists, but actually the clear and adequate intuition of feelings which is a necessary condition of right conduct.

It is important to realise that morality, here, is not a puritan code but the good life understood in the full resonance of that expression. Truth, goodness and beauty meet here in a Platonic identity, just as they are harmonised in the Indian concept of the highest state of being as *Sat-Chit-Ananda*. This order of being is an order of freedom, it is a non-repressive order. But in order to evolve to this level of being, both art and morality have to accept discipline. Schiller¹²⁸ luminously clarifies this in his essay on aesthetic education. Morality can and must be based on a sensuous ground, the laws of reason must be reconciled with the interest of the senses. "Sensuousness must triumphantly maintain its province and resist the violence which spirit would fain inflict upon it by its encroaching activity." To avoid misunderstanding, it is essential to note that sensuousness here means the life of feelings and spirit refers to the ethical consciousness. If Schiller want to defend the life of feelings from the imposed dictates of ethics, he also insists that feelings too should accept discipline. If freedom is to become the governing principle of civilisation, not only reason but also the "sensuous" (aesthetic) impulse requires a restraining

transformation. The additional release of sensuous energy must conform to the universal order of freedom. For freedom is not anarchy, it has order, though it has to be self-imposed order. Whatever order would have to be imposed upon the aesthetic impulse must itself be "an operation of freedom." The free individual himself must bring about the harmony between individual and universal gratification. In a truly free civilisation, all laws are self-given by the individuals. "To give freedom by freedom is the universal law of the aesthetic state." In a truly free civilisation, "the will of the whole" fulfils itself only "through the nature of the individual." Order is freedom only if it is founded on and sustained by the free gratification of the individuals. The aesthetic function would "abolish compulsion, and place man, both morally and physically, in freedom." It would harmonise the feelings and affections with the ideas of reason, deprive the "laws of reason of their moral compulsion" and reconcile them with the interest of the feelings. Abhinava also says that ethics reaches its fulfilment when the moral law is voluntarily chosen in delight and that this delight is the basic modality of poetic experience and that poetry can achieve what ethics sets out to achieve.

This is the essence of the classical attitude. Classicism effects, says Grierson,¹²⁹ "a synthesis which enables it to look round on life with a sense of its wholeness, its unity in variety, and the work of the artist is to give expression to that consciousness, hence the solidity of his work and hence too its definiteness, and in the hands of great artists its beauty." To regard classicism as content with a superficial acquaintance with the nature of emotions is to confuse the neo-classicism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with true classicism. "The essence of classicism", said Valéry,¹³⁰ "is to come after. Order presupposes a certain disorder which has been resolved. Classicism therefore implies deliberate and reflective acts which modify a 'natural' upsurge in conformity with a clear and rational conception of man and art." Gide¹³¹ endorses this. "It is important to remember that the struggle between classicism and romanticism also exists inside each mind. And it is from this very struggle that the work is born, the classic work of art relates the triumph of order and measure over an inner romanticism. And the wilder the riot to be tamed, the more beautiful your work will be. If the thing is orderly in its inception, the work will be cold and without interest." That is, if Romanticism glimpses the strength of emotions which neo-classicism never suspected, the anarchy created by the shock of that discovery is disciplined by a classicism whose vision and control reach still farther to forge again the links with life which had temporarily become frayed and loosened.

Health is, thus, the prime target of the classical attitude, for it seeks to situate man at ease in the world with its myriad demands, including the ethical and the aesthetic. To be at ease means to be adjusted without repressions. Francis Thompson¹³² explores the relation of this health with holiness and discovers that the poet and the saint are affinities. The saint

receives into himself and becomes one with divine law, whereafter he no longer needs to follow where the flocks have trodden, to keep the beaten track of rule, his will has undergone the heavenly magnetisation by which it points always and unalterably towards God. In like manner, the poet absorbs the law into himself, or rather he is himself absorbed into the law, moulded to it, until he becomes sensitively respondent to its faintest motion, as the spiritualised body to the soul. Thenceforth he needs no guidance from formal rule, having a more delicate rule within him. He is a law to himself, or indeed he is the law.

Art, thus, is not indulgence in any emotion but the disciplining of the emotional life in such a way that responsibilities of living will not be abdicated and, further, responsible living will also become a delighted living. This outlines the need to train feelings and intuition besides intellect. Bergson¹³³ wrote: "Consciousness in man is pre-eminently intellect. It might have been, it ought, so it seems, to have been also intuition. Intuition and intellect represent two opposite directions of the work of consciousness: intuition goes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction, and thus finds itself naturally in accordance with the movement of matter. A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development." Since the development of the intellect has taken place at a steadily accelerating tempo in our times, the urgent necessity today is to develop feeling to correct the imbalance. Giedion¹³⁴ writes: "Thinking is trained, feeling is left untrained. . . Knowledge and feeling are isolated from each other. So we arrive at the callous paradox that in our period feeling has become more difficult than thinking." We should add that it is sane, healthy feeling that has become difficult, for in a sensate culture like ours, with mass stimulants like the film and pulp literature dedicated to sensationalism, there is really a hypertrophy of the most primitive type of emotions. Shelley¹³⁵ indicates the urgent need for remedial action and also the role of poetry in that action. "The cultivation of poetry is never more to be desired than at periods, when, from an excess of the selfish and the calculating principle, the accumulation of the materials of external life exceeds the quantity of power of assimilating them to the internal laws of human nature." Tolstoy¹³⁶ also emphasises the need for the classical outlook and the role of art in stabilising it. "Art is not a pleasure, a solace, or an amusement; art is a great matter. Art is an organ of human life transmuting man's reasonable perception into feeling. In our age the common religious perception of men is the consciousness of the brotherhood of man—we know that the wellbeing of man lies in union with his fellowmen. True science should indicate the various methods of applying this consciousness to life. Art should transform this perception into feeling. The task of art is enormous. Through the influence of art aided by science, guided by religion, that peaceful cooperation of men which is now maintained by external means—by our law-courts

police, charitable institutions, factory inspection and so forth—should be obtained by man's free and joyous activity. Art should cause violence to be set aside."

This is a very precise clarification of what Abhinava meant when he said that the consummation of ethics is in delight, in "man's free and joyous activity", and that poetry can also achieve ethical ends through delight. To Wordsworth also poetry is the culture of feelings for a purpose—for man's mental and moral health and happiness. "A great poet ought to rectify men's feelings, to give them new compositions of feeling, to render their feelings more sane, pure and permanent, in short, more consonant to nature, that is to eternal nature, and the great moving spirit of things"¹³⁷. Wordsworth also emphasises the harmonisation of the powers of man, especially of the intellect and the emotion. "All good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings, but poems to which any value can be attached were never produced on any variety of subjects but by a man who, being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also thought long and deeply. For our continued influxes of feelings are modified and directed by our thoughts, which are indeed the representations of all our past feelings, and as by contemplating the relations of these general representations to each other, we discover what is really important to men, so, by the repetition and continuance of this act, our feelings will be connected with important subjects, till at length, if we be originally possessed of sensibility, such habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly and mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, and utter sentiments, of such a nature, and in such connection with each other, that the understanding of the reader must necessarily be in some degree enlightened, and his affections strengthened and purified"¹³⁸.

What Wordsworth said in the preface to the *Lyrical Ballads* was stated far more imaginatively and attested in a work, which has become one of the world's greatest epics, by Valmiki in the prefatory section of the *Ramayana*. His poetry began as a spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling when he saw the male of the bird pair fall dead and heard the anguished cry of the female bird. But this episode, ordinarily sufficient only for a lyrical poem, is the germ of a vast epic. Bhoja, much later, would emphasise that the *Maha Kavya* or epic poem should differ from the *Muktaka* or short poem—the "single-mooded" lyric of Day Lewis—by the grandeur of its theme which is not a matter of mere size but of sweep and coverage. An epic must show man in action in pursuit of one or more of the four *Purusharthas*, the goals of human existence indicated by ethical thought. The theme of the epic should be the problem of these four aims of man and not the passing sentiments recorded in *Muktakas*¹³⁹. Valmiki realised this centuries earlier. Spontaneous feeling has to be rectified and elaborated with the help of thought so that good poetry may also become great poetry which squarely confronts the problems of

responsible living Poetry, says Valmiki, should deal with the idealised man because it seeks to make man move nearer to the ideal. It should be inspired by a lofty vision This vision takes in all the values of human life, but recognises a hierarchy among them His epic, says Valmiki, is *Kamārtha-guna-samyuktam*, that is, it gives its due place to the satisfaction of sensuous but legitimate impulses, to Eros. But it is also *Dharmārtha-guna-vistaram*, that is, the dominant accent is on moral responsibility, on man as a moral being, on the dignity which man gains when he accepts the obligations implicit in an ideal character¹⁴⁰

D H Lawrence¹⁴¹ said categorically "The essential function of art is moral Not aesthetic, not decorative, not pastime and recreation But moral The essential function of art is moral." But, if the function of art is moral, its technique is not the same as that of ethics, which can legitimately try to teach through the reason Valmiki, like Lawrence, rejects the doctrine of art for art's sake, for there art does not look up from an unrelated sequence of pleasurable sensations to an integrated vision of life where a higher pleasure may emerge from an acceptance of pain, of the tragic He is not prepared to surrender the right to regard life as the basis, inspiration and justification of art, the right to look up from art to life so that when the glance returns it can embody the meaning of life in art But he luminously clarifies a truth which Lawrence should have clarified to rule out possible misunderstandings. The doctrine of art for art's sake does contain a positive truth It rightly insists that art has its own valid criteria of form and expression, its own modality, which cannot be neglected, whatever be the quality of the moral vision embodied in art Valmiki accepts this fully in his definition of the formal requirements of the best poetry. It has to be musical like a melody on strings, perfect in its communication, flawless in its rhythms, briefly, it should be a genuine poetic creation, the expression of an imaginative vision.

"Every man imputes himself", said Tennyson "No man can see further than his moral eyes will allow him"¹⁴² But vision has to reach further than the limited horizons of the prevailing moral beliefs before moral evolution can progress "How to observe is how to behave", said Thoreau "We are as much as we see"¹⁴³ Aesthetic observation is observation by the imagination It is because imagination can irradiate the intellect and ultimately influence character and personality that Shelley called it a great instrument of moral good "A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively, he must put himself in the place of another and of many others, the pains and pleasures of his species must become of his own The great instrument of moral good is the imagination, and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause . . . Poetry strengthens the faculty which is the organ of the moral nature of man in the same manner as exercise strengthens a limb"¹⁴⁴ Overtly didactic poetry, thus, is not the highest poetry Goethe regards it only as a hybrid between poetry and rhetoric a difficult attempt "to weave some-

thing together from science and imagination, to combine two opposite elements into a living body" All poetry should be didactic, but unnoticeably so "The reader must draw instruction from it himself, as he does from life A work of art can and will have moral consequences, but to ask moral purposes of an artist means to spoil his trade"¹⁴⁵ This is essentially the view of Indian poetics too Art should not have a moral aim, but must necessarily have a moral view This is not to make art didactic, for morality does not form either its content or purpose according to this view.¹⁴⁶ When Bhoja demanded that the extended poem should represent man in the pursuit of any of the *Purushartha* or goals of human life, he emphasised first that art should have strong links with life and, secondly, that this vision of life should be a moral vision For ethics, in clarifying the great scheme of the goals of existence, had already pointed out that enlightened morality (*Dharma*) should guide the seeking of wealth (*Artha*) and libidinal satisfactions (*Kama*) Poetry smoothly aligns itself with this dictate because its vision of human nature and life independently confirms its truth "Axioms in philosophy are not axioms", wrote Keats, "until they are proved upon our pulses"¹⁴⁷ Poetry proves the axioms of moral philosophy in our pulse Poetry can teach, as Lowes said, only if it teaches in art's way—if, in Browning's phrase, it "does the thing shall breed the thought"

A great creative artist of our own times, Brecht,¹⁴⁸ has laid as truculent an emphasis on the didactic responsibility of art as D H Lawrence He gives a clear idea of the "epic theatre" of which he was the greatest exponent "The stage began to narrate The narrator no longer vanished with the fourth wall Not only did the background make its own comment on stage happenings through large screens which evoked other events occurring at the same time in other places, documenting or contradicting statements by characters through phrases projected on to a screen, lending tangible, concrete statistics to abstract discussions, providing facts and figures for happenings which were plastic but unclear in their meaning, the actors no longer threw themselves completely into their roles but maintained a certain distance from the character performed by them, even distinctly inviting criticism" In evaluating this type of approach, it is very important to remember two things The first is that Brecht was not a Sunday school teacher who used the theatre "Many people attacked the theatre, claiming it was too moralistic Yet moral utterances were secondary in the epic theatre Its intention was less to moralize than to study We were not speaking on behalf of morality but on behalf of the wronged These are really two different things, for moral allusions are often used in telling the wronged that they must put up with their situation" Secondly, if the word of prosaic discourse can be made to sprout wings in poetry, concepts and thoughts and ideas can also be transmuted into art and Brecht insists on this transmutation "Whatever knowledge may be contained in a literary work, it must be completely converted into

literature” He clarifies his purpose in using projection and other techniques, ordinarily regarded as destructive of dramatic form “To make the events (represented on the stage) understandable, the environment of human activity had to be given great and ‘significant’ value” The significance is gained through the significant, aesthetic form. The criticism of Brecht’s theatre as too moralist would have had some point if the critics could have shown that the moral approach decomposed the dramatic form. But Brecht created a theatre of intense vitality

Brecht’s revolutionary form is a traditional form in India, for we have literary categories that are almost identical if you leave out modern techniques like projection. The mono-acting of Sanskrit Bhanas prevented the actor from too complete an identification with his role, for the reason, that the next moment he would be playing another role. In the Thullal of Kerala where there is only one raconteur-actor there can be seen a subtle, continuous interchange of the two roles. In one moment the actor is the narrator and his gesture makes us listen inwardly to the unheard hum and busy life of Gokul, the pastoral village where Krishna spent his childhood. In the next second we have drawn rapidly near and the raconteur is now the actor who has taken on the role of a cowherd boy or a milkmaid churning the curd. Again, in one moment the actor is bringing out the comic antics of a vain fop with a complete self-identification, and in the next he melts back into the role of the raconteur and indulges in an inimitable gesture which means . “There you are ! That is the sort of clown who set himself up as a rival to Krishna for the hand of Rukmini” Nambiar who wrote the libretti for the Thullal monodramas was a great social critic and satirist and he conscripted the contemporary social environment into the stream of his narrative even if the theme was Puranic, the locale heaven or hell. This has a Brechtian impact, providing even for legendary episodes a critical approach deriving directly from contemporary social reality. The art of the Chakyar, an earlier form from which the Thullal evolved by adopting a continuous verse libretto and more elaborate mimetic gestures, incorporated moral discussions as well into the narrative stream. The narration, in both forms, thus emerges with a continuously shifting focus, the camera now quite close, penetrating into the interior world of men’s moods, day-dreams and ambitions, now remote, seeing things in a broader perspective, correcting vanity with raillery and more serious anti-social traits with the cathartic distortion of caricature or even with the direct analysis of moral thought. But, as in Brecht, the final form is an integral aesthetic form, not moralising or social criticism with a sugar-coating.

Poetry serves morality not by directly endorsing its dictates but in a far more significant and effective way by strengthening the right attitude. “The great poets”, said Emerson, “are judged by the frame of mind they induce”¹⁴⁹ Goethe said that “we learn nothing” by reading great literature, but “we become something”¹⁵⁰ If aesthetic relish is a non-practical

activity, the experience can still endure and prolong when the mind returns to practical involvement in the world. Drinkwater¹⁵¹ wrote "It is not only that in this inspiration of words an experience has been imparted that is new in its own particular, beyond that, and even more radically important to me, my capacity for experiencing, for perceiving, has been permanently enlarged by this particular act of experience or vision, my faculties have been permanently sharpened, and my mind goes back to its routine avocations with a surer mastery than it employed before" The attitude stabilised by aesthetic experience is not so much a moral attitude, as one which will lead to a moral attitude when the mind changes over from the state of aesthetic contemplation to practical tasks. It is an attitude of impersonal joy¹⁵². Its carry-over from contemplation to action will slowly integrate the two aspects or moods of personality, the reflective and the active. Aesthetic experience needs the distancing of oneself from egocentric biases. This is essentially a *Satvic* discipline and in practical encounters this *Satvic* attitude will spontaneously yield moral consequences.

The subtle manner and sense in which the beautiful modulates to the good should be clearly understood if gross misunderstandings are to be avoided. Thomas Mann¹⁵³ gives a very helpful clarification. "Indubitably the criticism inherent in art has a moral component which hails from the idea of the 'good'—that idea rooted in the aesthetic as well as the moral. The appreciative layman enjoying a work of art uses the word 'beautiful' to praise it. But the artist, the craftsman, does not say 'beautiful', he says 'good'. He prefers this word because it expresses more exactly and more soberly the professionally and technically commendable qualities he has in mind. But that is not the whole of it. The truth is, the whole sphere of art lies in the ambiguous word 'good' whose meaning extends beyond the merely aesthetic over into the universally acceptable, and thence upwards towards the highest, most compelling idea of perfection." Art can align itself with ethics because the aesthetic problem is very much like the ethical problem. Ethics aims at a control of the social reality which will reduce the anarchy of myriad individuals each pursuing his own ambition into an order and a harmony. The poet has to order his material in the same way, chisel the resistant word to perfect shape. In the inner level, ethics can manage its task only by moulding the emotional reactivities, socialising and harmonising them. That harmonising is a basic requirement in art.

The subtlety of this convergence imposes certain healthy restraints on both ethics and aesthetics. Morality cannot demand that poetry should docilely adhere to its own dictates, for its perspective may be seriously defective in a social group at a certain epoch. Mathew Arnold¹⁵⁴ wanted modern poetry to include religion with poetry, "instead of existing as poetry only, and leaving religious wants to be supplied by the Christian religion, as a power existing independent of the poetical power." But history has also known many wars and massacres caused by theological

dogmas and religious fanaticisms with which poetry can have no concern. It can only be expected to align itself with the genuinely ethical and religious intuitions. "Poetry", says Santayana,¹⁵⁵ "is religion without points of application in conduct, and without an expression in worship and dogma." Here we can endorse the latter part of the dictum, that poetry is religion without ritual and dogma, about its relation to conduct, we have already seen that there is indeed a subtly operating influence. When Schiller asserted that the theatre was a "moral institution", he meant it in the sense we have clarified, for as Marc Connelly¹⁵⁶ points out, only disorder will result if the theatre tries to be a "moralizing institution". Chiaromonte¹⁵⁷ clarifies this: "To those who speak of a religious theatre we should reply that by the simple fact of inviting the community to consider the significance of human actions, and to evaluate its own way of being in the light of this significance, the theatre does confirm and reinforce that cohesion and intercourse between consciences in the image of a common destiny by which the sense of what is and is not sacred in life is essentially nourished." The same view is expressed by Giraudoux¹⁵⁸ "The stage is the only form of a nation's spiritual and artistic education . . . the only way by which the most humble and unlettered public can enter into direct contact with the greatest of conflicts and create for itself a lay religion, a liturgy and saints, feelings and passions."

This shows that poetry can operate only by nourishing the emotional reactivities, and not by preaching. Poetry with authentic power can communicate feelings which the sensitive heart can immediately accept as verities. The truth glimpsed by the poet becomes witnessed by all sensitive hearts (*Sakala sahodaya samvedana sakshika*). This is what De Quincey meant when he said that "literature seeks to communicate power". Power, as he understood it, was being "made to feel vividly, and with a vital consciousness, emotions which ordinary life rarely or never supplies occasions for exciting, and which had previously lain unawakened, and hardly within the dawn of consciousness—as myriads of modes of feeling are at this moment in every human mind for want of a poet to organise them". When, he asks, "these inert and sleeping forms are organised, when these possibilities are actualised, is this conscious and loving possession, . . . power, or what is it?"¹⁵⁹ This means that poetry that consciously and directly undertakes the support of morality betrays its own ideal function, for that is to explore the latent verities of the human heart from which a new, enlightened morality may ultimately spring, and not to bow passively before time-bound moral codes persisting by the sheer inertia of tradition. Shelley held out a clear warning in this respect: "Poetry acts in another and diviner manner. It awakens and enlarges the mind itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought. A poet, therefore, would do ill to embody his own conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually those of his place and time, in his poetical creations, which participate in neither"¹⁶⁰ Shelley here

makes the subtle, but very significant, distinction between the poet as the ordinary individual, whose moral concepts are the introjected reflections of the vetoes and commendations of his group, and the poet in the inspired, creative moment, who discovers new verities of the heart from which a new morality can arise Lamb,¹⁶¹ criticising the sentimental, overtly moralist, drama of his day, wrote "We turn away from the real essence of things to hunt after their relative shadows, moral duties, whereas if the truth of things were fairly represented, the relative duties might be safely trusted to themselves" And Mann¹⁶² cites his own experience "The political moralizings of a poet have undeniably something comic about them Moreover his propaganda for humanitarian ideals must inevitably bring him rather closer than close to the platitudinous Such has been my experience."

IV THE STIRRED SENSITIVITY

It is precisely this distinction—between the pedagogic which is often pedantic, and the aesthetic—that is emphasised in the doctrine of the *Kanta-sammitatva*, affinity with the beloved, of poetry Referred to by Abhinava,¹⁶³ it is dwelt upon by Mammata¹⁶⁴ and elaborated by later writers like Vidyadhara¹⁶⁵ The religious texts and ethical treatises are authoritarian (*Prabhu-sammita*) Imaginatively handled history instructs like a friend (*Mitra-sammita*) But the influence of poetry is *Kanta-sammita*, such as is the felt and induced direction of a beloved wife, than a command, instruction or advice Abhinava gives this formulation in the passage where he affirms that delight has primacy in poetry and that poetry can achieve through that delight all that ethics seeks to achieve The insinuating power of feminine grace is a perceptive image and we find it in the European tradition too, in a man who, like Abhinava, was both philosopher and aesthete Plato felt that through music the soul learnt harmony and rhythm, and even a disposition to justice "Can he who is harmoniously constituted ever be unjust? Is not this, Glaucon, why musical training is so powerful, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the secret places of the soul, bearing grace in their movements and making the soul graceful?"¹⁶⁶ The feminine fastination of art is a latent image here, a *Dhvani* But the ultimate implication is the same Aesthetic delight is not sensate pleasure but something which soothes the tensions that disturb the inner harmony and the harmony thus unconsciously stabilised can endure in the practical context also where it will manifest itself as a moral attitude The emphasis of Indian poetics on the *Satvic* nature of poetic experience clearly implies this deeper influence on personality though the principle of poetry's affinity with the beloved is more usually cited to clarify the precise manner in which poetry can assimilate moral issues and contexts in its content

Bacon¹⁶⁷ gives a formulation analogous to that of Indian poetics "The

best division of human learning is that derived from the three faculties of the rational soul, which is the seat of learning. History has reference to the Memory, poesy to the Imagination, and philosophy to the Reason." But it should be noted that Indian poetics does not endorse this compartmentalisation. The distinction it draws is between the manners in which a concept of reality, which includes both nature and the social world, is communicated, rather than the ways in which the concept is formed first of all. In fact, a world-outlook needs the integrated utilisation of reason, memory and imagination for its very formation. But, in the communication of that world-view, philosophy primarily relies on reason, history on memory and poetry on imagination. *Vyutpatti* is culture of both mind and heart and Abhinava's great dictum clearly says that philosophy, history and poetry can all lead to it, the essential difference being that poetry seeks its goal in a flood-tide of delight. In a sense, thus, poetry incorporates the reason of philosophy and the memory of history, just as ideal philosophy should take into account both historic experience and the realities of feelings and imagination and an ideal historical interpretation should incorporate rational judgment and imaginative sympathy. The *Agni Purana*¹⁶⁸ makes this absolutely clear. "If Science (*Sastra*) and History (*Itihasa*) and culture (of the imagination and feelings, in this context), all three combine, it becomes a poetic presentation (*Kavya*)"

The poet cannot abdicate his responsibility to think. Poetry, as Brett¹⁶⁹ has elaborated, is not retreat into an aesthetic world with no link to life, nor a Jungian-Freudian bodying forth of unconscious desires through symbols. The poet handles his materials in a way that implies thought because thought has contributed to his faith. This is why Coleridge affirms that the poet is a philosopher and poetry is the "figured language of thought". It would not be too fanciful to extend this expression into a comparison with the figured bass of early European music, for thought—which need not be a consciously held idea—is the base over which imagination traces its lovely arabesques, not as additive ornament, but like plant tendrils springing from a fertile ground. Bradley's clarification¹⁷⁰ is wholly acceptable. "Shakespeare's knowledge or his moral insight, Milton's greatness of soul, Shelley's 'hate of hate' and 'love of love' and that desire to help men which may have influenced a poet in hours of meditation—all these have as such no poetical worth; they have worth only when, passing through the unity of the poet's being, they appear as qualities of imagination, and then are indeed mighty powers in the world of poetry . . . Although poets have unusual powers of reflective thought, the specific genius of a poet does not lie there, but in the imagination. Therefore, his deepest and most original interpretation is likely to come by way of the imagination. And the specific way of the imagination is not to clothe in imagery consciously held ideas, it is to produce half-consciously a matter from which, when produced, the reader may, if he chooses, extract ideas." Bharata also says: "That knowledge is not knowledge which is

not embodied in the drama", that is, not imaginatively realised Browning¹⁷¹ puts it perceptively

*Art may tell a truth
Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,
Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word*

The mediate word which poetry cannot miss without ceasing to be poetry is the word used, not in its denotational function, but with that power of expression which only the reality of the genuinely poetic action (*Kavi Vyapana*) can endow. Such expression does not convey thoughts directly in the manner of prose discourse. It does things to us, stirs our hearts so profoundly that a new attitude takes shape in us which can lead to new thoughts about reality, the world's and our own. Art moulds character obliquely, by achieving "new compositions of feeling" as Wordsworth said. "The poet", says Winters,¹⁷² "tries to understand his experience in rational terms, to state his understanding, and simultaneously to state, by means of the feelings which we attach to words, the kind and degree of emotion that should properly be motivated by this understanding." As the basic assumption in Indian poetics is that poetry, through the patterned presentation of objective correlatives (the *Vibhavas*, etc.) raises to the relishable state a sentiment which is held to be latent in all, it would accept the definition of the task of poetry as an ideal revival (*Udbodhana*) of a latent reactivity. Being a revival, it necessarily goes back to the reader's inborn traits as well as his past experience. But it is also emphasised¹⁷³ that it is, at the same time, very much more than a reminiscence. In particular, the emotional situation, owing to the profound transformation which it undergoes in the process of poetic treatment, will throw a new light on that experience, and reveal its significance for life as, for instance, in the case of love, in Kalidasa's *Shakuntala*, which appears first as the manifestation of a natural impulse but is transformed by the time the play concludes into what has been described as "a spiritual welding of hearts." This is a "new composition" of feeling, of the profoundest human significance.

This human significance, when seen from the special perspective of ethics, will be seen as moral significance, though the poet is not primarily concerned with morality as such. The moral has to be exhaled by the work, not preached. "A drama", says Galsworthy,¹⁷⁴ "must be shaped so as to have a spire of meaning. Every grouping of life and character has its inherent moral, and the business of the dramatist is to so pose the group as to bring that moral poignantly to the light of day. Such is the moral that exhales from plays like *Lea*, *Hamlet* and *Macbeth*." This is also Valmiki's approach in the *Ramayana*, where the whole plot with its range of characters and incidents becomes the metaphor of a moral vision of life. Gurrey¹⁷⁵ has given a fine clarification of the delicacy of the integration that is needed here. A delicate balance between freedom of emotion

and controlling judgment is a quality of all great art. Creation of design in a work of art and response to it always involve a certain directing and disciplining of emotion. Art demands the participation of powerful feelings in the experiences it provides, but these powerful feelings are centered on fundamental experiences of life, presented in new and significant ways. And these feelings are so deeply involved in the reader's recreation of the experience that they combine with the remainder of the experience giving power to thought, to imagination and intuition, and fullness to the whole, they do not overwhelm thought or moral intuition and they are not left without directing purpose. The mutual interaction of every element of the experience is so immediate and so close that, at the end, there is complete unity. One is left with a sense of completion, with the experience of a fullness of meaning, emotional, intuitive, rational, moral.

The moral vision so gained may not tally with the prevailing moral code of the group in which the poet finds himself. The gulf between poetic understanding and prevailing morality is revealed in the fact that poetry may waimly shelter what morality may repudiate. "To get near the social advance for which all moderns hunger", Sherwood Anderson asks, "is it not necessary to have first of all understanding? How can I love my neighbour if I do not understand him? And it is just in the wider diffusion of this understanding that the work of a great writer helps the advance of mankind." He clarifies how the *Satvic*, impersonal attitude helps in this understanding. "I myself believe that when a man can thus stand aside from himself, recording simply and truthfully the inner workings of his own mind, he will be prepared to record truthfully the workings of other minds"¹⁷⁶. And the truth so discovered can dissolve the blind prejudices of puritan traditions. It can lead to the discovery of "picaresque saints",¹⁷⁷ men and women so affected by the general corruption of a sterile, chaotic civilisation that prudish morality will repudiate them but who, in their own way, are struggling towards "the discovery of what it means to be a human being". As Silone said, for them too, "life can be grounded in the search for community" and at the end of their wearisome journey they may find their salvation in the discovery of "the intimate reality of others", in the sacrament of compassion, in the holy significance of taking bread together. A deaf-mute in a novel by Silone (*The Seed Beneath the Snow*) learns to say the words "bread" and "companion" "Cumpaani", murmurs the deaf-mute, seeing men hunting for crumbs. Cesira in Moravia's *Two Women* finds in the story of Lazarus an incentive to "the compassion we owe to others and to ourselves". And Camus, in the *Myth of Sisyphus*, at last reached the conviction that "tenderness, creativity, action, human nobility will take their place again in this insensate world".

Holloway,¹⁷⁸ who dislikes the ambiguity in evaluating literature in the light of its moral worth, attacks the issue with some determination. Leavis demands "an intensely moral imagination the vividness of which is

inalienably a judging and a valuing " Holloway does not find this free from ambiguity But Leavis also speaks of the poet's responsibility "involving, of its very nature, imaginative sympathy, moral discrimination and judgment of relative human value" Human value need not coincide with the values recognised as such by the prevailing moral code with its narrow perspective "In his highest incarnation', said Camus,¹⁷⁹ "the genius is the man who creates in order that the poorest wretch in the darkest cell shall be honoured in his own eyes and those of others

The supreme end of art is to confound the judges, to revoke the sentence and to justify everything, life as well as man, in the light of beauty which is no more and no less than the light of truth No great work of genius has ever been wholly based on hatred or contempt In some recess of his heart, at some point of his story, the true creator is ultimately a reconciler" Mann¹⁸⁰ also has given a similar affirmation "It is not art's way 'to leave the stage with scornful laughter' She does not threaten life with cold, diabolic, nihilistic claw, instead of being life's animating spirit as she should She is bound up with the good, she is rooted in kindness which is akin to wisdom, even closer akin to love"

The equation of the aesthetic vision as the compassionate vision, about which we see such impressive convergence of opinion, is an important doctrine in the tradition of Sanskrit poetics Just as science has always sought to reduce the endless material variety of the world to a primordium of matter, by deriving compounds from elements and elements themselves from the ultimate electrical particle, poetics in India has tried to see whether the various sentiments can be derived as modifications of one basic emotional reactivity Bhavabhuti felt that *Karuna* was this basic sentiment It is often translated as pathos, but it is really the pathetic that generates pity, sympathy or compassion, the accent being on the latter The dominant sentiment of Bhavabhuti's *Uttara Rama Charita* is pathos in this sense Tamasa, a river goddess, a minor character in the play, contemplates the fortunes of Rama and Sita which furnish the episodes of the play and observes "The one sentiment of compassion, modified by a diversity of causes, undergoes different variations, as water assumes the different conditions of eddies, bubbles and waves, and it is all, nevertheless, but water"¹⁸¹ We should note, in passing, the exquisite propriety in making a river goddess draw a fine image for a subtle psychological concept from the movement of water, her own element Bhavabhuti is here using the concept of compassion in a very generalised and basic sense, as is clarified by commentators like Vira Raghava It stands for the generous going out of the heart to embrace the world It is stimulated, not only by the spectacle of men and women, living and suffering and fulfilling their destiny, but by the entire world of animate and inanimate things But first let us note its modification when stimulated and engaged by the human predicament, for it is here that the problem of the adjustive alignment of poetry and ethics, feeling and thought emerges

Suffering can excite compassion But can any kind of suffering be chosen by poetry for its compassion? "Representation of suffering—as mere suffering—is never the aim of art", wrote Schiller,¹⁸² in his important essay, *On the Pathetic*. "The ultimate aim of art is to represent the supersensuous, and tragic art in particular achieves this by making sensuous the moral independence of man from the laws of nature in a state of passion" Tragedy must represent "suffering nature" but also "moral resistance against suffering" Mere pity, mere compassion, is condemned by Schiller as unaesthetic The pathetic is aesthetic only in so far as it is sublime, an act of moral freedom And moral freedom in Kantian terminology, we should remember, is supersensuous Valmiki's Rama also accepted the moral imperative in spite of the fact that it involved suffering, although the drift of the sensate world would have justified hedonism Bhavabhuti's greatness lies in the fact that his play, a grand poem to compassion, steadily keeps in mind this component, moral sublimity If our hearts, with the poet's, go out in a flood-tide of feeling towards Rama and if on occasions we feel the pity of it all as unbearable, we are restored to strength by the recognition of the fact that Rama accepted the suffering in order to fulfil his duty towards his people His sufferings are accepted by him in an agonising, but sublime act of moral freedom, though the consequence is that Rama, the king, has to do terrible violence to Rama, the individual, by exiling Sita

The moral tension may not always be so clear in the poetic expression of compassion and therefore we should be very careful in our evaluation Compassion is a basic attitude of the spirit It is when it is engaged by a situation that presents moral complexities that the issues emerge clearly to the surface The feeling may find free lyrical expression, without involution in an episodic context, and then great delicacy of judgment is needed to decide whether suffering is masochism or life-giving pity in free lyrical expression Welland's study¹⁸³ of Wilfred Owen clarifies this In an eccentric introduction to the *Oxford Book of Modern Verse* Yeats dismissed Owen and some other poets of the First World War on the ground that "passive suffering is not a theme for poetry" The principle is right, but the condemnation of Owen is imperceptive "The poetry is in the pity", Owen had said He did not mean self-pity, and a pity which flows out to embrace the world is not passive "The eternal reciprocity of tears" like any other reciprocity implies an outgoing as well as suffering, a giving as well as a taking (let alone in the sense of "taking it")

This leads us to the wider spread of meaning in which Bhavabhuti uses the term *Kauna* In a tragic human predicament compassion is a going out of the heart to embrace specific individuals caught in the coils of suffering Uninvolved in such contexts, compassion wells up as a lyrical fountain through a profound awareness of the "tears at the heart of things" In moods of less tension, compassion is sympathy Though the primary meaning of that word is response to another's sorrow, it has come to be

used in an enlarged sense to mean all forms of attunement of heart, *Chittasamvada*¹⁸¹ The aesthetic response to the world is a sympathetic response in this sense. It is this basic sympathy that gives rise to all other feelings by contextual modification, like water appearing as ripples, waves, eddies, bubbles. In its purest essence it means the melting (*Druti*) of the heart and therefore the basic reactivity from which poetry, embodying any feeling, can arise.

Poetic sympathy is not confined to the world of man, it recovers the sense of kinship with the entire world, of animate and inanimate things, which inspired the world-vision of Vedic lyrical poetry. Here I must quote a modern American artist, Ibram Lassaw,¹⁸⁵ for he not only recovers the Vedic world-vision but has himself noted the affinity between his outlook and that of Indian thought. "In recent years, most of the titles of my sculptures have been based on stars and other celestial phenomena. At first, this system of titling seemed a convenient way of disposing of the problem of giving titles to totally abstract space compositions, certainly better to my liking than that of using numbers or dates. Soon there came the realisation that there was an underlying reason to my looking to the stars for names. I had long felt an analogy in the groupings of stars in three-dimensional space and the relationship of forms in my polymorphous compositions. The atomic world shows a similar space structure in my imagination. This view led to still further identification of that which I know with that which I feel. The idea that my body is, in a way, an island universe of atoms in an infinite continuum, stirs my imagination and my emotions. In all this, there is the basic assumption of an universal ecology, in which I, and in which life, play an integral part. There is a growing conviction in me that I belong to the family of the stars and the atoms, and an increasing sense of security in this knowledge of participation in an unknown, but wonderful process. There is no longer a real distinction between spirit and matter to me. They are merely aspects of a reality which cannot be bounded by verbal concepts. The artist contributes to the growth of awareness of reality, somewhat like a ductless gland secretes hormones for the body. Truly to love art means first of all to love God's world, for God is incarnate in the world. In each of my works I want to rejoice in this incarnation." Lassaw concludes by quoting the *Vedanta Sūtras*. "All who sing here to the harp, sing Him."

The unknown, but wonderful process in which man participates is the Vedic *Rita*, order, which binds the particle and the star in a harmoniously integrated system. God is the same concept, more concretised. God is the ground of the universe. "The sage beholds that mysterious existence where the universe comes to have one home. Therein unites and therefrom issues everything."¹⁸⁶ Human instincts are traced back to God along with inorganic and organic creation. "God Varuna has spread the vista in forests, put vigour in horses, milk in kine, set wise instincts in

hearts, the sun in heaven and the Soma plant on the hills"¹⁸⁷ The visible finite is derived from the invisible infinite and an image of almost surrealistic power is used to express this perception—a tree with roots above and branches growing downward "In the limitless region, Varuna, of hallowed power, holds erect the tree's stem The root is high above and the branches stream downward May they sink within the secret recesses of our own being."¹⁸⁸

The moment of grace, of inspiration, is the moment when a twig of this tree puts forth a fresh bud within the garden of our heart The perception of the unity of being is a poetic perception and it both needs and generates sympathy with all that exists it includes the sense of kinship that alone can prove the moral law in our pulse, but it is far vaster in its essential range The importance of Lassaw's personal record is that it indicates this inclusive range which can reveal even abstract art, which has very little to do with ethical problems, as the product of this sympathy, the feeling of belonging in a family with the stars and the atoms Another artist, Duca, clarifies how even the craftsman's respect for his material is a product of the sympathy, which, in the social context, leads to the spontaneous acceptance of moral law "Retrospectively I realise that several fundamental concepts cause a work to evolve so, that man must seek a profound knowledge of his environment and of the detailed nature of the material in it, that many arrangements of this material have the potential of creating an emotional response and understanding, and, most importantly, that it is the practice of this eternal sympathy that is the core of ethics"¹⁸⁹

Bhavabhūti incorporates a prayer in one of his plays¹⁹⁰ "May there be welfare to the whole cosmos (*Sarva Jagat*) May all elemental powers (*Sarva Bhuta*) devote themselves to doing good to others May all evils subside May the world be happy in all ways" The expounder of the doctrine of sympathy (*Karuna*) as the basic reactivity in poetic experience wishes the weal of the world, not only of the human world, but the world of animate and inanimate things In the human sphere, it is only when the individual thus feels happy in wishing others happiness that ethics reaches its fulfilment Poetic sympathy leads to the same end, though it sweeps beyond the family of man to found a family where the atom and the star also are one's brethren And this end is reached in a flood-tide of delight Abhinava's great affirmation is fully vindicated

CHAPTER TEN

Poetry and Liberation

I MEANING OF LIBERATION

WE have now to proceed to the elucidation of the last of Abhinava's great affirmations that poetry is as efficacious as the traditional psychological and spiritual disciplines in leading to the ultimate liberation, *Moksha*

Here we have to take extreme care in clearly understanding the concept of liberation. The development of theological systems on the one hand and of popular religion on the other seriously distorted the concept. We have to reject these vulgarisations by the highbrow and the lowbrow and go back to the luminous perception of the Upanishadic thinkers. This was inspired by the Vedic vision which was essentially a poetic intuition. In the analysis of the relation between ethics and aesthetics we saw that, in the Indian tradition, ethical thought merely stabilised the poetic vision of *Rita*, or cosmic order. And now, in the analysis of the relation between aesthetics and metaphysics, we shall see that the brilliant philosophical analysis of the Upanishads was only an endorsing of the poetic intuition of the Vedic lyrics.

To gain a convenient foothold for the difficult analytical ascent, we may provisionally accept this summary statement. Liberation means, in the Indian tradition, the discovery by the individual of his essential self which is different from his empirical self, the former is one with the reality which is the ground of the universe, and this reality has at least three fundamental attributes, it is not a void or absence or negation, it exists it is not nescience, it is consciousness, it is bliss.

Any emergent entity seems a miracle. The properties of water cannot be predicted from the knowledge of the properties of oxygen and hydrogen whose union produces it. A tree may grow from a seed, but its being is unique, its reality is not the same as the reality of the seed. There was a time when the tree was not, and only the seed was. Thought as well as poetic perception thus seem compelled to derive being from non-being. The great poem on creation in the *Rig Veda*¹ is a lyrical meditation on this miracle. "Searching in their heart with intellect (a beautiful expression for the combined enquiry by intuition and thought) the sages found the source of being in non-being." But this non-being cannot be a void

or emptiness, for it projected the world. The poet makes a heroic effort to go back to the ultimate beginning when space and time were themselves not created ("There was no air, then, neither the worlds, nor the sky beyond. Of neither night nor day was any semblance . . .") and realises that if the being of the world emerged from this abyss it could not be a void and that the contrasted categories by which the mind knows concrete realities cannot be applied here. "Non-being then existed not, nor being. Death was not, nor immortality."

The lustrous flame will go out if deprived of air. Etymologically *Nirvana* means precisely this extinction. But the dark emptiness that now results cannot be confused with the original reality, if it produced the flame and can produce it again. Rudolf Otto has noticed the contradiction in Hinayana Buddhism where metaphysical theory affirms that *Nirvana* is an absolutely empty state, while the emotions glow at the thought of reaching that state which, to the fervent sensibility at least, is a positive state. The clearer poetic perception of the Vedic mind eliminated this contradiction right from the beginning.

"Non-being" progressively becomes stabilised in conceptual thought as an infinite and invisible, nevertheless positive, state or power. Here again, it is primarily poetic cues that helped the clarification of the concept. The sky was a visible infinite and suggested the symbolic concept of Aditi (etymologically, the unbroken, indivisible and infinite), the great mother of the gods. "Aditi is space. Aditi is all gods, the five classes of being, the created and the cause of creation",² for the sun and the stars are mere local concretions in the expanse of space. The wind, invisible but undeniable, suggested that the unseen need not be the unreal. "Germ of the world, the deities' vital spirit, this god moves ever as his will inclines him. His voice is heard, his shape is ever viewless"³. Agni, fire, suggested several other important concepts. He is a god, but he has taken up his abode among mortals. He is termed the guest, the lord of the house. This poetic perception will later lead to the philosophical realisation that the transcendent can also be the immanent. The energy of fire manifests itself in numerous forms, which suggests that behind the plurality of the world may be a unity. Agni is the oldest of the gods, but since he is lit every morning, he is also the youngest of the gods, another poetic perception which points to the timelessness of Absolute Being.

Dawn, to whose beauty Vedic lyrical poetry seems to have been especially sensitive, was also rich in conceptual suggestions. The birth of light from darkness seemed the most natural symbol of the beginning of the universe itself and its ordained procession through time. The goddess is as old as time, but she is radiantly young at every appearance. She is "immortal, undecaying"⁴. If the world is a flux, pure being is eternally enduring. The Rīg Veda refers to the Mighty Eternal Being⁵. But becoming is derived directly from being. Being becomes becoming through a spiritual act, a ritual sacrifice, where its pure, static existence is willingly

offered up as oblation by the infinite so that it can manifest itself as the finite world "Of the sacrifice that the gods prepared with Being (*Purusha*) as the oblation, spring was the butter, summer the firewood and autumn the offering"⁶ The seasons are symbols of time Timeless being consents to exist as becoming in time The universe, thus, is not an alienation from reality, but its modified self-manifestation

A high terrace of perceptions is thus reached by the intuition of Vedic poetry and the Upanishads take up their further, analytical, exploration from this vantage ground Thought is also forced at times to define ultimate reality negatively "It is neither gross nor minute, neither short nor long, neither shadow nor darkness, neither air nor ether, neither taste nor smell."⁷ But this is because reality, which is prior to the universe in time and transcends it as a logical category, is beyond the reach of language and thought which have been evolved through and for the handling of material realities From it "words return unattaining, with the mind"⁸ Since all attributes are limitations imposed by the mind in order to be able to seize something conceptually, transcendent reality can be indicated only by the negation of identity with anything that is known through the senses or the intellect But, as in Vedic poetry, in Upanishadic thought also, ultimate reality is no void, nor the world an alienation from it The Upanishads repeat the great metaphor of Absolute Being sacrificing itself to be transformed into the world Being is the sacrificial horse The universe is his body "Dawn verily is the head of the sacrificial horse The sun is his eye, the wind his breath, the sky his back"⁹

The metrical version of the *Mandukya* Upanishad in Gaudapada's *Karika*¹⁰ gives a brilliant image to explain how genesis and plurality seem to exist in the world If a stick which is glowing at one end is whirled about, fiery lines and circles and arabesques are produced without anything being added to or issuing from the single burning point The pattern is melodic, it moulds to shape in time and the memory of the finished trajectory of the point has to be integrated with the curve it is tracing at this particular moment to realise the complete shape in consciousness Flux, the feature of existence which is often cited to prove its alienation from absolute reality, is not tragic transience or continuous perishing, but a process that fulfils itself through phased changes The fiery arabesques are derived directly from the glowing point So, too, the plural phenomena of the world are merely the vibrations of ultimate being which is a unity

Upanishadic enquiry was primarily a search for a centre within man which vibrated harmonically with the vibrations of Absolute Being that created the world The sound of a drum seems to fill the air It pervades space with its resonance and it seems utterly impossible to trace it to a particular location Nevertheless, there must be a drum pulsating somewhere If you can locate the drum, the mystery of the whole air *māṇḍe* resonant by unseen vibrations is solved This is the fine image

given by Yajnavalkya¹¹ The great discovery is then made that the sounding chamber is as much one's own soul as the great drum of which sky and earth form the vibrating membranes "As the one fire, entering the world, assumes many forms, according to each form that it burns, as the one wind entering the world assumes forms according to each form it enters, so also the One that is the inner self of all beings assumes forms according to each form that it enters and also exists outside that form as well"¹² And thus the Upanishads move to their great equation. In the *Chhandogya* Upanishad, after pointing to the example of the seed from which the mighty tree grows, Aruni tells his son, Svetaketu, that the world grew out of *Brahman* and concludes "Thou art that"¹³ The *Mandukya*, *Brihad Aranyaka* and *Aitareya* Upanishads echo this "The *Atman* (soul) is the *Brahman* (Absolute Reality) . The individual soul is the Absolute I am *Brahman* . Consciousness is *Brahman* "

We have elucidated the first attribute of reality relevant to the concept of liberation Reality is being, not a void It is Man's self is one with it Liberation means this realisation

The second attribute of reality is that it is conscious, not nescient. In the organismic concept developed by Upanishadic thought, the soul is the conscious relisher of experience "Know the soul as the rider, the body as the chariot, the intellect as the charioteer and the mind as the reins The organs are the horses and the sense objects the roads for them The soul with the body, organs and mind is designated by the sages as the experiencer"¹⁴ When they seek the *Atman*, the Upanishads are trying to clarify first the functional centre of being, the pivot round which physiological and psychological capacities and functions are patterned as a perfectly orchestrated system The *Kena* Upanishad defines the query that analysis has to answer "Under whose lead does the understanding go to its object? Under whose lead does the vital power, the chief of the internal organs, perform its work?"

The affirmation with which the first query is coupled—that understanding goes out to its object—reveals that Indian thought would reject the claim of reflexology that the reflex process remains the fundamental pattern throughout the entire evolution of consciousness and of the nervous system which is the organ of consciousness This concept of the reflex originated from the same outlook from which the Cartesian conception of causation arose¹⁵ The orthodox conception of the fundamental pattern of nervous activity is that of the reflex arc in which something originating in the external world, the stimulus, sets up impulses which travel along sensory nerve channels to a central system and are reflected back thence to the muscles, glands and other effector organs The affinity between this conception and the mechanistic concept of causation, to which systems actuated from without are more congenial than those actuated from within, is clear For the classical concept of the reflex visualises

organisms as marionettes, since springs of behaviour originate with changes outside them. Behaviourism would deny sentience altogether. Reflexology may not go to that extent, but it would deny that sentience has any initiating power, that "understanding goes out to its object". But our own times have brought, along with the revelation that the mechanistic outlook is inadequate even for physics, a mass of evidence to prove that its extension to biology is absolutely unwarranted. The study by Batham and Pantin¹⁶ of the sea-anemone revealed that the animal, which was at first thought to be inactive when unstimulated, was in a state of continual and varied activity which was not externally stimulated. Such phasic activities "are often behaviouristically relevant to a future possible event rather than to a past stimulus, as when sweeping and swaying movements increase the chance of finding food"¹⁷

Weiss¹⁸ has brought forward most striking evidence in support of the need to distinguish between the autonomous and the reflexogenous activity of the nervous system. He planted isolated pieces of the spinal cord of a salamander larva into the tissues of the tail of another specimen in such a way that nerve fibres grew out from the piece into a limb which had been isolated and planted near by. After a while, the muscles of this grafted limb began to contract, indicating that the piece of cord was sending out impulses. But these movements were not reflex actions. The stimulation of the skin produced no movements. The isolated cord was able to produce spontaneous activity. Its nerve cells were discharging impulses without receiving them. Later, sensory connections were formed and reflex responses could be obtained in the isolated nervous system which had thus been built. Although they came from sources devoid of primary motor or sensory neurons, the outgrowing sprouts of cord or hindbrain formed peripheral connections with skin and muscle. Thus, central neurons can provide functionally effective peripheral innervation. Nerves also form by accretion around pioneering fibres which have succeeded in making terminal connections. This process is called fasciculation and it implies that a pioneering fibre, in consequence of acquiring peripheral connections, develops the capacity to serve as a preferential traffic line for new sprouts¹⁹. It seems clear that we have to consider groups of cells within the central nervous system, not as passive agents of conduction, but as active systems, capable of spontaneous action.

Gerard and Young²⁰ have furnished further evidence to show that there is a continuous cerebral activity which is apparently uninitiated by external stimulation. Though electrical waves in an isolated piece of a frog's forebrain eventually die away and are restored by the stimulation of the olfactory nerves, the continuance of the activity for long periods in the absence of sensory stimulation indicates some sort of self-reactivating mechanism within the cerebral tissue. By placing electrodes on different parts of the brain it can be seen that waves of change of electrical poten-

tial travel slowly about within the tissue. In the forebrain of the frog, activity usually commences in the olfactory bulbs, which receive the olfactory nerves and are situated at the front end of the cerebral hemispheres, and sweeps back over the hemispheres at the rate of about four centimeters a second. Gerard and Libet have shown that this propagation continues even in the absence of continuity of the axons over two regions. If the cerebral hemispheres are cut across and then placed in close contact again, electrodes on the two halves reveal that many waves are crossing the gap. The activity of the brain is thus not only continuous but possesses a high degree of stability and persistence. Gerard indicates the significance of these data in the following words: "The most dramatic thing about the brain waves is that they exist with the subject at rest and are actually fragmented by activity. The main, or alpha rhythm, is most pronounced in a person sitting relaxed in a dark room. Mental effort, mild emotion, or sensory stimulation, especially by light, disrupts it. Experiments on other animals, notably the frog, prove what the human observations suggest: that the brain has a spontaneous electrical beat as automatic as that of the heart, which is modified by but is not dependent on outside stimulation. This major discovery has changed our thinking about the brain from the picture of a passive telephone system which is inactive unless receivers are up, to one of a system in continuous activity and able to start its own messages as well as to receive others."²¹

The isolated spinal cord in the experiment of Weiss, spontaneously active and innervating the limb and establishing connections with the periphery for a sensory and motor seizure of the world, is a symbol of understanding or consciousness seeking out its object, not only in the individual organism, but in organic evolution itself, spanning a tremendous stretch of time. The Darwinian interpretation is that variations in the capacities of organisms arise by accident and those variations that confer advantages in the struggle for survival are stabilised by evolution. That is how, according to this view, evolution ended up with organisms having many sense organs and a central nervous system to coördinate them, though it began with an almost featureless protoplasmic blob, the amoeba. But, according to the Samkhya theory of evolution, which was later accepted by Vyasa in the *Gita*, the need of the evolving organism, which is only the "front" of the consciousness that seeks its more and more complete manifestation, generates the function (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch) and the function produces the organ (eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin). This view, casually dismissed by classical biology, is now reviving and gaining ground. Bergson²² felt that vision seemed to be a faculty envisaged prior to its appearance in evolution and adopting all sorts of instrumentalities in its determined drive to make its appearance. And he supports this view by showing that nature reaches identical results by entirely different embryogenetic processes. The retina of the vertebrate is produced by the expansion of the rudimentary brain of the embryo. In the mollusc, on the con-

trary, the retina is derived from the ectoderm directly. If the crystalline lens of a Triton is removed, it is regenerated by the iris. Now, the original lens was built out of the ectoderm, while the iris is from the mesoderm. These are different germinal layers, distinguished early in embryonic development and following clearly distinct lines of development. Nowhere is a faculty surrendered because its specific physiological basis is lost or injured. There is always the urge to fashion out new instruments from the most divergent material. Parts differently situated, differently constituted, meant normally for different functions, are utilised for the performance of the same duties and the same pieces of the instrument are sometimes elaborated from widely heterogeneous material. In the case of vision, we find that nature has tried out device after device for this function. Very primitive eyes are found in varying numbers, situations and degrees of development in invertebrates. Compound eyes often occur in addition to small single eyes in arthropods. Some fishes had four eyes—two for seeing under water with the necessary optical correction and two for seeing above water. This useless complication was abandoned. Some reptiles had a third eye, the pineal eye, placed on top of the skull. But this also was abandoned. Reviewing all this, Lecomte du Nouy²³ writes: "The principle of a seeing device was retained, but the solutions changed. Everything takes place as if a goal had to be attained, and as if this goal was the real reason, the inspiration of evolution. All the attempts which did not bring the goal nearer were forgotten or eliminated."

The spontaneous, uninitiated, continuous activity of the nervous organisation even in rest, which shows up the engagement of consciousness with external reality as only one of the phases of its action, and the evolutionary data which suggest that consciousness has been evolving its instruments for the seizure of physical reality, all suggest a self-directing entity or principle which seeks objects when it so desires, instead of passively registering the impact of objects. A sensory stimulus is an energy change in the external world. Nature is showering innumerable such stimuli on the organism every second. If all these hurtle into consciousness, mental life will never be integrated. But we find that the great majority of these are screened and only those acceptable are noticed. The thresholds (relative, not absolute) for sensation depend upon the factor of attention. A light or sound signal of enough strength to be noticed ordinarily will not be noticed if the mind is engaged elsewhere. Attention, on the other hand, will spot signals which are ordinarily too weak to be noticed. The advanced research of modern times in the functioning of the nervous system has shown that sensory signals relayed from the external world through the nerves need not emerge into consciousness even when they reach the highest coordinating centres of the brain. The eye receives a light signal from an external object and the signal travels to the brain through the nerve channels. Now, it is true that, if the visual centre (cortex) in the brain is destroyed no sensation will emerge. But it has

also been demonstrated that the mere arrival of the impulse in the brain centre does not lead to conscious sensation of light. Changes in electrical potentials evoked in the sensory cortex by stimulating the peripheral nerves indicate the unhindered arrival of sensory messages in the brain. But they are no less a feature of an unaesthetised than a sound organism²⁴. We have, thus, no alternative but to recognise the unconscious nature of isolated processes²⁵. Even in the brain which is not anaesthetised, the variability of the threshold shows that conscious perception necessarily involves a factor of attention and attention presupposes interest, which in turn involves the affective and conative aspects of mental activity. The core of being, the subjective centre, has the august power of denying or granting audience to these signals from the external world. Only when it consents to be actuated does a physical signal, transmitted by channels that are physiological and therefore physical, become conscious sensation and perception. All this brilliant insight is enshrined with a high density, but with no possibility of ambiguity, in the Upanishadic definition of the *Atman* as "the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, the vocal organ of the vocal organ, the vital force of the vital force, the eye of the eye"²⁶.

The cortical system,²⁷ the latest evolute of the nervous organisation of mammals, is the organ which synthesises and generalises the activity of immediate projection and serves as the material substrate of a new capacity of much later origin, the capacity of abstraction. This capacity represents the climax of evolutionary development, for it involves inhibition of irrelevant strains of thought, recall by memory, storing of past experience by learning, recognition of universals, projection of past experience into the future by predictive or anticipatory adaptation to stimuli which do not yet exist. As contrasted with the closed arc of the reflex, it gives to the organism the maximum of flexibility and initiative in the prehensile seizure of external reality.

Nevertheless, it may not be ultimately valid to identify consciousness wholly with cortical functions. Pavlov²⁸ wrote "If we could look through the skull into the brain of a consciously thinking person, and if the place of optimal excitability were luminous, then we should see playing over the cerebral surface a bright spot with fantastic waving borders, constantly fluctuating in size and form, surrounded by a darkness more or less deep, covering the rest of the hemisphere" (The cerebral hemisphere is the most important region of the cortex). In locating consciousness in the organ for synthesis and abstraction, Pavlov, it would seem, is really regarding the power of self-consciousness, with a long evolutionary history behind it, as the first emergence of consciousness. His partial justification for doing this lies in the fact that the clarity with which one's own consciousness can be analysed is directly related to the degree of one's power to think in terms of abstract relations. The child's power of describing itself is far inferior to the adult's power of sizing up his own personality, because its capacity for verbalisation, for seizing on its own

relationship with the environment and for further synthesizing these data, is entirely inadequate. But this does not necessarily mean that the child is not conscious of itself. This shows how difficult it is to define consciousness. Miller²⁹ collected about sixteen definitions, most of them far from being precise, or satisfactory. Workers like Hathaway,³⁰ Stout and Baldwin,³¹ and Zilboorg³² equate the term with "awakeness", "awareness" and "self-awareness". Delay³³ identifies it with vigilance and Muncie³⁴ with experience. Sometimes, unconsciously, the definition becomes circular. Troland, thus, asserted that "consciousness may be defined in terms of experience as the cross section of the latter taken in time, at any moment". Experience is now defined as "the sum of an infinite, continuous temporal series of consciousness". In man, innumerable physiological processes like respiration and cardiac rhythm and the orchestration of the hormonal system in growth are directed by the autonomic nervous system. This is done unconsciously, but the directive agency is a nervous organisation like the central nervous system and it frees the latter for higher responsibilities, since, if these tasks needed to be carried out with conscious attention, no nervous energy would be left for thought and other advanced functions. The autonomic organisation of the higher animals corresponds to the entire nervous organisation of lower organisms that do not have a central system. But there also, should it not be defined as a latent consciousness, "going to its object", achieving its objectives? In the higher organisms also, in sleep, the entire biological organisation is in the charge of the autonomic system while the central system rests. But this does not invalidate the picture of a self-directing central principle which seeks experience or relaxes as it chooses. The *Kena Upanishad* regards the *Atman* (soul) as the principle under whose direction not only the understanding but also the vital powers function.

Upanishadic thought would broadly agree with Muncie and Troland when they equate consciousness with experience, for the *Katha Upanishad* defines the soul as the experiencer. But it is not prepared to equate this role only with the waking moments. The waking state in part depends on the arousing influence at the cerebral cortex of afferent messages initiated by sensory stimulation.³⁵ Reduction of sensory impressions is cultivated as a routine aid to sleep. Noises are sought to be eliminated and the light is switched off when retiring to bed. After experimental transection of the mesencephalon, the reduced brain, lying *in situ* ahead of the cut, is in a state of sleep and this is interpreted as due to the interruption of ascending sensory paths.³⁶ Though there are various theories of sleep, it seems clear that deafferentation of the brain is an important factor causing the advent of sleep.³⁷ In the light of its affirmation that the soul is the experiencer, and also of the fact that sleep is sought for rest and relished (at least in retrospect, on waking), Upanishadic thought proceeds to assert that the soul as experiencer is a reality in all the oscillations of consciousness between the waking state and deep sleep through the state

of slumber when dreams take place. It moves from the waking state to deep sleep through the dream state and back, "like a great fish that travels from one side of the river to the opposite side, swimming with the current and against it as it suits it"³⁸ In the waking state, the soul operates at the level of sensory experience. But even the waking spirit can be unconscious of particular stimuli, for it is the factor of its attention or interest that decides whether any particular stimulus leads to actual sensation. In dreaming, the sensory and motor functions are suspended but the personal centre operates through the mind which recalls its memories and desires. "Leaving its lower nest in breath's protection and upward from that nest soaring wherever it lists, it roams about, the golden-pinioned bird of the spirit"³⁹ The deep sleep state is at the opposite pole of the waking state, but it does not eclipse the *Atman*, the mind may sleep, but the *Atman* is the relisher of sleep. "As a falcon or an eagle, having flown about in the air, folds its wings and prepares to alight, so the soul hastes to that condition in which, asleep, it feels no desire and sees no dream"⁴⁰ In fact, it is in the deep sleep state that its essential nature is revealed most clearly. "This is its essential form, in which it rises above desire, is free from evil and without fear. For, as one embraced by a beloved woman knows not of anything without or within, so the soul merged with the self (the empirical personality discovering—and reposing at—its deepest level) knows not of anything without or within"⁴¹

Here thought faces a dilemma in the analysis of consciousness similar to the dilemma which it had to confront earlier in the analysis of the concept of existence. Since being is an emergent from non-being, the latter was at first confused with pure void, though later thought defined it as a positive state of potentiality. Here a similar temptation to equate the unconsciousness of deep sleep as the essential form of the spirit proves irresistible for a while. The technique of meditation traces in reverse the path of the *Brahman* in the evolution of the world and the path of the *Atman* in the involvement with the world. The consciousness progressively displaces itself from the waking state, filled by the objects of the external world and the tensions of practical living, to the dream state, which allows free movement of the mind and then to the deep sleep state in which the distinction between the meditating subject and the meditated object disappears. At this level, the deepest level, the *Atman* is the silent and formless depth of being within us. At this great depth, the *Atman* is part of the *Brahman*, the ground of being, for the superstructure of mental functions and bodily organisation all belong to the periphery that is shallow and does not extend down to this deep centre. But we need a clear answer to the question whether this state is absolutely identical with the deep sleep state, whether it is a state of nescience. Philosophy would take up this problem later. Mandana Misra raises the criticism that when the soul is freed from the qualities of pain and joy produced by contact with the world through the instrument of the body, the emptiness may not be

different from the total destruction of the self. This type of freedom may come perilously near the unconscious state of a stone. Sridhara meets this criticism with the argument that the natural state of the soul is not one of nescience but a positive state and when freed from the body (in a state of deafferentation) the soul can enjoy this state. But we do not have to wait for later philosophical thought for a solution. Upanishadic thought confronts the problem squarely.

In the reflex acts of daily life, as when a hand jerks to chase away a fly that has settled on it, the action is not conscious. Likewise, but at a deeper level, in normal living, the serenity of sleep is not a consciously relished serenity. It is relished only in retrospect, on waking. The position that since every man sleeps, he is in rapport with the *Brahman* everyday, can be extremely naive. Just as, in reflex action, we can be an agent of action without being aware of acting, we enjoy sleep without being aware of enjoying it during sleep. The meditative discipline, on the other hand, is for enlarging the frontiers of consciousness, or deepening its level. There is also a paradox involved here. The state of deep sleep is an unconscious state. The demand therefore is that we should be consciously relishing this unconscious state. All this led the Upanishads to posit a fourth, highest, state beyond the three levels of waking, dreaming and deep sleep—the *Turiya* state. This is a transcendent state and the paradoxes that are valid in ordinary existence disappear here. But it is intractable to definition and can at best be described only by the negation of all attributes characteristic of the other three states. The state is described thus: "Having neither external, nor internal, experience nor both combined, nor mere consciousness either, neither conscious nor unconscious, invisible, incapable of being dealt with or seized, without indications, unthinkable, unattainable, to be traced only through the abiding action of the one self, where the phenomenal world is at rest, serene, gracious, free from duality, it is the final state. That is the *Atman* that is to be known"⁴². Here consciousness becomes the Dweller on the Peak of Being (*Kutastha*). Since this highest truth is not reached by the intellect, it is not communicable by discourse. Only individual experience can test its truth. "I have known this Mighty Being", claims the *Yajur Veda*⁴³ and the *Svetasvatara Upanishad*⁴⁴ reiterates this claim of direct, personal experience by quoting the verse

We must realise that the precise endeavour of Upanishadic thought is to establish the reality of the "experiencer", a subject of experience. Since the agent is logically and ontologically prior to the experience, it cannot be exhaustively described as a string of experiences. The self cannot be reduced as a mosaic of perceptions, external or introspective. There are difficulties here which McTaggart⁴⁵ ably summarises: "What does the self include? Everything of which it is conscious. What can it say is not inside it? Nothing. What can it say is not outside it? A single abstraction. And any attempt to remove the paradox destroys the self. For the two sides are invariably connected. If we make it a distinct individual

by separating it from all other things, it loses all content, of which it can be conscious, and so loses the very individuality which we started by trying to preserve. If, on the other hand, we try to save the content, by emphasizing the inclusion at the expense of the exclusion, then the consciousness vanishes, and since the self has no contents, but the objects of which it is conscious, the contents vanish also." Upanishadic thought, however, takes the firm stand that the self, though it is not exclusive of conscious states, is not identical with them.⁴⁶ The self does not empty itself out in the perception of an external object or event. It is possible to contemplate an object and be aware that one is contemplating an object. And this latter awareness need not be a second act following the first awareness, of the object, but an integral part of an indivisible but complexly structured perception. Ribot⁴⁷ pointed out the reduction of the conscious individual to an idea during times of intense absorption, as in the case of a marksman taking aim, or a skilled surgeon performing a difficult operation, and attempted to conclude that the ego is a coordination, oscillating between two extreme points at both of which it ceases to exist—perfect unity and absolute uncoordination. Perfect unity of consciousness which here means concentration on an outside object and the awareness of personality, he claimed, excluded each other. But self-absorption may similarly rule out other-awareness and since this unawareness is not an annihilation of the object, concentration on an external object cannot also be interpreted as annihilating the self. Further, concentration, whether extrovert or introspective, needs a subject who thus concentrates. Again, although self-awareness may be lost in times of intense absorption, there always remains the practical, and not merely theoretical, possibility that the awareness of an object and pure self-awareness can exist as a unified perception. Such perception may not be easy or usual, but it is not inaccessible to psychological discipline.

To argue, as Ribot does, that in extrovert concentration the ego as a coordination ceases to exist is to take up, by implication, the idealist position that an object is real only when it is perceived. For the marksman the target is real and the self is not, for the self is not perceived; conversely, the self would be real only when it is perceived in an act of introspection; so runs the implied argument. No extended criticism of idealism can be offered here and it seems sufficient to agree with Alexander,⁴⁸ when he says about reality, "not its *esse* is its *percipi*, but merely its *percipi* is its *percipi*." This curt dismissal of idealism does not weaken the trend of the present thought, because the reality of the subject is on a different footing from the reality of external objects and even if the idealistic contentions are not easily disproved regarding the reality of the latter, there are logical difficulties in questioning the reality of the subject. The denial of the reality of the subject when it is not introspectively experienced is itself a conscious act or experience demanding an agent, whose conscious act or experience it is. Any conceivable extension

of the argument will result in the same infinite regress. It seems logically impossible to dislodge the Cartesian contention that if all experience is unreal, error will emerge as a real experience, demanding an agent, who is thus deluded.⁴⁹

Whatever may be the validity of the claim that knowledge makes objects of all that it knows, when it applies to entities other than the self, in the act of pure self-contemplation the self seems to be both the subject and object of knowledge. This is the terminal point of the movement of Upanishadic thought. In the *Taittiriya*, *Kena* and *Katha* Upanishads, a position analogous to the idealist view, that, since all knowing is a refraction, the self is unknowable in its essential nature, is taken up. But in the *Svetasvatara* and *Bṛihad Aranyaka* Upanishads, this agnosticism is luminously transformed into the very proof of the reality of the self. The self is unknowable because it is the eternal subject of knowledge and cannot be an object of knowledge to another. The next stage in the development of the thought is the query in the *Bṛihad Aranyaka* whether the knower of objects can know himself and the answer is in the affirmative. Self-consciousness is revealed as the ultimate verity in experience and "introspection is a psychological process corresponding to self-consciousness as a metaphysical reality"⁵⁰

The *Turiya* state was defined, as we have seen, as neither internal nor external experience, neither conscious nor unconscious. Any paradox here is due to the difficulties of verbalisation. It is essential here to realise that whereas, in western psychology, mind is the locus of consciousness and in introspection it is both the subject and the object, in Indian psychology the difference between mind as object and mind as subject is conceived to be fundamental. The two are therefore regarded as distinct entities and not as dual functions of the same entity. Mind as subject is the self or *Atman*. Mind as object is the *Antahkarana*. Consciousness is the attribute of the former, while the tendency is to regard the latter as an instrument of perception like any sense organ but of a higher order.⁵¹ Here we may usefully recall what was said about the inability of the mere arrival of nerve impulses in the cortical centres to spark conscious perception unless the deep centre of personality consents to attend to them. Both experience of external reality as well as internal experience, awareness of self as conscious perception, can arise only when the deep centre chooses to be in active liaison with the mind and uses it as an instrument. When not in such liaison there is no conscious thought or perception. But this is not unconsciousness either, for the self can any moment engage the mind in tasks of thought or perception. Just as pure being is not a void, the self reposing in its deepest level is pure consciousness without content of thought or perception, though it is very difficult to conceive of this state. It is a steady glow of pure self-relish. This state can be reached only by a deep inward exploration. "*Brahman* pierced the openings of the senses so that they turned outwards. Therefore man looks outward, not inward into

himself Some wise man, however, with eyes closed, and wishing for immortality, saw the self behind”⁵²

The doctrine that the self is the experiencer or the relisher of experience is fundamental to Indian metaphysics as well as aesthetics and Abhinava's contribution⁵³ here, besides reaffirming the doctrine, brings out the link between metaphysics and aesthetics which the concept can forge According to Abhinava, the *Atman* is a self-luminous mirror. Abhinava, in spite of the exceptional brilliance of his mind, is admittedly no authority on optics and therefore we should overlook slight inaccuracies in his interpretation of optical phenomena and realise the real meaning of the analogy The ordinary mirror, in order to receive a reflection, requires an external light to illumine it A mirror in the dark does not reflect any image But the *Atman* is self-luminous It receives the reflection of the external objects independently of any external illumination Thus the first aspect of the soul is that it is a self-luminous entity which receives reflections and makes them shine as identical with itself This aspect is technically called *Prakasa*, literally luminosity, here self-luminosity Here, once again, let us recall that cortical excitation does not bloom into conscious perception unless the centre of subjectivity lowers the threshold for the stimulus In accepting the signal thus, the *Atman* is receiving it into its self-luminosity In a mirror, a sufficiently illuminated object would have automatically registered itself as a reflection The other aspect of the soul is the reality of the range of its creative action First of all, it knows itself, it is free to analyse and synthesise the various perceptions, it retains them in the form of residual traces, it takes, at will, anything out of the past to reproduce a former state, as in the case of remembrance, it creates an altogether new construct, as in the case of imagination This aspect is technically called *Vimarsa*, and stands for the critical, evaluatory and synthetic function Now here, Utpala, the teacher of Abhinava, while stating that if the Absolute be without this freedom of synthesis and be characterised only by self-luminosity (*Prakasa*) it would be insentient like *Sphatika-mani*, quartz (quartz is not self-luminous, but let us forgive that) instead of using the word *Vimarsa*, uses the word *Chamatkruti* *Chamatkara* and *Chamatkruti* are aesthetic terms and this gives Abhinava an occasion to discuss the concept of *Chamatkara* in both its metaphysical as well as aesthetic implications In aesthetics *Chamatkara* means beauty and since beauty is the enjoyment of positive relish in the experience of feelings communicated through poetry, it is delight, *Ananda*, poetic delight Starting from here, Abhinava proceeds to clarify the meaning of *Chamatkara* in Utpala's and his own philosophy It is nothing but perfect self-consciousness, that is, consciousness of the self, free from all limitations; it is nothing but *Vimarsa* (power of synthesis) in its universal implication, which is the most essential aspect of *Prakasa* (self-luminosity) As such it is also called *Ananda*, delight⁵⁴

The significance of the concept of *Ananda* must be very precisely under-

stood as misunderstandings are possible. Just as metaphysical thought was tempted at first to regard non-being and nescience as the ultimate truths, it was also tempted initially to regard *Ananda* as the condition of Being in its state of complete withdrawal from all Becoming, of perfect repose in itself. But that interpretation does not do full justice to the depth of its meaning. It may stress the fact that the world has a unitary centre, but it makes the plurality of the world and its continuous becoming somewhat like an illusion. Just as pure being can freely function on the planes of both becoming and a withdrawal which, to the empirical understanding, seems indistinguishable from void, just as consciousness can freely move from the waking state to deep sleep through the dreams of slumber, the attribute of delight can manifest itself in the reality of both unity and variety. *Vimarsa* means just this freedom of being to repose as a still centre or proliferate into the myriad variety of the world. The *Taittiriya Upanishad*⁵⁵ asserted: "He (the Absolute, *Brahman*) is indeed bliss, and the soul realising that bliss becomes full of bliss." But this does not mean a rejection of the world for the transcendent, for the world is Being in its aspect of Becoming. This is brought out beyond the shadow of ambiguity by the analysis through which the Upanishads seek to unravel the unitary principle from which the world is derived. The *Kaushitaki* starts by positing *Prana* or air as the cosmogenetic principle, the primordial element. But very swiftly, *Prana* is progressively identified with life, with consciousness and with the self itself, the ultimate reality which is ageless and immortal. Thus *Prana*, which is originally the primordium of material creation, becomes identified with life from the biological point of view, consciousness from the psychological and the self from the metaphysical points of view.⁵⁶ The *Taittiriya* similarly progresses from matter to life and mind. Above the mind it posits a higher reason. Probably the mind stands here for sensation and instincts, while reason stands for the power of abstract and discriminatory thought which distinguishes man from animals and is a gift of cortical evolution. The *Taittiriya* does not stop here, but goes on to a still higher level, the highest in fact in its hierarchy. This is the bliss, which is the trait, the very nature, of the highest reality.⁵⁷

It is absolutely essential to stress this aspect, for art cannot exist if the world's existence is denied reality. And if the truths of aesthetics and metaphysics are an identity, as Indian thought claims, metaphysics also cannot deny the reality of the world. The analysis of the *Kaushitaki* and the *Taittiriya* establishes the validity of all planes of cosmic evolution, from the inorganic to the organic and to the conscious. The world is the proof of the *Vimarsa*, the freedom of analysis and synthesis of Pure Being: the freedom to proliferate into the world and continue as its deep centre. "*Brahman* desired: 'Let me be many, let me multiply.' He reflected and after reflection He projected all this—whatever there is. Having projected it, He penetrated into that very thing, and became the gross and the

subtle.”⁵⁶ The poetic intuition of the Vedas had realised this earlier “Fire is That, Sun is That, Wind is That, Moon is That Light is That, *Brahman* is That, Waters are Those Prajapati is He”⁵⁹ The play with singular and plural numbers (That, Those) and neuter and masculine genders (That, He) is deliberate, for establishing the unity behind the plurality of the world’s energies and the variety of their forms And the *raison d’etre* of plurality is aesthetic, in the ultimate analysis For God does not need to create the myriad world and therefore it is created out of pure delight, as a poem or song is created

II AUTHENTICITY OF BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

Intuition and intellect, poetic perception and rational enquiry, thus stabilise the concept of the Absolute as Being-Consciousness-Bliss (*Sat-Chit-Ananda*) Liberation is achieved when the individual realises his identity with this deepest self of all Abhinava had said that this ultimate goal of existence, like the proximate goals, comes to its fruition in delight The Absolute represents the inner harmony of the universe, a poetic unity of the world’s variety Realisation of that harmony is bliss The validity of the concept of bliss consists in the fact that the harmony of the universe must be realised in one’s own experience and not merely intellectually apprehended, for there can be no such thing as mediated delight⁶⁰ But it must be very clearly understood that this concept of liberation and realisation of the Absolute should not be mixed up with crude eschatological concepts, like personal survival in some form after death or the winning of some kind of heaven The Upanishads clearly affirm: “When the egocentric desires that are in the heart cease, then at once the mortal becomes immortal and obtains here (in this world) *Brahman*”⁶¹

Immortality, thus, is not survival beyond the appointed time of man’s life, although it means being lifted above the time-stream in the sense in which Toynbee⁶² refers to that concept “Both *Nirvana* and Heaven are conceptions of a reality outside history—a reality that is much more real than mere historical reality can be Have these conceptions of a transcendent reality any warrant in any experience that is accessible to human beings? Most human beings, in their ordinary experience of life, are confined to the time-stream as strictly as fish are confined to the water Yet a few people have reported to the rest of us the experience of breaking out of time into an altogether different dimension of spiritual existence In terms of time, the duration of this experience may be almost infinitesimally brief, yet an experience which, if it had been still in the time-stream, might have occupied no more than a fraction of a moment, can be eternal in its own dimension just because this dimension is right outside the flow of time” Indian thought not only agrees in understanding immortality in the sense clarified by Toynbee but also goes beyond and bridges the gulf between eternal and historical existence which seems unbridgeable to Toynbee. The

personal God is merely a refracted image of the withdrawn Absolute in Sankara. So is it in Eckhart and Boehme. But the Supreme Self of Vyasa's *Gita* stands higher even than the immutable *Brahman*, for the transcendental, withdrawn Absolute and the immanent World-Soul are aspects—and not necessarily higher and lower aspects—of the Supreme Self. At best there is only the contrast of static and dynamic aspects between the two. Historical existence is the extension (*Vibhuti*) of absolute existence in the plane of the temporal.

In Vyasa's sustained and magnificent rethinking of the whole issue, Becoming is no longer a casual flux, but a programme and fulfilment. The ideal is self-realisation. "Seeing the Self through the Self, he finds contentment within the Self." Here he finds the supreme bliss which is beyond the reach of the sense organs. But the technique of spiritual and psychological discipline, Yoga, is only one of the routes for self-realisation. Vyasa paves the way for a flexible and catholic interpretation of the concept of Yoga by giving this definition: "When one's properly controlled mind becomes steadfast within the Self and when one becomes free from all desires, then he is said to have accomplished Yoga." There is the Yoga of meditation, a very complex introspective discipline. But there can also be the Yoga of knowledge (*Jnana*), of devotion (*Bhakti*) and of work (*Karma*). As a poet he was in love with the world and as a philosopher he affirmed its mode of being as authentic. "The Yogi is he from whom the world shrinks not and who does not shrink from the world." All the four Yogas, if misunderstood, would lead to an alienation from the world, which Vyasa repeatedly warned against. Yoga as introspective technique and Yoga as knowledge both reveal the unity of being and the Yoga of adoration and the Yoga of work should lead the individual back to the world. Liberated from egocentered distinctions, the Yogi sees the self in others too and his ideal becomes the stability of the world.⁶³ Seeking the still centre of being is not to be confined to the anchorite's cell. The ideal is to be "steadfast like an unflickering flame in a windless place" and the greatest challenge is to be able to repose in this still centre right in the battlefield, the Kuru Kshetra, which is the symbol of the world itself. And the battle is not for personal advancement, but for the weal of the world (*Lokasangraha*).

Slightly long though it is, this elucidation was absolutely necessary for the discussion of the affirmation that art also can lead to the ultimate realisation. Self-realisation has too often been identified with world-denial which necessarily implies a denial of art too. That is why Vyasa bent his tremendous energy to the task of clarifying the concept by analysis, saving the world and art. And he did this with characteristic brilliance by making the greatest philosophical treatise in the Indian tradition, the *Gita*, an interlude which resolves the crisis of action in one of the world's greatest epic poems. Nevertheless, the confusion between liberation and quietism or withdrawal lingered and occasioned a great controversy about whether

Santa, tranquillity or serenity, could be accepted as a *Rasa* suitable for literary delineation. The persistence of misunderstanding vitiates large areas of this disputation, but both the fallacies as well as the insights revealed in the controversy will prove rewarding to us.

It is interesting to note that even the great Abhinava falters here, though only in the beginning. He is tempted to accept *Santa* as the greatest *Rasa*, because of its relation to the ultimate, and the greatest, of the four goals of man (*Puruṣārtha*)—liberation (*Moksha*). He says that literature, poetry and drama cannot restrict themselves to the trivium—ethical living, moralised pursuit of wealth and libidinal satisfactions (*Dharma, Artha, Kama*)—only, but must get ennobled by embracing the fourth and ultimate goal also, which is liberation. The attitude which can come to fruition in liberation is detachment (*Sama*) and tranquillity (*Santa*) is the aesthetic flavour (*Rasa*) of the composition which depicts the endeavour to attain it.⁶⁴ Aesthetic experience and ethical and metaphysical analysis should and do converge. But the ideal convergence is when each functions with its own proper modality. Here, there is a faint suspicion that Abhinava is allowing the analytic thought of metaphysics and ethics to intrude into the domain of aesthetics and dictate its ideal functions. The persistent misconception of liberation as withdrawal and the more subtle confusion which leads to the assumption that there is only one road to it, the ethical and ascetic discipline cause further difficulties. For when, after accepting *Santa* as the greatest *Rasa*, Abhinava thinks further on the *Vibhavas*, the objective correlatives, through which it can be delineated in poetry, he is unconsciously led to think in terms of association with the saintly and the virtuous (*Satsampark, Sadhusamagam*), study of philosophy, God's grace, etc as the requisite details of objective presentation and stoic indifference (*Nivēda*) and distaste (*Jugupsa*) for worldly things, as the ancillary emotions. For the association between asceticism and liberation and serenity, Bharata, or a misreading of him is partly responsible, quite apart from the fact that India, like any other country, had its quota of thinkers who felt that the world was an alienation from God. With his catholic temperament Bharata had said that drama should be of a varied nature in accordance with the varied nature of the world on the one hand and of the spectators on the other. He saw man in his various moods, in the dedicated pursuit of duty (*Dharma*), relaxing at play (*Krīda*), retiring in quiet withdrawal (*Sama*) from both. Therefore, he felt that drama should be able to serve the ascetics (*Tapasvi, Brahmaṁshi*) also.⁶⁵ It seems very clear that the implied meaning is that the delightful plays of the type written by Hrosvitha in the tenth century for her colleagues in the monastic retreat of Gandersheim have also a place. But it seems to have created the impression that asceticism was the only way to salvation and all plays should be inspired by the ascetic ideal and have ascetic themes. If theory had stopped here it would have become frozen at the conceptual level which would accept Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* as the most spiritual of all literary compositions.

But, as we shall see later, Abhinava was very soon his brilliant self again in the further attack on the problem

Thought stagnated in many eddies without gaining a forward impulsion in this controversy. Many denied that the *Santa* was suitable for poetic treatment. Even those who allowed it was divided into two groups: those who claimed that this *Rasa* could be treated in poetry, but not in drama and those who contended that it was suitable for dramatic treatment as well. Dhananjaya⁶⁶ forbids its delineation in dramatic form. Mammata rules it out in drama,⁶⁷ but allows it in poetry.⁶⁸ Jagannatha⁶⁹ contends that the *Santa* is capable of being represented in drama and appreciated by the audience. Rudrata, Ananda Vardhana, Bhatta Tauta and Kshemendra accept *Santa* for all literary forms. We find attempts, typical of orthodox scholarship, to get ready-made solutions by reference to authority. Vidyadhara⁷⁰ points out that Bharata has mentioned detachment (*Nirveda*) as an ancillary, derived emotion (*Vyabhichari Bhava*) immediately after the enumeration of the basic sentiments (*Sthayi Bhavas*) and at the beginning of the list of the derived emotions. And he interprets this as indicating that Bharata meant it both as a basic sentiment (*Sthayin*) and as a derived emotion (*Vyabhichari*). But Hema Chandra⁷¹ anticipates and rejects this type of quibble, though agreeing with the general proposition that *Santa* is acceptable as dominant motif in literary presentations of all categories.

More useful than the parade of illustrious names that figured in the controversy will be a study of their arguments. Dhananjaya rejects the idea that there can be such a sentiment (*Sthayi Bhava*) as detachment (*Nirveda* or *Sama*), for the development of that state—if it is at all possible to destroy utterly love, hate and other human feelings—would tend to the absence of all moods, therefore it is inadmissible in drama, the object of which is to delineate actions emerging from sentiments and to lead to the relish of sentiment as *Rasa*. Others hold that the quietistic *Rasa* does exist, as it is experienced by those who have attained that blissful state, but it has no root-sentiment (*Sthayin*) in dramatic composition, for detachment (*Nirveda*) being the cessation of all worldly activity and equanimity (*Sama*) being freedom from all mental excitement, it cannot be represented.

It is very clear that the misconception of liberation as the extinction of sensibility, instead of its deepening, is causing very serious difficulties in analysis. It is in Bhanudatta,⁷² the fifteenth century writer, that the outlook drives inexorably to its only possible conclusion: an uncompromising denial of worldly existence as an authentic mode of being. Briefly, his contention is that worldly existence (*Samsara*) is an illusion (*Maya*) and the soul, steeped in ignorance (*Avidya*) or hallucination (*Mithyajnana*), rolls through it, engaging itself in action (*Pravritti*), and, as a consequence, being subjected to affections like love and hate. All the basic sentiments (*Sthayins*) studied by aesthetic theory, therefore, are only the derived emotions (*Vyabhicharins*) of this basic emotion which he calls *Maya Rasa*,

relish in fantasy, whose root-sentiment or *Sthayin* is obsessive hallucination. Liberation means the transition from the *Maya Rasa* to the *Santa Rasa* and it is possible only through the withdrawal from action (*Pravritti*) into inaction (*Nivritti*). Krishna,⁷³ a seventeenth century writer who wrote a treatise on rhetoric in the form of a *Champu* (prose and verse mixed), also endorses this distinction of the *Maya Rasa* of action and the *Santa Rasa* of inaction.

Chiranjiva Bhattacharya⁷⁴ of the seventeenth century criticises Bhanudatta by arguing that *Rasa* experience is of the form of bliss and belongs to the enduring (*Nitya*), non-phenomenal world and so it is of the form of *Brahman*, the Absolute, therefore *Maya*, the merely hallucinatory reality of phenomena, cannot be a *Rasa*. Raghavan,⁷⁵ however, feels that this argument is weak and its acceptance would rule out the recognition of all the *Rasas* studied by Sanskrit poetics. His criticism of Bhanudatta is based on this argument. "As an opposite of the *Santa Rasa*, a *Maya Rasa* is no doubt present, but it is not a unitary *Rasa*. It is made up of *Srngara* (erotic emotion) and the seven other *Rasas*. It is not necessary to have a separate *Rasa* as *Maya* which is only the common name of all the eight mundane *Rasas* of *Pravritti*." The persistent misconception is operating in a subtle manner. The basic issue here is not *Rasa*-synthesis, but whether or not existence in the world is an authentic mode of being. If action in the world and the emotional experiences generated by it and further generating it are illussory, all *Rasa* experience is a hallucination and the further question whether it is unitary or not becomes a hollow mockery even as an academic issue. Chiranjiva may not have analysed the problem to this fundamental aspect, for he does give the impression that he was citing an orthodox metaphysical argument without realising its deeper implications. But he is nearer to the core of the problem, for he recognises that genuine *Rasa* experience is a real experience and not a hallucination. Very interesting in this context is Bhatta Nayaka's imaginative interpretation of the very first verse of Bharata. He gave this interpretation in the benedictory verse of his *Hridaya Darpana* which has been lost to us. But Abhinava⁷⁶ has preserved for us the invocatory verse. A phrase in the opening verse of Bharata (*Natyasastram pravakshyami Brahmana yad udahrtam*) is usually interpreted to mean that dramatic art was created and delivered by Brahma, the god of the trinity who is specially concerned with the function of creation, and there is the further attractive legend how Brahma made it a synthesis of all the Vedas. But Bhatta Nayaka reads the expression as "drama which is compared to the *Brahman*" or the Absolute of Vedanta. The actor is like the *Brahman*, upon him is created the world of the drama, as the world upon the substratum of the *Brahman*. Though drama and the world do not belong to the same order of reality as the actor and the *Brahman*, they do exist. Bhatta Nayaka says here that drama, like the world, is *Maya*, but the word does not mean illusion, it means phenomenological reality the nature of which is, in the last analysis,

an irreducible mystery, something not definable (*Anurvachanīya*) But both the world and drama exist and help in the attainment of the goals of man (*Purushārtha*)⁷⁷

Nirveda is indifference to life, dislike of worldly objects Even those who accept it as the root-sentiment of the *Santa Rasa*, in deference to orthodox opinion, feel that the withdrawal from the world it involves is morbid, something "inauspicious" (*Amangala*) This is a right kind of misgiving, but it has been used for some tricky and typically pedantic interpretation⁷⁸ of Bharata's reference to *Nirveda*, over which we need not waste time Caught in a cleft stick, we see Mammata squirming most uncomfortably He accepts *Nirveda* as the root-sentiment (*Sthayin*) of the *Santa Rasa* He does not want to admit that it is inauspicious (*Amangala*), but is forced to concede that it is somewhat of that nature (*Amangalapīya*) His commentator, Bhatta Gopala,⁷⁹ tries to come to his rescue by arguing that it is nearer the auspicious (*Mangalapīya*) than the inauspicious—on the right side of the centre rather than to the left of it or even at the midway point!

Earlier we mentioned that Bharata had affirmed that drama should serve all types of people, including ascetics It is significant that when he mentioned the tendency for withdrawal (*Sama*) from work and play, which man occasionally feels, he couples ascetics (*Tapasvī*) along with those who were fatigued (*Sramarta*) or sorrow-stricken (*Dukharta*, *Sokarata*)⁸⁰ Abhinava, when he got to work seriously on the problem, noticed that the mood resulting from such fatigue, sorrow and frustration was a disinterestedness (*Nuveda*) in ordinary things in the sphere of our mundane activities And he hastened to point out clearly that the quietude which can develop from this specific mood (which approaches to that of Coleridge's *Dejection*) has no reference to the fourth and ultimate goal, liberation, and the serene relish which is yielded by its realisation But the misunderstanding about ascetic withdrawal and liberation persisted, as we have seen, leading to the rejection of the world as an illusion in Bhanudatta and the misgiving which Mammata could not exorcise when he accepted withdrawal as the first step in the experience of serenity King Haripala Deva,⁸¹ a later writer, sought to end this confusion through a bold decision, though, probably because he was used to wielding executive authority, he did not feel the need to offer clarifying argument He distinguishes between what he calls the *Brahma Rasa* and the *Santa Rasa* In the case of the former, the base (*Sthayin*) is bliss (*Ananda*) It is eternal (*Nitya*) and permanent (*Sthira*) Therefore, Haripala clearly implies that the *Santa Rasa* is unstable and unenduring Though he does not explain himself further, it seems reasonable to conclude that Haripala postulated a *Brahma Rasa* to refer to a regular activity towards the attainment of liberation, which latter is a positive experience, in order to prevent the identification of liberation with a *Nuveda Santa*, a passive indifference towards mundane matters⁸² Here he was repeating the caution uttered by Abhinava

The technical terms used in this analysis, which is metaphysical as well as aesthetic, are difficult to translate precisely and therefore we should have a clear idea of the concepts they stand for. *Sama* is the condition of the mind when all tension subsides. *Santa Rasa* is the flavour of that condition realised in the further act of relishing it. It is this relishing that transforms a purely metaphysical experience into an aesthetic experience as well. The essential problem is the precise definition of this condition of the mind and consequently of its flavour when aesthetically relished. The ascetic tradition would regard all activity of the mind as an agitation, while the more enlightened metaphysical and aesthetic traditions strongly resist this reduction of *Sama* to near-insentience and interpret it as an active and positive state. Rudrabhatta⁸³ is another thinker who claims that *Sama* is the untinted, rippleless state of the mind (*Nivikara-chittatvam*). But he goes on to say that the *Santa Rasa* yielded by the aesthetic relishing of this state has four forms: subsidence of passion (*Varagya*), elimination of impurities (*Dosha-nigraha*), the happiness of contentment (*Santosha*) and the realisation of the ultimate reality (*Tatva-sakshatkara*). It is the tension of instinctual impulses and drives that subsides. But the consciousness is not dead or in a condition of torpor. It has a steady and quiet but intense glow. Ananda Vardhana does not accept *Sama* or *Niveda* as the basic state (*Sthayin*) of the *Santa Rasa*. Probably he felt that the terms would be very confusing since they were interpreted by different writers in diametrically opposite senses. He asserts that the basic state in *Santa Rasa* is that happiness which emerges from the cessation of desire (*Trishna-kshaya-sukha*)⁸⁴. It is not the repression of desire, for in that case the final state would not be that of happiness. It is also significant that he uses the more positive term, "happiness" or "delight" (*Sukha*) rather than "contentment" (*Santosha*). Hema Chandra,⁸⁵ later, equated this happiness from the cessation of desire with *Sama*. Since words do not matter very much if the conceptual meaning is clear, this is perfectly legitimate. But what we should not forget is that it means a complete break with the ascetic and stoic attitudes and interpretations.

Abhinava⁸⁶ takes up Ananda's concept and defends it vigorously against its critics. There were thinkers who were not satisfied with Ananda's interpretation and argued that the basic state was the complete death of all modifications of the mind or mental states (*Chitta-vritti*). Abhinava replies that if what is meant by this is an utter negativity, void, or insentience, it can scarcely be a state or a *Bhava*, for a *Sthayi Bhava* in an abiding, potential reality which is nursed to the relishable state by the aesthetic process and experience. If what is meant, on the other hand, is a positive state marked by the subsidence of mental conditions which are of the nature of tensions (build-up of affect which has not yet found an outlet for its discharge), it comes to the same thing as the blissful serenity which glows quietly, undistracted by the pull of extrovert desires. There were other critics who seemed to take the line that the state of the mind before

it knew of desire is the basic state of the experience of the *Santa Rasa*. Here we see the old preference of the withdrawn, static being, the transcendental Absolute, over the becoming that is Heidegger's being-in-the-world. Abhinava, who is as great a lover of aesthetics as of metaphysics, has very little patience for this tendency to forget the world and to streak back to mist-covered ontological horizons where concepts of both being and non-being cease to be serviceable. The state of absolutely unmodified consciousness (*Anupajata-visesha-chittavritti*) which the critics very knowingly speak of is a state anterior to the emergence of conation (the state of *Pragbhava* of *Trishna*). What Abhinava is defending is a state that is natural, in the sense that it is realisable in the condition of being-in-the-world. It is a state which is posterior to the emergence of conation in evolution and in the individual. It is a state of bliss which comes after the tranquil, non-repressive resolution of desire (the state of the *Pradhvamsabhava* of *Trishna*).

Visvanatha also inherited the troublesome legacy of the ascetic misconception, but he works his way towards a white, serene light. He starts by citing a verse to explain that the mood which the great sages called quietistic (*Santa*) is that state in which there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor hatred, nor affection, nor any desire. But the issue now is how this mood, arising only in a state which seems to demand the extinction of all feelings, can be a *Rasa*, which implies a state of active relishing, enjoying. Visvanatha now says that the definition that there is an absence of even pleasure in this state involves no contradiction, for this refers only to worldly pleasure. His further clarification is brilliant. He argues that the quietistic is a *Rasa* because in that state the soul is only about to be emancipated and is not completely absorbed into the Absolute, so that the presence of feelings in it is not something incompatible. He uses the term *Yukta-viyukta-dasa* for the state of the soul here⁸⁷. Literally it means the "bonded-liberated state". His analysis develops a fine intuitive insight here, similar to that of Vyasa who had given the brilliant clarification that the Yogi and the poet are poised in that interface between pure being and becoming, absolute existence and historical existence, which enables the relishing of both. The bondages of the world are not allowed to dominate. There is liberation from egocentric attachments which are enslaving bondages. But the emancipated spirit freely allows itself a richly significant bonding with the world. There is an extinction of desires—the purely personal, egocentric desires. To that extent, there is profound equanimity, for the impact of the world does not ripple the surface of the deep, silent pool within. But in the depths below, the fountains of love for the world, which is really being in its aspect of becoming, are running strong and clear.

In the great corpus of Indian thought on poetics, we can find some fascinating anticipations of the theory of "correspondences" of Rimbaud and Baudelaire. Thus, the various *Rasas* were given their corresponding symbolic colours. The *Santa Rasa*, according to Visvanatha, is white with

the radiant whiteness of the jasmine flower or the golden whiteness of the moon (*Kundendu-sundara-chhaya*) White is not an absence of colour but the blending of all colours. All the bright colour of the world goes into this white radiance.

Visvanatha's fascinating concept that poetic consciousness is poised at the interface of transcendental reality and the world has some remarkable echoes in the thought of Maritain.⁸⁸ Artistic experience is the "coming together of the world and the self. Things and the Self are grasped together Things are grasped in the Self and the Self is grasped in things, and subjectivity becomes a means of catching obscurely the inner side of Things" Chinese Taoist art reveals the same profound conviction, as has been clarified by Rawley Instead of seeking union with the Absolute while ignoring this world, the Chinese artist sought harmony with the universe by communion with all things "In the choice of subject matter, themes from nature acquired new meaning because everything partook of the mystery of the Tao"⁸⁹ If, in its highest plane, aesthetic experience is a transcendental experience, it still does not involve the dismissal of the world The interpenetration of nature and man, says Maritain, is quite peculiar in essence, for it is in no way a virtual absorption "Each of the two terms involved remains what it is, it keeps its essential identity, it asserts even more powerfully this identity of its own, while it suffers the contagion or impregnation of the other But neither one is alone, they are mysteriously commingled"⁹⁰ Vyasa insisted that the liberated individual should continue to work for the weal of the world (*Loka-samgraha*) for the world is not a mirage which fades away when one reaches journey's end The state of realisation, says Maritain, transcends "mere subjectivity," for it is a subjectivity which is enriched by relishing the world "The primary requirement of poetry, which is the obscure knowing, by the poet, of his own subjectivity, is inseparable from, is one with, another requirement—the grasping, by the poet, of the objective reality of the outer and inner world not by means of concepts and conceptual knowledge, but by means of knowledge through affective union"⁹¹

It is the reality of this affective state that was affirmed repeatedly by many thinkers against the claim that in *Santa* experience sensibility was not activated, but quiescent When Bhavabhūti declared compassion or sympathy (*Karuna*) as the basic affective state of which all other states were modifications, he was affirming the fundamental importance of this stirring or melting (*Druti*) of the heart Mammata⁹² asserted that the keen "sweetness" (*Madhurya*) experienced in the erotic *Rasa* (*Singara* or *Rati*) was present in *Santa Rasa* also, because it is occasioned by the melting of the heart which takes place in *Santa* as well Hema Chandra⁹³ and Jagannatha⁹⁴ also affirm that this movement of the heart (*Druti*) and delectation (*Madhurya*) are invariably present in the relishing of tranquillity and in a higher degree too This is a clear answer to those who claim that the consciousness is in a rippleless (*Nivikara*) state in

Santa Rasa Vaishnavite aesthetics also, as has been clarified by the detailed studies of Guha⁹⁵ and De,⁹⁶ saw serenity as an intense relish Rupa Gosvamin,⁹⁷ of the sixteenth century, used the terms *Madhura* and *Ujjvala* (of bright intensity) for *Singara* but this *Singara*, whose perfect expression the Vaishnavites found in the love of Krishna and the maidens, symbols of God and human souls, is a basic emotion which can take many forms Kavi Karnapura⁹⁸ also considers this supreme love (*Prieman*) as inclusive of various modifications It includes the affection of friendship (*Sakhya*) as in the case of Arjuna and Krishna, the tender fondness of parents for their children (*Vatsalya*) as in the love for Krishna of his parents, Vasudeva and Devaki and foster-parents, Nanda and Yasoda, loyal servitude (*Dasya*) of followers to a leader or of devotees to Krishna, and also the *Santa Rasa* Here serenity is fulfilled love and that love is an intensity (*Ujjvala*) A further affirmation that the state is a dynamic and not a static or quiescent one is seen in Abhinava's declaration⁹⁹ that the *Vritti* of the *Santa Rasa* is the *Satvati* Here the reader should recall what was said earlier¹⁰⁰ about the important concept of *Vritti* which relates to the quantum and quality of physical action in a dramatic representation, and by extension, in narrative forms as well In the *Satvati Vritti* there is a minimum of gross motor action, but there is continuous inward activity (*Mana Cheshta*) and the movements of the heart are reflected mainly in the involuntary expressions of emotion

In the difficult analytical task of clarifying that liberation, while it implies a withdrawal from immersion in the world, does not imply a denial of it, Abhinava seeks the help of the concept of what I would call musical modulation In the state of emancipation, the emotions which are basic to human nature are not surrendered, but they undergo a sea-change In a remarkable passage, Abhinava¹⁰¹ gives a rapid narration of this significant modulation in respect of all the *Rasas* The emancipated individual has the experience of the comic—in the spectacle of a world engaged in the hot pursuit of absurd ends He feels the pitifulness of the misdirected endeavour of the major part of humanity He feels anger at the world's temptations and rejects the inferior values they stand for He seeks the highest value, the discovery of the real nature of his self and, relishing it, he is thrilled with the world of the spirit This is the experience of thrilled wonder (*Vismaya*) Thus, all the basic sentiments (*Sthayin*) can become the mediators of the *Santa Rasa*, if they become modulated in an extraordinary (*Vichitra*) way, if they shed their bonds with the stimuli (*Vibhava*) that activate them in ordinary living and seek the stimuli that will become available if an inward exploration is undertaken

Here Abhinava, with his classic sense of analytical precision, says that the sentiments (*Sthayins*) of the other *Rasas*, even in their modulated form, do not become the *Sthayin* of the *Santa Rasa*, but its derived emotions (*Vyabhicharin*)¹⁰² Here again the reader will have to recall what was said earlier¹⁰³ about the *Vyabhichari Bhava* The emotion which colours any

particular episodic context in the narrative stream has a specific feeling tone because it is the modification of the persisting basic emotion in that context. Thus it is genetically related to the basic emotion. Likewise, it is the self-relish which is the basic reality and distaste for the inferior values of the world and the birth of wonder at the discovery of the inward realm are all derivative experiences of this self-relish. Convinced, like Plato, that the ultimate, transcendental experience is essentially an aesthetic experience, Abhinava does not stop with the affirmation that liberation as such (*Moksha*) is the ultimate goal of man (*Puruṣārtha*), but asserts that it is the aesthetic relishing of that liberation that is the real ultimate. The flavour of this relishing is the *Santa Rasa*.

But Abhinava also points out that poetic relish, in itself, approaches this condition. For, if in the pursuit which has liberation as its specific aim the ordinary emotions have to modulate and dissociate from their normal stimuli, in aesthetic experience this dissociation is the very first event. In the aesthetic context, the *Vibhava* or stimulus is not a trigger which initiates a build-up of emotional dynamism for a physiological task of practical engagement with it. The aesthetic attitude is non-practical, in the sense of being non-utilitarian. Therefore aesthetic relish, affirms Abhinava,¹⁰⁴ is of the form of the blissful serenity of liberation (*Santapīya*). It is very important to note here that there are no ascetic, religious and purely metaphysical concepts concealed here. Poetic experience wins liberation through its own modality. Any poetic experience is a liberation. And the specific liberation, which metaphysics has in mind, reaches complete fruition only when it is poetically relished. This is the profound meaning of Abhinava's claim that poetry is as efficacious as the traditional spiritual disciplines in leading to the ultimate liberation. Mander¹⁰⁵ wrote that all art is committed "to something beyond itself, to a statement of values not purely aesthetic". But the integration of Vyasa and Abhinava is aimed at showing that all values are basically aesthetic values.

III. CONVERGENCE OF AESTHETICS AND METAPHYSICS

Indian cosmogonic speculations had established the aesthetic principle right at the head of the ontological series, the cosmic process. For Absolute Being becomes Becoming through no utilitarian need but through the poetic urge to proliferate and objectify itself in the myriad forms of creation. This poetic impulse is what initiates cosmic evolution and the terminal of the evolution is also poetic experience. This is an extraordinarily fascinating summative view and needs to be clarified in some detail. Desire, instead of being frowned upon, becomes a first principle of creation. The world began because the One desired to objectify himself as the Many,¹⁰⁶ like a dramatist projecting himself in the myriad characters he creates. But this is poetic desire, the aesthetic urge to create. Once created, the forms are autonomous and desire or conation operates first on a lower

plane in them, as the desire to experience and mould physical reality. This conation needs sense organs for its operation. "Brahman pierced the openings of the senses so that they turned outwards"¹⁰⁷ Desire or conation thus becomes the *élan vital* that powers biological evolution, the perfection of organs of steadily increasing efficiency for the seizure of the world.

Both Samkhya doctrine and the monism of Vyasa's *Gita* accept the view that it is the conative principle that fashions the sense organs in the course of biological evolution. But there is this difference. Samkhya keeps the spirit, *Purusha*, separate from matter or nature, *Prakṛti*. The mere presence of the former serves as a catalytic force which helps nature to evolve, but the soul itself is not involved in the evolutionary process. This is rather like the theory of Hans Driesch¹⁰⁸ that phylogeny—the evolution of the myriad biological species—is the consequence of a superentelchey which realises its essence in matter. Here, there can be no real emergence in evolution as the nature of this essence is given from the beginning. This is the theory of *Maya* in its misunderstood form, for it reduces evolution and the world to a near-illusion. Samkhya is still more extreme, for it would not even admit that it is the superentelchey, the *Purusha*, that is manifesting itself in the evolution of nature, for the spirit is ever aloof from matter. Consistent with this dualism, Samkhya derives the sense of the ego, *Ahamkara*, self-consciousness, as the product of the evolution of nature. The doctrine seeks to mark off this empirical self as utterly distinct from the *Purusha* who is lifted above the world and desire. It is possible that Samkhya insisted on this dualism because Kapila, the founder of the doctrine, started with a pessimistic view of existence, seeing change as a continuous decay rather than as the phase of a process taking shape through many changes.

But a doctrine which recognises the reality of evolution is inevitably compelled to concede to the process a trend. If the spirit serves as a catalyst for nature to evolve, the evolutionary process should show a definite trend and Samkhya, even when it claims that self-consciousness is the product of the evolution of nature, concedes the recognition that it can approach very near to the *Purusha* in its quality. The biologist would only be happy with the derivation of self-consciousness from the evolution of nature. For it is the evolution of living matter, of the cortex and its functions—the *Buddhi* of Samkhya—that makes self-consciousness a biological reality. The biological monist may not like the dismissal of this self-consciousness as only empirical and not "real". But Samkhya psychology had elaborated its brilliant system of three principles, *Tamasic*, *Rajasic*, and *Satvic*, as we have already seen. Patanjali¹⁰⁹ had made the suggestion much earlier that the intellect (*Buddhi*), although it is a biological evolute, comes very near in essence to the soul (*Atman*) when it is dominated by the *Satvic* principle. The Samkhya conception of liberation also emphasises the *Satvic* attitude and living and Bhoja,¹¹⁰ who used Samkhya theory in his aesthetic system, says that the *Satva*-dominated ego-consciousness

(*Ahamkara*) is a refinement of material reality (*Prakṛitivikāra*) which acquires the power of reflecting the spirit

Thus, even a dualist metaphysics, which started by insisting on the dichotomy of spirit and nature, soul and matter, transcendental and bio-social existence is forced to concede that ultimately the gap between being and becoming is almost closed. The monist solution is without even this slight reservation. When the monist philosopher is also a poet, as in the case of Vyasa, even the lingering shadows of any reservation are expelled by the luminous poetic perception. The highest reality, for Vyasa, is a Supreme Person — not insentience, but consciousness. The withdrawn, static, transcendental being and the world in evolutionary flux, becoming, are only two aspects, the static and the dynamic, of the supreme reality. Vyasa's Krishna tells Arjuna: "Whatever being is born, the moving or the unmoving, know thou to be owing to the union of *Kshetra* (matter, field) and *Kshetrajña* (spirit, field-force)"¹¹¹ Lacombe¹¹² has brilliantly clarified how this synthesis has been able to donate to Indian art a proliferating richness, an extraordinary wealth and variety of forms, while assuring the unitary nature of aesthetic experience. Indian art integrates two planes — that of transcendental being and the plane of evolution. In the latter, there is a prodigality of forms. But all forms are creative modifications of pure being (This is the essence of the *Vivartavada* to which Lacombe refers). And this is realised in the serene relish of aesthetic experience, which is a state of detachment from practical involvement. The terminal of evolution, thus, is the same state of poetic relishing that initiated it. For the supreme consciousness created the world and its myriad forms not to satisfy any need but as poet (*Kavi*) relishing his own poetic creativity. The empirical self of man, the final product of biological evolution, also reaches its supreme development in realising the poetic attitude, in relishing the myriad objects of nature as forms, as pure aesthetic experience, rather than as instruments for the satisfaction of needs.

This should not be confused with a flight from the engagement with social reality. The magnificent ordering of the principle of the *Puruṣārtha* or goals of man allows the fullest satisfaction of biological and social needs. But evolution has to sweep beyond them. Here, there are minds which seek liberation through devotion to God. The essence of Abhinava's affirmation is that the paths of devotion and aesthetic experience converge. In fact not only is there convergence in goal, but also overlap of the paths themselves. The fascinating convolutions of the thought of Madhusudana Saraswati¹¹³ bring this out. Abhinava seems to move from aesthetics to metaphysics. Madhusudana, on the other hand, moves from metaphysics to aesthetics. He starts by saying that though the goals of man are said to be four, there is really only one *Puruṣārtha*, which is bliss untainted by misery (*Dukhasamsprishtha-Sukha*). The four goals thus are really means to this end. Since devotion to God (*Bhagavad-Bhakti*) is one of the ways of attaining such unalloyed bliss, devotion also is a *Puruṣārtha*.

In the clarification of the concept of devotion, Madhusudana takes a very original stand. He says that in devotion, the mind (*Antahkarana*) takes the form of what it comes into contact with—here the form of God. This assumption of the divine form (*Bhagavadakarata*) is devotion. The correspondences of this metaphysical theory with the aesthetic theory should be carefully noted. For, in defining the molten state of the mind now, he uses all the terms (*Pianaya, Anuaga, Sneha*) which the Vaishnavite aestheticians used in respect of the sublimated erotic sentiment (*Singara*) for which they found a fine symbol, the legend of the dalliance of Krishna with the maidens of Vraja, where the latter represent human souls seeking their eternal beloved, God. Here the basic attitude may seem to be dualist since an embrace, however ardent, needs two people. But, as Tagore said, in this state, all the contradictions of existence merge themselves and are lost. "Only in love are unity and duality not at variance"¹¹⁴. And the great Vaishnavite, Chaitanya, in his doctrine of *Achintya Bhedabheda*, translogical difference-cum-identity, forgot the duality in the melting union of the embrace.

If pure aesthetic theory is not committed to the acceptance of the specifically Vaishnavite theistic synthesis of aesthetics and metaphysics, there is still an essential identity of basic approach. For Bhoja deepens the concept of the erotic sentiment (*Singara*) to *Atmarati*, the soul's delectation of itself. We shall return to a detailed study of Bhoja later. But here we should note the subtle congruence of both the metaphysical and aesthetic approaches. The aesthetics of Abhinava and Bhoja is based as much on a fundamental monism as the metaphysics of Madhusudana. Self-relish, no less than embrace, but more subtly, needs a polarisation and duality—the self as the relisher and the self as the relished. But this need not annul the fundamental monism. Abhinava's concept of *Vimarsa*, explained earlier, establishes the capacity of the self for what Reinhold Niebuhr would call an infinite regression of the self. The self can be steeped in delight, the self can consciously relish the delight, the self can relish its state as the relisher of delight. Therefore, in *Atmarati*, where the self is both the relished and the relisher, no finality of dualism is involved, though, as we shall see later, the poetic reality of the situation escapes a rigid monism of the type which Sankara expounded. Madhusudana also, though he is stabilising theism rather than concerned with aesthetics, takes care not to break loose from the monistic anchorage, for the basic state (*Sthayin*) which can be developed into the relish of the bliss of devotion, for him, is the mind that has taken the form of God (*Bhagavadakarata*). The only dualism or polarisation that is required for Abhinava's aesthetic monism is the recognition of the reality that the poet can contemplate and relish his creation although it is himself in its essence. God created the world, being proliferated into becoming, essentially to fulfil the aesthetic need to objectify itself as the other. Brahman created the world because "He desired a second"¹¹⁵. The second, the other, is the "expression" of the self in the

strict sense in which Croce uses the term, a concrete objectification which gains autonomy even though it is of the essence of the self. The meaning of this will be made clearer by what Miles¹¹⁶ has to say about aesthetic creation in general "Truly creative art activities might be viewed as a means of bringing about a relationship between the deeply personal, non-verbal inner world and the public, impersonal world of forms, between meaning and symbol As such—through projection or objectification—they provide one means (of course there are others) of establishing contact with the Deep Centre or Self"

Inspiration is essential to this type of expression and its analysis by Indian aesthetics is in harmony with the monism that is basic to both metaphysics and aesthetics in the Indian tradition About the reality of the role of inspiration in aesthetic creation, we have innumerable personal records, a typical one being this statement by Gide¹¹⁷ "It was like a sudden illumination, the book appearing to me all at once, like an unfamiliar landscape at the sudden flash of lightning on a stormy night" Inspiration seems like the descent of a wholly other power into the depths of one's spirit Rosamond Harding¹¹⁸ has collected affirmations to this effect from the personal records of many writers "The mind in creation" says Shelley, "is as a fading coal, which some invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness" Keats said that some of the things he wrote "struck him with astonishment and seemed rather the production of another person than his own". George Eliot told J. W. Cross that "in all that she considered her best writing, there was a 'not herself' which took possession of her, and that she felt her own personality to be merely the instrument through which this spirit, as it were, was acting". Thackeray says in the *Round-about-Papers* : "I have been surprised at the observations made by some of my characters It seems as if an occult power was moving my pen" Elgar described himself as the "all but unconscious medium" by which his musical compositions came into being Valéry¹¹⁹ points out the clear implications of this type of universal experience "What can be more theological than to debate on inspiration and labour, on the value of intuition and the artifices of art? Have we not here problems altogether comparable to the famous theological problem of grace and works?" The evidence we glanced at seems more to favour the doctrine of grace than works Day Lewis¹²⁰ also seems to favour grace as the key of inspiration

*You are called only to make the sacrifice
Whether or no he enters into it
Is the god's affair .*

You cannot command his presence, goes on Lewis, nor explain it It is well if the sacrifice catches fire of its own accord on the altar

But dot not
Flatter yourself that discipline and devotion
Have wrought the miracle, they have
Only allowed it.

In Lewis and others, even in Valéry, the problem of inspiration is not a pure metaphysical problem but has only very strong analogies with the metaphysical problem of grace and works and the bulk of the opinion favours the dualist solution of grace rather than the monist solution of works. In the Indian doctrine of the Vedas as revelation (*Śruti*), on the other hand, the problem of inspiration is a pure metaphysical problem and the solution is monistic. A theory of the Vedas existing eternally as subtle sound was elaborated from very early days. It has affinities with the concept of the Logos in Greek philosophy and in the early Christian philosophy influenced by Neoplatonism. But the difference is more important than the affinity. The very important feature that the transcendental origin of inspiration was harmonised with the *personal* inspiration of particular gifted individuals is revealed by the fact that the name of the sage-poet who composed it is given with every hymn in the Vedas. And there is a great multitude of these poets. The hymns, thus, are the fruit of the inspiration of individuals. At first it would seem that the theoretical explanation is that inspiration wings its flight from a transcendental source to seek expression through the minds of particular gifted individuals. Like Day Lewis, the Vedic poet feels that the glorious word dawning spontaneously in his mind is like "the appearance of the finely robed loving wife before her husband"¹²¹. But it is rapidly realised that the miracle is not external but arises within, not an epiphany of something wholly other, but the descent of the self to its deepest level where it is revealed to be the one reality which is not the other but the Self itself. According to Patanjali, the inspired artist who works with language is a Yogi whose inward vision enables him to look within and see the eternal flow of pure consciousness, the alphabets are not mere phonetic types, but glowing sparks of *Brahman* illuminating the entire sphere of existence. Thus the final solution of the problem of inspiration is monistic. It is not the descent of an alien power into the depths of one's being, but the reaching of his own depths by the poet's self. The doctrine of grace usually goes with dualistic theism. But Madhusudana accommodated his theism within the monistic frame-work and also within aesthetic theory when he said that the basic reality for the *Rasa* of devotion (*Bhakti*) was the mind that had become one with the deity. Aesthetic theory, which was not particularly concerned with theistic belief as such, stated the same thing more unreservedly. Abhinava equated aesthetic relishing (*Charvāna*) with the manifestation of the deeper reality of the self (*Abhivyakti*). It is also defined as realisation freed from obstacles (*Vita-vighna-pratīti*). Jagannatha defines the state as consciousness which has got rid of its envelope (*Bhagavāna-chit*), the envelope being

the web of egocentric interests and associations. Inspiration is not a shaft of light descending from above, but the pure light of the self which shines forth when what veiled it is removed. It is exceptional to find a Catholic thinker holding such essentially monistic views. But Maritain¹²² claims that Plato was misled when he believed that "poetic inspiration came from above the soul". And he proceeds to assert: "There is no Muse outside the soul, there is poetic experience and poetic intuition within the soul, coming to the poet from above conceptual reason".

At the farthest reach of its thought, Indian poetics equates aesthetic experience (*Rasasvada*) with the experience of the ultimate reality (*Brahmasvada*). No dualism lingers because aesthetic relish is also affirmed to be the delectation of the Self (*Atma Rati*). The transcendental, therefore, is not the other, but one's deepest reality. This vertical synthesis which integrates the heaven above with the self integrates also the world below with the self. Recognition of this is of the utmost importance not only for understanding the essence of Indian poetics but also for realising the value of poetry as a spiritual quest. The ascetic tradition, everywhere, has clung to the belief that the acceptance of the world is a denial of God. And this belief has not remained confined to religious thought. It has dominated poetry which explores religious or spiritual values. In the third poem of T.S. Eliot's *Ash Wednesday* where the soul ascends those sombre stairs which recall Dante's purgatorial mount, a slotted window at the "first turning of the third stair" yields a brief glimpse of the loveliness of the world, of "hawthorn blossom and a pasture scene" where a "broadbacked figure drest in blue and green enchanted the Maytime with an antique flute", and the music of the flute is felt to be a distraction. Again, the final poem embodies the reflection that although he desires to focus his mind upon God, "though I do not wish to wish these things", the wide window opens on a scene which tugs at the poet's heart. "The white sails still fly seaward, seaward flying unbroken wings". Sight stirs sweet memories, the lost heart rejoices in the lost lilac and the lost sea voices, quickens to recover the cry of quail and the whirling plover. But a troubled sense of guilt lingers because all these seem distractions, pulling the mind away from the contemplation of God.

IV A STUDY IN AFFINITIES VALE'RY

Among the poets of our time, it is Paul Valéry who has achieved the most brilliant resolution of this conflict and *Le Cimetière marin* (Cemetery by the Seashore) is the poem which celebrates this resolution. Its analysis would be very valuable to us, for many reasons. First of all, Valéry simultaneously resolves here both the conflicts—for there are really two, though in intimate coalescence—the conflict in metaphysical thought between the fascination of the world and the sense of its transience, which confronts thought with an agonising choice between being and becoming, and the

closely related conflict in mental and aesthetic life between the acceptance of the myriad stimuli of the world and a retreat into the lonely cell within. Further, it seems to me that his resolution has profound affinities with that offered by Indian poetics. But I am also woefully conscious of the fact that this poem, besides being one of the greatest, produced in our time, is also one of the most obscure. Fortunately, Valéry himself has offered illuminating comments on the poem. These comments, which we shall give after the analysis, will be seen to endorse my interpretation of its affinity with Indian thought.

In the poem Valéry refers to Zeno, the Eleatic philosopher (fifth century B.C.) and his famous paradoxes. They should be well known, but are given here, in case some readers may not have come across them. The first paradox is that of the arrow in flight. At any given moment of its flight, says Zeno, it cannot be where it is not, it has to be where it is. But if it is where it is, it cannot be moving, since, if it were, it would not be there. Therefore, at that particular moment, it is not moving. Similar arguments apply to any other point or moment in the flight of the arrow, therefore at no point or moment does it move, therefore its apparent movement is an illusion. The other paradox, that of Achilles and the tortoise, is also used to illustrate the illusory nature of change or motion. Achilles and the tortoise run a race, the fleet-footed son of Thetis giving the crawler a generous start. But Achilles will never catch up with the tortoise, since by the time that Achilles has reached any point where the tortoise was, the animal would have crawled to another point further ahead. By the time Achilles reaches this point, the animal would have moved on to another and so on *ad infinitum*. The distance between the two may diminish, but it can never be abolished, since, whatever point Achilles reaches, the time he takes in reaching it would have enabled the tortoise to move forward to a further point. Zeno's conclusion is that motion and change, however actual to the senses, are logically, metaphysically, unreal. Zeno, here, is endorsing the thought of Parmenides of Elea (sixth century B.C.) who believed that beginning and end, birth and death, formation and destruction, were of forms only, the one Real never begins and never ends, there is no Becoming, there is only Being, motion and change are unreal.

Valéry's composition is a poem, not a philosophical essay. The thought of Zeno is suggested by the environment, a cemetery on the shore of the Mediterranean swooning under the noonday heat. "Everything burns and is undone." The tranquil tombs suggest the image of white sheep and the poet's self becomes the shepherd who herds to rest the mysterious sheep, vain dreams and enquiring thoughts. The whole landscape, of the mind as well as nature, becomes "drunk with absence, life's infinitude." One look on "the calm of the gods which the sea disposes" becomes a great recompense after the fret of thought.

Too often the thought that the world is not an authentic mode of being is provoked by the subconscious fear of death, for the empirical self wants

to forget that it also belongs to the world in flux, to becoming, and tries to sneak into the realm of being, which again is interpreted grossly as some sort of personal survival after death. But Valéry rejects these self-deceptions. The grinning skull dismisses as a lie the claim that "where we end we but begin", if personal immortality is what it refers to. Zeno's winged idea that denies motion to the flying arrow pierces deep within, but Valéry refuses to seek comfort from that type of speculation which, rather than the world and change that it seeks to reduce to a mirage, is the real illusion. For "the arrow slays".

But if the void of nihilism suddenly opens up with this affirmation that death is a fact, thought leaps across the chasm to a high terrace beyond. Death is change, but change is not decay or irrevocable perishing. The sense of a mighty process which works and takes shape though change begins to dawn. Seeing the heaving sea and the sun at noon voyaging high above the abyss, the poet gets an intuition of the world, of becoming, which is religious in the pure sense in which poetic experience, uncontaminated by dogma and theology, can be religious. "Pure works of an eternal cause are these," he affirms. Keats, in a similar moment of profound meditation over nature, had a vision of "the moving waters at their priest-like task of pure ablution round earth's human shores"¹²³. Vyasa's Krishna, in the *Maha Bharata*, gives the most splendid affirmation of the perception that the world, becoming, is the pure work of an eternal cause. "Know action to originate from the *Brahman* and the *Brahman* from the Imperishable"¹²⁴. When he is asked to call off the imminent war, Krishna replies that there can be no withdrawal from work. "The wind blows through work. Causing day and night, through work, the sleepless sun rises every day. The sleepless moon too goes through its phases and the fire enkindled by work burns, doing good to the creatures of the earth. Earth carries this great load and the unwearied rivers carry their waters with speed, satisfying the desire of all beings."

It is worth while to pause a little here to study the meaning of the sea as symbol in T. S. Eliot, Vyasa and Valéry. To Eliot,¹²⁵ the sea is time, not conceived as the matrix of process, but as the implacable agent of corrosion. The tolling bell of the buoy off the coast of Cape Ann, Massachusetts, measures "a time that is not our time, rung by the unhurried ground swell of the sea, a time older than the time of chronometers" and the time counted by men and women immersed in their hopes and anxieties. There is no end to the corrosion wrought by this time, no end "to the drift of the sea and the drifting wreckage, the bone's prayer to Death its God". Eliot's time is a sadist, for it not only takes away things from us but leaves the tensions of striving and the inevitable frustrations of loss to further torment us. "The moments of agony (whether, or not, due to misunderstanding, having hoped for the wrong things or dreaded the wrong things, is not the question)" always abide, "permanent with such permanence as time has."

The image of drifting wreckage on the currents of the sea was used by Valmiki's Rama. the coming together of individuals in the bondages of blood and love is like the brief juxtaposition of driftwood on the sea. But Rama wins his way from pessimism to courageous living. Vyasa's Krishna uses the image of the sea to suggest, not flux or wreckage, but profound stability. "Like the sea, deep and unfathomable, neither swell up by what flows into you, nor get exhausted by what is taken from you"¹²⁶ This is not the stability of things dead or inert, for the sea is ever receiving the vast seepage of the earth and exhaling the vapour that will condense as clouds. Like Vyasa, Valéry also realises that the supreme ideal should be poised dynamism rather than stasis. The sea that seemed to have the calm of the gods under the noonday sun, that seemed still like the being of Parmenides and Zeno, is really the symbol of the unceasing motion and becoming which the Eleatics sought to dismiss as illusory. "The sea, the sea, forever rebegun!" Waves awake in the sea that was calm like a pool. The poet exhorts the waves to break and shatter with their wind-bred power the dead stillness into which his meditation had drifted. "A freshness breathed from off the quickening sea gives back my soul. Oh salty majesty! The wind awakes! I must presume to live! The wave dares spout in powder from the rocks! Flee, dazzled pages!" The sea-breeze snaps close the book of Zeno. The vast, spread-out book of the sea teaches Valéry that intense activity and silence can be an identity. In that "turbulence that is with silence one," Zeno's paradoxes can gain no foothold. "At Sun! what shadow of a tortoise stays the soul, Achilles running motionless!"

There are affinities, even more profound than in the acceptance of becoming as an authentic mode of being, between the thought of Valéry and Indian thought. Valéry's own comments on his poem will help us in their discovery. "*Le Cimetière marin* first came to my mind as a composition of stanzas of six ten-syllable lines. This decision enabled me to distribute rather easily in my work what it needed of the sensuous, affective, and abstract in order to suggest, transported into the poetic universe, the meditation of a certain *self*. The need to produce contrasts and to maintain a kind of balance between the moments of this *self* led me (for example) to introduce at one point some recollection of philosophy. The lines in which the famous arguments of Zeno of Elea appear (but enlivened, intermixed, carried away with the violence of all dialectic, like a whole rigging by a sudden gust of wind) have the function of compensating by a metaphysical tonality, for the sensual and the 'too human' of the preceding stanzas, they also characterize more exactly *the person speaking*—a lover of abstractions, finally they oppose to what was speculative and too attentive in him the persistent power of reflex whose sudden movement breaks up and dissipates a state of sombre fixity, as a complement to the reigning splendour at the same time that it overturns a totality of *judgments* on everything human, inhuman and superhuman. I corrupted the images of

Zeno to express the rebellion against the duration and the acuteness of a meditation that makes one feel too cruelly the gap between *being* and *knowing* developed by the consciousness of consciousness. The *soul* naively wants to exhaust the infinite of the Eleatic But all I meant to take from philosophy was a little of its colour"¹²⁷

The analysis has the extreme subtlety which is the most distinctive feature of Valéry's mind The basic affirmation it makes is that the entire meditation is a poetic creation This is not so banal a remark as would seem at first sight For what it implies is that analytical thoughts embodied in the poem are to be evaluated as much (or more) for the contribution they make to the overall feeling of the poetic experience as for their value as appraisals or judgments of reality, both phenomenological and transcendent In the poem itself we see Valéry expectantly awaiting the advent of inspiration "For myself, unto myself alone, near to the poem's source, against the bone, between the void and the pure event, I await the echo of my inward immensity" And inspiration came, not as thought or concept or idea, but as a musical rhythm "If someone wonders what I wanted 'to say' in a certain poem, I reply that I did not *want to say* but *wanted to do*, and it was the intention of *doing* which *made the meaning* of what I said." Poetry is action, *Kavi Karma* Here, a specific rhythm awakes in the depths of the sensibility and the action consists of developing it to the fully relishable state with all those objective correlatives which Indian poetics has so brilliantly analysed the prime stimulus (*Vibhava*), here the blue Mediterranean; the ancillary stimuli (*Anubhava*), the deep stillness of the noon-day heat, the profound quiet of the tombs, and later the rising of the wind and windblown spray over the rocks, and the derived emotions (*Vyabhicharin*), the *thoughts* of death and change, being and becoming *transformed as feeling*

Since this interpretation may seem to some like an amusing attempt by the Indian mind to annex Valéry, I hasten to give what Valéry himself has to say "As for *Le Cimetière marin*, this intention (of *doing*) at first was only a rhythmic form, empty, or filled with empty syllables, which happened to obsess me for a while I noted that this form was decasyllabic, and I reflected somewhat on this type so seldom used in modern poetry; it seemed poor and monotonous It was slight indeed alongside the alexandrine, which three or four generations of great artists prodigiously elaborated The demon of generalization suggested that I try to raise this *Ten* to the power of *Twelve* It proposed to me a particular stanza of six lines and the idea of a *composition* based on the number of these stanzas, and determined by a variety of tones and functions to be assigned them Between these stanzas contrasts or correspondences were to be set up This last condition soon demanded that the possible poem be a monologue of 'myself', in which the simplest and most constant themes of my affective and intellectual life—just as they had imposed themselves on my adolescence and associated with the sea and the light at a certain place on

the shores of the Mediterranean—were to be called forth, interwoven, contrasted .”

The poem's source, as Valéry said earlier, lies “between the void and the pure event” The void is the rippleless consciousness, dangerously akin to insentience, which some Indian thinkers regarded as the basic state of the *Santa Rasa* But the poem is not born there but at the interface between this quiescent state and the stirred, poetically active consciousness Vyasa shifted the emphasis in metaphysics from insentience to consciousness His Supreme Person is above both Being (*Brahman*) and Becoming, these latter being only the static and dynamic aspects of a consciousness that reigns paramount This was his answer to the ascetic tradition which recognised only pure being or stasis as the ultimate reality and derived becoming as a degradation or corruption of it The poem and the poetic attitude itself are possible only when the consciousness is poised in the interface between repose in self and object-awareness This is the bonded-liberated state (*Yukta-viyukta-dasa*) of Visvanatha Bhoja also made ego-consciousness (*Ahamkara*) rather than the self (*Atman*), the basis (*Sthayin*) of all poetic experience, for the latter term is too frequently confused with the void, with a consciousness defined rigorously as so absolutely unmodified as to be scarcely different from insentience The Indian view, further, is that poetic creation means the provision of episodic substance to the latent feeling so that it develops to the relishable state Valéry uses the concept of pure form for latent feeling, but it means the same thing, for the pure form here is a specific rhythm, with its latent *Rasa* or flavour “I like to think that I find my work developing progressively out of pure conditions of form, more and more reflective—made precise to the point where they propose or virtually impose a *subject*—or at least, a family of subjects The very thought of constructions of this sort remains for me the most poetic of ideas the idea of composition”

Valéry contrasts the void with the “pure event” and he also speaks of “pure conditions of form” as the initial state of poetic inspiration and creation The pure form here is a musical rhythm with its feeling-tone The pure event thus is the consciousness, withdrawn from practical involvement with the world, but still active, because it is engaged in a pure relishing Indian poetics boldly uses metaphors of relishing the flavoured sweetness of a fruit or choice liquor for poetic experience, even while it insists that the analogy has to be lifted to a higher plane, for what is relished is not the physiological or practical utilities of an object but its aesthetic form There is an astonishing parallel in Valéry “the fruit melts into relish, it transforms its absence into deliciousness in a mouth where its form perishes

” The affinity and the difference between ordinary and aesthetic relish are brought out here with an exact correspondence to Indian views Ordinary experience seeks the utilities of objects Even here, there is a world of difference between the man who eats for sustenance and the man with the fine palate who enjoys his nourishment with a fine relish The

perishing of the perfection of form of the fruit is absolute in the hungry, greedy devouring. But, to the fine palate, the form prolongs as relish. Here the fruit is only a medium, the final experience is that of a self-relish where the self and the object have become interpenetrated. The gifted sensibility can relish every experience thus, however unpromising it may seem to others. Just as the relish abides even after the fruit is consumed, what is even initially a near-bareness can be contemplated by the poetic sensibility and made to yield its own relish. Here the poet is relishing the bareness of the noonday landscape of sea and sand where "everything burns and is undone", more accurately, he is relishing the feel of bareness within himself, induced by the scene. "My soul exposed to the torches of the sun, I can sustain thee, implacable light, thou with pitiless arms!" The soul is "consumed" by the dazzling light, but it does not mean that it sinks into the torpor of noontide, it is relishing this astringent experience.

The Vedas refer to the soul as resting in the relish of experience (*Rasena niptah*)¹²⁸. Vyasa's Krishna, in the *Bhagavata*, tells Uddhava. "Like wind, you should be able to pass through untouched. Pervasive, touching everything, yet itself untouched, the ether is indeed the best example of the Yogi. Like a bee, take in little by little, and from good and bad extract the essence even as the bee does the honey." The bare landscape also yields its *Rasa*. "Precise midday the sea from fire composes. Pure energies of lightning-flash consume the diamonds of imperceptible foam." The desolation of bareness becomes a felt peace within. "What peace is conceived in this pure air!" The sea to Vyasa is the symbol of the *Sthita-Prajna*, the man whose consciousness is in absolute possession of itself, perfect in its stability. The *Gita* teaches the lesson of a full living, the balanced development of the "sensuous, affective and abstract" facets of personality and the "meditation of a certain self" which is *Le Cimetière marin* also seeks this balance, as Valéry specifically mentions. Here comes a remarkable distancing of the self. As the sensuous is valuable in poetry because it is relishable, and not because it has utility, the abstract also has value only on these terms. Eleatic doctrine is a theory of reality. Nevertheless, its value does not lie in its assertions but in the colour it can contribute to the feeling-spectrum of the poem. "All I meant to take from philosophy was a little of its colour." That is, the abstract thought or doctrine is also made to yield its aesthetic relish which is assigned its place in the overall aesthetic feel of the poem. Valéry knows that the Eleatic concept of the infinite cannot be naively exhausted. Beyond the stirred, poetically awakened consciousness may be a profound stillness and all poetic utterance may have ultimately to die away in a rich silence which it can only suggest distantly. But here we enter the void and groundlessness of Eckhart and Boehme, where poetry is not possible. At the interface, where it is possible and which alone, therefore, is relevant in poetry and poetics, all things gain value by their aesthetic relishability, including the doctrines that assert or deny the reality of the experience of the world that sanctions poetry.

V. A STUDY IN CONTRASTS : T. S. ELIOT

On the assumption that the reference to Valéry has been justified by its contribution to the clarification of the Indian concepts regarding poetry, life and liberation, a similar reference to T S Eliot is now attempted. In fact, in the case of Eliot, a prefatory apologia is not necessary, for we find in him an acknowledged assimilation of Indian concepts. In his essay on Dante, he has stated that the next greatest philosophical poem to the *Divine Comedy* within his experience was the *Bhagavad Gita*. In the *Four Quartets* there are many references to the *Gita* and the clear statement that he is trying to worry out the meaning of "what Krishna meant". But I feel that, like the great majority of the readers of the *Gita*, Eliot too has read it as an isolated philosophical poem and not as a dialogue with a full dramatic function. The *Gita* is a central episode in a vast epic, in fact the strategically significant episode which resolves the crisis in the action of the epic. As the *Four Quartets* also return insistently in every section to the relation between the soul's attitude to action and experience in this world and the problem of poetic expression, Eliot would have benefited far more if he had studied the *Gita* as an embedded episode in a vast poem, for the final message of the epic is that of an aesthetic attitude which meets in full the demands of action in the world and ultimate liberation. As it is, there are unresolved contradictions in Eliot, an analysis of which will further clarify the precise position of Indian thought in this field.

Fragments from Heraclitus supply the epigraph for *Burnt Norton*, the first poem of the *Four Quartets*. In Greek thought the tradition of Heraclitus is an absolute antithesis of the tradition of Parmenides and Zeno. The latter denied reality to Becoming and affirmed Being to be the only reality. For Heraclitus, "Being is intelligible only in terms of Becoming". Flux is not irrevocable decay, but process and evolution moulding to shape like a melody. This rhythm of events and order in change he explains as the reason or Logos of the universe. This is also the absolute conviction of Vyasa.

For the realisation of the Logos or attunement with it, Eliot feels there are two ways—either ordered movement or escape from movement. It is here that a serious danger inheres. To be consistent with the affirmation that Being is intelligible only in terms of Becoming, escape from movement cannot be prescribed, unless movement here is clearly defined as distraction, movement not ordered from within, from a personal centre, but something forced. In fact, Eliot is very clear here, for he refers to that caricature of action which is really "movement of that which is only moved and has in it no source of movement—driven by daemonic, chthonic powers"¹²⁹. He also refers to "abstention from movement, while the world moves in appetency, on its metallated ways of time past and time future"¹³⁰. But both the ascetic-religious Judaeo-Christian tradition as well as the tradition of Jewish nihilism—both St. Augustine and Ecclesiastes—seem to have converged in

Eliot to develop a pressure towards the unconscious denial of becoming. We have already referred to the difference between his concept of time and use of the image of the sea and those of Valéry and Vyasa. Eliot feels that time present and time past are both present in time future and time future contained in time past. This inevitably means the denial of the reality of process and evolution. "If all time is eternally present all time is irredeemable" and what might have been is an abstraction remaining a perpetual possibility only in a world of speculation.¹³¹ Eliot is wary of "development" which is "a partial fallacy, encouraged by superficial notions of evolution". He feels that "what Krishna meant" was identical that the future is "a lavender spray of wistful regret for those who are not here to regret, pressed between yellow leaves of a book that has never been opened"¹³². We do not create history, we arrive at the road stations that were always there. In the sequences of the journey in the subway and the sea voyage, in Eliot's poem, the passengers do not belong to constancy and the passage to time, but both belong to change. Those who arrive at the end of the journey are not those who set out on the journey. Incidentally, this does not mean that they have grown and left their past selves behind. The meaning here seems to be clearly that flux disintegrates utterly, dissolving what we call personality into a sequence of mental states, with no abiding core that can be said to grow and evolve.

With the meditation moving in this direction, Zeno triumphs over Heraclitus. Originally two ways of liberation were mentioned—ordered movement and abstention from distracting movement. Now, abstention crowds out the other alternative and if it suggests a new alternative, it is only its own variant. "This is the one way and the other is the same". The only way now is an Eleatic denial of the world and Becoming—a descent into "internal darkness, deprivation, dessication of the world of sense, evacuation of the world of fancy, inoperancy of the world of spirit"¹³³.

With even the spirit hushed, we reach the rippleless state of consciousness (*Nivikaratva*) advocated as the ultimate reality by a powerful tradition in Indian thought as well. This ascetic way, the way of dessication, has no room for joy. "In order to arrive there, to arrive where you are, to get from where you are not, you must go by a way wherein there is no ecstasy"¹³⁴.

With the acceptance of time and history as predetermined, with life and being seen as sea the continuous wrecker, the doctrine of grace makes its inevitable appearance. All those concerned with the sea of time need assistance. Hence the Virgin, whose shrine stands appropriately on the promontory, is invoked to pray for those whose business carries them to sea, for the women who wait at home, and for those who do not return.¹³⁵ Innumerable echoes of this are available in Sanskrit hymns where life as sea (*Samsara Sagara*) is a routine image and God is appealed to for protection from ship-wreck.

"Events," says Vijnana Bhikshu, "stand in relation of time and space"¹³⁶.

Time is the very stuff of the world of Becoming. "Time," says Zimmer, "is a becoming and a vanishing, the background and the element of the transient, the very frame and content of the floating processes of the psyche and its changing, perishable objects of experience"¹³⁷ If one rejects the reality of Becoming, not only life but art also becomes an illusion, for even poetic meditation and experience are events which, in this view, are unreal. But if we accept Becoming as an authentic mode of Being, it would be possible to agree with the Vaiseshikas who regarded time "as the independent real pervading the whole universe and making the ordered movement of things possible"¹³⁸ Acceptance of Becoming would lead to world-affirmation and denial to world-negation, both of which concepts have been defined with helpful clarity by Schweitzer¹³⁹ "World and life affirmation consists in this that man regards existence as he experiences it in himself and as it has developed in the world as something of value *per se* and accordingly strives to let it reach perfection in himself, whilst within his own sphere of influence he endeavours to preserve and to further it" As against this, "world and life negation consists in his regarding existence as he experiences it in himself and as it developed in the world as something meaningless and sorrowful and he resolves accordingly to bring life to a standstill in himself by mortifying his will-to-live and to renounce all activity which aims at improvement of the conditions of life in this world" Schweitzer claims the European world-view as affirmatory and regards the Indian view as life-negating. I do not feel it necessary to waste time on commenting on that part of the analysis here, since the rest of this work, especially the chapter on Vyasa, will deal with such stereotyped notions about Indian thought and tradition in the way they deserve to be dealt with.

Historiography, as a discipline, cannot proceed without at least a provisional acceptance of Becoming as real. But the attitude of negation can determine its whole drift. Collingwood¹⁴⁰ sums up the view of medieval European historiography thus. "History, as the will of God, orders itself, and does not depend for its orderliness on the human agent's will to order it. Plans emerge, and get themselves carried into effect, which no human being has planned, and even men who think they are working against the emergence of these plans are in fact contributing to them" Now, there is a tremendous difference between the view that God's will acts directly and the view that it acts through the initiative of man. In the first view, man's initiative becomes irrelevant and illusory. In the second, man becomes the soldier of God by a voluntary allegiance and this conserves for his initiative both reality and meaningfulness. In Vyasa's great poem, the world's action is not autonomous, it is God's action. In historical crises He intervenes. "Whenever there is a decline of righteousness and rise of unrighteousness I incarnate myself. I come into being (*Sambhavamī*) from age to age"¹⁴¹ That resonant expression (*Sambhavamī*), which claims that Being transforms itself into Becoming, is a completely unreserved affirma-

tion of the world But let us follow what happens in the epic Krishna, the incarnation of the Supreme Person, who gave this august assurance, is a non-combatant in the clan war between the Pandavas and the unrighteous Kurus He becomes the charioteer of Arjuna who has to do the fighting and who learns from Krishna why he has to fight The fight is Arjuna's choice and exertion The dialogue of the two is the dialogue of *Nara* and *Narayana* The terms are conveniently translated as man and God But it is often forgotten that the terms are conjugated into a complex concept, *Nara-Narayana*, man-God Narayana is not the withdrawn Absolute but God in man, and Nara is man in God They are like the I and Thou of Martin Buber, into which the self dichotomises itself for a profound interior dialogue In the ultimate phase no dualism lingers

This activist world-affirmation cannot possibly have any patience with the negation expressed by a poet like Thomas Hardy who felt acute nostalgia for the age "before the birth of consciousness when all went well", and wailed "Ere nescience shall be reaffirmed, how long, how long?"¹⁴² It cannot accept that time and history are predetermined and therefore "irredeemable" It cannot accept that voyagers in the journey of life change in an unrelated sequence, without a core persisting which can transform change into growth Auden¹⁴³ illustrates the tragedy of the vacillation of the self that rules out organic continuity and growth and ultimately makes the self incapable of action The "shore where childhood played" is lost from the map "Lost in my wake the archipelago, islands of self through which I sailed all day And lost the way to action and to you" When he felt in himself an inadequacy for revolutionary political action, he thought the salvation lay in the abandonment of the personal will once will is abandoned the obstacle will prove illusive "Lost if I steer" He feels that the gale of desire may blow sailor and ship past the illusive reef and he may yet land "to celebrate with you birth of a natural order and of love".

Vyasa cannot accept this type of beliefs He insists on growth He makes his Arjuna remember all his associations with the Kurus who are his near kinsmen Appalled by the thought of spilling kinsmen's blood, Arjuna refuses to fight He has to grow, in the brief moments allowed before the signal for the battle is given, he has to retain all his poignant memories and nevertheless mobilise the will to fight, he has to grow towards a new resolution, resisting the pressure of a tragic overburden of memories which inhibit action And as the teacher of the poetic doctrine that the world is a tissue spun by entities and forces continuously at work, Vyasa cannot subscribe to any theory that unsteered, willless drifting can take one to the goal Octavio Paz,¹⁴⁴ the Mexican, is another poet who found that he could not mobilise himself for action "I attempted to go out into the night and communicate at dawn with those who suffer; but the sun had died and eternal night was setting in" What inhibits action in his case also is the lack of a sense of self, of a belief in his own reality, for which Freud,

who claimed the ego to be a veneer and the anarchy of the id to be the abiding reality, is responsible "Opposing images cloud my eyes, and other images from a greater depth deny these, like a burning babble, waters that a more secret and heavier water drowns" Vyasa's ideal is the *Sthitaprajna*, one who is in full possession of his consciousness and Krishna's counsel to Arjuna, which forms the text of the *Gita*, is intended to make him self-possessed in the profoundest sense, for the opening scene shows him as overwhelmed by a traumatic shock brought about by the sudden perception of what a clan war really means

We have now to return to the *Four Quartets*, for the paradox, and probably the deliberately left source of tension, of the poem is the fact that, alongside the negation we analysed earlier, we have also a complete and complex affirmation. The chief contrast around which Eliot constructs the poem is that between the view of time as an irredeemable continuum and the conviction that man can live both "in and out of time", that, although immersed in the flux, he can yet penetrate to the eternal by apprehending timeless existence within time and above it¹⁴⁵. A sequence from another poem, Chorus VII of *The Rock* on the Incarnation of the Word, will prove very helpful here

*Then came, at a predetermined moment, a moment in
time and of time,
A moment not out of time, but in time, in what we
call history · transecting, bisecting the world
of time, a moment
in time but not like a moment of time,
A moment in time but time was made through that moment
for without the meaning there is no time, and
that moment of time gave the meaning*

If time, as Zimmer puts it, is "the very frame and content of the floating processes of the psyche and its changing, perishable objects of experience", it is the objects that perish, not the psyche. If there is a still centre deep within, from its perspective, high above the flux, a panoramic vision can be gained which will transform the flux into a process. Thereby change ceases to be decay and becomes endowed with meaning. The still centre can initiate action which, even if it becomes inevitably involved in the flux, will cease to be completely absorbed by time, by virtue of its meaning, which is timeless. Eliot here takes up an image he had used in *Triumphal March*, "the still point of the turning world". This notion of "a mathematically pure point", as Philip Wheelwright has called it, seems to be Eliot's poetic equivalent for Dante's "unmoved mover" and it symbolises a timeless release from the outer compulsions of the world. The "still point" can be defined only by negatives of all that appear to belong to the "turning world". In the world, things are in arrest or in movement. But at the

still point there is "neither arrest nor movement" There is no movement, if movement is interpreted as induced, compulsive, instead of being spontaneous There is neither arrest nor "fixity", for it is intensely active, in a way that may need to use up time and therefore has to end in time, but with a meaningfulness that does not belong to the order of time, of things that decay The Vedic figure of Being as the dancer in the Becoming is echoed here "At the still point, there the dance is Except for the point; the still point, there would be no dance, and there is only the dance"¹⁴⁶ This asserts the basic ideas of Heraclitus, both change and meaningful pattern in change Here "tranquillity and movement are the same", as Paz puts it "We must be still and still moving into another intensity"¹⁴⁷ We must ever strive "to apprehend the point of intersection of the timeless with time" Though the still centre, the completely self-possessed consciousness, does not belong to time, it is only in time that significant moments can be created, remembered Thus the movement out of time, the timeless moment, is involved in time, and time must be conquered through time All this is absolutely clear in its indication that withdrawal from action cannot be liberation "A people without history is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern of timeless moments"¹⁴⁸—that is, moments in time endowed with significance by the action of the spirit Moments of time must be in places, and the spiritual, though not of time or place, is known in time and place "History is now and England"—wartime England, with dive-bombers raining death from the sky This is precisely the lesson that Krishna taught Arjuna history, action into time from beyond time, is now and here, Kurukshetra, the battlefield of the great war of the Bharatas

This action cannot belong to "internal darkness and deprivation", suggested earlier as the only way, for Eliot refers to the experience of plenitude, of *Erhebung* (exaltation) It cannot possibly end in "dessication of the world of sense and inoperancy of the world of spirit". Liberation is "not less of love but expanding of love beyond desire"¹⁴⁹ Ego-centered love has to flow out to take in the world The attachment to our own narrow field of action and interests grows into the love of our country From the withdrawn, Eleatic, world of Being, Eliot comes out into the Heraclitean world of Becoming, of men living, working, suffering Earlier, in the *Waste Land*, he had accepted the Indian way of linking the timeless life and living in time For, "What the Thunder Said" is a straight quotation from the Upanishads¹⁵⁰ "*Datta, Dayadhama, Damyata*"—"Give, sympathise, control" The longed-for rain does not irrigate the waste land, because the quester is unable to go through this initiation with its three demands. His giving was not a giving of himself in love, but the seizure of the other in lust The prison of self in which he is locked prevents his sharing the concerns of others Sympathy would open this prison, but pride and self-love have locked it firmly Surrender to blood prevents the liberation that can come with control

VI THE RESOLUTION IN INDIAN THOUGHT

The juxtaposition of the way of denial and the way of affirmation contributes a very high tension to the *Four Quartets*, but the lack of a clear reconciliation does create ambiguities. The difficulty encountered by thought on these heights is very real, however, and we find evidences of the great strain in the Indian tradition also. Those who rejected the *Santa Rasa*, the tranquillity of liberation, as impermissible for literary delineation, used the argument that it implied the total absence of all feelings and action—"a dessication of sense and inoperancy of spirit"—and such a state of non-action could not be represented on the stage. The counter-argument claimed that this line of thought rested on a wrong assumption. The state of absolute cessation of action is only the climax, the ultimate plane (*Paryanta Bhumi*), and this certainly cannot be dramatically represented. But, the counter-argument runs, the climactic plane encounters this difficulty in the case of the other *Rasas* also, sexual union (*Samprayoga*) and murder cannot be represented on the stage, but love (*Singara*) and anger (*Raudra*) are not denied the status of *Rasas* and are delineated in dramas. Likewise, the acceptance of *Santa* does not mean any obligation, impossible in any case, to present inaction, but means only the depiction of an ardent spirit in search of serenity, his trials and victories over passions¹⁵¹

The reply is valid in its own plane. But that plane does not represent the highest insight. Both argument and counter-argument accept that the tranquillity of liberation is the "ultimate" plane and understand the "ultimate" as where action completely ceases. Let us follow up this fallacy a little more. There is evidence to suggest that the controversy about the admissibility of the *Santa Rasa* for dramatic representation arose directly out of the evaluation of the *Nagananda*,¹⁵² a seventh century play by Emperor Harsha of Kanauj. The weaknesses of the play have been analysed by this writer elsewhere¹⁵³. The first half of it is a courtly romantic comedy, later it changes, without any organic growth, into a didactic play. The hero refuses to fight when enemies invade his kingdom. "Gladly, unasked, would I give my own life for another in compassion. How then could I consent to the cruel slaughter of men merely to win a realm?" Later he offers himself as food to Garuda, the great eagle of Indian myth, in place of Sankha Chuda, a Naga youth. In the end, goddess Gauri has to make her appearance to save him as well as the play. The hero's quietism was misinterpreted as the serenity of liberation and Vyasa's great epic was also seen as illustrating this type of liberation. It is astonishing to find even Ananda Vardhana¹⁵⁴ going completely astray in this analysis. He sees the entire significance of the *Maha Bharata* inhering in the last sequence, where the Pandava heroes and even the great Krishna die one by one. The utter uselessness of even the great victory at Kurukshetra, he feels, clearly shows that Vyasa meant to emphasise the vanity of existence and teach the lesson of withdrawal into the "tranquillity" of world

denial and inaction This is a fantastically erroneous reading of Vyasa We have analysed earlier¹⁵⁵ why Vyasa prolonged his epic beyond the victory in the field to the terminal which is the terminal of all specific manifestations in the stream of Becoming. He wanted to affirm, by a forthright juxtaposition, that the transience of material embodiments could not assail the imperishable values which the spirit could realise through these very embodiments The significant moment of the epic is not the terminal twilight, but the existential moment in the field just before the battle breaks Arjuna, like Jimuta Vahana, the hero of *Nagananda*, lays down his arms But he is taught that liberation lies, not in withdrawal, but in action Arjuna's initial recoil was not due to any sudden accession of Olympian serenity, it was *Tamasic*, a failure of nerve at the thought of spilling kinsmen's blood The *Rajasic* character should be able to discipline itself against such weaknesses by its impassioned activism and sense of duty But Vyasa wants him to ascend still higher before he takes up arms Arjuna has to fight, without hatred in his heart, abandoning any desire for the fruit of his exertion in terms of personal benefit, for the weal of the world

Bharata's own definition of *Nuveda*, "quietism", shows that he does not mean withdrawal but activism in the poise of absolute self-possession It is born of *Tattvajñana*, knowledge of the ultimate truth, of the self It needs *Matī*, informed intelligence which is the fruit of the study of all the sciences that have relevance to man (*Nana-sāstra-vichintana*). It needs *Dhṛti*, which means firmness, contentment and joy *Sama* is the condition of the mind when all agitation subsides. Vyasa demands that the movement into this stillness should be understood as moving into another intensity, that its tranquillity should be understood as movement, that it should be realised as the still centre where the dance is, not arrest or fixity But too often it is misunderstood as withdrawal and inoperancy of the spirit Therefore, Indian poetics seeks to rescue the concept from the possibility of any ambiguity by linking the *Rasas* of serenity (*Santa*) and heroism (*Vīra*) It affirms that *Utsaha*, enthusiasm, courage, the exaltation of self-assertion, is basic to both Bharata¹⁵⁶ defines *Utsaha* as compounded of resoluteness (*Sthāyīya*), courage (*Dhairyā*), sacrificial spirit (*Tyāga*) He sketches a typology which clearly militates against the identification of serenity with withdrawal, for he mentions three kinds of heroism¹⁵⁷ *Yuddhavīra* is martial heroism Sticking to what is right at all costs is *Dharmavīra*, an instance being Yudhishthira in *Maha Bharata* Generosity even at the risk of life to oneself, as exemplified by Karna in the same epic, is *Danavīra* Some writers tried to add a fourth category, *Dayavīra*, the courage for extreme compassion that forgets the self Abhinava¹⁵⁸ opposes it because he does not like an unnecessary proliferation of concepts. But since he opposes it only because of its redundancy, as he feels that *Dayavīra* is only another name for *Santa*, his concurrence with the analytical linking of serene self-possession and heroic selflessness is very clear Visvanatha uses the term

Dayavira for *Danavira* and the *Tyagavira*, self-sacrificing heroism, mentioned by some writers, is only an extension of the concept and of the original intuition of Bharata.

The concept rapidly develops as the basis of a typology of character. We speak of the "hero" of a novel or a drama. The term is mostly a synonym for "leading role", it does not have the specific meaning of "heroic type". But in Bhoja's typology¹⁵⁹ this meaning is always insisted upon. He indicates four types of heroes: the brave and high spirited (*Dhrodatta*), the brave and proud (*Dhurodhata*), the brave and sportive (*Dhualalita*), and the brave and serene (*Dhuapiasanta*). Here the doctrine of *Rasa* which is fundamental to Indian poetics becomes integrated with the demands of living and the psychology of character. It is worth while to elaborate the significance of this a little. Personality is a structured organism-environment field, each aspect of which stands in dynamic relationship to other aspects.¹⁶⁰ Individuality by itself is not so much a force as the pattern into which a force, which is common to all organisms, has been moulded. It is an achievement, not a datum, acquired through interaction with actual conditions. The encounter with life is aggressive. The term invariably suggests the abnormal and the unsavoury. This creates great difficulties in understanding the truth that normal aggression is a positive and essential factor for successful encounter at any level of biological evolution. The organism, in order to live and survive, must absorb needed material from the environment and metabolise it into its living tissue. This act is an aggression—the attempt to assault, subdue, control or extract meaning from the environment for its own purposes.¹⁶¹ One of the simplest human reactions to situations that block action is that of increasing the vigour of attack. The aggressive impulses supply the energy for the attack on life, which does not necessarily mean attacking one's comrades. The aggressive reactions we see early in life are relatively nonspecific increases in vigour.¹⁶² The same libidinal and aggressive forces used in childhood in play and learning are used in adult life in dealing with the environment, to extract from it the objects needed for material self-preservation, and the values needed for psychological self-preservation. Aggression, which cannot find a direct expression under the conditions of civilised living, is internalised and used by the superego to make the ego mobilise all its instinctual energy and to submit to hardship. This internalised aggression is the ultimate guarantee of work and therefore of self-preservation.¹⁶³ In civilised living, aggressiveness is directed more towards mastery than towards destructiveness.¹⁶⁴

At the level of human evolution, these biological realities become complicated. One can fall into a dull, passive tenor of life. Or one can drift with one's drives, which are mostly instinctual and unconscious. Here there will be more semblance of action than in the first case, but the action is still passive. This is the *Tamasic* behaviour of the Samkhya analysis, which Vyasa adopts, though for a creative rehandling. In all higher

types of behaviour, the normal aggression we have analysed should be a reality. It is this exaltation, the "non-specific increase in vigour" that Bharata designated by the term *Utsaha*. Conflict is also normal here. Functional maturity in the world around him cannot be gained by the individual unless he faces many conflicts. The moral fibre cannot develop when a person either withdraws from conflict situations or is always protected from them. Now, conflict arises, in civilised living, from the simultaneous operation of two action systems—desires, wishes and purposes, values and ideals. The activist, *Rajasic* temper reaches equilibrations which yield the first three of Bhoja's four character-types. It should be noted that all the four belong to the genus, hero, *Dhruva*, for biological life-energy, conative persistence, *Utsaha*, is already integrated with value systems to yield the complex growth and condition that we call courage. In the *Dhruodatta*, the brave and high-spirited, we find this evolution in an ideally direct and comparatively simple form. In the brave and haughty (*Dhruodhata*), the development yields a self-image that is a shade too aristocratic, exclusive. The brave and sportive (*Dhruvalalita*) reaches a finer balance and is capable of relaxation, though the steeled temper is an abiding reality and is revealed without any weakening when a conflict-situation emerges.

In the fourth category, the *Dhruva Santa*, the brave and serene, *Rajasic* values are replaced by the still higher, *Satvic*, values. As Tillich¹⁶⁵ said, courage means the self-affirmation of a man's essential nature, being oneself and following one's inner aim. The *Rajasic* character is courteously and even sensitively responsive to the needs of others. But it sees no reason to surrender the legitimate needs of one's own self. It thus finds its ideal milieu in the social world, where order has to be realised on the basis of justice for all and resistance may become a moral duty when one's own just rights are threatened. But there is a way to the superman through Calvary which Nietzsche missed. Serene renunciation should be distinguished from surrender through de-animation or frustration. The former can be an act of supreme courage, a supreme self-affirmation. This is why Keyserling¹⁶⁶ claims that courage distinguishes alike two seemingly opposed archetypes—the hero and the saint. In the case of the saint, no vital manifestation of any importance to the moral consciousness is abandoned to its natural inclination. Every movement is governed by the spiritual principle which penetrates all as the poet's inspiration penetrates a pile of words to coordinate them according to a preconceived rhythm. Even martyrdom becomes an affirmation rather than a surrender. Likewise, the hero, in taking his own life as a matter of course and playing with death, affirms his personal identity at a superior degree. Whether successful or not, the consequence of heroic effort is euphoric and enthusing. All energies here subserve the meaning affirmed by the autonomous spirit. The possibility of vanquishing from within everything that appears to be an ineluctable outward fate produces joy and a sense of conquest. Adversity is greeted as the indispensable means of self-affirmation.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The Aesthetic World-View of Vyasa

I “WHAT KRISHNA MEANT”

I AM afraid we must pause now to consider why we were discussing what we have been discussing

Our extended analysis has been for teasing out the clear sense of the concept of liberation. For this concept to have vital relevance in a study of poetics, it is not enough to point out, with some Sanskrit writers, or by referring to an endeavour like that of Eliot in the *Waste Land* and the *Four Quartets*, that the struggles of the spirit for emancipation from all that implies bondage can be and have been the content of poetry. For anything can be the content of poetry. We need to establish an identity or at least an isomorphism between the spiritual experience of liberation and poetic experience as such. And since the possibility of poetic experience dissociated from the state of being-in-the-world is inconceivable to us, we have to work towards a synthesis which will integrate the authenticity of being in its aspect as becoming, poetic experience and the experience of liberation.

Since it is the belief of this writer that Vyasa's profound mind has effected such a synthesis, a study of his thought in this field has a place, and a central one, in this work. Specific references to contrasts and affinities between the thoughts of Valéry or Eliot and Vyasa have already built up a pressure for a comprehensive presentation of Vyasa's views. What finally makes it unavoidable is the fact that his meaning has been seriously misunderstood, not only abroad, but in India too. “What Krishna meant”, according to Eliot, was the rigid predetermination of historical existence: the future is “a lavender spray of wistful regret for those who are not yet here to regret, pressed between yellow leaves of a book that has never been opened”¹. The book which was never really opened suggests an Eleatic reading of becoming as illusion, the wistfulness a pessimism about being-in-the-world and the regret that is already there, even before the generations who have to taste its bitter-sweet flavour have arrived, suggests a belief in fatalism and a disbelief in any real creativity in creation. This is not what Krishna, or more accurately, his creator, Vyasa, meant. Ananda

Vardhana, who interpreted the prolongation of the epic beyond the victory in the field and the winning of the empire to the death of the heroes who won that empire as indicating that decay and regret were already long decreed, failed, like Eliot, to understand what Vyasa meant. Therefore we have to take up the task of clarifying what he really did mean. This is going to be a formidable task, for it involves the presentation of the quintessence of the *Maha Bharata*, of the *Gita* which is a part of it, and of the *Bhagavata* in a chapter, while the complexity and profundity of the material need the space of an entire volume. Nevertheless, the task has to be attempted.

Probably under the unconscious influence of his pessimistic appraisal of life, Kapila, the founder of the Samkhya doctrine, kept *Purusha*, spirit, aloof from *Prakriti*, nature. The inability to integrate the apparent dichotomy of spirit and matter, soul and body, extended deeper to make the doctrine pluralist as regards the souls also. There were as many souls as there were individuals and at no time did they merge into a unity. The doctrinaire monism of a later day eliminated this pluralism, but was so much influenced by Samkhya thought as to retain the feeling that nature, the world, was an alienation from infinite existence, very little more real than an illusion. As a state of consciousness seemed limited to what it was conscious of, metaphysical thought also felt the compulsion to define infinite existence as something perilously near unconsciousness, insentience.

Vyasa made a radically new approach. "Those minds worship Me through knowledge who see My visage in the world, who see Me as both the one and the many"² The extraordinarily daring stratagem by which Krishna, in a crisis of action in the epic, is made to reveal himself as the Supreme Person (*Purushottama*) reveals both the massive self-assurance of the poet and his conviction that the ultimate reality cannot be inconscient, but has to be superconscious. In Samkhya doctrine, the spirit is merely the witness of the action of nature. In the *Gita*, he is the "lord of the world, the relisher (*Bhokta*) of the action of nature, the indwelling friend in the heart of every material entity"³ All that is, is embedded in this ground reality. "Nothing other, distinct from Me, exists. Like pearls on a string, all these are suspended on Me"⁴ But Vyasa's doctrine cannot be equated with pantheism, though it accommodates pantheism, just as it includes all that is valid in dualism and qualified monism with an astonishing catholicity and a subtle balancing. "This entire universe is filled by My subtle presence. All material creations exist in Me, not I in them"⁵ That is, the Supreme Person is not emptied out by a total transformation in creation. His immanence does not affect his transcendence, his becoming in material creation does not limit his continuing reality as pure being. Krishna makes the meaning of this clear by outlining a cyclical theory of creation. "At the end of each eon, all material creations are ingathered in Me. At the commencement of the next eon, I project them forth again"⁶

The life of the universe thus pulses steadily in the rhythm of evolution

and involution. The ingathered phase is the *Brahman* of the rigid monism of a later day as well as of the tradition of ascetic, world-denying thought. These schools interpreted this state alone as being genuine, with the result that the tendency to regard the world as mere appearance always persisted. Even after the *Gita*, we find Sankara contrasting the purely phenomenal reality of the world with the basic reality of *Brahman*. But Vyasa, the poet, could not accept this relegation of the world, the arena of storm and stress and myriad challenges which alone could furnish man with an existential context for a self-attestation, to a lower plane. The very subtle and very important shift in accent should be noted. The Supreme Person transcends even the *Brahman*, the withdrawn Absolute which was the transcendent ultimate of rigid monism. The withdrawn Absolute and the immanent world-soul are but aspects of the Supreme Self. And there is no contrast of higher and lower between these two aspects, there is only the contrast of dynamic and static phases, action and repose. Further, since the *Gita* is addressed to man, not pure being, but embodied being working out his destiny in historical existence, the accent is really on action, not withdrawal. "Action is born from *Brahman*, *Brahman* from the Abiding, therefore *Brahman* resides in action."⁷

The troublesome concept of the *Brahman*, as rigid monism understood it, now gets blurred and is quietly allowed to get lost. Already, by the affirmations that *Brahman* resides in action, dynamism, becoming, and that action is derived from the Abiding through *Brahman*, it is reduced to an intermediary phase between the Supreme Person and his creation. Whatever validity lingers in the concept is now integrated in a new scheme⁸ of a triune unity: the Supreme Person (*Purushottama*) who includes but is more than the Person of Becoming (*Kshara Purusha*) and the Person of Being (*Akshara Purusha*), the latter two belong to the world, actually constitute it and explain its Heraclitean flux which is also an evolution. The concept of the *Akshara Purusha* incorporates the valid elements of the old concept of the *Brahman*. Sankara correctly interprets Vyasa in understanding the *Kshara* as the ever changing material nature or the soul as embedded in it and the *Akshara* as the immutable essential energy or design in nature. Krishna defines these as emanations or powers of the Supreme Person: *Apara Prakriti*, the lower nature and *Para Prakriti*, the higher.⁹ The significance of this scheme has to be clearly understood. Krishna makes clear that these two natures are the womb of all material creations and that through their instrumentation the Supreme Person abides as the point of origin and of the collapsed return of the universe in its rhythmic evolution and involution.¹⁰ The *Para* or the higher nature is a concept which has affinities with the Logos of Hellenic thought and of Christian Neo-Platonism, the *élan vital* of Bergson, and the superentelechy working out the revelation of its essence in the evolution of the material world suggested by Hans Driesch. For the *Para* is what upholds the world and is the source of life (*Jivabhuta*).¹¹

What is completely rejected here is the view that creation and evolution are casual accidents. Bertrand Russell wrote . "That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving, that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms . . all these things, if not quite beyond dispute are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand"¹² But contemporary thought does not accept this position unanimously As Whitehead would say, a dead nature can give no reasons. And we are familiar with the crisis in the thought of our own times precipitated by the premature conclusion that the brick of the universe is the dead material particle What is helping to resolve the crisis is the confirmation, through the work of Planck, Bohr, Schrodinger and others, of what Lucretius had affirmed long ago—that the power of self-movement inheres in matter. This inherent power is *Para* Mere matter, analytically dissected into deadness, is *Apara* Vyasa stresses again and again that, in creation, only analytical dissection can separate out the indwelling person and the material embodiment, nature, for they really form an indissoluble unity He repeats the great Upanishadic metaphor of the world as a tree with roots above and branches crowned with foliage spreading below¹³ All entities and states are becomings of the Supreme Self (*bhavanti matta eva*). "Whatever has originated, mobile or immobile, has originated through the union of the field and the knower of the field"¹⁴ . . This body is called the field and the wise call him who knows this the knower of the field¹⁵ . . Know Me as the Knower of the field in all fields¹⁶ . . ."

Sankara interprets this union of the field and the knower of the field as only a matter of appearance Only the knower is there, but he is seen as the field, just as a rope in uncertain light is mistaken for a snake This is a regression to concepts similar to the Eleatic interpretation of material reality and its dynamism and evolution as illusory It is definitely not the view of Vyasa The poet's answer to all the cerebrations of philosophers is clear and understandably touched with a little asperity "Deluded minds despise Me lodged in the human body because they know not My supreme nature of being, lord of all existences" It needs the synthetic imagination of the poet to understand the epiphany of the spirit in matter The vivisection of analysis destroys the union, tries hard to forget the embodiment and stagnates in the concept of an attenuated, withdrawn, disembodied spirit Again, it is this type of outlook that leads to masochism and mortification of the flesh, for deluded minds cannot understand the spirit being lodged in the body. Vyasa condemns them by a total rejection "Those foolish men who perform violent austerities torture the material constellation of the body and also Me, the indweller of the body"¹⁷ Offending the body is as much a sin as doing violence to the spirit, for the body is the word become flesh "Though I am unborn and imperishable, though I am the lord of all creation, I come into being (*sambhavami*) through My

power (*Atmamayaya*)”¹⁸ Sankara, tirelessly persisting in his steady endeavour to strait-jacket the meaning of the *Gita* into an Eleatic framework, interprets this verse thus. “I *appear* to be born and embodied, through my own power, *but not in reality, unlike others* (*na paramarthato lokavat*)” This is serious and utterly unjustified distortion. That resonant expression, *sambhavamī*, which asserts that Being transforms itself into Becoming is an absolutely unreserved affirmation of the authenticity of the mode of being-in-the-world.

Eleatic conception reduces the world to an immobile Parmenidean plenum whose dynamism is illusory and this is the view of Sankara also. But we have already seen how Vyasa managed to shake the somnolent *Brahman* of the world-denying ascetics into wakefulness by deriving all action from the Abiding through the *Brahman*, which thereby is seen in a new light, as the potential existence of all creation, as the *Para Prakṛti*, the logos or super-entelechy which gives the world its dynamism. The authenticity of the dynamism of becoming is affirmed again in terms where no ambiguity can linger. “There is not for Me, in the three worlds, anything that has to be done nor anything unobtained to be obtained. And yet I continue in action. For if ever I did not remain engaged in action unsleeping, men would in every way follow my way. These worlds would fall into ruin if I did not do my work. I would then be the creator of chaos and would destroy these people”¹⁹ The *Gita* also repeats the profound Vedic metaphor of Pure Being offering itself as oblation in a ritual sacrifice to establish the realm of becoming. And ceaseless work is what upholds this becoming. Sun and wind, fire and water weave the web of the evolving world through their unremitting work.

The “evolving” world, we said, for the concept of evolution is one of the most important elements in Vyasa’s system. And his thought does not commence with organic evolution but returns to the dark backward and abysm of time, to build up a theory of the evolution of stellar systems and inanimate matter which paved the way for the evolution of living matter. “From food (matter metabolised) living creatures come into being. Food is born from rain. Rain is born from *Yajna*, dedication (of the sun). Dedication is born of *Karma*, work”²⁰ The grand ecology of the world, the sense of a continuing telic trend in creation, the intuition that inanimate nature settled into an order so that life could manifest itself, are pithily expressed in this gnomic utterance. And immediately following it comes this peremptory call to ceaseless action. “He, who does not act in unison with the wheel turning thus, is evil in nature, steeped in sensuality, and his life is of no use”²¹ The affirmation that becoming, embodied existence, means unremitting action, is repeated in several places. “It is utterly impossible for embodied being to abstain completely from work”²² “No one can remain even for a moment without doing work”²³ Ascetic withdrawal masks repressions. “He, who restrains his motor organs but continues to brood over the objects of sense, whose nature

is deluded (by self-deception), is a hypocrite.”²¹

The energies of nature function automatically in their ceaseless rhythm . nobody has to exhort them specially to maintain their dynamism . But in the case of man, this exhortation and its support by a clarifying wisdom become necessary . This means that at the terminal of evolution, kinesis—or, more accurately, the right type of activism, for it is impossible to be static—has to be chosen and willed . Thus emerges the problem of explaining how matter, evolving by a natural law that it cannot violate, can terminate in a situation of freedom where moral law can be chosen or denied . The theory of the three qualitative principles (*Gunas*) is the brilliant solution offered for this problem .

Ancient Indian thought did attempt the analysis of the dynamism of nature through a purely quantitative approach, the *matra* being the quantitative unit of matter . But it was very soon realised that the ultimate solution would not be forthcoming without a qualitative analysis . “In the basis of the physical world”, says Aurobindo, “the miraculous varying results of different combinations and quantities of elements otherwise identical with each other admit of no conceivable explanation if there is not a superior power of variative quality of which these material dispositions are only the convenient mechanical devices”²⁵ . A doctrinaire Pythagoreanism would reduce all qualitative manifestations to underlying quantitative arrangements . Fascinated by the fact that two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen yield that miracle, water, our own times would propose a theory of emergent evolution which, when you analyse it thoroughly, merely describes the miracle, does not explain it . Indian thought indicates another approach to the problem . It outlines a theory of nature’s concomitant and inseparable powers of equilibrium (*Satva*), kinesis (*Rajas*) and inertia (*Tamas*) . Together they constitute the dynamic principle, which is also a telic principle, of nature . And they are not separate, disembodied forces acting on matter from outside , they are built into matter as its qualities, as inherent as its quantitative magnitudes, and guide its evolution from within .

Conceptual thought has to handle a difficult problem here and it is because the poetic delicacy and sensitiveness of Vyasa’s solution were beyond the grasp of the purely intellectualistic approach of philosophers, both before and after his time, that their systems harden into unsatisfactory dogma . Samkhya thought kept spirit aloof from matter, because the natural order showed serious imperfections and if the spirit was involved in nature, it would share these inadequacies . Vyasa, however, made *Purusha* the creator of *Prakṛti* . But, once created, nature is autonomous in her working and evolution . Spirit presides at the pageant of nature, it does not function directly as the impresario of that great production . “Under My presiding (*maya adhyakshena*), nature generates all things, animate and inanimate, and by this instrumentation the world revolves”²⁶ . It is in order to stress this autonomy of the working of nature that the Supreme

Person repeatedly asserts what may seem to be a paradox . that all the visible world is the work of his *Prakṛti*, not his own. When once matter has been created with an inherent power of qualitative variations their interaction leads to the magnificent pageant of the world and to evolution

The evolution outlined by Vyasa is the same as that worked out by Samkhya thought Very precise, but also very highly condensed, summations of the scheme are given in several places²⁷ in the *Gīta* Undifferentiated matter is the initial state It evolves into the five differentiated states of matter earth, water, air, fire, and ether In spite of the seeming archaism of the classification of material primordia, it epitomises a valid analysis Ether is space, both the stage on which the evolutionary process takes place and a symbol, through its pure emptiness, of the womb of potentiality out of which actuality is born Earth, water and air stand for the three states of matter solid, liquid and gaseous Fire is energy in all its forms The role of energy in maintaining the organisation of the body is indicated pithily "Becoming *Vaisvanara* in the bodies of living creatures and acting in unison with the inward and outward impulses (*Prāṇa* and *Apāṇa*) I digest the four kinds of food (*anna*)"²⁸ The expression has great density, but its meaning is clear Heat engines perform work with the help of an initial gradient Heat flows down from a higher level to a lower level and it is this flow that can be made to perform work But, if this gradient is not maintained by a continuous inflow from outside the system, if the heat engine is completely insulated, a dead level of equalised heat or energy is soon reached, there is no more any flow of energy down a gradient and the system cannot do any further work The second law of thermodynamics lays down that all systems working on heat gradients will ultimately run down This is what is meant by saying that entropy, the proportion of energy that becomes unavailable for work, inevitably increases till a dead level is reached The body is a heat engine Nevertheless it continues to work for years In one sense there is no mystery here, for as Bertalanffy²⁹ and others have clarified, the law of entropy governs only closed systems while the living organism is an open system It continuously takes in matter (*Anna* is both food and matter and the four kinds refer to solid, liquid, etc) *Vaisvanara* is a form of the principle of *Agni*, fire, more strictly energy Here it is the homeostatic principle which maintains body heat by metabolising matter *Prāṇa* and *Apāṇa* stand usually for inspired and expired breath The role of respiration in metabolism is too well known to need further comment But we should also remember that in the more esoteric terminology of Yoga, they stand for afferent and efferent impulses and *Vaisvanara* stands for *Suṣūmṇa*, the nervous system which integrates the self-maintaining functions of the organism

The biological organism at any level of evolution is clearly defined³⁰ as an aggregate (*Samghata*), the constellated material system which is the body, energised by the life principle (*Chetana*) and the power of auto-

repair, self-maintenance and conative persistence (*Dhrti*). To emphasise the absolutely scientific approach of Vyasa, let us see very briefly how modern biological thought can serve as a commentary on this summative scheme. The organism, says J A Thomson,³¹ is a self-stoking, self-repairing system for the transformation of matter and energy; the transfer of energy into it is attended with effects conducive to further transfer and retardative of dissipation, while the very opposite is true of an inanimate system. Living matter, as E S Russell³² emphasises, is an organised unity. We reach unintelligible chaos when we endeavour to treat physiological phenomena as separate events. As Myers³³ points out, they become intelligible only when we accept their directive nature. Stressing that we must seek to understand physiological phenomena as manifestations of life regarded as a whole, Haldane³⁴ points out the philosophical implications of these biological realities. From the point of view of materialism, the maintenance and reproduction of a living organism are nothing less than a miracle because "coordinated maintenance of structure and activity is inconsistent with the physical conception of self-existent matter and energy". This is the reason why Vyasa tells us that, for an integral understanding of nature, we need several concepts : *Apara*, nature as matter and energy with quantitative and qualitative variability, *Para*, nature as the teleological principle in material process, Being (*Purusha*) of which both *Para* and *Apara* are the powers and manifestations. All these concepts are required for a satisfactory understanding of Being in its aspect as process, Becoming. The organism is a spatiotemporal process, "a dynamic pattern in time", as Coghill calls it, for its dynamic activity is, in the words of Sherrington,³⁵ a harmony in time as well as in space, having as its end the master-functions of maintenance, development and reproduction.

But the dynamic pattern in time is not confined to ontogeny. It straddles the immense span of biological evolution and reveals itself in phylogeny. Here the interpretation of evolution is that of a life-principle which evolves various sensory and motor organs for a complex and increasingly complete seizure of the world and physical reality. Vyasa is on the side of Bergson and Lecomte du Nouy, not on the side of those who would regard evolution as the result of a series of random mutations. "That, which is indeed a fragment of My own self, having become a living soul, eternal, in the world of the living, draws to itself the senses, of which the mind is the sixth, that inhere in nature . . . He (the living soul) enjoys the objects of the senses, using the ear, the eye, and the organs of touch, taste and smell as also the mind"³⁶ (In Indian psychology, the mind is grouped with the sense organs symbolising their integrated action as well as the basic identity in the modality of all sensory perception). In the higher organisms, other functions develop on the basis of the prime reactivities. "I am lodged in the hearts of all. From Me are memory (*Smrti*), knowledge (*Jnana*) and oblivion (*Apohana*). I am indeed He who is to be known by all the Vedas"³⁷. Here *Jnana* is consciousness; *Smrti* is the

preconscious, the store of things that may not figure in consciousness at any moment but can be recalled by remembrance, *Apohana* is the sub-conscious, whose abiding action cannot be denied. The dweller in the heart is super-consciousness *Buddhi*, which seems to stand for reason, intuition and also will, is another product of advanced evolution and is mentioned, along with mind, the ego and the five primordia of matter, as one of the eight components of nature²⁸. In a more detailed presentation,²⁹ along with the five primordia of matter are mentioned five sense organs and five motor organs which negotiate the embodied soul's interaction with the material world. At the apex of this organised constellation are *Buddhi* and ego-sense, *Ahamkara*. They are empirical reason and empirical ego. And there is an extraordinarily condensed summing up of empirical being with the principles of its motivations and action, the entire structure and function of the constellated field that is the organism. "Desire and aversion, pleasure and pain, the organised material system (*Samghata*), the life principle (*Chetana*) and the principle of conative persistence (*Dhriti*)—this in brief is the field (*Kshetra*) with its modifications"³⁰

With the evolution of the highest powers of knowledge, memory, reason and will, and the ego-sense which grows out of their coordination, the organism becomes an agent who chooses its actions. Can evolution, which by now has become stepped up from the biological to the moral plane, be furthered by right action? Vyasa's stand here is vigorously affirmative and immediately the whole world-denying tradition ranges against him in solid opposition. Committed to the view that the world is an illusion, Sankara insists that liberation means the realisation of this illusory nature of becoming and that, the moment this knowledge dawns, activism becomes utterly meaningless. The self-contradictions into which he is led in the attempt to interpret Vyasa in conformity with his own notions, make a very interesting study. He is very sure that the essential purpose of the *Gita* is to teach us a way out of the bonding action of the world (*samsara-karma-nivritti*) and not enjoin action (*na pravartakam*). While Vyasa uses the concept of Yoga to mean action from the highest personal centre, Sankara regresses to the Yoga of Patanjali which was a psychological discipline for meditation and trance, from which there is no return to the world of action. Sankara rejects the view of harmonised knowledge and action (*Jnana-karma-samuchhaya*)⁴¹. Like Patanjali, he allows selfless action only as a purification which will be a means for reaching illumination and will cease to have relevance thereafter. But Vyasa's great concept of work for the weal of the world (*lokasamgrahartha karma*) continues to disturb Sankara's self-assurance. He is forced to admit that there is no objection to the performance of work until one reaches death, even after illumination⁴². He even makes the extraordinary statement, very dangerous to his position, that the liberated individual is said to be above all duties only in a eulogistically figurative sense (*alamkara*)⁴³. But he corrects himself back into error by the casuistry that Arjuna was a man of the

world involved in action (*madhyamadhikāṇī*) for whom renunciation was dangerous and therefore Krishna advised him to take to action. Sankara of course is entitled to his views, but what is objectionable is the attempt to prove that Vyasa's views are the same. There is no danger, however, of the message of the massive mind of Vyasa being distorted by such attempts. Twice in the *Maha Bhārata*,⁴⁴ Vyasa tells Suka that the most ancient discipline of the Brahmin is to obtain release by knowledge and do work in the world.

Vyasa stresses the extreme subtlety of action. All the tangled problems of the moral life of the world originate in men's concepts about right motivations and right actions and therefore the problem has to be approached with a full appreciation of its complex profundity. "What is action? What is withdrawal from action?—As to this even the wise are perplexed. That, by knowing which liberation from evil is gained, that knowledge of what action is, I shall impart to you. One has to understand what action (*Karma*) is, and likewise one has to understand what is wrong action (*Vikarma*) and one has to understand about inaction (*Akarma*). Deep-hidden is the way of work."⁴⁵ Vyasa himself defines Yoga as "skill in action (*Karmasu kausalam*)". The skill here implies not only smooth, adroit execution of work in the world, but also the skill of the exploring thought in clarifying the principles which will make action a liberation, not a bondage. This means that an integrated vision of nature and man and man's destiny has to be gained first before engagement in action. Vyasa requires us to know the meaning of life, in all the grand range of its nature, motivation and behaviour, before we engage in action. The *Gita's* science of the practical (*Karmayoga sāstra*) is derived from its philosophy of spirit (*Brahma-vidyantaṅgata*) and spirit here includes nature which is its manifestation.

The word *Dharma* ordinarily means the pattern of moral action. But it has also the meaning of function, in the precise sense in which that term is used in physics or chemistry. This type of function derives directly from intrinsic property or quality. That is why the *Gita* defines *Dharma* as the innate law of any entity and the behaviour or action proceeding from and determined by that inner nature (*svabhava niyatam karma*). In the inanimate realm, the relation between nature and function is direct, the expression of nature in physical and chemical function automatic. But when the capacity to be aware of the self and freedom to choose the type of action develop in evolution function does not flow automatically from intrinsic nature but from the nature of the self-image which the individual has formed. This is the price that has to be paid for freedom—that, without knowledge, "free" choice may lead to bondage. Now, the word *Svabhava* is also a term with resonant meaning. Though ordinarily used to mean nature or temperament it literally means the principle of self-becoming. The situation is now no longer static as in the case of a crystal or a chemical molecule, whose behaviour does not react on itself.

to make it evolve to any higher level (qualitative, not quantitative) of its own self or being. Vyasa has no love for abstract metaphysical theorising and just as his view integrates the transcendental and the empirical, being and becoming, absolute existence and historical existence, it is fully aware of the reality and dynamics of social existence. His great message here is that all individuals who perform their duty towards society are equal in basic status. The social order is one of division of labour. It is significant that Krishna asserts that the constitution of this order has divine sanction. "The four classes were created by Me." It will be a most serious mistake if this is interpreted to mean that the caste hierarchy is divinely ordained. Vyasa takes the greatest care to clarify that he is not thinking of hereditary castes but of aptitude types. If Vyasa insists that every man must fulfil his *Svadharmā* or his own specific social obligations and if he broadly identifies these obligations with the functional occupation of the class to which the individual belongs, he also definitely relates *Svadharmā* to *Svabhava* or personality type, the complex of temperament, outlook and aptitudes.⁴⁶ Here he is trying to recover the real intention of the Rig Vedic hymn⁴⁷ which visualised society as a mighty person whose limbs were the important orders of society. In this vision, society is regarded as consisting of men following four broad types of pursuits—culture, politics, industry and labour. "The Aryan-Sanskrit sociological thought, which first defined and named this four-fold structure of society, is as much ours as India's", claims Gerald Heard.⁴⁸ "There have always been present in human community four types or strata of consciousness"—the emergent seers and sensitives, politicians, technicians, the unspecialised masses. Functions necessarily differ between individuals because capacities and the entire pattern of the structure of personalities differ. But by relating duties (*Svadharmā*) to the specific pattern of personal capacities (*Svabhava*), Vyasa once again revealed the fine catholicity of his mind, for he affirmed that the faithful discharge of one's duties be they ever so humble, would lead to liberation. "He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded—by worshipping Him through the performance of his own duty does man attain perfection."⁴⁹ The basic belief, that creation is a divine programme, is affirmed here. There is a teleological order in the evolution of inanimate matter and moral law is the product of the long-term working of natural law. In the case of material entities, *Svabhava* is property and *Dharma* function. The basic meanings remain constant, but significantly modulate in the case of man. *Svabhava* is the pattern of personality organisation and *Svadharmā* is the duty consonant with the specific pattern.

For the complete understanding of the dynamics of action in men, their concepts of the world and their self-image have to be carefully analysed, for it is these that determine the quality of the satisfaction they seek and the action they choose. Vyasa's typological analysis here is one of the most important sequences in the *Gīta*. There are the demoniac (*Asura*),

who have wilfully left the line of evolution⁵⁰ The world, to them, is a moral anarchy, not a moral order It is without a moral basis (*apratishtham*), not built upon a reciprocity (*apaśpaśasambhutam*), therefore not a convergent harmony of myriad forces and entities, but a bitterly competitive order Its sole origin is the blind drive of the libido (*kamahaitukam*), or the will in the special sense in which Schopenhauer uses the term "Committed to this view, these lost souls of feeble understanding, of cruel deeds, emerge as the enemies of the world for its destruction Giving themselves up to insatiable desire ('under the whip of pleasure, that merciless executioner'—Baudelaire), full of hypocrisy, excessive pride and arrogance, holding wrong views through delusion, they chase unworthy objectives Obsessed with innumerable cares which would end only with their death, looking upon the gratification of desires as their highest aim, assured that this is the whole truth, bound by hundreds of ties of desire, given over to lust and anger, they strive to amass hoards of wealth, by unjust means, for the gratification of their desires"⁵¹ But "they do not know the meaning of action nor repose"⁵²

As distinguished from the demoniac type, the Tamasic, Rajasic, and Satvic types are in the main line of evolution, though at different levels It has already been pointed out that each of these three terms, though it retains a basic identity of meaning, modulates significantly with the progress of evolution Thus inertia, kinesis and equilibrium have physical connotations in the case of inorganic evolution and psychological and spiritual connotations in human evolution. Another important thing to remember is that if Vyasa broadly categorises the working class as Tamasic, the agriculturist and industrialist as Tamasic-Rajasic, the ruling class as Rajasic-Satvic and the thinker and the seer as Satvic, he makes it clear that this is a generalised, statistical classification In each group, the individual can evolve to the highest level The *Maha Bharata* has also a *Vyadha-Gita*, a great discourse by a fully realised individual, who was by profession a butcher And the example of Janaka, a ruler and therefore a Kshatriya (Rajasic social type) whose Satvic perfection made even the Brahmins come to him for instruction, is also referred to in the *Maha Bharata*⁵³

Tamasic trait binds by "error (*Pramada*), stupefied passivity (*Alasya*) and torpor (*Nidra*)"⁵⁴ The word, in its etymological derivation, is related to the word "faint" (*Tam* · *Tamyati* to faint) This indicates the failure to grasp reality with a luminous knowledge This stupefaction of incomprehension is *Alasya* The error into which delusion leads is *Pramada* Letting oneself drift because one is unequal to the job of understanding reality is the drugged condition of *Nidra*, literally sleep "The Tamasic is born of ignorance and deludes"⁵⁵ This is further clarified elsewhere "That narrow outlook which clings to one single effect as if it were the whole, without concern for the cause, without grasping the real, is Tamasic"⁵⁶ "That obstinacy with which the man of misguided thought

refuses to let go fantasy, fear, grief, depression and arrogance is Tamasic”⁵⁷ The happiness such a type seeks and obtains is defined thus “That happiness which deludes the soul both in the moment of its experience and in its further consequence and which arises from error, stupefaction and torpor, is Tamasic.”⁵⁸

Etymologically, Rajasic means that which has a tendency to get stuck, united, attached to something (*Rajo ragatmakam*) “It springs from desire and binds the soul through action”⁵⁹ The whole structure and dynamism of personality organisation belong to a higher level here. The Tamasic is sluggish and drifts where blind impulsions take it. Here the conative perception is clearer and action is accepted as the programme for its realisation. But what is still lacking is a sense of the unity of existence. “That knowledge or world-view is Rajasic, which sees the principle of being as separate in different creatures”⁶⁰ But even if the basic unity is not perceived, the Rajasic type does not embrace the amoral egotism of the Asuric type or let itself be dominated by blind instinctual drives like the Tamasic. It accepts the world as a moral order and seeks the satisfaction of libidinal-aesthetic urges (*Kama*) and economic prosperity (*Artha*) within the framework of the moral regulations of the conduct of life (*Dharma*)⁶¹ But its dynamism is the conative persistence that desires the reward for its endeavour (*Phalakamkshi dhrti*). And because a deeper insight is lacking, the happiness it seeks may sometimes betray it. The experience realised by keen effort may be pleasurable in the moment of relish, but may turn sour in its later consequences.⁶² Arjuna is such a Rajasic type. He has made enormous efforts to mobilise for victory in the battle for empire. The battle is imminent. It is then that he experiences a traumatic shock. This victory, stained by the blood of kinsmen, will bring no happiness. The entire purpose of the *Gita* is to help him to evolve so that he can see the whole context from a higher perspective.

It is the Satvic level that gives this higher perspective. “The knowledge by which the one imperishable being is seen in all existences, undivided in the divided, know that knowledge to be Satvic”⁶³ The personality type is moulded by the world-view. “The unwavering fortitude is Satvic by which, through concentration, one controls the activities of the mind and the sensory and motor organs”⁶⁴ Distinguishing the Satvic character are features like “serenity (*sama*), self-control (*dama*), austerity, purity of body and mind, forbearance, uprightness, knowledge, wisdom and faith”⁶⁵ Happiness is an insatiable torment at the Tamasic level, the “thirst athirst of thirst” of Tristan Tzara. At the Rajasic level, it is nectar at the moment of relishing, but often ferments into poison later. The converse is the reality with the Satvic level. “That happiness which may be like poison at first but becomes nectar at the end, which springs from a clear understanding of the Self, is Satvic”⁶⁶

It is very important to note that conative persistence (*Dhrti*) which is the basic reality of organic evolution, indicating an upward ascent against

the slack and undertow of matter drifting towards a dead level of energy, is mentioned by Vyasa in the definition of all the three types, Tamasic, Rajasic and Satvic⁶⁷ Vyasa has also no difficulty in accepting that pleasure and pain etch the grooves of behaviour. But he makes it very clear that the terms are relative and that the meaning of happiness can change widely according to the individual's knowledge, according to the degree to which his image of the world and his self-image approximate to reality. In Vyasa's *Bhagavata*, the Lord says "I am present in all beings as their soul, but ignoring My presence, man makes an ostentation of image worship"⁶⁸ This is not so much a comment on idol worship as on the worship of false self-images which men give unto themselves. Evolution can rise to the Satvic level only when the correct self-image is gained through knowledge. "When the light of knowledge illuminates all the gates of the body (sensory channels) then it may be known that the Satvic quality has gained increase."⁶⁹

II. TRANSCENDENCE OF MECHANISM

It is here that we come across a doctrine that can create serious difficulties if its real meaning is not understood. Even the Satvic is not the terminal point of rest of spiritual evolution. "Those who are established in the Satvic rise upwards"⁷⁰ This ascent is a transcendence not only of the Tamasic and Rajasic levels but of the Satvic plane too. Life eternal is gained only "when the embodied soul rises above these three modes that spring from the body"⁷¹ This doctrine of *traigunatitya*, transcendence of the three modes, is clarified by Vyasa's precise analysis of causality, volition and the natural order. "Learn of Me these five factors for the accomplishment of all actions: the matrix of action (*Adhishthanam*), the doer (*Karta*), the various instruments of action (*Karanam*), the various patterns of coordinated conative behaviour (*Cheshta*) and providence (*Daivam*)"⁷² The matrix of action is the frame of body, life and mind which is the basis or standing-ground of the soul in nature. The instruments of action are primarily the motor organs (*Karmendriya*) but here include the sense organs (*Jnanendriya*) also since efferent action is based on the afferent signals sent up by these. *Cheshta* is the coordinated behaviour patterns that emerge through trial and error and learning for the realisation of objectives. *Daivam* is a complex term with subtle but related shades of meaning. Basically it specifies the overall texture of the web of nature which is spun from the strands that link specific causes with specific results. Man does not create physical effects *de novo* but actualises them by manipulating the causal efficacies embedded in nature. Secondly, it means the vaster action of nature beyond the small illuminated circle which is all that man, even with the greatest foresight, can take into account in planning his action. When we select and stimulate a single strand of cause-effect relation for realising our objective, we often forget that the strand

is part of a fabric of great extension. The tension on the other strands of the fabric may sometimes distort or cancel or reinforce the action on the selected strand. It is in such contexts that we begin to talk of good and bad luck. Or we may rise from the obsession with personal vicissitudes to a larger contemplation of man and history and may choose a cold, implacable fatality or a wise providence as the presiding principle in creation. Since the Supreme Person refers to the power which creates the world as "My power" (*Atmamaya*)⁷³ and asserts, "this is My divine power of modes" (*daivi hyesha gunamayi mama maya*),⁷⁴ Vyasa himself is seen as rejecting a concept of fatality like that of Hardy and affirming his faith in providence.

Vyasa is emphatic that these five factors are present in every action. "Whatever action a man undertakes by his body, speech or mind, whether it is right or wrong, these five are its factors."⁷⁵ Now comes the demand, extremely difficult to understand, that man should evolve beyond all the three modes—not only the Tamasic and Rajasic, but also the Satvic. Why is this necessary? It is necessary because the ego-sense (*Ahamkara*) is an evolute of nature and nature works and evolves by virtue of a property or function which is basically mechanistic. Beings function "as if they were mounted on a machine (*yantrarudha*)"⁷⁶. But the profound difference between Vyasa's view and mechanistic materialism should never be forgotten. For "the Lord abides in the hearts of all beings" and it is His power which is the reality behind their function.⁷⁷ Evolution does not cease to be a divine programme because the laws of its development are intelligible in terms of material process. And the freedom of action which emerges at the summit of evolution has its laws of operation also. In fact, how genuine is the freedom is something which can be decided only by a precise study of the whole arc of motivation, action and consequence. When blind instinctual drives and automatisms of habit launch the personality in the tide of action, as in the Tamasic type, or when the extrovert-activist Rajasic type pursues desires without the poise of mind that can face occasional blocks to desires without a sense of frustration, action does not emerge from the highest personal centre. The Satvic motivation belongs to a much higher plane, but with his profound insight Vyasa cautions us against the facile assumption that the highest personal centre has been reached here. The Satvic too can bind like the other two modes though in a more subtle manner. A purer ego may pursue a nobler desire. But the action may still have a self-reference and the self may still be a concept of closed horizons though relatively far wider than in the other cases. Further, the empirical self is the product of the work of nature, understood here as the whole complex reality of the embodied condition, even as the whole cosmic process is the result of the operation of causes.⁷⁸ Heredity, the extra-plasmic inheritance of culture which is even weightier than heredity in the case of man, the social environment—all these are the determinants of freedom, though the expression may sound like a paradox.

When the ego thinks "I choose and will this virtuous and not that evil action", it may be merely reflecting a predominant wave or formed current of the Satvic principle or mode by which nature chooses through the reason one type of action in preference to another.⁷⁹

Tertullian wrote : "For us we have no need for curiosity after Jesus Christ, nor for investigation after the Gospel." Later, in the fourth century, Ambrose of Milan expressed this anti-rationalism in even clearer terms. "To discuss the nature and position of the earth does not help us in our hope of the life to come. It is enough to know what the scripture states 'that He hung up the earth upon nothing' Why then argue that He hung it up in the air or upon the water, and raise a controversy as to how the thin air could sustain the earth, or why, if upon the waters, the earth does not go crashing down to the bottom?" Ambrose proceeds to argue that God did not fix the earth's stability as an artisan would, with compass and level, but as the Omnipotent, by the might of His command. He concludes: "Sufficeth for our salvation, not much disputation, but the mind's faith, so that rather than the creature we may serve the Creator, who is God blessed for ever." Vyasa too teaches that liberation is possible through the service of God, by dedicating all action to Him, though, in his case, this is a poetic expression adjusted to the level and needs of a certain type of temperament. But even here, knowledge of the creation and creature is necessary for the way of devotion. William of Conches gives a spirited answer to those who reject the investigation of nature and insist on blind faith. "Because they know not the forces of nature, and in order that they may have comrades in their ignorance, they suffer not that others should search out anything, and would have us believe like rustics and ask no reason. But we say that in all things a reason must be sought. They say 'We do not know how this is, but we know that God can do it' You poor fools! God can make a cow out of a tree. But has He ever done so? Therefore show some reason why a thing is so, or cease to hold that it is so." Vyasa may smile at the naiveté of this counter-attack, but he would agree that it is extremely unlikely that God would try to win cheap applause by making cows out of trees when he has left to nature the power and responsibility to create cows and also men. And man should have a thorough understanding of the working of nature of which he is a part before he starts trying to further nature's evolution by his own effort.

"He who knows the true character of the distinction (of the soul) from the modes of nature and their works, understanding that it is the modes which are working on the modes (*Guna guneshu vartante*), does not get attached"⁸⁰ Inability to understand the precise significance of this utterance has led interpretative thought astray in India. We can see the whole issue against the vaster background of the currents of world thought, by noting the serious difficulties that have arisen whenever the relation between the causal order of nature and freedom is analysed erroneously. Behind

the medieval European mind's faith in miracles was an unconscious fear—the feeling that the causal order, the determinism, that governed the behaviour of matter, was incompatible with freedom. The medieval mind clung to its faith in miracles, because they not only attested to the omnipotence of God but also signified a breach in the iron defences of the Bastille of determinism, understood as the final compulsive authority of the empirical world. The perception is not deep here and the nature of this problem is such that an unsightly formulated solution will fail to establish freedom irrespective of whether it affirms or denies the causal order. This needs some clarification.

Those who believe that the causal order is incompatible with freedom should read Hume again to realise that when the causal order is denied, freedom is also denied. Hume developed his attack on the concept of causation in three stages. He first sought to show that the concept had an anthropomorphic origin. We experience a tactile impact when we push objects into motion or when objects in motion collide with us. The concept of causation, according to Hume, originates in a sort of pathetic fallacy, through our projecting this subjective sensation into the world. "These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can *a priori* draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to suppose, that they have some such feelings when they transfer or receive motion"⁸¹ Hume now proceeded to establish the unreality of volition even in the narrower range of bodily movements. "We learn from anatomy that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps something still more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, by which the whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible?"⁸² It is clear that in emphasising the extensive mediate processes which intervene within the apparent immediacy of willed action, Hume was moving to deliver his final blow. Processes follow each other in sequence, no other linkage was visible between phenomena. The subject was a sequence of ideas, images, volitions, without any connecting ground or unity. Likewise, external reality was an incessant flow of happenings. Processes originating others in a chain were nowhere in evidence, according to Hume. Those who feel that the causal law of nature is inimical to freedom are in a worse plight after this rescue by Hume, for, if the causal law is demolished, so is the possibility of willed action and therefore of freedom.

Freud swings to the other extreme. He destroys freedom by insisting on the universality of the causal law. "Anyone breaking away from the determination of natural phenomena, at any single point, has thrown over the whole scientific outlook on the world"⁸³. , You have an illusion of

a psychic freedom within you which you do not want to give up. I regret to say that on this point I find myself in sharpest opposition to your views⁷⁸¹

In philosophical analysis, freedom has always had two meanings : freedom from constraining factors and freedom to express oneself in various fields of action. Of the latter, the ethical field is one of the most important and a great amount of the opposition to the determinism of the causal law is due to the unconscious fear that it destroys the freedom of ethical action. Those who fear that they will be drowned in this slough of despond clutch even at the straw of electronic indeterminism. There is serious confusion of ideas here. The meaning of Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy is that the motion of the particle will always remain undetermined, in the sense of being beyond the reach of accurate measurement. It does not mean that the motion is pure haphazard. But in any case, if it does mean pure haphazard, this haphazard in the material world is the very last factor to be invoked as the physical correlative of man's ethical behaviour, as Cassirer and Schrodinger⁸⁵ have shown. The conception of free-will in ethics does not mean that events are statistically at random, but rather that they become controlled by voluntarily embraced normative concepts. Its very definite meaning is that action in a given situation is not fortuitous, but determined by a moral concept⁸⁶. It is determinism and not indeterminism that is a suitable correlative to the mental phenomenon of will, which is not always easy to predict from "outside", but usually extremely determined from "inside". Freedom lies in self-determination as opposed to determination by something else⁸⁷. There is compulsion upon us only when we have to do something, against our preferences, under the pressure of outside forces. In free activity our compulsion comes from ourselves⁸⁸. We can make quite sure what we want before we speak the final word, take the final step, so that the decision will be the expression of our innermost, our entire nature. This is the only thing that we can properly mean by our wills being free. And this is the only kind of freedom essential to morality⁸⁹.

The faulty conclusions of Hume and Freud and those who seek refuge in particle indeterminism are due to the fact that they do not analyse all the factors relevant to human behaviour and action. When I move my limb, even my ignorance of the mediate neural and muscular processes involved cannot make the gesture anything else than my volitional act. The body is a material organisation (*Samghata*) which has acquired through evolution instruments (*Karanam*). If Hume shows ignorance of the realities of biological evolution, Freud ignores psychological evolution by refusing to see the reality of higher psychisms and emphasising only the lower psychisms like failed acts, dreams and sexuality and morbid psychisms like neuroses and psychoses⁹⁰. Reason, or *Buddhi*, is an evolute of nature and the ego-sense (*Ahamkara*) develops on the basis of that faculty. This ego is the *Karta*, the agent of action.

Here comes a difficulty in Vyasa's analysis. Although he definitely mentions the agent as one of the five factors concerned in the emergence of any action, he also says. "While all kinds of work are done by the modes of nature, he who is bewildered by the ego-sense thinks. 'I am the doer'."⁹¹ Eleatic tradition pounces upon this to buttress its concept that all action and change, the world itself, are illusions. But its clear meaning is that when the ego is entirely subject to the deterministic pressures that act on it from outside itself, it does not act freely. Then it is not the doer, but things are done to it. After studying the bearing of developments in physics on the question of freedom, Max Planck⁹² stated. "The freedom of the ego here and now and its independence of the causal chain is a truth that comes from the immediate dictate of the human consciousness." Vyasa would be in essential agreement with this, but, from his point of view, the statement would lack analytical subtlety and precision. Basically, his claim is that the ego cannot be hypostatized. When the reflex arc is no longer the pattern of behaviour, when cortical evolution has made the capacity for conceptual thought a reality, motivation and action are determined by the self-image which the individual builds up for himself. This self-image is the ego, not the deep-lying essential being, which lies dormant till reason turns inward to face those depths and reflects it in its self-appraisal. This means that the empirical ego is not something fixed and concrete like a vermiform appendix. It is perpetually being moulded to shape. This is why Vyasa gives the very elaborate analysis of the Tamasic, Rajasic and Satvic egos, relating them precisely to the self-image and the world-image that the individual forms, and deriving from them the specific patterns of the whole arc of motivation, action and psychological reaction to the fruits of action. If freedom can be equated with self-determination, the equation would still lack precise meaning if the nature of the self is left undefined. Bodily and mental causes operate here⁹³. momentary mood, impulses and desires as well as long-term purposes and ideals⁹⁴. That is why Vyasa gives elaborate prescriptions regarding disciplines of self-control, both physical and mental, and stresses both knowledge (*Vijnana*) and wisdom (*Jnana*) as essential for the discovery of the real self.

Since the relation between the self and the self-image is of fundamental importance to Vyasa's interpretation of freedom and since that interpretation synthesises metaphysics and aesthetics, the analysis needs a further clarification. In the *Gita*, no distinction is made between the *Kshetrajna*, the knower of the field, and the Supreme Person. Elsewhere in the *Maha Bharata* also, Vyasa states "When the soul (*Atman*) is associated with the modes of nature it is called the knower of the field, when it is not thus associated, it is called the Supreme Self"⁹⁵. After thus establishing the identity of the transcendent and the immanent, Vyasa concentrates on immanence, because he is not a disembodied spirit but a poet writing for embodied beings. This indwelling knower of the field illumines the whole

of the field, the entire world of becoming, "as the one sun illuminates the whole earth".⁹⁶ All that is embodied is a union of the field and the knower. Vyasa's meaning is very clear throughout. But Sankara, with his passion for the transcendent and his misgivings about the embodied condition, rebelled against this view which makes becoming also an authentic mode of being. Therefore, when Vyasa affirms that all that exists is a union of the field and its knower, Sankara distorts the meaning by declaring the union of the two to be of the nature of an illusion (*Adhyasa*) which consists in confounding the world for reality, becoming for being. He saw that Vyasa's view affirmed God to be a transmigrant, in fact the only transmigrant, since Becoming was Being in its dynamic aspect. In an unguarded moment Sankara himself admits. "Of a truth God is the only transmigrant (*Satyam nesvarad anyad samsarin*)"⁹⁷ But he regresses immediately to his Eleatic standpoint and argues that "the Supreme Being seems to be a transmigrant (*Samsarin*), by reason of the cosmic manifestation, even as the individual self seems to be bound by its identification with the body". For him, all this is like mistaking a rope in dim light for a snake. Only the rope is there. Likewise, the world and Becoming are illusions. The individual self can be regarded as a distinct entity only in the rather pointless sense in which the space within an earthen jar can be regarded as distinct from the ambient space. And consistent with his rigorous monism, when Krishna says that the enlightened "become of like nature to Me (*mama sadharmyam agatah*)"⁹⁸ Sankara interprets *Sadharmya* to mean absolute identity of being and not equality of attributes.

Sankara's rigorous monism leaves too many loose strands lying about. It is with the empirical self, the core of personality which is a psychological complex of character, attitudes, preferences, that a person starts on the journey towards realisation. Vyasa insists on our realistic recognition of this situation. But if, as Sankara says, the self (*Atman*) is absolutely identical with the Supreme Self (*Paramatman*) how could it ever have conceived of itself as a separate entity? Sankara's answer is that the self mistakes the phenomenon for the noumenon, being deceived by ignorance (*Avidya*). If the *Atman* is thus deceived, does it not amount to saying that the *Paramatman* is also deceived, since the two are claimed to be an absolute identity? As a matter of fact, the end of the spiritual journey reveals not so much that the *Atman* and the *Brahman* (Sankara prefers that term for its Eleatic associations, exactly for which reason Vyasa drops it in favour of "Supreme Being", *Puruṣhottama*) are identical, as that the *Brahman* is self-identical, since there is no self other than *Brahman* according to Sankara. This does not look like a meaningful statement. What is the meaning of a journey when at its end it is revealed that the goal alone exists and the journey and the self which made the journey are not real?

Cold thought confronts the proposition that all that is, is derived from

God, and is unable to see that the derivation can be a becoming, an emergent order of creativity. Vyasa, being as great a poet as a thinker, has no difficulties here. Nature with her three modes represents the creative power of the Supreme Person. The properties and functions of nature, once the order of nature is created, operate with autonomy, since it is for this efficient autonomy that the properties and functions have been assigned to her. And this autonomous working leads to an evolution which progressively creates the sensory and motor organs, mind and reason. The ego-sense develops through the synthesising action of reason which binds the memories of the past with the experiences of the present and expectations of the future, envisages goals, directs the sensory and motor organs for the journey to these goals. But since reason can be overwhelmed by impulse or led astray by erroneous conceptualisations of itself and the world, the ego grounded on it has a Protean variability and cannot be hypostatized as a fixed essence. That is why Vyasa gives extended analyses of the Tamasic, Rajasic and Satvic egos and also this exhortation and warning: "Man has to lift himself by himself. Let him not degrade himself, for the self alone is the friend of the self and the self alone is the enemy of the self. For him who has conquered his (lower) self by the (higher) self his Self is a friend. But for him who has not possessed his (higher) Self his very self will act like an enemy"⁹⁹ It is when reason turns inward to receive light from the source deep within that the ego-sense, always plastic, moulds to shape on the ground of its deepest reality. "The senses are great, greater than the senses is mind, greater than mind is reason, greater than reason is he (the soul)"¹⁰⁰ When a man dwells in his mind on the objects of sense, bondage to them is generated. From bondage is born desire and from desire is born passion. From passion arises bewilderment, from bewilderment the disintegration of memory and from the disintegration of memory the destruction of reason and from the destruction of reason he perishes.¹⁰¹ It is the emergence of the ego that makes possible the experience of subjectivity. But the ego can identify itself with any object or force and it will take colour and form from that identification. Bondage results when the plastic ego-sense is allowed to set on the basis of limited, superficial identifications. Liberation is a return to inward being, our deepest subjectivity. The discipline for this return is outlined thus: The mind should control the senses. It is the libertinism of the senses that leads to erroneous conceptual identifications (*Sankalpa*) of the ego and generates libidinal drives that block the discovery of the true subjective centre. Reason should control the mind and fix it, so disciplined, on the self.¹⁰² "Whatsoever makes the wavering and unsteady mind wander away let him restrain and bring it back to the control of the Self alone."¹⁰³

The Eleatic distortion of the whole reality here is condensed in a favourite metaphor: the sun's image glows like a second sun on the surface of a pool, in truth, there is only one sun and only the real sun remains when

the pool dries up. But, against the background of the reality claimed by Vyasa for nature as material process (*Apara Prakṛti*) guided by a teleological, evolutionary principle (*Para Prakṛti*), the ego cannot be dismissed as just a dead image. It is a living, striving reality and its discovery of its own deepest identity is a positive achievement, not a surrealist fantasy where the self mislays itself or thinks that it is something else and wakes up to realise that the whole thing has been a Dadaist practical joke. A polarised dualism, between the ego and the self, is initially necessary even if the final resolution is a close embrace. Rigid monism cannot provide this ecstatic longing for union. It is significant here that Sankara, the poet, is at variance with Sankara, the philosopher. In one of his hymns he says "Lord, it is the waves that get merged in the ocean and not the ocean in the waves. So, when all limitations are removed from me, it is I who become merged in Thee and not Thou in me." The polarisation which is the basis of the lyrical longing that inspires the spiritual quest is affirmed by Vyasa in a profound utterance that shows the longing to be mutual. "He who sees Me everywhere and sees all in Me, I am not lost to him, nor is he lost to Me"¹⁰⁴. But man has to strive in order not to be lost to his own self. The ego has to make the choice whether it should operate at the level of its peripheral capacities or discover its true subjective centre and grow to fulness on that base. Duns Scotus said that since freedom of the will is God's command, even God cannot dictate man's decision. Krishna concludes his teaching and tells Arjuna : "Thus has wisdom more secret than all secrets been declared to thee by Me. Reflect on it fully and do as thou chooseth."¹⁰⁵

While this final exhortation establishes the reality of the freedom of choice and action, certain passages have created fresh difficulties, though only for imperceptive interpreters. "Therefore stand up and gain glory. Vanquishing thy foes, enjoy an opulent realm. All these foes have already been slain by Me. Be thou the mere occasion (*numitta matram*)"¹⁰⁶. In order to understand the profound meaning of this we have to recall the providence (*Daivam*) which Vyasa mentioned as one of the factors, along with the agent of action, that determine any event in the world. Arjuna has the freedom to choose action or withdrawal. But even if he chooses action, the final result is not determined solely by his action, but by the pattern of innumerable convergent causes that begin to play upon any vectorial energy released towards an objective, since it acts in a milieu in which myriads of entities and forces are active. That this is the true meaning of the utterance, and not any Eleatic or fatalist interpretation that man's initiative is an illusion and a hollow mockery, is clearly brought out by this passage. "To action alone hast thou a right, not to its ultimate outcome. Let not the fruits of action be thy motive. Neither let there be in thee any inclination to inaction".¹⁰⁷ These pregnant words have a dramatic reference in the epic context to the opening scene where the too self-complacent Arjuna asks Krishna to drive the chariot to a vantage point

from which he can survey the enemy hosts "Let *me* see the warriors who are eager for battle (with *me*) Let *me* see the men with whom *I* have to contend in this strife"¹⁰⁸ Arjuna's ego has forgotten the immense plurality of the world and of the factors that determine the outcome of any action and he has to be made to see the truth On the other hand, his initiative too is a reality, if it is not, the *Gita* is a vast irrelevance in the epic action, for its clear object is to turn him back to action from his mood of profound depression As the Supreme Person, Krishna is the guardian of the eternal moral law (*sasvata dharmagopta*)¹⁰⁹ *Dharma* here is the extension of the Vedic concept of the cosmic order, *Rita* And Krishna gives the august assurance "Whenever there is a decline of righteousness and rise of unrighteousness, then I create Myself (*Srijami aham*) For the protection of the good, for the destruction of the wicked and for the establishment of moral order, I come into being (*sambhavam*) from age to age"¹¹⁰ But as we have already seen, in the epic, Krishna is a non-combatant and events are piloted by the action of Arjuna, though under his guidance Vyasa preserves both the creativity of human initiative and action in historical evolution and the vaster perspective of history as a fulfilment through an orchestration of myriad causal strands T S Eliot's reading of what Krishna meant is seriously wrong

It is important to note how the meaning of the expression, *Kanta*, agent of action, fluctuates Vyasa points out that the ego which surrenders itself to the drives of its inferior nature is mistaken in regarding itself as the agent of action, for all that happens here is due to the modes of nature working on each other 'When the ego has discovered its true centre of subjectivity it gains the sovereign right of action But when it realises that events are determined by a divine scheme, of which its action is only one factor, though a very important one, it exchanges its status as the agent of action for something which is really far higher, the status of being a conscious and responsible instrument Aurobindo says "When we are freed by knowledge, the Lord, no longer hidden in our hearts, but manifest as our supreme self, takes up our works and uses us as faultless instruments, *numitta-matram*, for the helping of the world"¹¹¹ This principle of harmony is in harmony with the profoundest intuitions in the Christian tradition "We have the mind of Christ"¹¹² "I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me"¹¹³ Aquinas wrote "The works of a man who is led by the Holy Ghost are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own"¹¹⁴ Boehme cautions you against breaking off "with thine own willing, from God's willing, and with thine own seeing from God's seeing"

But this ascent to the role of an instrument should not be misunderstood as a relapse into comfortable passivity That is why there is always danger in imprecise definitions like this one by Tauler "By their works they cannot go again If any man is to come to God, he must be empty of all works and let God work alone" There should be an alignment

in motivation or inspiration for action, not a surrender of action. If Vyasa makes use of certain features of Samkhya thought and of Patanjali's discipline of meditation, his fundamental difference should always be kept in mind. The rigid dualism of Samkhya, like the rigid monism of Patanjali and later of Sankara, rules out the continuation of works after liberation has been attained. But the *Gita's* injunction is to worship the divine by our own work (*svakarma*) . Our offering must be the works determined by the profoundest law of our own functioning (*svadharma*) and nature (*svabhava*) . A surrender that is really the acquisition of an "opulent realm" (*Rajyam samiddham*) is implied here. But it is not the surrender of action. Vyasa's Yoga is "skill in action" (*Karmasu Kausalam*) and the supreme skill lies in abiding in action while remaining outside the frame of determined motivations, and consequences which react on the agent to build up further deterministic pressures. Here we turn back to the clarification of the demand made by Vyasa that man must transcend all the modes of lower nature since they all work "as if mounted on a machine"

In the analysis of the determinism of natural phenomena, Kant proved more profound than Hume and Freud. In accepting the rule of the causal law in the empirical world while affirming the freedom of the human spirit, and in noting the coexistence of freedom and a categorical imperative, Kant¹¹⁵ was able to define the whole problem with a just insight. Man is free only because he is controlled and created, having within himself a principle that requires his allegiance. He is free when he binds himself to his sense of duty¹¹⁶. But Vyasa's analysis penetrates far beyond this Kantian terminal. The word *Dharma*, as we noted earlier, is a very complex term with layers of meaning. In the *Dharma Sastras*, or the wisdom literature of India, it is generally used in the sense of moral duty, prescriptions of behaviour which the individual is asked to obey in the interests of social cohesion and order. *Dharma* here is an external command which has to be accepted as an obligation. But *Dharma* also means function and is genetically related to intrinsic property or nature, *Svabhava*, of which it is the active expression. In the world of becoming, *Svabhava* is not fixed, but can change and evolve. The word itself means "self-becoming". Vyasa's analysis, therefore, proceeds in the direction of a self-piloted evolution, at the end of which *Dharma*, while continuing to be the same type of moral action as is enjoined by ethics, will cease to be obedience to an external prescription and will become the function of an evolved nature, *Svabhava*. The sense of a categorical imperative, with its constraint, is shed. "The man whose delight is in the Self alone, who is content with the Self, for him there exists no work that has to be done"¹¹⁷. All obligatory duties cease to be valid at this level (*Sarva-dharma-parityajya*) . Obligatory prescription is necessary when man functions at the level of nature, in any of her three modes. It is not necessary now because the state is a transcendence of all the three modes (*Traigunatitya*) .

Not being tainted with the least distrust of the embodied condition, be-

coming or being-in-the-world, strongly believing in the teleological principle behind the evolution of nature, Vyasa makes it clear that what is meant here is not a repudiation of nature. We have the thing we seek within us, but we have in practice to evolve it out of the lower planes of our nature. Therefore, in the action of the modes itself there must be some means, some *point d'appui*, some leverage, by which we can effect this transformation¹¹⁸. The Satvic nature is the ground for this take-off. But although it is far more evolved than the Rajasic and Tamasic natures, it is not the terminal, because a finer and nobler ego may still be a self-centered ego, desirous of reward (*phalakamkshi*), even though the reward may be the satisfaction of having behaved virtuously. We have to reach this ego first, but we have to leave behind this empirical ego and reach out to the Self. "He whose self is harmonised by this discipline of action sees the Self abiding in all beings and all beings in the Self"¹¹⁹. He who is trained in the way of works and is pure in soul, who is master of his self and who has conquered the senses, whose soul becomes the Self of all beings (*sarvabhutatmabhutatma*), he is not tainted by action, though he acts¹²⁰. It is the sense of obligatory duty that drops away, not action. Work is not practised any longer as a discipline (*sadhana*), but becomes the functional expression (*lakshana*) of an evolved nature¹²¹. Krishna tells Uddhava in the *Bhagavata*: "The emancipated individual does not do the virtuous act because he is conscious that it will yield good or refrain from the evil act because he is conscious that it will yield evil consequences. But, like a child, he spontaneously does the good deed and refrains from the bad"¹²². Dattatreya says in the same poem: "Two types of people live in this world in bliss, free from tensions: the innocent child and the enlightened who has transcended the three modalities of nature"¹²³. The self lives consciously in the divine and acts from that consciousness. Here again, the genetic relationship between *Svabhava*, nature, and *Svadharmā*, function, is splendidly maintained. The meaning of *Dharma* rises from behaviour functionally derived from the needs and urges of the self to behaviour which sustains the order of the world, because the nature of the self, *Svabhava*, has become attuned with that of the Self of the world. The liberated "have attained to My state of being (*madbhavam agatah*)"¹²⁴ have become "of like functional nature to Me (*mama sadharmyam agatah*)"¹²⁵.

The Purva Mimamsa school, who clung to a Vedic literalism, meant by *Karma*, not action and work, but the ritual deed, and by *Yajna*, not dedicated, sacrificial action, but the ritual sacrifice. But Vyasa insisted that all conscientious action has the sanctity of a ritual and that all action should be a dedication, *Yajna*, in this sense. The Vedic ritual sacrifice is used as a metaphor with a profound deepening of meaning. For the man who works without being attached to the self, "the act of offering is God, the oblation is God. By God it is offered into the fire of God. God is that which is to be attained by him who realizes God in his works"¹²⁶. This should be related to the earlier passage where the Supreme Person

declares . "There is not for Me any work in the three worlds which has to be done nor anything to be obtained which has not been obtained Yet I am engaged in work For, if ever I did not engage in work unwearied, men would in every way follow my path These worlds would fall into ruin, I would become the creator of disorder and destroy these people."¹²⁷ Thus, the individual who has attained to His state of being, has become of like function to Him, works like Him for the weal of the world, spontaneously with a dedication where no self-interest remains "Therefore, without attachment, perform always the work that has to be done, for man attains to the highest by doing work without attachment"¹²⁸ Only the nature of the motivation changes here, selfless activity has to be as intense as the activity of those who determinedly pursue their self-interest in this world "In the (intense) way the unlearned act from attachment to their work, so should the wise also act, but without any attachment, with the desire to maintain the weal of the world (*lokasamgraham*)"¹²⁹ The final message is that the liberated is not alienated from the world, but works for its weal, since he has reached profound attunement with the Supreme Being, who, too, is not alienated from the world but is ever at work for its weal "Dear to Me is he from whom the world does not shrink and who does not shrink from the world"¹³⁰ They who restrain the senses, and remain even-minded in all conditions, rejoicing in the welfare of all creations (*sarvabhuta-hiterata*) attain to Me . "¹³¹

III. ACTIVIST ENGAGEMENT AND AESTHETIC RELISHING

Useful though this account of Vyasa's world-view may be, we have now to establish its relevance in this work, which is concerned with poetics and not with philosophy strictly as such We shall now see that Vyasa's thought has vital relevance in the study of poetics, because it is the thought of a poet building up a world-view which is basically poetic

Let us begin by remembering his background "Vyasa" is not his real name, which was Krishna He was also called Dwaipayana because he was born in a river island (*Dwipa* = island) "Vyasa" means compiler or editor (literally, sorter or divider) Tradition affirms him to be the man who undertook the tremendous task of arranging the entire mass of Vedic literature into the four Vedic compilations with their Aranyakas and Upanishads The *Gita* also shows him to be thoroughly familiar with not only Vedic lore but all the previous currents of philosophical thought like those of the Charvakas or materialists and the Samkhyas or Sophists Like any poem of T S Eliot's, the *Gita* also is very rich in its texture, assimilating innumerable phrases and idioms and expressions from the Vedas and the Upanishads But the significant fact remains that, though saturated in philosophy, Vyasa rejected the philosophical treatise as the form for the expression of his meditations on nature and man and man's destiny

The fact that the *Gita* is read today almost invariably as an isolated

philosophical poem is not Vyasa's fault. The *Gita* is a strictly functional episode in a vast epic, for it takes place at a central crisis of the epic action and its relevance is that it resolves that crisis and allows the epic action to resume its forward flow. In the battlefield, Arjuna, the Pandava hero, experiences a profound crisis of spirit. He begins to wonder what use an empire would be if it is to be won by bloodshed. It is at this critical moment that a profound transformation takes place in the narrative. A pinnacle of thought has to be ascended towards an integrative world-vision, because the highest insight is needed to take decision, here and now, to choose between action and withdrawal. Poetry is valid only if the world is real. Further, poetry can confront the most terrible explosion of the world's energies. But such an encounter is utterly different from the sweet sessions of silent thought which the philosopher holds in the quiet seclusion of his study. Vyasa's study is the war chariot. The tremendous *fortissimo* of the myriad sounds of the battlefield relaxes only for a moment to allow the dialogue on muted strings to be heard. When the interior dialogue is over, the thunder of the battlefield once again storms into consciousness like a peremptory call of the world demanding immediate attention to its crisis and the epic action is resumed.

Vyasa thus accepts the world as the ground of the most intense experience and as the challenge for its poetic resolution. Krishna describes the world or nature with its modes as "this divine (*daivi*) creativity (*Maya*) of Mine"¹³². Eleatic thought would insist on interpreting *Maya* as illusion. But it is exactly here that Vyasa recalls the positive intuitions of earlier thought and confirms them through Krishna's august affirmation. The riddle of creation had fascinated the Indian mind right from the earliest days. "Who could perceive (it) directly", asks the Rîg Veda, "and who could declare whence born and why this variegated creation?"¹³³. Anandagiri, the thirteenth century commentator of the *Gita*, feels that this riddle is beyond solution by the human mind. "We cannot say that it is meant for the enjoyment of the Supreme, for the Supreme really enjoys nothing. It is pure consciousness, a mere witness. And there is no other enjoyer, for there is no other conscious entity. Nor is creation intended to secure liberation (*moksha*), for it is opposed to liberation. Thus neither the question nor an answer to it is possible and there is no occasion for it, as creation is due to the *Maya* of the Supreme." Vyasa's deep poetic intuition, however, affirmed that an answer could be found. Anandagiri interprets *Maya* as illusion. But the word is derived from the root, *ma*, to form, to build, and originally meant the capacity to create forms. "Though unborn and imperishable, yet establishing Myself in My own nature, I come into (empiric) being through My creativity (*Atmamayaya*)"¹³⁴. This clear affirmation rules out any interpretation that creation, becoming, is mere appearance.

The riddle of the motivation still remains. Anandagiri's difficulty is that the Supreme can possibly have no need to create. The assertion of

the Supreme Person in the *Gita* that, though he has no unrealised objectives to realise, he is ever at work, should have given Anandagiri the clue that activity can be endotelic. Ducasse¹³⁵ has luminously clarified the motivational aspects of action. Activity is of two kinds—as means to a goal external to itself, as an end in itself. Utilitarian activity belongs to the first type. Play belongs to the second category. Schiller noted the close affinity between play activity and aesthetic creativity, which is really a higher activity of the same category. In his interpretation of the expression “divine creativity (*daivi-maya*)”, Abhinava renders *daivi* as play (*krida*)-like on the authentic basis of the Vedic definition of divine beings as active without the promptings of unfulfilled needs, of their activity as sport (*Devah kridakarastata bhava daivi*). The concept of sport, *Krida* or *Lila*, is found in the *Brahma Sutra*¹³⁶ and there is an Upanishadic affirmation¹³⁷ that the one God is eternally at play (*nutyalilanurakta*) in the varied activities of the world.

Vyasa himself develops this concept to the fullest extent in the *Bhagavata*. And it is worth while glancing at the exposition of the concept in this great work also, as it is a sequel to the *Maha Bharata* and the *Gita* and its analysis from the specific point of view of organic relevance to aesthetic doctrine does not seem to have been attempted so far.

The *Bhagavata* describes itself as the narration of the spontaneous sports (*Lila*) of the Supreme Person who incarnated as Krishna through his divine creativity (*Atma Maya*) which is the very form of his own being (*Atmaswarupini*)¹³⁸. Each term in this definition is a condensed treasure of profound meaning. *Maya* does not mean the projection of the phantasmagoria of appearance, it means embodiment, material manifestation, the taking on of objectivity which will be palpable to the senses, intellect and imagination. It is in fact the self-transformation of God as nature, of being as becoming. This creation is a sport which is also a serious enterprise¹³⁹. Sky and air, fire and water, the earth, planets and stars, rivers and sea are all the manifestation of God as material reality¹⁴⁰. The beauty of entire creation is only a tiny drop of the beauty of God¹⁴¹. Becoming is being unfolding in terms of origin, development and disappearance, the cycle being ever renewed. The three modalities of nature—Tamasic, Rajasic and Satvic—are the instrumentalities employed by Being for its self-transformation as Becoming¹⁴². Time is the emergent reality of this transformation¹⁴³. Time is the measured pace of being in becoming. The action of the modalities of nature is His work and sport¹⁴⁴. “I am the dynamism of dynamic phenomena. I am the active inner principle of natural objects.”¹⁴⁵ Time cannot be interpreted as a fatality of instability or a continuous, irrevocable decay. The waters flow away incessantly, combustible material burns away every second in the flame, nevertheless the river and the flame are realities, just as the moon’s reality is not affected by the fact that its orb is always seen in the phases of growth or decay.¹⁴⁶ The body, the biological basis of the reality of the organism, is also changing

similarly every second. The incessant change (*Nitya Pralaya*) does not destroy the reality of the organism¹⁴⁷. Becoming is being as process. The world is real as a river current is real¹⁴⁸.

This process is also an evolution. But just as the incessant change of process creates initial difficulties in understanding becoming as an authentic reality, the subtle action of the teleological principle in material processes is also difficult to grasp at first. "Since the primordial elements of matter are structured into the bodies of living things they can be said to have formed these bodies. But since they were there even before as potential causes (for biological evolution) they may be regarded as not having undergone any special creative transformation. I exist in created objects as their soul. But since nothing else exists besides Me, it may be argued that I do not (specially) exist in them"¹⁴⁹. After a long controversy about material causation and teleology, science today has reached a similar insight and realises that the two principles are not contradictory, but are in fact aspects of a unitary, integrative principle. "The meaning of any natural thing or event", says the biologist, Herrick,¹⁵⁰ "cannot be fully grasped or explained scientifically until we discover its relations to the other components of the orderly flow of process we call our cosmos. The mechanism of this apparent teleology is intrinsic to the natural system in operation, it is not imposed upon it from without. This is what we mean by saying that it is natural, not a mystic, thaumaturgy". Pauli,¹⁵¹ endorsing Bohr, has emphasised that physics and psyche have to be seen as complementary aspects of the same reality. The "double-aspect theory of psychology"¹⁵² integrates this insight. A single world-stuff is postulated, which reveals material or mental properties according to the point of view taken up. Looked at from outside, the world-stuff reveals only material properties. Its operations appear as mind only to itself, from within¹⁵³. And the living organism is psycho-physical because it is evolved from a nature which is psycho-physical¹⁵⁴.

Vyasa feels no difficulties here and moves to a confident analysis. It is Being's desire for creative self-expression that releases the telic principle (*Mahattatva*) to operate nature from within, as a formative principle embedded in nature¹⁵⁵. *Maya* is unambiguously defined as the evolutionary power that throws up embodiments, from the primordial elements to organisms¹⁵⁶. It is this *Maya* or nature, under the controlled direction of God, that moulds the body and psyche of organisms¹⁵⁷. "Before creation, there was only pure Being (*Paramatman*)". For the understanding of creation, Being itself is interpreted as nature with its three modalities. Again, it has been interpreted as the teleological principle (*Mahattatva*), because it is intelligence (*Logos*), as the inner active principle because it is dynamic and as the ego (*Ahamkara*) because it is the basis of living individuality (*Jiva*)¹⁵⁸. The ego is the product of the dynamism of nature evolving under the action of the teleological principle¹⁵⁹. This principle moves towards the possibility of an increasing range of experience. The body is

the instrument of experience and it is the inner telism implanted in nature by God that structures the synthesis and organisation of matter without which the body, the medium of experience, cannot be moulded.¹⁶⁰ The various sensory organs evolve—are evolved—for enabling experience¹⁶¹ The integrative reality, however, is not the body but the psychophysical self, the ego. The self is the self-luminous principle without which the intellect cannot terminate in the light of understanding; it is the source of the initiative for action without which the motor organs will never be able to move to the execution of anything¹⁶² Whitehead¹⁶³ gives this analysis. Our experience in the present discloses its own nature as with two sources of derivation, namely, the body and the antecedent experiential functionings. Also there is a claim for identification with each of these sources. But the body is mine and the antecedent experience is mine. Still more, there is only one ego, to claim the body and to claim the stream of experience.

Pantheism limits pure being to created reality, which is a finite reality. In Vyasa's doctrine, the Supreme Person exists both in the transcendental as well as embodied states. The ascetic tradition of world-denial feels that the latter is a grading down of absolute reality, if not a total alienation from it. Vyasa is completely free from this type of feeling. "Though the Supreme Person is eternally immersed in the relish of the bliss which is His Self, at times, through the desire for play, He manifests Himself as nature and then the series of creation commences."¹⁶⁴ The ascetic view is nervous about attributing any desire to Pure Being, for it would indicate Being to be in need of something, of which it is deprived at that moment. Play and aesthetic creativity, on the other hand, are not initiated by a sense of deprivation, but by an overflow of the creative energy of the self which seeks self-expression through objectification in myriad forms. "Though He lacks nothing, though He needs nothing, though He is plenitude and self-sufficiency, He engages in entrancingly lovely sport"¹⁶⁵ This sport is creative self-expression and therefore essentially an aesthetic activity. "He, the Lord of *Maya* (creativity), desired to transform Himself into the Many"¹⁶⁶ The withdrawn, transcendental state as well as creation and immanence are merely two states of his being¹⁶⁷ If anything, the bias of the poet is, as it should be, on the side of creation. Suka, the son of Vyasa, says: "I am firm-rooted in the *Nuguna Brahman*"—(the formless transcendental, the void and abyss of Eckhart and Boehme)—"but Krishna's sports have captivated my heart in spite of itself." That is why Suka recites the *Bhagavata* throughout the land. He does not hesitate to call this lyrical narrative the "very form of the deity (*Bhagavatsvarupa*)"¹⁶⁸ As the poem is the concretisation in sensuously palpable tissue of the spirit, the world is the self-expression of Being. "*Maya* is the delighted smile of God"¹⁶⁹ The visualisation of Krishna in the *Bhagavata* was so exquisite that it became the basic iconographic model for Indian sculpture and painting. Towards the end of the *Bhagavata*, the symbolism of the details

of the visualisation is explained. "Though unborn, Krishna wears the vital power of embodied existence, which is the intrinsic power of His own being, as the sparkling *Kaustubha* gem on his chest ' The garland of woodland blossoms he wears is *Maya* with her Satvic and other modalities"¹⁷⁰ "The static (*nishkriya*) Absolute is inspired by desire for poetic self-expression to transform itself into dynamic (*saṁkriya*) becoming and proliferates into the myriad forms and actions of the world, into the dualities of meaning and word (*śabda-artha rūpa*), intention and linguistic expression (*vachya-vachaka rūpa*)"¹⁷¹

Without perceptive poetic insight, the formless transcendental is very easily misunderstood as a void. This happened in the concept of *Nirvana* in Hinayana Buddhism and of the *Nirguna Brahman* in Hindu thought. Vyasa, through the words of Suka, rejects these concepts for the more profoundly valid and far richer concept of a Supreme Person, for not only the reality of the world but the possibility of poetry will wither away in the arid ground of these fallacies. A remarkable confirmation of this last assertion comes from Mallarmé. During a certain phase of his life he came to the conviction that God was a fantasy, a comforting myth invented by men to hide the appalling truth that behind the apparently solid world of appearances was merely nothingness. The belief destroyed the possibility of poetry. "I am too desolate to believe even in my poetry and to put myself again to work, which the shattering thought has made me abandon"¹⁷² The *Bhagavata* was possible because the *Nirguna Brahman* was abandoned for the radiant personalisation of Krishna. The world also was restored its reality, for "creation is the delighted smile of God". Mallarmé described modern poets, including himself, as the "unfortunate we whom the earth disgusts and who have no refuge except the dream". Baudelaire's imagination is always setting sail for exotic lands and the realms of fantasy. Reacting against this, Claudel wrote "I know I am here with God and every morning I reopen my eyes in paradise"¹⁷³ Poetry is not dream and illusion, he said. There is a "perennial poetry" the themes of which are furnished by the creation. "The end of poetry is not, as Baudelaire says, 'plunging into the depth of the infinite for discovering the new', but penetrating into the depth of the definite to discover there the inexhaustible"¹⁷⁴

The affirmation of the authenticity of being-in-the-world by Vyasa against its rejection as an illusion by ascetic orthodoxy has had striking parallels in recent times in the re-interpretation of early Christian tradition. Thus, the existentialist thought of Heidegger was assimilated by Bultmann¹⁷⁵ in his exposition of the philosophy of the New Testament. In clarifying the concept of the *soma* in Paul, Bultmann uses Heidegger's analysis of man as "being-in-the-world". Bultmann takes *soma* to stand for "a way of being and more particularly, a way of being in virtue of which man is in a world"¹⁷⁶ Here Bultmann is accepting into the Christian belief-system the existentialist affirmation that becoming is also being. Macquarrie¹⁷⁷ feels

difficulties in unreservedly accepting such a synthesis. He tests Bultmann's equation by applying it to the difficult passage in *I Corinthians XV* with its puzzling allusion to a "spiritual body". For our usual understanding of what is meant by a body, this is sheer contradiction. But if we take *soma* as "being-in-the-world", then the natural body is that way of being in which man identifies himself with his present physical environment and what it offers, the spiritual body that way of being by which he responds to an environment that offers to him again his true self. "On earth he is always more or less estranged from himself, in the life to come he is at one with himself." By an ambiguity which to me seems deliberate, Macquarrie is seeking to re-establish the Eleatic view while seemingly accommodating the existentialist affirmation of the authenticity of being-in-the-world. For he restores the old antithesis between life in the world and the life to come. This is not Bultmann's meaning, nor Vyasa's. Vyasa says very clearly that the nature of man's being becomes mechanically determined and helpless (*Avasa*) only when it surrenders itself to the determinism of nature. But man can establish himself on nature and use being-in-the-world for the self-affirmation of the spirit. The body, the most concrete symbol of being-in-the-world, then becomes not only useful but absolutely indispensable for the most perfect spiritual fruition, for man has to fulfil himself as embodied being, not as disembodied spirit. It is only when the embodied condition is thus established as authentic that poetry can become meaningful and authentic. "What, in effect, is poetry?" asked Lamartine¹⁷⁸. "It is the incarnation of the most intimate reality of man's heart and the most divine element of his thought, of the most magnificent images and the most melodious sounds of visible nature. It is at once feeling and sensation, spirit and matter. That is why it is the complete language, the perfect utterance that takes in man in the wholeness of his humanity - thought for his intellect, feeling for the soul, image for the imagination, music for the ear." This is the profounder meaning of the *Bhagavata's* affirmation that the relation between meaning (*Vachya*) and expression (*Vachaka*) is also an aspect of the relation between static, transcendental being and dynamic becoming or creation. The *Bhagavata* is *Bhagavatsvarupa*, poetry is the very form of Reality.

Since, from an absolute perspective, nothing exists but God, it is He who experiences the world as embodied being, through the sensory and motor organisation of the body and through the myriad forms of nature¹⁷⁹. The poet of creation, however, is not submerged by experience, but dominates it and relishes it. "He is like an actor who takes on many roles but does not forget his identity in any of them. He creates this world, sports in it and in the end withdraws the world into Himself"¹⁸⁰. Krishna tells Uddhava - "My being is pure bliss, pure experience, pure spirit"¹⁸¹. Even in the transcendental state (*anuvachanavasta*), which the ascetic tradition would regard as an unmodified, rippleless (*nrvikara*) state, Vyasa affirms the continuing reality of the glow of realish¹⁸². "The real nature of *Paramatman*

is unitary relish, serenity, freedom from tension, pure consciousness"¹⁸³ The antithesis between being and becoming is thus eliminated by Vyasa. Pure relish is the nature of being, whether withdrawn and transcendental or self-projected into the world and immanent in it

From the point of view of embodied beings, true knowledge is defined by Krishna as the awareness of all the aspects, fundamental and evolutionary, of the material world and of the spirit that abides as the ground of the world.¹⁸⁴ The emphasis, thus, is again on the acceptance of the world, not its rejection as an illusory appearance. This is clarified beyond any ambiguity. "If knowledge and the ecstasy of devotion are to be realised, it is possible only through this human body. This human body is the means for all auspicious fruition"¹⁸⁵ The specific mention of the human form is not due to any anthropocentrism, but due to a profound insight into the realities of biological evolution and the capacity of man to be the conscious agent of experience instead of being a marionette of blind drives. "The world is a stream of action. It is a tree, the bloom of which is experience (*Bhoga*) and the fruit liberation (*Moksha*)"¹⁸⁶ Since, in Vyasa's thought, liberation is not regression into unconsciousness but the experience of positive relish, this means that experience as involvement has to modulate as experience as detached, aesthetic relish. This is possible only when biological evolution reaches the stage of man. "By His creativity (*Maya*) the Supreme person commenced creation and evolved numerous organic forms like trees, reptiles, fishes, birds and mammals. But He was not satisfied. Therefore He created the human species. The intellect of man has a great uniqueness. Through it *Brahman* can be realised. Man is mortal and death is ever behind him. Nevertheless, the special greatness of the human organisation is the capacity to realise the ultimate goal, liberation (*Moksha*). Therefore, man should endeavour to reach liberation before death. Mere sensory experience is possible in the case of other biological species too"¹⁸⁷

Liberation is attaining to the Supreme Person. Krishna tells Uddhava: "This human body is the most serviceable vehicle for knowing My nature and reaching Me. Whoever, after being gifted with it (the human form), worships Me with genuine love, will attain to Me"¹⁸⁸ This, incidentally, is not the old doctrine of the jealous tribal deity fiercely demanding homage. If dualism, and the concept of God as the wholly other, are suggested here, it is because it is an initial, poetic statement which will be soon given a psychological clarification. And even within the limits of the poetic statement, devotion is seen as a bipolar field where both the poles attract and are attracted. Krishna tells Uddhava that the individual perfected in devotion needs or seeks nothing, not even liberation. "My love of my own self is not as great as My love of such spirits. I wander in the wake of such an individual. Why? Because the dust rising from the tread of his feet may perchance flutter and fall on Me and make Me holy"¹⁸⁹ The psychological doctrine, of which this is the poetic expression is thus ex-

pounded Against those who would dismiss the world as an illusion, Krishna asserts "Nobody will be able to establish the world as different from spirit"¹⁹⁰ Becoming is being But very serious misunderstanding will arise if levels of evolving inwardness are not distinguished in the material and biological reality of nature "Those who emphasize the aspect of the embodied soul (*Jiva*) as the radiant energy of consciousness (*Chaitanya*) define it as *Anusayi*, that is, resting on nature, as on a bed Those who emphasize its aspect as an evolute, define it as *Avyakṛta*, that is, of the form of nature itself."¹⁹¹ This makes it essential to distinguish the spirit from material nature for the operational purposes (*Vyavahara*) of a self-directed evolution towards inwardness¹⁹² It is the empirical ego that starts the upward ascent At first it identifies itself with the mind (sensory functions) But the modalities (*Guna*) of material nature—which operate like a machine, as the *Gita* clarified—invade the mind, saturate it and transform it into their own nature¹⁹³ "Until the ego discovers its deeper reality as spirit and abides there, it is impossible to discriminate between the mind and the *Gunās*"—that is, if the ego does not realise its inwardness, it will remain determined by external factors The *Gita* had defined *Yoga* as skill in action In the prayer of the gods to Krishna, this skill in action (*Karma Kausala*) is clarified as his ability to remain free from the modalities of nature even while manifesting himself through them¹⁹⁴ And Krishna says later "Among skills I am the skill in the discrimination between that which is of the spirit and that which is not of the spirit (*Atmanatma viveka kausala*)."¹⁹⁵ In the passage immediately after the affirmation that the embodied being who worships him with genuine love will attain to him, Krishna clarifies that He is not the wholly other, but the deeper self of man "I do not reside far The soul, whose nature is bliss, residing within the conscience of man, is Myself"¹⁹⁶

The *Bhagavata* has an extraordinary concept of a dual individuality, (*Yugala-rupa*, *Yugala-bhuta*) . Nara-Narayana¹⁹⁷ Etymologically the words would mean man and God, or in the conjugated form, man-God They are, in terms of mythical concretisation, two incarnations But they are always together and addressed as an identity Again, Narayana is reborn as Krishna, and Nara as Arjuna Krishna is Arjuna's charioteer and in the depth of the allegory, the charioteer of the empirical ego is the real self This is not rigid monism, for that doctrine offers no intelligible explanation for the fact that the ego has to discover the charioteer for the spiritual journey

Alongside the affirmation that the Supreme Person becomes manifold and enjoys experience, there is also the subtle affirmation that he creates these manifold forms, enters into them and enables each species to enjoy the range of objective experience open to it in terms of its psychophysical organisation or evolutionary level¹⁹⁸ The Satvic level is indicated here as the highest level "The Satvic state is the route for reaching Me"¹⁹⁹ But reaching him is really reaching down into man's own deeper self "It

is when the Satvic quality is strengthened that the ego is stabilised in its own intrinsic nature and function (*svadharma*) which takes the form of devotion to Me"²⁰⁰ Since the Satvic is also a modality of nature, this means that nature itself provides to empirical being a *point d'appui* for the highest realisation. The Samkhya distrust of nature is completely rejected here. And it has to be, for Vyasa's *Purusha* is not aloof from nature but its master. The teleological doctrine is extended from biological evolution to spiritual evolution. "He continuously inspires the creation to the most auspicious functional realisation of its own nature (*Dharmanushthana*) and thus orients it spirit-ward"²⁰¹

But inspiration is not compulsion and if man is to rise to Satvic perfection, it must be by his own effort. "That knowledge is Satvic which realises that the soul is not bound"²⁰²—by the world, though it is active in the world. "That happiness is Satvic which is realised through inwardness (*antarmukhatva*), through realisation of the Self"²⁰³ Krishna distinguishes his realm from the heaven of popular religion as well as the near-insentience of the Brahmic state so popular with the world-denying tradition. "The uniqueness of that realm is this. Though it is a *Loka* (realm where sentience and experience are possible, not the extinction of *Nirvana*), it is ever free from anxiety and tension. Though it is a state of experience (*Bhoga*), it is distinguished by the plenitude of the bliss of spirit"²⁰⁴ Markandeya's prayer affirms the poetic preference of the Satvic perfection of the embodied condition to the transcendental, near-insentient Brahmic state. "That which yields peace to embodied beings is Thy Satvic form"²⁰⁵

The Supreme Person in His aspect as the Satvic reality is the One who transforms Himself as the Many, prompted by no need, nor desire for material benefit. Creation is sport, *Lila*, for play activity is not the result of the pull of utilitarian desire, but a spontaneous overflow of energy. In outlining an emanatory theory of the universe, the Upanishads had used this image. "As a spider projects and withdraws its web so does this world here proceed from the Immutable."²⁰⁶ Vyasa uses the image, but with a subtle modification which makes the emanation a *Lila*. "As the spider issues the gossamer from its own mouth, and, after sporting, suspended on it, withdraws the web into itself, You, through Your creative power (*Maya*), transform Yourself into myriad forms for sporting in the creation, preservation and withdrawal of the world"²⁰⁷ Vyasa's concept of *Lila* embodies the earlier intuitions of creation as an essentially aesthetic act. The Vedic references to God as Poet (*Kavi*) and dancer outline the concept of the world as pure aesthetic creation. Play (*Krida*, *Lila*), as well as aesthetic self-expression indicate the welling up of energy that seeks creative outlet. The Vedas use this perception to outline an answer for the riddle of creation. At one place God is called the dancer²⁰⁸ Dancing is the beauty of movement. Pure Being may be static, but in creation, Being becomes rhythmic Becoming. God is also called the Poet in the Vedas. "He who is the supporter of the worlds of life, He, Poet, cherishes manifold

forms by His poetic power.”²⁰⁹ In the *Gita* also the Supreme Person refers to Himself as Poet.²¹⁰ Since liberation is attaining to the quality of being of the Supreme Person, it is attaining this poetic state wherein the world will be relished as creative sport or as a magnificent poetic experience. Claudel²¹¹ wrote “When He had composed the universe, when He had arranged the sport in beauty . . . and when you speak, O poet, in a delectable enumeration, uttering the name of each thing . . . you participate in its creation, you cooperate in bringing it into existence” The poetic word is a repetition of the creative act, he adds The word born of the poetic confrontation is not a denotation of the object as an utility, but the token of its aesthetic relishing Here it is very interesting to note that Vyasa’s metaphor of the spider reappears in both Mallarmé and Valéry. Mallarmé²¹² describes himself as poised in the deep centre of his own being for poetic creation “I seek the centre of my being where I rest like a spider, on the principal threads evolved from my own being and with whose help I shall weave at the points of contacts (of creative imagination with reality ?) the marvellous laceworks that I have conceived and that already exist in the bosom of beauty.” Valéry²¹³ writes : “I imagine the poet as a spirit full of resources and ruses, deceptively somnolent at the imaginary centre of his work yet uncreated, alertly waiting for the moment of power which is his prey. . . . There, attentive to the chance happenings from which it selects its nourishment, there, deep hidden in the midst of the network tracery and of the secret harps which it has made from linguistic tissue, whose threads are ever subtly vibrating, a mysterious spider, the hunting Muse, keeps alert watch.”

While Eleatic thought is nervously cautious about attributing any impulse or desire to Pure Being, the aesthetic vision of the world boldly ascribes to it the desire for creative self-expression According to the Creation Hymn²¹⁴ in the *Rig Veda*, pure static being was stirred by the impulse towards creation and the universe began “Desire entered the One in the beginning, desire which was the earliest seed born of spirit.” The *Upanishads* reiterate the concept Desire awakes in the One to be the many, in the infinite existence to be a finite series of historical existence. “*Brahman* desired ‘Let Me be many, let me multiply’ He reflected and after reflection He projected all this—whatever there is Having projected it, He penetrated into that very thing and became the gross and the subtle”²¹⁵ Vyasa accepts and reaffirms the concept “He is indivisible and yet He seems to be abiding divided among beings It is He who maintains creatures, destroys them and creates them afresh”²¹⁶ He is the poet, *Kavi*, who projects himself in many dramatic poems, peopled with myriad characters Vyasa’s Supreme Person is not the aloof, withdrawn, transcendental Being He is akin to that spirit which Blake characterised as Eternity, and which he said was in love with the productions of Time Eternity and temporal life need not be contradictory realities The Spanish poet Jorge Guillén wrote . “Dark eternity is not, no, is not, a monster of the heavens. Our

invisible souls capture its presence among things" Jiménez is another Spanish poet who accepts the world as the fruition of the creative desire of God "Green sea and grey sky and blue sky and loving albatrosses on the waves, and the sun over everything, and you in the sun, gazing down, desired and desirous God!" Rilke unconsciously echoes the affirmation in the *Bṛihad Aranyaka* Upanishad that God desired a second "What will you do, God, if I die, I am your jug (what if I am smashed?) I am your drink (what if I go bad?) I am your cloak and your trade, if you lose me you lose your purpose" Not man alone, but also sea and sky and the albatross on the wave are the purpose of God And in his confrontation of the myriad objects which God created out of His poetic desire for self-expression, man also should not renounce the desire that is poetic "The work of art", says Claudel,²¹⁷ "is the result of the collaboration of imagination with desire" But there should be no mistake about the quality of this desire "It is necessary that our sensibility should confront the object in a state of desire, that our activity (he means poetic activity, *Kavi Vyapana*) should be provoked by thousand scattered touches and kept mobilised, so to speak, to respond to impression with expression" The Satvic desire for self-expression, when confronted with the object, is totally different from the Tamasic obsession with it or the Rajasic desire to appropriate it in the utilitarian seizure

The aesthetic significance of the myriad forms of creation is often forgotten in the emphasis on the unilinear trend in evolution from amoeba to man It is very interesting to note, therefore, that a distinguished biologist, Agnes Arber, has drawn attention to it in a work whose title, *The Manifold and the One*,²¹⁸ unconsciously echoes the expression "Divided and Indivisible (*Vibhaktam avibhaktam*)" in the *Gita*²¹⁹ Arber stresses the aesthetic quality of individuality and the subtle relationship between the essential and unique self-expression of everything and the inclusive reality in which it participates "Each thing represents one aspect of Reality, but Reality itself is wholly outside measurement The quality, for example, of any animal or plant may approximate to perfection in its own kind, but these perfections do not lead to one another and they cannot be ranged along a scale Each is ultimate in the sense of being an expression of the Absolute conditioned by the characteristics and limitations of a finite individuality" Vyasa sees in the world the Lord of existence expressing Himself for ever in His infinite range of quality (*ananta guna*) in the myriad forms of creation "Whatsoever there is, endowed with glory and grace and vigour, know that to have sprung from a fragment of My splendour"²²⁰ In a breathlessly rapid narration²²¹ Krishna enumerates as reflections of his splendour the sublimest forms of each species, the Himalayas among mountains, the thunderbolt among manifestations of energy, the banyan among trees, Uchaisravas (Indra's steed) among horses The *Book of Job* contemplates the fine form of the war-horse, streamlined for speed, with an aesthetic perception of the same profundity "Hast thou given

the horse his might ? Hast thou clothed his neck with the quivering mane ? Hast thou made him to leap as a locust ? The glory of his snorting is terrible ”

Yes, let us not forget that in this world, terror also abides along with beauty and that profounder intuition can see the beautiful in the terrible as well. Man has too often the tendency to make himself the centre of the world and evaluate other things in the light of their relevance to his interests. The horse has been domesticated by man from the earliest days. But the battery of questions that rain down on Job compels him to open his eyes afresh and see that the horse is a perfect creation, whose beauty is independent of the uses to which man puts it. This intuition is clarified in the other queries that continue to pour down. “Canst thou bind the rhinoceros with thy thong to the plough, or will he break the clods of the valleys after thee ? Canst thou put a ring in the whale’s nose and canst thou take him as a servant for ever ?” The aesthetic perception has to dawn to liberate us from the narrow perspective of purely practical interests. Its further task is to liberate us from the fear of the terrible. In the comfortable world-scheme of Eliphaz in the *Book of Job*, pain seems to have been exorcised, along with the sense of reality. “The tiger has perished for want of prey and the young lions are scattered abroad.” But later comes the thundered counter from God, which asserts that the lion whelps also are His care. “Wilt thou take the prey for the lioness and satisfy the appetite of her whelps ?” There is the picture of the eagle, at once pure representation and profound symbol. “The eagle abideth among the rocks and dwelleth among cragged flints and stony hills where there is no access. From thence she looketh for the prey and her eyes see afar off. Her young ones shall suck up blood.”

A vision of life which forgets death is more likely to be an escapist fantasy than the experience of a complete meaning. Hildegard of Bingen has recorded a vision in which she saw “a fair human form” who declared his identity thus. “Mine is the blast of the thundered word by which all things were made. I permeate all things that they may not die. I am life.” As in the *Gita*, the world is the splendour of God. “I burn in the sun and the moon and the stars. Mine is that mysterious force of the invisible wind. I sustain the breath of all living. I breathe in the verdure and in the flowers, and when the waters flow like living things, it is I.” But the dark other face of life is not forgotten. “Death hath no part in me, yet do I allot it.”²²² Krishna too asserts that the soul is deathless, but that meaning belongs to the highest plane and in the ascent towards it, the death that stalks the empirical world has to be confronted. Therefore Krishna reveals his Cosmic Form and an overwhelmed Arjuna cries out when the whole space between earth and sky is filled by the apparition. “O Exalted One, the three worlds tremble, when this wondrous, terrible form of Thine is seen.”²²³ He sees the whole universe gathered in one place in this form. He sees the vast armies mobilised for action in the field, his own as well

as the enemy's hosts, rushing into the terrible mouths of this form "As the many rushing torrents of rivers race towards the sea, so do these heroes of the world of men rush into Thy flaming mouths As moths gyrate swiftly to their death in a blazing fire, so do these men rush to their destruction in Thy mouths with ever accelerating speed Devouring all the worlds on every side with Thy flaming mouths, Thou lickest them up Thy fiery rays fill this whole universe and scorch it with their fierce radiance"²²⁴

"I am Time",²²⁵ says Krishna earlier and this form is the revelation of that aspect of His nature Terrible is the vision, but Vyasa shows how the mind can assimilate it without being overwhelmed First of all, it is only one aspect of the Supreme Being, the vision of one cardinal function, it does not exhaust His reality "Time am I, grown mighty for subduing the world, engaged here in destroying the world" The word "here" refers to the epic context, the great battle of Kurukshetra which is about to break The very next line makes it absolutely clear "Even without thee (thy action) all the warriors standing arrayed in the opposing armies shall cease to be"²²⁶ Here again, profound intuition is needed to understand that the divine action in history can transcend individual human effort without negating it It works through the teleological designing of many independent causal strands, the orchestration of many forces that may be unrelated in separate origins But among these strands the choice, right or wrong, of the individual has also a place

Earlier, we saw that, in order to clarify that this telism is an immanent action and not an intrusive, external dictation from above, Krishna in the *Bhagavata* pointed out that thought would be tempted to equate living matter and non-living matter, body and soul, and to deny any emergent realities in evolution This ambiguity emerges in the plane of historical existence also when biological evolution has reached the level of man and the possibility of history The *Bhagavata* has many retrospective glances on the crowded historical events that formed the tissue of the *Maha Bharata* "The wind causes the bamboos of overgrown thickets to rub against one another and thus ignite the fire that burns them down Similarly, when the kings became a burden to earth through their rivalry for power, Krishna destroyed them, with their vast armies, without taking arms himself, through their own hatred of each other"²²⁷ Here again appears the ambiguity Were not the Kurus responsible for their own destruction? "They gave unforgivable provocation to the Pandavas by endless humiliations, tricked them out of their kingdom by dishonesty in the chess game, grossly insulted their queen, Draupadi These Pandavas were the instrument by which Krishna managed the destruction of cruel kings in both the camps"²²⁸ With exceptional brilliance, Vyasa extends this ambiguity into the subsequent destiny of the Yadavas, Krishna's own clan Since this powerful clan was the main support of the Pandavas, without whose help they would not have decided on war with the Kurus, and since Krishna was the chief adviser of

Arjuna, Gandhari, the mother of the Kurus, who lost all her hundred sons in the war, curses Krishna that his own clan will be destroyed within a generation. But after using the Yadavas mightily in the Maha Bharata war, Krishna himself realises that they too have to be destroyed, since, grown tremendously in power, they have now become unbridled tyrants²²⁹. But the actual immediate cause of their destruction is the gross insult they offered to a hermit and his consequent curse. The long-range divine scheme is a reality. But it ever acts through men's decisive choices and actions. The Kauravas and the Yadavas had to be destroyed, but they were destroyed through their own culpable action. What resisted the Kauravas and ultimately destroyed them was the firmness of Arjuna. Therefore his resolution too was of strategic importance in the evolution of history. If it was part of the divine scheme in the ultimate analysis, the divine purpose acted through Arjuna's responsible choice.

In asking for freedom of will, man cannot also expect omnipotence. Krishna repeatedly asserts that man has right to action, but should leave the fruit of action to be decided by the larger scheme of providence. And He is with man in the wisdom of his choice and the reality of his action. "Of those who chastise I am the rod (of chastisement). Of those that seek victory I am the wise policy. Of things secret I am the silence and of the knowers of wisdom I am the wisdom"²³⁰. This means that man reaches his highest spiritual status when he acts after surrendering self-interest and in the spirit of being the instrument of a higher purpose. The beginning and conclusion of the *Gita* bring this out with profound subtlety. Arjuna lays down arms because he does not want an empire to be won by the slaughter of kinsmen. He thinks that the surrender of empire is a noble sacrifice. But it was no enlightened surrender, it was the rationalisation of a traumatic collapse of morale. That moment would have passed even without Krishna's instruction and he would have taken up arms again. But the resumption of action would have been as much driven behaviour as the laying down of arms. The profundity of Vyasa comes out in these words of Krishna to Arjuna towards the end of the *Gita* discourse. "Fettered by your own (habitual) acts born of your nature (that of a Rajasic warrior) that which, through delusion you wished not to do, that you shall do compulsively, helplessly (*avasa*)"²³¹. Neither in withdrawal nor in action, of this type, is there any real sacrifice (*tyaga*) of self-interest which indicates a higher self-possession. Behaviour can be evaluated only in the light of the understanding of its profoundest motivation. If demoniac frenzy of action indicates no self-possession, "the renunciation, through ignorance, of any duty that ought to be done is Tamasic and the abandonment of a responsibility because it is painful is Rajasic"²³². Only that renunciation is Satvic where action is performed without attachment to self-interest, without desire for personal benefit²³³. "To action alone hast thou a right, never at all to its fruits. Let not the fruits of action be thy motive. Neither let there be in thee any attachment to inaction"²³⁴.

When these profound truths sink into Arjuna's heart, the fog lifts and he begins to see significance where previously he saw only terror or pain or grief. Krishna says in the *Bhagavata* that the fortitude which strengthens the spirit lies in accepting the tragic that has a rationale and significance²³⁵ And Kunti, the mother of the Pandavas, prays thus to Krishna "I ask this boon of You—that we may confront the tragic continuously in our lives For the advent of the tragic is guarantee that we shall find Thee"²³⁶ Here Arjuna realises that the seemingly "inauspicious action" (*Akusala karma*)²³⁷ also has its place in the divine scheme, like a discord that is resolved into a concord as the music sweeps forward in its great rhythms Just before revealing his form as Time, the destroyer, Krishna had, in a profound equation, declared himself to be both death and life "I am death, the all-devouring and I am the origin of things that are yet to be"²³⁸ And even as he contemplates the terrible vision, Arjuna begins to see the terror transforming into splendour, to realise that all is well "Rightly does the world rejoice and delight in Thy splendour The demons are fleeing in terror in all directions and all the hosts of the perfected ones are bowing down before thee in adoration"²³⁹ The demons are fantasies, misgivings, the brooding pessimism of the overwhelmed mind The perfected ones (*Siddhas*) stand for the illumination of the mind The ultimate realisation emerges, not as a mere proposition acceptable to the intellect, but as an uplifting aesthetic experience of the "splendour" of what at first seemed to be the terrible, the tragic In the epic context, this final reconciliation is expressed with supreme artistry in Arjuna's moving appeal to Krishna to forgive him for having treated him as a friend and taken liberties on the basis of that relationship²⁴⁰ Krishna reassures him that he still continues to be Arjuna's friend and charioteer by the resumption of his familiar form.

IV THE FULFILMENT IN RELISH

The terminal of man's spiritual evolution, in Vyasa's view, is the state where he can, even while engaged in action, relish experience aesthetically This view derives directly from Vyasa's ontological thought Experience has its basis in event, mental or physical, and events emerge from the dynamism of nature, being the effects of the causal interactions of its modes "Modifications and modalities are born from nature"²⁴¹ The instruments of action, the body and the senses, are produced by the evolution of nature The soul (*Purusha*) is the cause (the agent) in regard to the experience of pleasure and pain²⁴² Pure Being transforms itself into Becoming in order to relish becoming, which is processual, empiric being "The soul in nature relishes the modes born of nature"²⁴³ Since this transfiguration of Being is not compelled by any need, it is fundamentally aesthetic, it is a play (*Krida* or *Lila*) But Krishna also says "This divine creativity (*Maya*) of Mine, consisting of the modes of nature, is hard to transcend

Those who take refuge in Me alone can cross beyond it"²⁴⁴ What does this mean?

The interaction of the modes of nature initiates the evolution of matter which terminates in the emergence of man with his psycho-physical self. Eleatic thought would ignore the reality of evolution. But Vyasa has no misgiving in accepting the world and evolution. Now, the empirical self is a creation of the interaction of the modes of nature and at this stage of evolution, it is invested with the freedom to make its self-becoming (*svabhava*) either an evolution determined from within or a determined effect of the lower energies of nature. To the extent that it engages in action for the satisfaction of narrow personal ends, it becomes a passive field where nature's modes interact and determine the modification of the field. The empirical self can transcend the modes of nature only when its action is not compulsive in this manner, when it intervenes in the action of nature from above, from beyond the modes themselves. This means an ascent to the aesthetic motivation of Being itself in its first transformation into Becoming. "When the seer knows his soul to be beyond the modes, he attains to My being (*madbhavam*)"²⁴⁵ Eleatic thought has no perception of this mutation of the empirical Self into the Self, which has to be achieved by the self's own effort. But only when this state is realised does the soul repose in a pure relishing even while engaging the world's reality. "Know the soul as the rider, the body as the chariot, the intellect as the charioteer and the mind as the reins. The organs are the horses and the sense objects the roads for them. The soul with the body, organs and mind is designated by the sages as the relisher"²⁴⁶ That metaphor is from the Upanishads. Note the brilliant inversion as well as ultimate correspondence in Vyasa's concretisation of the metaphor in the epic narrative. Arjuna is the rider and Krishna the charioteer. That is, initially, the intellect or empirical self is the rider and it has to be guided by the Self, regarded as the other. But, with realisation, the self realises itself as of like being with the Self. "He attains to My being."

Biological evolution, the teleological design behind it and the aesthetic quality of experience in which it can culminate, are all condensed in this pregnant utterance. "A fragment of My own self, having become a living soul, eternal, in the world of life, attracts to itself the senses, of which the mind is the sixth, that rest in nature"²⁴⁷ Through evolution, empirical being acquires the instruments for varied sensory experiences of the world. As physical nature (*Apāra Prakṛti*) as well as the teleological principle embedded in it (*Para Prakṛti*) both emanate from the Supreme Person, the empirical being which experiences nature is also part of nature in a profounder sense than being an evolute from it, which of course it is. Without accepting Hume's destructive dissection of the empirical self into an unrelated stream of experience, we can accept that the empirical self is an integration of the sensory experience of the world. The *Bhagavata* says that the Supreme Person as spiritual reality (*Adhvatmika*) is the same as the divinised form

(*Adhidaivika*), that men conceive and adore and also the material form pertaining to the elements (*Adhibhautika*) that is the germ of the world. "The empirical self, the witness who is the subject of the experience made possible by sensory organs like the eye, abides equally in the great lords (deified sources) of sensory experience like the sun. It is the body with its sensory organs like the eye that intervenes to give the impression of their separateness"²⁴⁸ The empirical self, at any level of evolution, is integrated out of the experience of the world transacted by the sensory modalities it possesses. But its living reality as the subject of visual experience is dependent on the source of light in nature, of which it also forms a part.

The affirmation of an aesthetic urge behind the tremendous adventure of evolution—relishing the myriad possibilities of experience—eliminates the difficulties which Galileo confronted in assessing the objectively real in world experience. Galileo felt that only the quantitative magnitudes of the physical world were objectively real. "By no imagination can a body be separated from such conditions. But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, sounding or mute, of a pleasant or unpleasant odour, I do not perceive my mind forced to acknowledge it necessarily accompanied by such conditions. So, if the senses were not the escorts, perhaps the reason or the imagination by itself would never have arrived at them. Hence, I think that these tastes, odours, colours, etc. on the side of the object in which they seem to exist, are nothing else than mere names, but hold their residence solely in the sensitive body, so that, if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated"²⁴⁹ Note the profound antithesis between the two views. Both Vyasa and Galileo affirm that the sensory organ intervenes in experience. But while Galileo interprets that intervention as the basis of the subjective fantasy of an "unreal" experience, Vyasa claims that the mediation obscures the facts that the object becomes the subject in experience and that both form a complex, living, interpenetrating identity. The colour of the world is one of its numerous qualities which make possible the experience of beauty. The quality of colour may be dependent on a quantitative magnitude—the number of vibrations of the source of light per unit time. But colour is not an illusion. It is derived directly from the physical constitution of nature and its permeation into our psychophysical constitution. If the world's splendour is a fantasy, there is no point in the Supreme Person claiming it as a fragment of His Splendour.

The sensory channels go on increasing in number and discriminatory efficiency throughout evolution. But instead of their bringing intimations of the world's splendour, which is a part of His splendour, they prove, in the great majority of people, to be the breaches through which the obsessive, material aspects of the world, its Tamasic and Rajasic powers, pour in to capture the spirit of man. That is why Krishna refers to the profound distinction in the relations between empirical beings and nature

and between nature and Himself when He assumes empirical being. The former are helpless, in bondage, because they are controlled by nature (*avasam prakṛteḥ vasat*)²⁵⁰ But He does His creative action on the empirical plane 'by firmly establishing Himself in His own nature' (*prakṛtim svam adhiṣṭhaya*),²⁵¹ "by taking hold of nature which is My own" (*prakṛtim svam avasṭabhya*)²⁵² The involvement of the self in the world has to be corrected by a distancing of the self from the world which is identical with the distancing from the object that is required for its relishing in aesthetic experience. The soul dwelling in the body has to be "the witness (*Upadṛashta*), the assenter (*Anumanta*), the controller (*Bharta*), the relisher (*Bhokta*)"²⁵³ We saw earlier that conscious attention can lower the threshold for incoming sensory signals and thus gives assent to their entry into notice. In a similar way, it is this assent which enables experience to register itself as pleasurable or painful. But this assent can be given or withheld only on the basis of a sovereign autonomy from the deterministic pressures of nature, which forms not only an external milieu, but also internal milieu, through sensory mediation, for man. This is why Krishna says that not only the Tamasic and Rajasic motivations but even the Satvic have to be transcended. Action has to become virtuous without the consciousness of being virtuous and this is possible only when there is a welling up of love within and one becomes the friend of all creation (*suhṛdam sarva bhūtanam*). Virtue is not an alignment with an external command or truth. The tidal flow of the heart's purer emotions makes every action a warm self-affirmation and it is this human warmth that makes it spontaneously virtuous. It is very important to note that this view is definitely against withdrawal from action. Krishna gives it as his "decided and final view" (*nischitam matam uttamam*)²⁵⁴ that action should not be abandoned. What is necessary is the transformation of action as aesthetic self-experience. This means that it cannot be an ectotelic, utilitarian, self-interested action. "When one is impelled by desire and is attached to the fruit of action one is bound. But the self-possessed attains to a stable peace by abandoning attachment to the fruits of action."²⁵⁵

Here we glimpse again the central faith of Vyasa that the highest, most meaningful interpretation of life is the aesthetic. But the very important difference between this view and the Samkhya approach should be noted. Samkhya wanted to maintain the spirit uncontaminated by the vicissitudes of matter, of historical existence. The world then might become an aesthetic spectacle, but the view is seen from the top of the ivory tower. Vyasa, on the other hand, imposes upon the individual the difficult, but heroic, obligation to be a participant and witness of the drama of existence at the same time. With his genius for synthesis, he reconciles the doctrine that action is superior to non-action²⁵⁶ with the claims of the aesthetic outlook. The conative persistence (*Dhṛti*) which enables the individual to maintain himself in the struggle for existence is now to be turned inward to keep under control the activities of the mind, the life organs and the senses,²⁵⁷

so that the self may use them to relish experience instead of being pulled here and there by their wayward drifts. The realised state is not one of passivity or deadness of feeling. It is distinguished by courage (*Dhṛti*) and euphoric enthusiasm (*Utsaha*), but the individual is now free from the bondage of narrow self-interest (*Mukta-saṅga*), in fact he is completely liberated from that sense of the self which we call egoism (*Anahamvādī*)²⁵⁶

The dissolution of egoism means the expansion of ego-boundaries. Till now the ego was hemmed in by the deterministic pressures exerted by the world. These conquered, the ego expands to take in the world in a spontaneous movement of love. It is in order to emphasise this path of realisation as one of joy, aesthetic relishing, that Krishna condemned the path of asceticism and of mortification of the flesh as "a diabolical torturing of the body and of Me who dwell within the body"²⁵⁹. Again, in order to distinguish the reality of the aesthetic experience from the extinction asserted by the concept of *Nirvana* in Hinayana Buddhism, Vyasa qualifies the final state of realisation in his system as *Brahma Nirvana*,²⁶⁰ a repose in something positive. What is experienced here is "the infinite bliss of contact with the Eternal" (*Brahma-saṁsparsaṁ atyantam sukham*)²⁶¹. The word "contact" (*saṁsparsa*) is important, because it halts poetic thought from careering into a rigid monism which would make the growth and self-discipline of the ego a hollow mockery. But it also suggests the dialectical nearness and separation between the empirical ego and the Eternal Ego that can hold the two in a polarised relationship. Aesthetic creation and experience always need this separation even if what is separated is what is nearest, for instance the separation of a poetic thought from the mind from which it arose. Only then can it be critically contemplated and finally relished. This polarity of the highest state, therefore, is preceded by a similar polarity in the embodied self which divides itself into the relishing mind and its own purer identity which is relished.

But before "the self can be delighted with the self" (*atmanyevatmanā tushta*) thus, the self has to be a poised, stable, undisturbed consciousness (*Sthita-prajña*) and this is possible only "when the mind-generated desires are discarded"²⁶². It is very important to realise that the discarding of desires here is not ascetic self-repression. Vyasa's thought is wedded to action chosen in freedom and action needs the dynamism of desire, a truth which participants on both sides of the traditional controversy on the freedom of the will forget. It is obvious that if rigid determinism obtained in the field of human behaviour there would be no freedom of choice. It is perhaps less obvious, but not less true, that if the freedom of the will was absolute, in the sense that it remained isolated in the personality system, unaffected by the values which inspire the mind and heart, there would be no choice of any line of action since all alternatives would be equal and would be regarded with an equal indifference²⁶³. Man is free only because he is controlled and created, having within himself a principle that requires his allegiance. Freedom consists, as Maritain²⁶⁴ has pointed

out, in being or making oneself actively the sufficient principle of one's operation, in other words, in perfecting oneself as an individual whole in the act one brings about

We have seen that Vyasa integrated the concepts of *Svabhava*, which means both character as well as self-becoming, and *Svadharmā*, which means both duty as well as function in the purer sense it has in a scientific theory of the dynamics of action. The function is motivated by volition or desire. That is why Krishna says "I am the strength of the strong, devoid of desire (*Kama*) and passion (*Raga*). In all beings I am the desire (*Kama*) which is not contrary to *Dharma*"²⁶⁵. The paradoxical juxtaposition of the rejection and endorsement of desire makes it very clear that it is the desire that has become a blind drive that is ruinous to the spirit while the desire that leads man to the discovery of the highest function his personality is capable of is both salutary and necessary for his self-realisation. What is the plane of this highest function? It is the ascent to the level of the original moment of creation when desire entered in the One to be the Many, to seek its self-expression through the creation of the other, so that it can relish itself in the other, which is the fruition of its pure creativity. This assimilation of the world into one's own being through aesthetic relish is possible only when one is liberated from the involvement with it which indicates bonding attachment. Etymologically, "Rajasic" means that which gets attached and this is why Krishna says that the mind of the seeker of liberation has to be free from this tendency (*Santarajasam*).

Just as there is no ascetic distrust of desire in Vyasa, there is also no distrust of happiness. "The mind thus tranquillised (*prasanta manas*) becomes stainless, attained to the state of pure Being and realises the supreme happiness (*sukham uttamam*)"²⁶⁶. It is important to remember that the final tranquillity is defined not as a rippleless state of torpor but as a glow of positive happiness. "How can he who is not tranquil (*asanta*) ever find happiness (*sukham*)?"²⁶⁷. Liberation does not mean a disappearance of the individual in a featureless Absolute. "He who has attained to Pure Being (*Brahmabhuta*) is of ever joyous spirit (*Prasannatma*)"²⁶⁸. The spirit of man reaching up to pure being in this way operates at the level of its own highest function, wins liberation and reposes in a stable happiness. "I am the abode of the eternal law of being (*sasvata dharmā*), the liberation without relapse and enduring bliss (*aikantika sukha*)"²⁶⁹. Vyasa is the supreme hedonist. He knows that happiness and desire for it are the primary motivations of man and he offers to him the path of the highest desire and the highest happiness which goes beyond the mere titillation of the senses. "This is the supreme delight, beyond the reach of the senses, perceived by the intelligence, wherein established, he no longer falls away from the truth (of his being)"²⁷⁰. Just as liberation does not mean disappearance into a featureless Absolute, it is also totally different from an ascetic withdrawal from the world. For the liberated continues to relish the world and only the liberated can relish it with the most stable

delight "He moves among the objects of sense with a mind brought under his absolute control and attains to a radiant joyousness of spirit (*Prasada*)"²⁷¹

To distinguish the levels at which the self can function, Indian metaphysical thought sometimes uses the metaphor of the five sheaths (*Panchakosa*) of the self. From the periphery to the deep centre they are the body considered as a material organisation (*Annamaya Kosa*), the same organisation in its aspect as a living biological system (*Pranamaya Kosa*), psychological organisation consisting of the senses with the mind (*Manomaya Kosa*) which enable sensory experience; the rational self (*Vijnanamaya Kosa*) capable of analytical, synthetic and abstract thought which can be turned toward the study of the nature of the self itself, and the self which has discovered its deep centre and reposes there in unalloyed bliss (*Anandamaya Kosa*). It is in this self whose nature is bliss that the journey of liberation terminates. Now Sankara, committed to the Eleatic doctrine which insists on an absolute separation between being and becoming, the transcendental and the empirical, and rejects the latter as unreal, asserts that the pure self is different from all the five sheaths (*Panchakosa-vilakshana*),²⁷² the Absolute is not the divinised, blissful Self (*Anandamaya-Kosa*)²⁷³ Vyasa can agree with him without, however, surrendering his most significant assertions through that concession. Vyasa, like the Upanishads earlier, does affirm that, if Being transforms itself into Becoming, it also continues to exist in the transcendental state. The difference between Sankara and Vyasa does not lie here but in the further interpretation. For Sankara, the withdrawn, rippleless, transcendental state alone is real, the empirical state is in an illusion. For Vyasa, who insists that the whole situation should be seen from the point of view of empirical being, what is most important is the journey towards the highest vantage ground possible in the embodied condition. Putting it simply but without the least irreverence, the transcendental can be trusted to look after itself. But we happen to be empirical beings, parts of embodied becoming, manifested creation. We have to reach the highest summit possible in terms of our reality. When Vyasa gives his message to the creature how to swing free of the determinism of the creaturely condition, he is not involved in self-contradiction, for creaturely evolution does reach a level (with the emergence of *Buddhi*, reason, cortical functions) which can serve as the *point d'appui* for a further, self-directed evolution toward freedom. He is concerned with liberation here (*ihaiva*),²⁷⁴ on earth itself, before the body is given up in death (*prak-sana-vimokshanat*),²⁷⁵ in the embodied condition itself. And his liberation is not the cold death in life, "the dessication of the senses and the inoperancy of the spirit", that asceticism stands for. The liberated discovers within himself the source of the happiness of the senses, of the mind and of the radiant illumination of the reason (*antah sukham, antaramah, antaryotih*)²⁷⁶ The transcendental state beyond may be inaccessible to verbalisation, even to conceptualisation. There may be difficulties in defining it as conscious

or unconscious, blissful or rippleless But the embodied self, at the summit it can reach, is pure consciousness and bliss.

Let us conclude with a clarification of that affirmation Krishna says "The three modes, Satvic, Rajasic and Tamasic, are born of nature and bind in the body (*deha*) the imperishable dweller in the body (*dehi*)" ²⁷⁷ For "bind" the word is *nibadhnanti* and this is the word used in the text Sankara claims that *nibadhnanti* should be interpreted as *nibadhnantiva*, "seems to bind" Eleatic prejudice is at work here, seeking a radical alteration of the original meaning, for, to Sankara, becoming, if it were real, would be a bondage and since pure being cannot be in bondage, becoming is an illusion Diametrically opposite is the true meaning of Vyasa Since he uses the expression "dweller in the body" (*dehi*) for the soul, his clear meaning is that embodiment by itself need not necessarily mean bondage If it did, he would not be affirming that he is outlining the path of liberation "here, before the body is surrendered in death" The dweller in the body is in bondage to the body only when it surrenders itself to the automatism of the interactions of the modes of nature and thus reduces itself to impotence (*avasa*) But the indwelling soul can assert its sovereignty over the psychophysical nature and thus established (*adhishtaya*), thus possessed of the instrumentalities of nature (*avashtabhya*), it can take in the world in a supreme relish, instead of being swept away in its currents.

With the ascent towards this sovereignty, the meaning of the word "bind" (*nibadhnanti*) also undergoes a subtle change, though the direction of the change is always away from the Eleatic interpretation of Sankara The soul which allows itself to be pulled down to the Tamasic level is in bondage in that sense of the term which implies loss of self-determination The bondage here results from lethargy, ignorance or surrender to blind, unconscious motivations ²⁷⁸ The Rajasic is on a higher plane But here also there is bondage, though it is the bondage of action rather than of inert passivity, for desires awaken and pull the indwelling spirit into the maelstrom of action and there is no luminous discrimination of the quality of these desires ²⁷⁹

But there is a subtle, though profound, difference in the Satvic plane "Of these three modes, the *Satvic*, being pure, causes illumination and leads to health It binds through linkage with knowledge (*jnana*) and with happiness (*sukha*)" ²⁸⁰ Purity (*nirmalatva*) here is like the purity in qualitative chemical analysis, the Satvic self is not mixed up with anything else, unlike the Rajasic, which means that which attaches itself to something else The Satvic thus shines forth with its own light and indicates the perfect health of the spirit The binding here, therefore, is not a bondage but a bonding, of the type of electrical and chemical bonding of particles and atoms which give rise to the reality of complex unities like molecules The Satvic is the bonding of the Self, of transcendental being, which can enable it to manifest itself as the empirical self of becoming Since all the three modes belong to nature, the Satvic also belongs to

the empirical order. But it is nearest to the critical transition from being to becoming. It stands for the copula, "to be".

If it is necessary to distinguish a lower Satvic plane, where action is virtuous because there is a desire to be virtuous, from a higher Satvic plane where virtue is spontaneous expression of the quality of being, to go further and demand the transcendence of even the higher Satvic plane is to sever the anchorage from empirical being and pass beyond into a state which transcends both verbalisation and conceptualisation. Human and humanistic experience is possible only in the state of empirical becoming. It reaches its purest intensity at the interface of becoming and pure being, at the edge of the vast pool of silence. And this intensity is a poetic intensity, for the self here, even while engaged in the world's action, reposes in pure consciousness and bliss, in the tranquil relishing of itself. This is what Baudelaire²⁸¹ meant when he said that to the poetic spirit, the world was a "*dictionnaire hiéroglyphique*". Flaubert²⁸² wrote "The world exists only for donating to us images of itself". Mallarmé²⁸³ affirmed "The world has been made for terminating in a good book". In the profound idiom of the Vedas, the self reaches fulfilment in relish (*rasena triptah*)²⁸⁴ when the world is transmuted into relish and thus becomes assimilated into the Self which now relishes itself as thus enriched.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Expansion of Ego-Boundaries

I. REHABILITATION OF THE EGO

A GLANCE back at the long, winding road we have covered will help us in deciding where to go from here

Starting with Abhinava's claim that liberation is possible through poetry, we tried to analyse that concept and realised that thought, both in India and Europe, often got bogged down in the misunderstanding of liberation as a dessication of the senses and inoperancy of the spirit. The experience of that type of liberation cannot possibly be an aesthetic experience. Here, Vyasa's great synthesis of metaphysics and aesthetics has helped us out and we can now confidently work our way back to the field of aesthetic theory, for we are not primarily concerned with metaphysics as such. But let us negotiate the transition carefully, without succumbing to the temptation to reject the transcendental for the world and art, just because the wrong kind of metaphysics rejects the world and feeling for the transcendental. For if we do not resist that temptation, the profound meaning of both Vyasa and Abhinava will be lost to us.

Unable to see flux as process, ascetic thought retreated from the world and defined liberation as the absolutely rippleless (*Nirvikara*) self-absorption of consciousness. This discipline may win a liberation from the bondages of the world, but the struggle and the repressions leave the spirit so exhausted that it falls short of absolute mastery. That mastery can come only with the confident, assured, tranquil relishing of the state of release from the bondage. Nami Sadhu pointed out that no mental state could be termed as a state of *Rasa* experience unless it was actually relished.¹ And without this relishing, victory ends in an exhaustion that is not different from defeat. The Vedic reference² to the soul as enjoying the *Rasa* of experience (*Rasena triptah*) is the germinal beginning which ultimately evolved into the magnificent structure of Vyasa's thought. And Indian poetics has benefited through Vyasa's great intuition. Serenity (*Santa*) is the *Rasa* of the realisation of the Self (*Tattvajnana*). Theistic attitudes would, initially at least, conceive of the Self as a personal God and even for the monist, till realisation is achieved, *Brahman* is the other towards which the empirical self will have to ascend. For this level, the

aesthetics of spiritual experience is defined thus the primary stimulus (*Alambana Vibhava*) for the experience of serenity (*Santa Rasa*) is the personal God or the impersonal *Brahman*. The enhancing stimulus (*Uddipana Vibhava*) is the whole world. (The reader should refresh his memory with the precise meaning of these technical terms from the opening section of this work, on the theory of the poetic context.) It is very interesting to note here that in recent years, Catholic theism, in the thought of Bremond³ and Elizabeth Jennings,⁴ has moved towards a similar synthesis. Jennings especially is convinced of the identity in kind of the two states—inspiration for the poet and “union with God” for the Christian. Actually this corresponds to the specifically Vaishnavite viewpoint in the Indian tradition, while the generalised statement of Indian poetics is valid not only for dualistic theism but also for monism and, further, for even a secularism which is not interested in transcendental concepts. For the generalised statement is that when the unveiled, pure consciousness (*Bhagnavarana chit*) shines forth, no dualism lingers. The dualism resolved is that between the Self and the Absolute for the transcendentalist. For the agnostic and the secular, it need only be that between the self immersed in the world and the self that is the deeper reality, one’s own inwardness.

At this—the highest—level, says Abhinava,⁵ the *Atman* becomes the *Sthayin*, all *Bhavas* become *Vyabhicharins*, the Self being like a wall (*Bhutti*), substratum or dome of many coloured glass, the colours being the infinite moods of the human sensibility, colours no longer opaque but transparent, letting the white radiance of eternity shine through them. The *Sthayin* or *Sthayi Bhava* is the sentiment (as Shand defined it) and the *Vyabhicharins* are the derived emotions, which are the modifications of the *Sthayin* in specific contexts and which thus prove its abiding action. What Abhinava now achieves is a modal shift of the tonic. The *Sthayins* of ordinary experience—love, heroism, humour—become derivatives (*Vyabhicharins*) of the abiding *Sthayitama*, *Sthayin* of *Sthayins*, the Self, proofs of its ability for a protean self-modification so that it can relish itself in an infinite variety. This is why Bhatta Narasimha, a late commentator on Bhoja, claimed that *Rasa*, as relish, is one, in spite of its variety, for it is always the relish of the self. And it is a state of bliss in a double degree as aesthetic relishing (*Rasasvada*) and as the relishing of the real self which is unalloyed bliss (*Ananda*).⁶

As the profound importance of Vyasa in Indian poetics has escaped every writer, ancient or modern, it is worth while briefly clarifying the derivation of this formulation of the theory of poetics from the poetry of Vyasa. In fact, while the rhetoricians forgot Vyasa, the writers of poems modelled on the *Bhagavata* remembered him with a profound appreciation. Thus, if Namī Sadhu was able to point out that no mental state could be termed as a state of *Rasa* experience unless it was actually relished, the *Padma Purana* in its homage to the *Bhagavata* pointed out that liberation, in that magnificent poem of Vyasa’s, was not an inoperancy of spirit but a pro-

found *Rasa* experience The *Padma Purana* introduces *Bhakti*, the ecstasy of devotion, in the form of a feminine figure and liberation, *Mukti*, is only her hand-maiden⁷ Liberation thus reaches its fruition in intense relish. *Bhakti* ultimately comes to dwell in the *Bhagavata* and in the hearts of those who relish the poem. *Bhakti* is the beloved of God and He too hastens to be near her, thereby coming to dwell in the hearts of these relishers of the poem When this theistic level, where the Self is projected as the other, is transcended, no dualism lingers and the Self (*Atman*) becomes the *Sthayin* of all relish.

This is the doctrine of Abhinava But, for this self-relish, the self has to become both subject and object. The usual reading of the romantic allegory of the *Bhagavata* is that Krishna stands for God and Radha and other maidens for the human souls seeking their beloved. That interpretation is not without validity, on the plane of theistic dualism But that is not the highest level in Vyasa and the *Skanda Purana* intuits the higher level Shandilya, and again, Yamuna, in that poem declare : "Radha is Krishna's soul It is because He delights in His own self thus that Krishna is called *Atmarama* Krishna is Radha, Radha is Krishna, their love is the music of the flute"⁸ The sentiments emerge from the contacts of the evolving personality with the world In the profound modulation indicated by Abhinava, these sentiments become the derived emotions of a self-relish Shandilya wholly accepts the world "Vraja (the pastoral village of Krishna) is *Brahman* . There is no difference between the form of God and this land . . . Krishna is called *Aptakama* (of fulfilled desire) since He sports here with all that is beloved to Him"⁹ But this desire is not the pressure of need, but the desire for creative self-projection into the myriad things and moods of the world and for their relish

The real self which is above time is, thus, relished in time, a truth which Eliot analyses with clarity although it abides with him as an unresolved and poignant paradox We shall deal with that paradox later Let us note the affirmations first

A radiant vision of the world is not something which belongs to the Eleatic world of illusion but something that belongs to the realm of eternal verities "After the kingfisher's wing has answered light to light, and is silent, the light is still at the still point of the turning world"¹⁰ Norman MacCaig¹¹ echoes this conviction in the poem, *Advices of Time* In the profound aesthetic experience of the world

. . . the senses tell
Such truths about these strange particulars
That flower or tide, becomes immortal as
No god or goddess was

A temporal art like music illustrates, for Eliot, this paradox of simultaneously being in time and above time The Heraclitean problem of

unchanging unity in changing phases is pursued with the violin, again attempting to rise above the limitations of time to where "all is always now" This reminds one of a passage in the *Vishnu Purana* "Poetry and all literary creations, as also music, are but aspects of the Lord in His form as sound"¹² Words in poetry and notes in music pass in a train and cease to be heard If they belong wholly to the temporal order they will utterly cease to be But they reach into the enduring stillness

*Words move, music moves
Only in time, but that which is only living
Can only die Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence*

The non-temporal arts also do not lack the movement that can become this stillness, for what endures, even in the case of the temporal arts, is not the notes, since they perish, but the form that binds the notes heard now with the notes heard no more and the notes yet to be heard The detail of a static pattern is movement that is also the enduring stillness "Only by the form, the pattern, can words or music reach the stillness, as a Chinese jar still moves perpetually in its stillness"¹³ In Ch'an Buddhist art we find the same deep penetration in the art of painting Art, here, is "delving down into the Buddha that each of us unknowingly carries with him"¹⁴ Unless the artist's work is imbued with this vision of "the subjective non-phenomenal aspect of life",¹⁵ his production will be mere toys

But the paradox remains "To be conscious is not to be in time But only in time can the moment in the rose garden, the moment in the arbour when the rain beat be remembered Only through time time is conquered"¹⁶ This inescapable involvement with the flux, "with past and future", seems to leave a residuary feeling of insecurity. Each instant, under the slow erosion of time, the headlands of the future are decaying and becoming the sediment of the deep, tideless sea of the past In this ceaseless flux, the edge of the present, a continuously moving ledge caught in a perpetual landslide, seems too insecure a spot to locate "the point of interaction of the timeless with time" This feeling makes Eliot revert to the tradition of world-denial The apprehension of the interaction is an occupation for the saint For most of us, there is only the tragically brief, unattended, unpredictable "moment in and out of time,"

*The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight,
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lighting
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
While the music lasts* ¹⁷

But these are only "hints and guesses, hints followed by guesses" There

is no perfection of serenity, no *Santa Rasa* here, for the moments of vision seem so uncertain in their advent, so brief in their duration, and their message so ambiguous even in its luminosity

If we analyse this feeling of insecurity or anxiety, we can see that it is traceable to three sources : the feelings that death is the ultimate reality for creaturely, time-bound existence, that even during the life-span the vision is too transient to be significant, that the experience cannot be qualitatively quite identical with what it is claimed to be

Bradley¹⁸ wrote . "Fully to realise the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible In order thus to know we should have to be, and then we should not exist" This is an uncompromising philosophical statement of the traditional view that Being cannot also be Becoming The philosophical thought melts into a current of anguished feeling in this despairing question asked by the Spanish poet Miguel de Unamuno at the end of his poem *Heimosua* "Night falls, I awake, my anxiety returns, the splendid vision has melted away, I am a man once more And now tell me, Lord, tell me in my ear can all this beauty abolish our death?"¹⁹ No further progress of the spirit is possible now, unless man comes to terms with death within the peace of some concept Eschatological concepts are the adjustments usually resorted to here to get rid of the anxiety In their original forms they are apt to be very crude But even when a poet manages to eliminate the crudity we should not be misled and must be able to recognise it for what it really is, a fantasy and a wish-fulfilment In the poem *Experience of Death* (*Todeserfahrung*) Rilke claims that death and life are in fact one, since it is only at the moment of death that intimations of true reality reach the world, surging upwards through the cleft that is opening to receive the departing spirit "Then as you departed there broke on to this stage a streak of reality through that cleft whereby you went green, real green, real sunshine, and real woodland" Elaborate that landscape a little and you will get the *Sukhavati* paradise of the Buddhists with its jewel trees and music of flowing water, the *Svarga* of the Hindus and the heaven of the Muslims with their bevvies of ever-willing nymphs and the comparatively less exciting Christian heaven with too many people playing the harp Vyasa's comments on such concepts range from pungent sarcasm to creative interpretation. "In heaven also you will find rivalry with those who get equal amenities and jealousy for those who receive special favours"²⁰ These paradises are "fantasies and dreams and their accounts good only for the titillation of the ear".²¹ At best the concept is an aid to moral habits which may ultimately lead to liberation, just as children are offered candies for persuading them to take tonics²² In Vyasa's reinterpretation, "heaven is not any special world or realm, but the perfection of the Satvic state"²³ In Vyasa's synthesis, the Satvic state is an aesthetic state Mallarmé²⁴ refers to the moments of deep immersion in aesthetic creation and defines them as filled by the "joy of contemplating Eternity and relishing it, even while alive, within oneself".

Courage and insight can formulate far sounder alternative solutions than the fantasies of heaven. A vital courage enabled the Vedic poets to accept death as the comrade of man (*Manava Bandhu*) and if the glory of the dawn reminds them at first of past generations who enjoyed her beauty but are today no more, they immediately realise that their own present relish of her beauty is a reality which nothing can cancel, not even their eventual death. The Upanishads and the *Gita* formulate a solution from a profounder depth. It is the empirical ego (the *Kshara Purusha* of the *Gita*) that belongs to the world of flux. At its depth, this ego is one with the enduring Self (*Akshara Purusha*). The death of the body becomes irrelevant here, for as long as rapport has not been established with the deepest reality of being, even life is death. On the other hand, "life dies into the fullness"²⁵ even before the advent of the death of the mortal body and this death is an experience of deathlessness. In Upanishadic thought, the transcendence of the creaturely, time-bound state is the ultimate terminal of the spiritual journey. The mortal becomes immortal. But the sense in which immortality is used must be clearly understood. It does not mean physical survival or the survival of the empirical self. It means freedom from passion and vexing desire. "When every passion that nestles in the heart vanishes, then man gains immortality, then *Brahman* is obtained by him"²⁶. The empirical self has to die for gaining this immortality. "As flowing rivers disappear in the sea, thus the sage, released from name (*Nama*) and form (*Rupa*) is merged in the divine spirit"²⁷. It is not an inert, but a positive state, it is the enjoyment of the bliss of pure being. "He (*Brahman*) is indeed bliss, and the soul realising this bliss becomes full of bliss"²⁸. And aesthetic experience is this deathless bliss, because what is experienced, the world, is realised to be the splendour of the Supreme Person, the *Purushottama* of the *Gita*, and it is experienced from the still point of the turning world where resides the poet (*Kavi*) who has composed this vast epic of creation.

Baudelaire²⁹ quotes with approval this passage from Catherine Crowe³⁰ "By imagination, I do not simply mean to convey the common notion implied by that much abused word, which is only *fancy*, but the *constructive* imagination, which is a much higher function, and which, in as much as man is made in the likeness of God, bears a distant relation to that sublime power by which the creator projects, creates and upholds his universe." This imagination reconstructs the world of material utilities as a world created for pure relish, thereby participating in God's act of original creation which was prompted by no need, but was a poetic self-projection. Gottfried Benn, in some moments of his agitated life, comes very near to these perceptions. When he penetrates deep into the natural order he becomes involved in the flux which seems to negate all abiding reality. "The world thought to pieces. And space and time, and what wove and weighed mankind, only a function of eternities. The myth lied." But in a rare moment, the vision comes. "One final day—broad spaces in an evening

glow, a stream leads you to a goal out of reach, a high light bathes the old trees, and makes itself an opposite in the shadows, not a fruit and no crown of wheat-ears, but indeed it asked for no harvest. It plays its game, is conscious of its light, and sinks without memories—everything is said³¹. Involvement in the pursuit of the harvest of outward utilities blocks the vision which is reached, to use Benn's own idiom, only through an "inner Emigration". And from this inwardness, he is conscious of the light of the evening sun, and perhaps of another light, one half-glimped, that seems to be-taken some abiding reality. Time as flux makes a profound impression on Eliot too, it is pictured as the sea or river with no end to the drifting wreckage they carry. But he has also a glimpse of the moment that does not share the death of time-bound things.

The second source of anxiety is the feeling that moments of vision are too brief to be significant. Of the authenticity of vision there is no doubt. "The silent sister in white and blue" makes the sign which is authentic in its message, in Eliot's *Ash Wednesday*. Yet, a line or two later comes the return to the unenlightened level of common living. "And after this our exile". This insecurity is definitely due to the loss of an integral vision of life which alone can make living in the world an authentic mode of being. The significant systematisation of the four ends of life (*Purushartha*) in Indian thought had once managed this integration, sanctioning and guiding the pursuit of economic ends (*Artha*) and the satisfaction of libidinal and emotional urges (*Kama*) through the principles of the ethical consciousness (*Dharma*), so that life would always be moving steadily towards the ultimate goal, liberation (*Moksha*). Only some such programmatic ordering of life can give to vision a stabilised significance and enduring relevance to life. That vision, whether it be poetic or moral, is really the commencement and not the end of work is finely brought out by Grubb³².

*This hour is not that summit, sacrament, home
Any more than vileness proves a doom
Any more than insight makes a poem*

Paton³³ has made the reasonable demand that in evaluating the experience of mystics, "a dispassionate decision must ultimately turn, not on the mode of reception, but on the positive content of the mystic vision as conveyed to us, however dimly, by analogies and images"; and this is only to be judged "by its continuity with ordinary religious experience" and also with poetry, philosophical reflections and moral aspirations. A vision that cannot thus forge a rich continuity with life is likely to be as barren of value as the asceticism of the Desert Fathers. Bullough³⁴ had the intuition to realise that what unifies experiences of beauty unifies also a much wider range of experiences. Aesthetic consciousness is seen by him as an attitude towards experience and so he systematically integrates

aesthetic experience of nature, of art, of behaviour (etiquette and beyond), of personal characteristics and of whole ways of life

Even when he feels that the moments of vision are only "hints and guesses", Eliot adds that "the rest is prayer, observance, discipline, thought and action", and that the "hint half guessed, the gift half understood is incarnation"³⁵ What deprives this intuition of sovereign certitude is the lack of full confidence in its enunciation, the failure to see with absolute clarity the possibility of the programmatic extension of vision as a life inspired by the vision in everyone of its aspects. Early Indian thought reached certitude through the clear perception of this possibility. It proceeded to a detailed guidance of living, but it is very important to realise that the inwardness was never lost sight of. "Assiduously do that which gives satisfaction to the inner self"³⁶ Even virtue fails to purify if it is merely an outward act without an inward resonance. "Charity, sacrifices, austerity, cleanliness, frequenting sacred places, learning—all these are no purifying ablutions, if the mind is not pure"³⁷ As against the Hinayana doctrine that *Nirvana* is absolutely above the flux of time, Mahayana sees it as the moment out of time which is also in time. "Those who are afraid of sorrow which arises from the round of birth and death seek *Nirvana*. They do not realise that between the cycle of birth and death and *Nirvana* there is really no difference at all. They see *Nirvana* as the absence of all becoming, and the cessation of all contact of sense-organ and sense-object, and they will not understand that it is only the inner realisation of the store of impression"³⁸ In the programmatic extension of the eternal moment into time in the world, if virtues and disciplines are indicated, they are no longer the necessary but exacting and difficult aid to self-liberation. "The Bodhisattva develops the consciousness of joy in his relations with all beings"³⁹ And it is this joyous life-acceptance of the self that transmutes these chill virtues into rich, poetic sentiments. "The virtue of generosity is not my helper. I am the helper of generosity. Nor do the virtues of morality, patience, courage, meditation and wisdom help me. It is I who help them"⁴⁰

This repose in the self, in its moments of pure aesthetic relish, will lead to the realisation that "in all the world there is no such thing as an old sunrise, an old wind upon the cheeks",⁴¹ for the self here never loses its capacity for savouring afresh every experience. And in its action in the world also, it receives the impulsion from the inner flood of joy. The experience of timeless Being is thus stabilised in the myriad experiences of Becoming. Poetry, thus, in the words of Shelley, redeems "from decay the visitations of the divinity in man". There is no more any need to feel like an "exile". This is what Wallace Stevens⁴² meant when he expressed the confidence that "the hour filled with inexpressible bliss, in which I have no need, am happy, forget need's golden hand" was itself the guarantee that it could be extended to cover the whole of life.

*And if there is an hour, there is a day,
There is a month, a year, there is a time
In which majesty is the mirror of the self;
I have not but I am and as I am I am*

The third source of anxiety is the feeling that aesthetic experience, since it is gained through time-bound existence, cannot be qualitatively quite identical with what it claims to be transcendental experience of timeless being. Sarada Tanaya⁴³ feels that, compared to transcendental experience (*Brahmasvada*), poetic experience (*Kavyarajasvada*) is worldly (*Laukika*), of the flux and earth and inevitably earthy. Madhusudana Sarasvati⁴⁴ also feels that although poetic experience is superior to mundane experience, it is still not on par with transcendental experience. But since he is concerned with establishing the supreme efficacy of devotion (*Bhakti*), Madhusudana is in a quandary, for he does not like to admit that devotion cannot take us to the highest level. Therefore he concedes that devotion is on a par with transcendental experience, but he argues that here God conceived as a person (*Bhagavan*) or the Self (*Paramatman*) is the ground reality (*Sthayin* and *Alambana*). Having conceded this much, he cannot deny the same status to the poetic delineation of the *Rasa* of devotion or even the *Rasa* of serenity (*Santa*). Vyasa's clear intuition of the whole reality eliminates all such difficulties. He wrote the *Bhagavata* for showing the way to the highest poetic relish, for this is what devotion becomes in his magnificent poetic narration. "In what other state is there a fuller reality of the spirit than in devotion?"⁴⁵ The *Bhagavata*, it is affirmed, is the form of pure relish (*Rasa*) and the reader is invited to drink deep this nectar of the relish of God (*Bhagavad Rasa*)⁴⁶. And this relish is distilled by all the resources of poetry, it is a poetic relish.

Sankara lands in difficulties here. The egocentric predicament cannot be escaped in life. Life is desire and strife; the practical, utilitarian motivation and its attendant tension may be eliminated, but the illusion lingers in a latent form, because the source of the poetic experience is the world which is an illusion. The elimination of illusion (*Avidya*) even in its latent form is only achieved by the saint (the Eliotian antithesis). Poetic experience gives a foretaste of liberation (*Moksha*) but it is not a completely stabilised liberation, because it is transient, not being based on perfect knowledge. So runs his analysis.⁴⁷

We have already seen the lingering strength of old attitudes, of ascetic distrust of the world, in Sankara and his subtle distortions of Vyasa's meaning in his commentary on the *Gita* for strengthening his own point of view. Actually he was more deeply influenced by the Samkhya dualism of spirit and nature than he would have been prepared to admit. And Samkhya doctrine was coloured by Kapila's pessimism; that is why it kept the spirit so carefully aloof from possible contamination by nature. Samkhya liberation was complete withdrawal from the world. The liberated should

be, as Vijnana Bhikshu⁴⁸ says, serene like a mountain-tarn. But this mountain-tarn seems like the stagnant tarns in Verhaeren because it does not reflect the bright pageant of earth and sky. This pageant is no illusion. "Life", wrote José Hierro, the Spanish poet, 'is the body and soul together eyes that wonder and weep, lips that kiss and smile, ears that hear something more than the silent music of the heavens'⁴⁹ Murphy⁵⁰ has made this eloquent plea. "Man, being of the stuff of which the universe is made, whatever that stuff may ultimately prove to be, may have deep affinities with it, deep isomorphism with it, inevitably a tendency to become, as microcosm, what it is as macrocosm, at least in many fundamental respects, and so realize his nature more and more as he discovers the nature of cosmic structure and cosmic movement."

The solution which Octavio Paz,⁵¹ the Mexican poet, ultimately arrived at will prove, through its striking affinities, a good lead back to the Indian and especially Vyasa's solution. The image of Vijnana Bhikshu's mountain-tarn seems to have occurred to Paz too. But it brings no peace to the spirit. "Must everything end in a spatter of stagnant water?" Then he notes that "time cannot be measured", it cannot be dismissed as an irreversible drift to decay, because it is not homogeneous. If there are dead and inert moments, there are others which have an enduring life. "There are moments that burst and are stars, others that are like a dammed river and some like motionless trees, others are this same river obliterating these same trees." It is in the moments that are stars that the ultimate meaning inheres. It is then that "light penetrates the sleeping body of water and for a moment names are inhabited." This image, it should be noted, is valid for the moment of realisation of the individual and also as a cosmogonic principle, for being has not withdrawn after creation but inhabits becoming, the pageant of name and form (*Nama* and *Rupa* in Indian thought) it unrolls. This dual significance continues in the clarification of the perception. "Intellect finally incarnates in forms, the two hostile halves are reconciled, and the consciousness-mirror liquefies, becomes once more a fountain, a tree of images, words that are flowers, that are fruit, that are deeds." The two halves are being and becoming, the potential state before inspiration dawns and the images that are subsequently bodied forth, the bareness before the world was created and the myriad loveliness that was then brought into being through becoming.

The extraordinary affinities of this perception with Abhinava's concept of consciousness as a mirror which has both self-luminosity (*Prakasa*) and ability to liquefy into myriad images and forms through its creativity (*Vimarsa*) should be noted. After this movement of perception, there is no "exile", there is only the serene return to the world of becoming, over which now shines the radiant light of being. "The world sets its doors ajar, and an angel nods at the entrance to the garden." The distrust of existence is completely shed. "To see, to touch each day's lovely forms. The light throbs, all darts and wings. As the coral extends

its branches in the water, I stretch my senses in this living hour : the moment fulfils itself in a yellow harmony. Oh moon, wheat-ear heavy with minutes, eternity's brimming cup !” Again, there is an astonishing affinity between the image of the moon here and the Indian myth of Soma, where the moon becomes the god of fertility and the brimming vessel of the creative force by which the universe itself is sustained⁵² In iconographical tradition God Siva is represented as wearing the moon as a head ornament and the poetic interpretation of this given by the *Skanda Purana* should also be recalled here The moon, steadily growing from a sickle to an orb and again declining is the symbol of time which spells out its course by the cyclical growth and decay and rejuvenation of all things God wears time, thus making it the vehicle of a fulfilment, a creative process fulfilling His purpose Becoming is the programmatic extension in time of Being

In a very interesting paper which probes the deeper affinities between the aesthetic conceptions of the East and the West, Van Meter Ames⁵³ has tried to show that the aesthetic attitude, in its profounder aspect, is one which can integrate all values of life It is the purely formalist interpretation of art that inhibits this growth to an inclusive spread of meaning The formalists see the value of art as divorced from other and (to them) lesser values of life Form, for them, is the shape of the work of art But the effort to confine an art-object to its own outline has been met by the realisation that a thing of art reaches out to the response of the appreciator, expresses the values of life, and may have influence throughout a culture Although some philosophers have been strict formalists, others, like John Dewey have seen art as an organising, expressing, and celebrating activity in the midst of the on-going affairs of everyday, thus it is spiritual because it brings freshness freedom, creativity into the world, it is life-giving Therefore, the question emerges “whether art comes to the full in the design of the artwork itself, as formalists hold, or whether form that is vital serves to organize and order thought and feeling about the human situation, to focus and *form* the values of life that, in becoming artistic, do not cease to be social, scientific, and religious” Ames concludes thus “It seems more adequate to regard form in the broad and vital way of interfusing sensuous materials expression, function, and the rest Then form, instead of being an isolated element in aesthetic experience, becomes the organization of all that is actually involved” Thus the way form is spoken of in athletics is revealing for aesthetics, if art is not regarded as something finished and done but is instead appreciated as an activity “Form that makes life and art worthwhile is a rhythm of organizing energies, of meeting situations freely and resourcefully Then form is not something isolated or abstracted but the feel of a career Then sense and emotion, expression, association and function are not added to form or detachable from it, but inherent in it, constitutive of it. Then form is how something is done when done well”

This is a very perceptive analysis and exactly corresponds with the thought of Vyasa, who, however, has given it a sustained, magnificent exposition. Vyasa's skill (*Kausala*) is athletic "form" elevated to the grander engagement of the spirit with the resistant forces of the embodied condition, the world, which is no illusion, but the field for the action of that form. "Yoga is skill in action (*Yoga karmasu kausala*)" Vyasa's Krishna also adds "Among skills I am the skill in the discrimination between that which is of the spirit and that which is not of the spirit (*Atmanatma viveka kausala*)" This skill faces its greatest challenge in resisting the deterministic pressures of the embodied condition, in securely establishing the self over them and in transforming the world as the means for realising the four goals of the embodied spirit. The skill is athletic form elevated as an aesthetic transforming power, for Krishna describes himself as the poet and he demands action in the world which is also a liberation and he also demands that the liberation should be experienced as relish and not degenerate as dessication of the senses and inoperancy of the spirit.

II EGO AND THE PEAK OF EXPERIENCE

Now that we have been able to analyse the untenability of the lingering mental reservations about the precise nature of aesthetically experienced liberation, we can take up a more positive approach and try to get closer to its intrinsic features. In the spirit of the Upanishadic assertion that, when one liberates oneself from the bondages of egocentric impulses, *Brahman* is obtained, Mammata⁵⁴ asserts that aesthetic experience leads to the transcendental beatitude here, on earth, in the mode of 'being in the world' (*Sadya Paranivṛiti*). The complete and precise statement of this view is given by Visvanatha⁵⁵. The endeavour to pack the whole rich meaning into a brief formula has given it a very high density. A close, but probably not very readable, rendering would be as follows: "*Rasa* is relished (*asvadyate*) by those having an innate knowledge of absolute values (*Kaicit-pramatiblu*) in exaltation of pure consciousness (*sattvodorekat*), as self-luminous (*svapirakasa*), in the mode at once of ecstasy and intellect (*ananda-chinmaya*), free from the contact of aught else perceived, (*vedyantara-sparsa-sunya*), of twin kinship with the relishing of the Absolute (*Brahmasvadasahodara*), the life whereof is super-mundane wonder (*lokot-tara-chamatkara-pīṇah*), as intrinsic aspect (*svakaravat-svapavah*), in indivisibility (of the object from its relish—*abhinnatva*)". A rendering which would be more readable and would at the same time be faithful would be as follows: "Pure aesthetic experience is theirs in whom the knowledge of ideal beauty is innate. It is known intuitively, in intellectual ecstasy without accompaniment of ideation, at the highest level of conscious being, identical with the experience of the Absolute, its life-breath is a transcendental wonder, impossible to analyse into the object relished and the relishing and yet in the image of our very being"⁵⁶

Each term in this complex summation needs some exposition for complete understanding. Poetic experience is in the intrinsic aspect (*svaka avat-svarupavat*) of our being. That is, in the moment of poetic experience, being functions in the pure essence of its nature, without those limitations which becoming ordinarily imposes. Becoming is living in the natural order. And every event in nature is the result of some modes of nature working on, or interacting with, other modes (*Guna guneshu variante.*) Being operates as if mounted on a machine, the causal order of phenomenology (*yantrarudhomayaya*). The modes are the *Tamasic*, *Rajasic* and *Satvic* principles. But we have seen with Vyasa how the spirit can liberate itself from the deterministic pressures of these modes in an attitude of detached relishing. Visvanatha's claim is that in aesthetic relishing also this liberation is a reality. In essence, this implies a liberation from the egocentric predicament where the ego is conditioned and determined by the milieu and its own blind impulsions. It is achieved by the exaltation of the Satvic quality (*sattvodrekat*). Being is self-luminous (*svapi akasa*) now, because, as Jagannatha⁵⁷ said, *Rasa* or the glow of relish is the manifestation of the light of the self itself when the obscuring elements fall away. The *Vibhavas*, etc. or the features of the aesthetic presentation are what make these elements fall away. That is why Jagannatha calls them removers of obstacles (*Vighnapasarakas*). Abhinava⁵⁸ clarifies how the Satvic state, essential to spiritual liberation, is also essential to the liberation which enables aesthetic experience. For the Tamasic state is a lethargic deadness which is incompatible with the intensity of aesthetic experience; the Rajasic breeds a conative urge which leads to desire or aversion which in turn leads to practical involvement. In the Satvic confrontation a universalised subject relishes a universalised object. This is the profound meaning of what Novalis wrote: "The poet is literally out of his senses—in exchange, all comes about within him. He is, to the letter, subject and object at the same time, soul and universe"⁵⁹.

This leads us to the terms in Visvanatha's definition which affirm that aesthetic experience is pure consciousness and ecstasy without ideation, free from the contact of aught else perceived. Novalis defined the poetic consciousness as both soul and universe at the same time. Does Visvanatha's definition obliterate the object, the universe, in the soul's climactic relish of itself?

In the Yoga of Patanjali, which is a psychic discipline, the highest state is supposed to be the *Nirvikalpa* state. This is a state of consciousness where the distinction of the subject and object of experience is completely lost. The Eleatic bias for the unmodified, transcendental state of being often makes this state liable to be interpreted as something perilously near unconsciousness. Aesthetic theory has avoided this extreme, as far as poetic experience is concerned. The experience of relish (*Rasapratiti*), it is pointed out, cannot be absolutely unrelated, because it is only through the knowledge of the prime stimuli (*Vibhava*), etc. of the aesthetic presentation, though in

a generalised form, that the experience emerges. Therefore, the experience of relish cannot be a *Nirvikalpa* state⁶⁰

As contrasted with the *Nirvikalpa* state, the *Savikalpa* state of Yogic trance is one in which there is a definite perception of the object in its name and form. In spiritual exercise, this is supposed to be the highest level accessible to those who conceive the transcendental in the personalised form of a deity. The lingering anthropomorphism here has made many reluctant to accept it as the highest possible state. But they have also felt that the *Nirvikalpa* state is not a satisfactory alternative. Thus, in the interpretation of the verse in the *Gita* that affirms that supreme happiness comes to the Yogi whose mind is tranquil, whose passions have subsided, who is stainless and has become "one with the Absolute" (*brahmabhutam*),⁶¹ Sridhara interprets the expression as "attaining to the condition of the transcendental" (*brahmatvam praptam*). Here the journey is not forgotten at journey's end, there is no merger which implies the absolute oblivion of self-identity. The self is conscious of itself as the relisher. Nilakantha⁶² also affirms that this state is not one of ecstatic oblivion of the self and of the journey's end but their relishing. He calls this state as one of conscious ecstasy or relishing (*samprajnata samadhi*). Valéry's ideal too, both in the experience of life and poetic experience, was "the maximum consciousness possible". Recalling the Indian concept of the super-conscious (*Turiya*) state is his demand that the reach of consciousness should be able to recover whatever of value that the mental hazard of inspiration can offer.⁶³ Charles Lamb⁶⁴ also wrote: "The ground of mistake is that men, finding in the raptures of the higher poetry a condition of exaltation to which they have no parallel in their own experience, besides the spurious resemblance of it in dreams and fevers, impute a state of dreaminess to the poet. But the true poet dreams being awake. He is not possessed by his subject but has dominion over it."

But if, on the analogy of spiritual experience, aesthetic experience is not equated with the *Nirvikalpa* state of object-amnesia, there are difficulties in equating it wholly with the *Savikalpa* state where the object figures in the consciousness with too great a concreteness and too direct an impact than seem compatible with the subtle reality of the whole situation. If the object—the aesthetic presentation or a natural object aesthetically contemplated—is necessary for the experience, in the final analysis, it is an ineffable experience, not solely the resultant of the object's impact, nor exhaustively determined by it. The object as material entity transmits its impact through a sensation. Beauty, however, is not concrete, material, tangible in this manner. "It does not act directly on the nerves or the senses, nor is it the direct cause of a sensation."⁶⁵ Regnaud tries to clarify the reluctance of Indian poetics to accept aesthetic experience as either *Nirvikalpa* or *Savikalpa* this way. "It is not an (unconscious) ecstasy, for the spirit does not surrender here its clear awareness of itself. It is a delicate inner vibration where, under a ray from the object relished, all the

forces of our spiritual life expand”⁶⁶ This is the *Chitta Vistara*, expansion of consciousness which takes place in aesthetic experience, according to Indian doctrine.

If the mind is now in a state of serene self-possession,, the serenity is not to be confused with a withdrawn deadness Mallarmé⁶⁷ has a remarkable passage which reads like an elaboration of the Indian concept of *Druti*, the melting of the heart, in poetic experience “The tear-drop of exquisite relish” that makes its appearance in intense poetic experience belongs with “the highest summit of serenity where beauty ravishes our spirit” Reverdy⁶⁸ also affirms that poetry, even of the apparently most serene type, is “always a veritable drama of the soul, its profound and sensitive action”. But, in order to have experiences of such intensity, Mallarmé emphasises, the banal preoccupations with the world have to be shed, for the tear distils like a perfume all that is divine, not of the earth, within us

The mind that receives the object in this type of confrontation is no longer the mind that engaged in practical living, likewise, the object also no longer belongs wholly to the material external world In a moment above time, though in time, subject and object are both radically transformed for a unique confrontation A verse by Norman MacCaig⁶⁹ expresses all this beautifully

*The bud flies in the mind, and more than bird :
Time dies somewhere between it and its flight
The bird flies in the mind, and more than mind :
Sunset and winds and roofs enrich the light
That makes it bird and more than bird, till they
Can never fly away*

It is the perfect awareness of this very subtle nature of poetic experience which made Visvanatha affirm that it belongs to the interface between embodiment and transcendence, to the “bonded-liberated state” (*Yukta-vyukta dasa*) It is the same awareness which made Indian poetics guard itself against the acceptance of any amnesia of the self or the object Aesthetic experience needs the object, the world, no less than it needs the self If the final state is a relish of the self by the self, that is no reason to ignore the object, for it is the object that initiates the movement which ends in the self discovering its own deepest reality And at this depth, the object does not become irrelevant, it too becomes radically transformed, like the self The object becomes an ecstasy

It is the incapacity for this type of subtle analysis that has made some theorists of abstract art opt for a *Nirvikalpa* doctrine and dismiss the object altogether The difficulties of analysis can be seen in what Kazimir Malevich claims for suprematism—which, incidentally, is just a high-sounding word for abstract art “Suprematism is the discovery of that pure art which in the course of time, and by an accretion of ‘things’, had been

lost to sight The happy liberating touch of non-objectivity drew me out into the 'desert' where only feeling is real From the suprematist point of view, the appearances of natural objects are in themselves meaningless, the essential thing is feeling—in itself and completely independent of the context in which it has been evoked"⁷⁰ Kandinsky⁷¹ also argued for the dematerialisation of objects, for non-objective forms which would realise "the final aim of art, a pure and eternal artistry, irrespective of time and space and personality" Mondrian, the advocate of neoplasticism—again, another of the fashionable words for abstract art—rejects the "particular" form for the "neutral" or "universal" form "Because these forms become more and more neutral as they approach a state of universality, neoplasticism uses only a single neutral form the rectangular area in varying dimensions"⁷² In the discipline of contemplation, the rectangle is for Mondrian what his navel is for the Indian ascetic Rudolf Otto,⁷³ similarly, refers to Chinese paintings where "almost nothing" is painted and the void itself is depicted as the subject "'Void' is, like Darkness and Silence, a negation, but a negation that does away with every 'this' and 'here', in order that the 'wholly other' may become actual"

Abstract art is as valid as representational art, because the spirit can relish forms both in a plenitude of presentation and in the latency of suggestion, both forms drawn from the treasury of the world and forms created by the imagination But the fallacy in the claims made by Malevich and others is that they regard a context or the stimulus of an object as somehow affecting the genuineness of the experience, what they call "feeling-in-itself" Auto-suggestion can work up feeling, but it cannot create art which can communicate the experience to another Further, there is complete misunderstanding here as to how the object becomes universal in aesthetic experience For Mondrian, form has to lose all suggestions of organic shape, become a rectangle, in order to become universal But really the particular becomes the universal not by becoming unrecognisable as a particular, but by acquiring a generalised significance, which can make it a particular for all those who confront it, in any other epoch or land

Every time it is relished, it grows to this universalised significance without surrendering its particularity What confers this power on the object is the creativity of the poet or painter And the range of the creativity is indicated by the range of objects and persons and phenomena that receive an instrument of accession from the spirit to become states of its own being, to become unified in its self-relish Herein lies the profounder greatness of the creativity of epic poets like Homer or Vyasa The opposite of this expanding range of self-relish is the self-obsession that limits poetic action—the *Kavi Vyapana* of Sanskrit theory—to a narrow range of themes which reflect the features of the poet's introversion Sean Lucy⁷⁴ has pointed out the limitations of T S Eliot's poetry "Only a narrow range of human experience seems to be subjected to the poetic process, a range which deals almost entirely with states of mind and soul" Lucy's

meaning is clear, but the statement is clumsy, for even the vast extroversion of Vyasa refers ultimately to states of mind and soul. The issue is really one of how much of the world the creative spirit has been able to annex to irrigate his own being. The truth that the extroversion of the creative spirit really means a steadily deepening inwardness is finely brought out in Tomlinson's poem⁷⁵ to Constable, the painter

*A descriptive painter? If delight
Describes, which wings from the brush
The errors of a mind, so tempered,
It can forgo all pathos, for what he saw
Discovered what he was.*

The errors of the mind, the limitations of personality, are cleansed, not by dessicating the myriad organic shapes of the world to a "neutral" rectangle, but by shedding the inverted pathetic fallacy that liking the particular for its particularity is erecting a barrier between the self and its own deeper reality. The relish of every new object in the world discloses to the spirit an unsuspected dimension of its capacity for self-relish. To recall Bhatta Tauta, description (*Varnana*) is the expression of vision (*Darsana*) and the vision is of the self relishing itself in a new delight.

Visvanatha defined this poetic delight as "a state of twin kinship with the relishing of the Absolute (*Brahmasvada sahodara*)". Reverdy⁷⁶ wrote : "The poet is in a difficult and often dangerous position, at the intersection of two planes having a cruelly sharp edge : the plane of dreams and the plane of reality. A prisoner of appearance, cramped in the narrow confines of this world with which the common run of people are content, the poet clears the obstacle it constitutes in order to reach the absolute and the real ; there his spirit moves freely." The artist, said Baudelaire,⁷⁷ is a man tormented by the "insatiable thirst for all that is there, beyond" and his work brings to others experience of a "paradise revealed" on earth. At the deepest level of poetic experience, as Wordsworth wrote in *Tintern Abbey*, "we are laid asleep in body and become a living soul". The poet, in the words of Conrad,⁷⁸ takes the reader out of the "perishable activity" which is his daily routine, into "the light of imperishable consciousness". This is the highest Satvic state of Vyasa, the loftiest accessible for embodied being. It is not the state of absolute transcendence but of "twin kinship with it", in the careful definition of Visvanatha who is sober enough never to forget that embodied being can only reach the interface between the self of becoming and the self of pure being, which latter is a silent abyss. There the world is forgotten but not at the interface. It is the world of the common run of people, the world of practical involvement that Reverdy rejects. Baudelaire's paradise is revealed on earth. And, according to Wordsworth at the deepest level of poetic being

*With an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things*

If the object, the world, the life of things, prolong themselves in poetic experience, they also undergo subtle transformations. Since it is the misunderstanding of these transformations that is actually behind the ascetic denial of the world, it is necessary to understand their precise nature. Abhinava draws an important distinction between ordinary worldly experience and poetic experience in terms of dyadic and triadic relations.⁷⁹ Confrontations of practical living are dominated by the direct subject-object relation. The aesthetic confrontation, on the other hand, is triadic. For aesthetic experience is obtained, not through mere objective perception of the presented, but by subjective realisation of what is presented through the artistic creation, which functions as a medium. Abhinava⁸⁰ uses the analogy of the devotee using an icon or idol or picture for a convenient take-off of the ascent of contemplation. The ascent is a journey into inwardness. Abhinava now affirms that the dyadic relation can reappear even at the height and has to be resolved.⁸¹ He admits that there is a stage in the process of poetic experience, in which the self experiences itself as affected by the specific sentiment. But he asserts that this is not the final stage. At the highest stage, this specificity sinks into the background and the self relishes itself in its aspect as *Ananda*, pure bliss. (This is the *Vyatiueka Turiyatita* state). Though Abhinava uses the word *Rasa* in both cases, the meaning modulates. In the first stage, *Rasa* means the object of relish (*Rasyate iti rasah*), for here the universalised object is relished by the universalised subject. At the higher stage, the self, now kindled to a steady glow of bliss, experiences a self-sufficiency, a repose within itself (*niavachhina svatma paramaisa, svatma visranti*). *Rasa* here means the act of relishing (*Rasanam rasah*). For there is no distinct object of relish now, the object has been assimilated into the self as its euphoric exaltation.

Poe⁸² has a dim intuition of the distinction of these levels, though he is not able to analyse it with the brilliant clarity of Abhinava. Poe refers to the Principle of the Human Aspiration for Supernal Beauty. "The manifestation of the Principle is always found in an elevating excitement of the Soul—quite independent of that passion which is the intoxication of the Heart or of that Truth which is the satisfaction of the Reason." Though the liberal use of capital letters is not the equivalent of clarifying analysis, the intoxication of the heart seems to refer to Abhinava's first stage, when the specificity of the sentiment relished lingers in the consciousness, and the elevating excitement of the soul to the higher stage where the self reposes in its aspect of bliss.

Baudelaire's analysis is much more penetrating than that of Poe. He refers to an excitement or enthusiasm of the soul which is different from

"the passion which is the drunkenness of the heart and the excitement of truth which is the nourishment of the reason. For passion is natural, too natural not to introduce a wounding, discordant note in the domain of pure beauty, too familiar and too violent not to offend the pure desires, the gracious melancholies and the noble despairs which inhabit the supernatural regions of poetry"⁸³ Claudel⁸⁴ clarifies the distinction between the practical and the poetic confrontations, thereby coming closer to Abhinava. In the poetic confrontation, the egoistic, possessive nature has to be shed and the pure object, the object not in its aspect of daily utility, but in the plenitude of its signification in which it becomes a partial but intelligible and delectable image of God, relished. In such relish it is not the heart or the reason but the deep self of man that is exalted.

T. S. Eliot⁸⁵ also intuits the distinction, although a certain lack of clarity lingers in his statement. One who reads poets should not mistake for the poetry "an emotional state aroused in himself by the poetry, a state which may be merely an indulgence of his own emotions . . . The end of the enjoyment of poetry is a pure contemplation from which all the accidents of personal emotion are removed" Croce and Collingwood provide more careful statements. "Intuition", says Croce,⁸⁶ "is distinguished as *form* from what is felt and suffered, from the flux or wave of sensation, or from psychic matter, and this form, this taking possession, is expression" Collingwood⁸⁷ says that artistic expression is not passive, but active, and the emotions it expresses are not passively felt psychic emotional charges, but "emotions of consciousness". An emotion of consciousness, although it presupposes experiences, is not a direct emotional charge upon it, but an organised reaction which is one aspect of self-conscious awareness of it, "self conscious awareness of one's own self-knowledge by feeling".

If the self's euphoria is the climactic experience, this cannot be used to dismiss the world and art, for the precise reason that it is the poetic stimulus that initiates the movement within the self which enables it to reach a self-repose in its aspect as bliss. As Collingwood says, without art a man cannot express his emotions of consciousness except involuntarily, accordingly, he can neither control them nor even know what they are, they "will be in him as mere brute feelings . . . either concealed in the darkness of his own self-ignorance, or breaking in upon him in the shape of passion-storms which he can neither control, nor understand". Béguin⁸⁸ distinguishes between aesthetic and mystic experiences thus: "Poetic experience is from the very start oriented towards expression, and terminates in a word uttered, or a work produced, while mystic experience tends towards silence and terminates in an immanent fruition of the absolute". In its emphasis on the truth that aesthetic creativity, if it is to qualify really as such, has to yield an objective correlative, this statement is wholly acceptable. But if it implies that the immanent fruition of the absolute takes place only with an insulation from the world and that it is incompatible with the word uttered and the work produced, Vyasa and Abhinava would demur.

"Fruition" is the exact concept used in Indian theory also as is clear from such expressions as *Bhoga*, *Samapatti*, *Laya*, etc and the soul is a fragment of the Absolute (*Mamamsa Jivabhuta*) But, in Vyasa, the "fruition" makes the individual a poised consciousness (*sthitaprajna*) who returns to the world. And Abhinava, as we have seen, distinguishes between the impoverished self-sufficiency of the spirit in which no feelings had awakened in an intimate contact with the world and the richer self-possession where all the potentialities for feeling remain but with a very significant modulation.

Thus, the distinction suggested between mystic and poetic experience by Béguin is considerably narrowed down. Just as mystic experience prevents itself from being a dessication of the senses and inoperancy of the spirit by maintaining the bond with the poetic richness of the world, poetic experience prevents the bond with the world from becoming a bondage, by moving near to the mystic state, though not by an immersion in the self-oblivion of trance. "The dust of the dead words cling to thee," wrote Tagore⁸⁹ "Wash thy soul with silence." It is a cleansing ablution in silence that is indicated, not a disappearance into the gulf. That is why Vyasa elevated the concept of the Supreme Person above that of the impersonal *Brahman*. Tagore benefits by the insight of that far greater poet-philosopher and clarifies his own meaning thus. "In art, the person in us is sending its answers to the Supreme Person, who reveals Himself to us in a world of endless beauty across the lightless world of facts"⁹⁰ The object cognised is fact, the object poetically experienced is beauty. "The world, which takes its form in the mould of man's perception, still remains only as the partial world of his senses and mind. It is like a guest and not like a kinsman. It becomes completely our own when it comes within the range of our emotions"⁹¹ Poetry "brings to us ideas, vitalised by feelings, ready to be made into the life-stuff of our nature"⁹² If living matter continues to maintain itself with its specific quality over the years, it still cannot dispense with nourishment, though, through metabolic action, the latter is transformed as living tissue. Similar is the case with the spirit. The object is transformed as spirit in poetic experience, musicalised, as Valéry puts it. "It is like our touch upon the harp string", says Tagore. "If it is too feeble, then we are merely aware of the touch, but if it is strong, then our touch comes back to us in tunes and our consciousness is intensified"⁹³ Then, and only then, can we say that "in art, man reveals himself and not his objects"⁹⁴

III THE BONDED-LIBERATED STATE

We saw earlier that the rigid monism of Sankara regarded the empirical ego, the psycho-physical self, as an illusion and thereby failed to give a satisfactory clarification for exactly what is happening in the commencement and progress of the spiritual and aesthetic quest. Vyasa's profounder

formulation, on the other hand, rejects only egotism, not the ego, understood as the consciousness that clearly recognises itself as the agent who undertakes the discipline of the upward ascent. Since this ego returns from the summit to the world as the self-possessed agent of action—though the action now is no longer motivated by narrow self-interest but is for the weal of the world—the entire doctrine of Vyasa steadily moves away from the ascetic interpretation of liberation as an extinction of self-awareness and towards its reinterpretation as an expansion of ego-boundaries. This work can come to a conclusion with the elucidation of that concept, for it recovers the spirit for the world and art and clarifies why the liberated spirit chooses a self-revelation through aesthetic expression as against the silence of mystic experience. Bhoja is the greatest exponent of this concept, but the cues were already there in the prior tradition.

Coleridge⁹⁵ has stated that what gave him the greatest pleasure in reading Milton's works was the latter's "sense of intense egotism" ("Intense ego-awareness" would have been a happier expression.) "The egotism of such a man", says Coleridge, 'is a revelation of the spirit.' But it is doubtful whether there is anywhere else in world literature a more confident repose in the ego than that revealed by Vyasa. In the magnificent passage in the *Gita* where Krishna enumerates the splendours of the world, affirming that each of them is a part of his splendour, he says · "Among the sages I am Vyasa"⁹⁶ (*Munnam apyāham Vyasah*). This is repeated in many places in the *Bhagavata*⁹⁷. The burden of the references in the latter work is that since people's capacity to understand the highest truths had declined, Vyasa was born as an incarnation to reveal the true meaning of the Vedas through delectable poetry. In a land like India where charismatic leadership has played a great role and charisma is divinised in popular conception, Vyasa would soon have become an incarnation any way, like the Buddha became in Mahayana doctrine. But here we are dealing with an anticipation of the legend-making tendency of the mass mind by the writer himself, a gesture which would have smacked of irreverence or even impudence, but for the fact that no taint of egotism clings to this luminous, confident sense of the ego, this poised consciousness of the self (*sthitaṭīajna*). In Vyasa, there is, further, the fine relish of a very subtle humour in Krishna, who is Vyasa's own magnificent conception, affirming that Vyasa's genius is also authentic part of his splendour.

While rigid monism dismisses the ego as an illusion, this deeper insight demands the expansion of ego-boundaries. Since it is the empirical ego that strives and evolves, it is only this interpretation that gives meaning and reality to the self's endeavour. Asceticism regards desire as a weakness and opts for the rippleless (*Nirvikara*) state of consciousness. This humanism, on the other hand, regards the highest state as one of relish and it affirms that desire for the highest happiness is the greatest inspiration of the spirit. The Vedic and Upanishadic explanation of creation is that desire entered the One to be Many. The *Agni Purana*, which belongs to

the tenth or eleventh century, elaborates this concept into an evolutionary scheme. spirit (*Chaitanya*) is bliss (*Ananda*), relish (*Rasa*), its first modification is the ego-sense (*Ahamkara*), the ego manifests itself as desire (*Kama*) and all the sentiments which are the eternal inspiration of life and art are the modifications of this desire⁹⁸. The profounder meaning of the Upanishadic saying that "all things become desirable when the spirit desires them" (*Atmanastu kamaya sarvam priyam bhavati*) is that the soul's aspiration is an abiding reality in its adventure of self-discovery. Bharata also said that love or desire (*Kama*) is the fundamental orientation from which all other emotive reactivities (*Bhavas*) arise. The *Bhagavata*⁹⁹ speaks of the four goals of man (*Purushartha*) as the four *Kamas*. The invocatory verse of Yasodhara's *Jayamangala*, a commentary on Vatsyayana's *Kama Sutra* or Book of Eros, also speaks of the *Kamas* of *Dharma* (ethical values), *Artha* (wealth), *Kama* (in the special sense of libidinal satisfactions) and *Moksha* (liberation).

The doctrine that is taking shape suggests as generalised a conception of *Kama* as that of the libido in the Freudian system, for *Kama*, like libido, ordinarily refers only to sexual desire and the erotic sentiment (*Srngaiya*). But the differences are more important than the affinities. To Freud, sublimation is always a compromise and since the reasoning behind all behaviour is a rationalisation, there can be no true liberation. That definitely is not the conclusion of Indian thought. To retain the libido as the motivating energy behind all human endeavour and to resist at the same time the temptation to see human behaviour as always and inevitably driven behaviour needed a capacity for subtle, confident and extended analysis. It was Bhoja who proved equal to the task in the Indian tradition. He outlined his system in the fifth chapter of the *Sarasvati Kanthabharana*¹⁰⁰ and elaborated it in the *Srngaiya Prakasa*,¹⁰¹ for which Raghavan¹⁰² has written a truly monumental exposition.

Bhoja asserts that even the highest relish is the relish of an ego. For him, this ego-consciousness (*Ahamkara*) is the substratum for every emotive experience, as it is the agent of the volition that seeks the experience. The ego abides and develops because the fundamental principle of being is the self's love of itself, *Atma-rakti* or *Atma-kama*. Himself an aristocrat Bhoja makes it very clear that he is talking about the ego of the individual who has reached the highest level of culture, the perfection of human nature. Alike in such a man and the primitive, ego and self-love are the basic reality. But the ego of the primitive can develop to the ego of the perfectly cultured individual precisely because the self-love inspires the ego to seek higher and higher levels of self-affirmation and realisation. "The good man", wrote Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, "ought to be a lover of self, since he will then act nobly but the bad man ought not to be a lover of self, since he will follow his passions".

The initial stage, before the commencement of the expansion of ego-boundaries, is called by Bhoja the anterior phase (*Purvakoti*). Here one

starts with the initial equipment of *Ahamkāra*, the ego-sense which is also a self-love. In the stage which Bhoja calls the middle phase (*Madhyamavastha*), the ego comes into contact with the world and proliferates into the myriad sentiments (*Bhava*), all of which are enjoyed only by this power of *Ahamkāra*. Every sentiment in its lower or higher degree of growth (*Prakāśha*) only serves to heighten the inner self-relish (*Rasa*) of the ego. The principle of the ego (*Ahamkāra-tattva*) is in the middle like fire and all the sentiments (*Bhavas*), which are its own manifestations, glow around it like flames and heighten its brilliance. If the unitary ego-sense proliferates thus into myriad sentiments by coming into contact with the myriad objects of the world, in the last phase (*Uttarakoti* or *Paramakashtha*) there is again a synthesis of a higher unity. All sentiments, at the climax of their development, become a kind of love (*Prieman*) from where they pass into the ego's self-relish (*Ahamkāra Rasa*). In the ultimate sense, *Rasa*, thus, is one and unitary.

"Feeling", said Whalley,¹⁰³ "is centrifugal, vectorial, outward moving, pointing insistently outside the self in which it is generated." The self is the anterior reality, for it is in it that feelings are generated. This is the *Purvakoti* of Bhoja. The centrifugal radiation of feeling penetrating into the world is the middle phase. But the process does not stop there, for Whalley adds "The fulcrum for feeling is the self, the central point of departure and return." The return is the *Uttarakoti* of Bhoja. There are striking affinities also between the concepts of the ego of Bhoja and of Valéry¹⁰⁴ who says: "As the ear catches and loses and catches again through all the varying movement of a symphony some grave and persistent *motif* which ceases to be heard from moment to moment, but which never ceases to be there—so the pure *ego*, the unique and continuous element in each being in the world, rediscovering itself and losing itself again, inhabits our intelligence eternally." The ego loses itself when it is drawn into the vortex of the world by feelings functioning as the dynamism which urges practical involvement. It rediscovers itself when it can mobilise the energy to relish experience instead of merely suffering it or being submerged by it. Experience thus relished is a delight in the self as stimulated by that experience. Bhoja analyses several verses to show that the exaltation of the lover derives from his delight in himself as the object of the love of the beloved. The conception of the ego-consciousness (*Ahamkāra*) makes all expression a process of self-fulfilment.

Shelley came up half-way to Bhoja's insight when he derived all poetry, and indeed all creation, from love and defined love as "a going out of our own nature and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action or person, not our own." This is only the middle phase of Bhoja. In the climactic phase, what is "not our own" gets assimilated into our being and the love now is the love of the self thus enriched. The "imitation" of the object by poetry, in Greek thought,¹⁰⁵ means the same as "communion" and the self is an enriched self after the communion, the

source of a higher self-delight Mallarmé¹⁰⁶ wrote "For me, poetry (the aesthetic attitude which leads to the relish of the world is what is meant here) is the equivalent of love, for it is in love with itself and its relish of itself settles down deliciously on my soul" The hermetic style which Mallarmé carried over to his prose from his poetry creates difficulties, but it seems clear that his "love" corresponds to Bhoja's *Srngara* which is the self's love of itself as enriched by the relish of the world through the poetic confrontation Apollinaire also, like Bhoja, starts with the concept of love as *Singara* in the restricted sense, a sexual and reproductive energy, but profoundly deepens the meaning "Love is the natural poetry of life, the natural instinct which stimulates us to create life, to reproduce"¹⁰⁷ Poets will bear the responsibility of giving, through lyrical teleology and alchemy, an ever purer meaning to the divinity, which is so alive and so true in us, and which is this perpetual renewal of ourselves"¹⁰⁸ Rimbaud¹⁰⁹ defined the primary task of the poet as an exploration of his own soul, knowing it and cultivating it, which corresponds to the *Atmarati* (delight in the self) of the cultured man, the *Sahridaya*, in Bhoja's doctrine And Valéry¹¹⁰ defined poetry as a "manoeuvring of the self by the self"

Provided we never lose sight of the important differences, the affinities between Bhoja's concept and that of Narcism in psychoanalytic thought can be stressed with advantage Carncross¹¹¹ wrote "It is a fact that deep down, below complete consciousness, the individual is in love with himself We speak of him as being Narcistic" Wittles¹¹² gets even nearer to Bhoja "In as much as a permanent fixation on the beloved can only come about through an overflow of the lover's personality into that of the beloved, a great love always presupposes a vigorous Ego That is why I consider the idea of the Ego and the idea of Narcism to be identical (Bhoja also equates *Ahamkara* and *Atma Kama*) What we love and worship in another is our own Ego, which we have exteriorised into the other's personality" Object-libido develops from ego-libido and returns to ego-libido as its further self-fulfilment

Singara ordinarily means the erotic sentiment, just as the libido is ordinarily associated with sex But Wittles shows how this libido is to be understood as a vaster force, a generalised self-love "When a man prizes a beloved, and passionately over-estimates her value, there is another object of libido which he overvalues even more grossly, more persistently and with greater conviction He values himself at a higher rate than any outward object of sexual desire" Bhoja also deepens the meaning in a similar manner *Srngara*, in his reinterpretation, is not mere erotic sentiment It is so called because it is itself the peak (*Singa*) and takes man to the peak of perfection The title of Bhoja's work means the illumination of *Singara* in this sense That is why Ruyyaka¹¹³ hailed Bhoja's *Rasa* theory as *Srngara Advaita*, or the monistic doctrine of Narcism, for Bhoja's *Ahamkara-Srngara* is not produced by the perfection (*Prakarsha*) of erotic feeling (*Rati*), but erotic feeling and all other emotional experiences are

produced from it Abhinava¹¹⁴ also saw the possibility of interpreting *Rati* in this profounder sense though he did not develop it into a detailed exposition.

In Romantic criticism "lyric" is often used as equivalent of "poetry" This probably indicates nothing more than a temperamental preference But Croce,¹¹⁵ who identified art with the "intuitive" act of the "spirit", deepened that approach For him, all of art is lyric, and lyric, he adds, is employed in this construction not as an adjective but as a synonym There is really no poetry of "objective" narration Collingwood¹¹⁶ writes : "Real beauty is neither 'objective' nor 'subjective' in any sense that excludes the other . . . The experience of beauty is an experience of utter union with the object, every barrier is broken down, and the beholder feels that his own soul is living in the object and that the object is unfolding its life in his own heart" Lipps¹¹⁷ gives a subtler analysis "Aesthetic satisfaction consists in this, that it is satisfaction in an object, which yet, just so far as it is an object of satisfaction is not an object but myself, or it is satisfaction in a self which yet, just so far as it is aesthetically enjoyed, is not myself but something objective" Delight in the object becomes delight in the self because it is self-love which first oriented the subject towards the object And the delight in the self is an objective delight because aesthetic relish or *Rasa* means, not unconscious exaltation, but conscious savouring of the self by the self

A reviewer¹¹⁸ of Karl Shapiro hailed his poetry as implying the variation of Descartes' famous dictum *Cogito ergo sum* as : "I feel, therefore I am" Bhoja's ego also proves its reality to itself through feeling the world And this feeling of the world culminates in a relish by the self of itself as the relisher of the world Bhoja's ego-consciousness (*Ahamkara*) is also called *Abhimana*, which can be inadequately rendered as a self-approval, or elation with the self, because it imparts the quality of pleasure to all experiences including what is ordinarily painful in the contexts of daily life The elation emerges because in all great experience the self discovers its own power for such experience, which is in fact the source of the experience Collingwood¹¹⁹ clarifies this in respect of the experience of the sublime "Sublimity is beauty which forces itself upon our mind, beauty which strikes us as it were against our will and in spite of ourselves" But, "the power which we attribute to the object is really our own, it is our own aesthetic activity The shock of sublimity is the shock of an uprush of imaginative energy within ourselves" Bhoja's concept of the ego proliferating itself into myriad emotive attitudes for the seizure of the world reflects the ruler the annexer of territories, turned aesthete We can see the same approach in Malraux The root metaphor underlying his view of art is one of conquest, of victory, power, domination¹²⁰ He tells us that the artist "masters" the world, "conquers" his material, art is a "victory" over reality In a typical sentence, Malraux tells us : "That eternal youngness of mornings in the Ile-de-France and that shimmer—like the long, murmur-

ous cadences of the *Odyssey*—in the Provençal air cannot be imitated, they must be conquered” The transformation of the world into the self is a fundamental concept in Rilke also, though he does not at first stress the transitive poetic action (*Kavi Vyapara*) unlike Malraux or Bhoja Earth is ever seeking “an invisible rearing in us”, the world’s phenomena “want us to change them entirely within our invisible hearts, into—oh endlessly into—ourselves”

*Nowhere, beloved, can world exist but within,
Life passes in transformation And ever diminishing
Vanishes what's outside*¹²¹

In the letter he wrote to his Polish translator in 1925, Rilke saw this transformation as an active enterprise by our sensibility “Our task is to stamp this provisional, perishing earth into ourselves so deeply, so painfully and passionately that its being may rise again ‘invisibly’ in us”¹²²

It is into the self that not only the world but art also passes in its transformation The skilled reader, in Montaigne’s phrase, “puts his ear close to himself, holds his breath and listens” Dowden¹²³ gives a similar analysis of his experience of Wordsworth “I read Wordsworth a great deal, and find my own in his pages” In the end, after having been “enveloped” by Wordsworth, he can “go in and come out at will”, revering and loving him, but retaining his independence He found that his own identity, when reading Wordsworth, “seems to have been appropriating without surrendering itself really for a moment” The creative artist, likewise, “dyes his objects with himself”, in Walter de la Mare’s phrase “My earnest desire”, wrote Duhamel, “is to reveal myself first of all and probably last of all to myself, to give birth to the man I have been concealing within me”¹²⁴ Elsewhere he says that though the good novelist has many models, “he is himself his most versatile model and can serve for giant or dwarf, he samples all the portions of himself, puts on all the costumes, tries on all the wigs Line by line he asks questions and answers them, attacks and defends himself”¹²⁵ Valéry also had this sense of exploration centered in the self When he was studying Leonardo da Vinci, he wandered so far into his subject that he did not know how to return, but he consoled himself with the thought that “every road leads back to oneself”¹²⁶

Though we referred to the concept of Narcism because of its affinities with Bhoja’s doctrine of the ego, we cannot afford to forget the profound difference between the world-view of psychoanalysis and that of Bhoja The psychoanalytic concept is essentially that of an unchanging primitive egotism, which wears all cultural acquisitions as a mask or a veneer But psychoanalytic revisionism has not been content to freeze into this reductionism and has claimed culture as real growth of personality Wittles¹²⁷ wrote “Everyone is in love with himself He possesses in his libido a transmutable energy, with the aid of which he has brought to pass the

most splendid achievements of civilization” Lionel de Fonseka¹²⁸ points out that “vulgarity always says I” Commenting on this, Maritain¹²⁹ stresses how important it is to distinguish the higher principle of the ego from this type of egotism “Vulgarity’s I is nothing but the self-centered ego, a neuter subject of predicates and phenomena, a subject as Matter, marked with the opacity and voracity of matter, like the I of the egoist But in an entirely different manner poetry likewise always says I ‘My heart hath uttered a good word’, David sang ‘Vivify me and I will keep Thy commandments’ Poetry’s I is the substantial depth of living and loving subjectivity, it is the creative Self, a subject as act, marked with the diaphaneity and expansiveness proper to the operations of the spirit Poetry’s I resembles in this respect the I of the saint”

If the poetic ego is not to be confused with vulgar egotism, the affinity with the saint which Maritain mentions should not be mistaken to mean that it is a depersonalisation As there has been considerable misunderstanding about this, it is worthwhile clarifying it. Mario Praz¹³⁰ interpreted the doctrine of “negative capability” affirmed by Keats as a schizoid characteristic typical of the decadent poet and indicating the depersonalisation which is the fate of “feminine, impressionable, sentimental, incoherent, fickle minds” It is true that Keats¹³¹ had written that “the poetical character is not itself it has no self it has no character” Keats added that the poetical character “has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the chameleon poet” Praz sees in this attitude the germ of that leaning towards “voluptuousness and lust, incest, sadism and satanism”, evidence of which he patiently collected from the poetry of decadent romanticism But this is serious misunderstanding of Keats If he said that the poetical character has no self, he added that it is “everything and nothing” If the poet creates an Iago, it does not mean that he is an Iago It only means that his understanding of life and men is not superficial but reaches down to the depths The poetical character “does no harm from its relish of the dark side of things any more than from its taste for the bright one because they both end in speculation”—that is, imaginative realisation, not a personal identification The most significant part of the affirmation of Keats is the reference to relish The poetical character “lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or elevated”

But Keats too went wrong in contrasting his negative capability with the expansion of the ego “As to the poetical Character itself (I mean that sort of which, if I am anything, I am a Member, that sort distinguished from the Wordsworthian or egoistical sublime, which is a thing *per se* and stands alone) . . .” If the Wordsworthian trance laid the body asleep, it enabled the spirit to see into the life of things At the level we are dealing with, sublimity of the ego is also the surrender of the ego—the narrow ego bound to the preoccupations of ordinary living The thunder exhorts T S Eliot to the “awful daring of a moment’s surrender. . . By

this and this only we have existed" In his essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent", Eliot shows himself as anti-romantic and anti-subjective and he contemplates poetic career as "a continual extinction of personality" Kenner¹³² relates this attitude to F H Bradley's idealism and interprets the getting away from the self as a getting towards a higher self Only shackling identifications are surrendered and this leads to the expansion of the boundaries of the ego Rilke wrote "There outside is everything that I am experiencing within, and nothing has limits either within or without, only that I weave myself more clearly into things when my glance harmonizes with them" It is because surrender is victory that there is really no contradiction between Rimbaud's assertion "I is another" (*Je est un autre*)¹³³ and Lautréamont's claim "If I exist I am not another," (*Si J'existe je ne suis pas un autre*) Baudelaire wrote that "the true poet should know how to get out of himself and understand a totally different nature"¹³⁴ But he clarifies that getting out of one's self does not imply a self-oblivion, for "the poet has the incomparable privilege of being himself and another"¹³⁵ And Rimbaud who wrote "I is another" also wrote that in all forms of love, suffering and folly, the poet is really searching for himself¹³⁶ It is Bayley¹³⁷ who comes closest to Bhoja Only out of an attitude of mind which he calls "love", can the novelist create various characters This love consists in the joyous gift of thinking and feeling like innumerable people different from oneself Through the creation of characters with an inner life, the novelist communicates this gift to the readers who thus come to share in it Bayley, however, does not penetrate further, as Bhoja does, to realise that this love of the other is a profound love of one's self

When Eliot referred to surrender, he unconsciously qualified it as a moment's surrender, because of his conviction that vision and the escape from time can only be momentary and exile is inevitable when the moment passes But we have seen already that a programmatic ordering of life can stabilise the vision, extend the experience to be coextensive with life, piloting it towards its goals Abercrombie¹³⁸ referred to the emotional reality of being, "emotion nameless and unappointed, the general substratum to all existence, the layer of flame which is the closest we can get to the central fire, to the will to live" For this emotive aspiration toward a fuller life, Bhoja deliberately retains the term *Srngara*, a term as rich in plural signification as "libido" He then analyses in detail the *Srngara* of *Artha* (economic prosperity), of *Kama* (libidinal satisfactions in the restricted sense of the term), or *Dharma* (ethical life) and of *Moksha* (liberation)¹³⁹ All these are fresh realms annexed by the ego-principle in its progressive expansion Bhoja definitely asserts that when the ego does not undertake a willed evolution of itself in this manner, the personality remains stunted at the rustic (*Gramya*) level and when it does evolve, the ego (*Ahamkara*) becomes Satvic in quality And the highest level of the Satvic is the nearest embodied beings can get to pure being Here Bhoja

is in agreement with Coleridge¹⁴⁰ who claimed for imagination this sovereign power - "reception, in the finite mind, of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM".

William Blake¹⁴¹ also held identical views though the idiom of the mystic may occasionally be mystifying. Blake refuses to consider the personal as in itself evil, for by it we obtain experience. But the mind or imagination or consciousness of man has two poles, the personal and impersonal (which is really a higher personal), or, as Blake preferred to call them, the limit of contraction and the unlimited expansion. When we act from the personal we tend to bind our consciousness down to a narrow centre. When, on the other hand, we allow our imagination to expand away from this egoistic mood, we become vehicles for the universal thought and merge in the universal mood. Blake contrasted reason with poetic genius and saw the former as the principle of narrow egotism, materialistic self-identification and the rationalisations of the self-seeker. When this type of intellect dominates the individual "the limit of contraction" becomes "the limit of the opaque". But deep within us is the poetic genius. "The Poetic Genius is the true Man"¹⁴². This genius is impatient for peace and freedom which it realises when it grows to the universal mood. It does so not by the surrender of its own nature, but by expanding until it contains that which is the essence of all. The circle of individuality will widen out until all other individualities are contained within it. He who has thus passed into the impersonal (or higher personal) portion of his mind perceives that it is not a mind but all minds. Hence Blake's statement that "Albion", or man, once contained all "the starry heavens", and his description of their flight from him as he materialised. When once a man has reentered into this, his ancient state, he perceives all things with the eyes of God. This is the kinship with the divine state (*Brahmasvada sahodaratva*) which Visvanatha claimed for the highest poetic consciousness.

Mallarmé describes himself as submitting to the discipline of development which would enable the world to rediscover its identity in himself. This involves a loss of ego which is really the discovery of a higher ego. "I am impersonal now, an aptitude which the world of the spirit has for seeing itself and for developing through what I was"¹⁴³. Claudel affirms even more clearly that the kinship with the relishing of the Absolute—Visvanatha's *Brahmasvada sahodaratva*—is not an alienation from the self, but the discovery of the real self, for God, in his definition, is "someone within me who is more truly my Self than myself"¹⁴⁴.

The problem of ego-boundaries has to be very clearly understood if the journey is to end in the possession of the world and the self. Ego-boundaries cannot be too weak, nor can they be too rigid. Weak ego-boundaries are probably due to the surrender of that increase in vigour and self-assertion which is yielded by the right use of aggressive impulses. Aggression does not mean here antisocial urges. Nor does it mean even the utilitarian domination of reality, but its aesthetic seizure in relish. It is the courage

or *Dhṛti* of the *Gīta*, the dynamism behind the conquest of the world by the sensibility which Malraux is never tired of speaking of. In the weak ego, this type of self-assertion is inhibited and due to this inhibition, differentiation or assertion of the self is felt as an aggression of the type which breeds guilt. The weak ego of this type remains for ever at the rustic's level, mentioned by Bhoja, and denies itself all possibilities of growth. Over-rigid ego-boundaries can also lead to difficulties. For here, even if the strong ego dominates the world, it is denied the relish of the self, if the strength is that of egotism and not the strength of Satvic self-possession, as Bhoja would put it, or of the plenitude of unlimited expansion and assimilation of the entire macrocosm, as Blake would express it.

Albert Camus is one of the few personalities of our own times who have had the profoundest experience of the world and the self. And there is an astonishing convergence between the insights he gained in one of his meditations¹⁴⁵ and the ultimate conclusions of Sanskrit poetics. Camus' reverie starts with a relaxed moment in his room on a January afternoon with sunlight and the breeze carrying the scent of dried grass pouring in through the window. He discovers that he truly lives when the world interpenetrates his being. "A cloud passes and a moment grows pale. I die to myself. If a cloud covers up the sun and lets it through again, the bright yellow of the vase of mimosas leaps out of the shade. The birth of this single flash of brightness is enough to fill me with a confused and whirling joy." The confusion and excitement of the first impact of vision calm down and the moment matures into one of serene relish. "Moment of adorable silence. But the song of the world rises and I, a prisoner chained deep in the cave, am filled with delight before I have time to desire." Desire is object-oriented, particularised, delight is an euphoria which may be stimulated by the intense experience of an object, but soon expands into an autonomous state of being. Camus here hovers in that intermediate realm between the object-oriented (*Savikalpa*) and objectless (*Nirvikalpa*) meditation which Sanskrit poetics has analysed in detail. Desirelessness makes the moment free from the contact of aught else perceived (*vedyantarasparsa-sunya*) while the reference to the experience of delight recalls Visvanatha's definition of the mode of being in such experiences as one at once of ecstasy and awareness (*ananda-chinmaya*). It is a moment of rest (*visranti*) and also of a fresh self-encounter. "Today is a resting place and my heart goes out to meet itself." Camus experiences the self-luminous (*svaprakasa*) exaltation of pure consciousness (*sattvodorekat*) which, Visvanatha claimed, was of twin kinship with the relishing of the abiding and eternal verity or Absolute (*Brahmasvada-sahodara*). "Eternity is here while I was waiting for it. I do not know what I could wish for rather than this continued presence of self with self." But this self which the self now discovers is an infinitely richer self because it has assimilated the world. In such moments of vision, the *angst* of the struggle of existence melts away and the unveiled, pure consciousness (*Bhagavara*

chit) shines forth No dualism between world and self lingers because the expansion of the consciousness (*Chitta vistara*) and the melting of the heart (*druti*) assimilate the world into the self "When am I truer and more transparent than when I *am* the world?" The world becomes part of the soul as a flavoured experience "One thinks one has cut oneself off from the world, but it is enough to see an olive tree upright in the golden dust, or beeches glistening in the morning sun, to feel this separation melt away Who am I and what can I do—except enter into the movement of the branches and the light, be this ray of sunlight in which my cigarette smoulders away, this soft and gentle passion breathing in the air? If I try to reach myself, it is at the heart of this light that I am to be found And if I try to taste and understand this delicate flavour that contains the secret of the world, it is again myself that I find at the heart of the universe" Camus' soul also has become *Rasena tripta*, profoundly content in relishing the world as a flavoured experience and in relishing the self itself as thus enriched

In the ontology of the *Pratyabhijna* doctrine of Abhinava, creation is the Supreme Person's manifestation of Himself to Himself, like a reflection of God in a mirror which is God Himself Man too can see thus his reflection in the world But what he sees will reflect what he is, though what he can be depends upon his own disciplined strength of self-evolution Maeterlinck wrote "Whether you climb to the top of the mountain or go down to the village, whether you travel to the ends of the earth or take a walk round the house, you will meet only yourself on the roads of chance If Judas goes out this evening, his steps will lead him towards Judas and he will have a chance to betray, but if Socrates opens his door, he will find Socrates asleep on the threshold and will have a chance to be wise" Along the great, crowded lanes of the world, our nature moves like a magnet, attracting kindred spirits and in turn attracted by them And not only men and women, fawn and flower, but river and meadow, forest and hill, sunlight and starlight, are kindred spirits in this great communion We are really meeting ourselves and expanding our ego-boundaries, in the innumerable encounters of life We become more and more free as we become more and more bound by our expanding sense of values to the myriad elements of the universe and to the deeper realities of our own nature This is the bonded-liberated state (*Yukta-viyukta dasa*) of Sanskrit poetics, it is the highest fruition of the evolving consciousness and this fruition culminates in a poetic relish

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